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Preface 
After February 1943, the shadow of Stalingrad ever lengthened ahead of Adolf Hitler. 
The battle for that city had ended in disastrous defeat, shattering the myth of his military 
"Midas touch", ending his chances of defeating the Red Army, permanently damaging 
relations with Italy, Rumania, Hungary and other allied nations1, and, of course, inflicting 
heavy losses on his eastern armies. More than 150,000 Axis soldiers, most of them 
German, had been killed or wounded in the city's approaches or ruins; 108,000 others 
stumbled into Soviet captivity, 91,000 in the battle's last three days alone. (Although Hitler 
never learned of their fate, only 6,000 ever returned to Germany.) 
The battle has attracted considerable scholarly and journalistic attention. Literally scores 
of books and articles on Stalingrad have appeared during the 50 years since Stalin's 
armies bulldozed into Berlin, bringing the war in Europe to a close. Most have been 
published in Germany and, to a lesser degree, Russia, where the name "Stalingrad" still 
conjurs up powerful and emotional imagery.2 Comparatively few have been published in 
the English-speaking world. This is understandable; because no British, Commonwealth 
or American forces took part in the battle, they can number none of their own among its 
many heroes, martyrs, prisoners and victims. Moreover, although the German defeat at 
Stalingrad was immediately seen in the West as a turning point, its effects were not 
directly felt by the Anglo-American nations. 
The main focus of Stalingrad historiography, including the dozen books published in 
1992 and 1993 to commemorate the battle's 50th anniversary, has been the 'fighting, 
encirclement, suffering and destruction of Paulus' Sixth Army. Few books and articles 
have devoted adequate attention to the activities of the Luftwaffe, although it made 
substantial contributions to all battles throughout the 1942 summer campaign-of which 
Stalingrad was the climax-and was alone responsible for the maintenance of Sixth Army 
after Zhukov's forces severed it from all but radio contact with other German army 
formations. 
This dissertation provides a detailed history of the Luftwaffe's operations during the 
entire summer campaign, as well as during its essential prelimary operations in the 
Crimea and the ill-fated airlift that grew out of its failure. A paucity of previous works on 
the subject-most of little worth and focusing only on the airlift3-allowed me to interpret 
documentary evidence according to my own understanding, without having soaked up the 
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biases and views of others and with no compulsion to make my views conform to received 
opinion. l\Ionetheless, lowe a debt to the late Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher, whose 
work on German air operations in Russia provided me with a basic chronological outline 
of planning and operations as well as a helpful starting point for archival exploration. 
During the 1950s, the United States Air Force Historical Division sponsored a German 
Air Force Historical Project, commonly referred to as the "GAF Monograph Project". 
Under this project's auspices, former Luftwaffe officers wrote a series of monographs on 
their air force's organization, planning and operations before and during the Second 
World War. Several studies focused on the war against the Soviet Union, notably Plocher's 
three-volume operational history, The German Air Force Versus Russia.4 He wrote these 
volumes before his recall to duty in the new German Air Force in 1957. They were 
subsequently translated into English, heavily edited by Harry Fletcher of the USAF Historical 
Division, and published in the mid-1960s. 
Plocher organized his narrative by year, then by geographical region. Thus, his volume 
on Luftwaffe operations in 1942 devotes tl-Iree chapters to events in southern Russia, 
including the Crimean campaigns, the drive to Stalingrad, the airlift and its aftermath. 
Although his treatment of those events is generally sensible and reliable, he wrote in the 
same journalistic and melodramatic manner as Hans-Detlef Herhudt von Rohden, who 
had written an earlier study of the Stalingrad airlift, and Franz Kurowski, who later covered 
the events of 1942 in two books on the Luftwaffe (particularly its fighter units) in Russia.s 
Both von Rohden and Kurowski wrote in an emotive style, preferring anecdotal narrative 
to thorough, dispassionate analysis. Von Rohden's account is especially weak. His biases 
and prejudices are evident throughout, often manifest in the purported words of key 
participants, and it would appear that he even concocted several conversations and 
conferences. His work is of limited value to historians. Plocher's scholarship is much 
better, and certainly reveals no evidence of deliberate falsification. Still, hyperbole abounds 
in his narrative. Moreover, it describes without explaining, is slender (because each 
volume also had to include operations in the central and northern combat zones), poorly 
organized, repetitive and inaccurate in places. It is also uneven in its treatment of topics, 
doubtless owing to time and space constraints. 
My dissertation attempts to do far more than merely locating and adding the many 
pieces miSSing from my predecessors' depictions and touching up their flaws. I have 
painted a new picture, having reconsidered the campaign in the light of a far wider body 
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of documentary sources, re-examined the known data-including the sources they used-
from a different vantage point, and employed a different methodology. As a result, my 
work places emphasis on different factors, analyzes many previously-ignored actions and 
events, and provides what I believe to be the first scholarly treatment of the Luftwaffe's 
deployment in southern Russia during 1942 and the first months of 1943. 
It is a campaign history, following an analytical pattern common to the genre, comprising 
a consecutive consideration of four different but intertwined aspects of the campaign: 
genesis, purposes, operational execution and consequences. Accordingly, I endeavour 
to show that Operation B/au, the 1942 campaign, grew out of the failure of Operation 
Barbarossa, the 1941 campaign, to destroy the Red Army and Air Force in a rapid blitz 
campaign. By January 1942, the Wehrmacht's eastern armies and air fleets had suffered 
five months of constant offensive fighting followed by two months of intense defensive 
fighting. This had weakened them to such an extent that they were no longer capable of 
carrying out large-scale offensive operations along the entire eastern front. Consequently, 
Hitler and the Wehrmacht High Command planned a much less grandiose campaign for 
summer. 
To create a broad context for that campaign, I analyze Hitler's strategic ambitions 
during the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, when economic considerations were 
as important to the formulation of a new strategy as the depleted state of the eastern 
armies and air fleets. Fearful of heavy attacks on Rumanian oilfields, his main source of 
oil, and aware that Barbarossa had virtually exhausted the Reich's reserves, Hitler 
considered the protection of the Rumanian oilfields and the aquisition of new sources 
essential if he were to wage a prolonged war against the growing list of nations he now 
opposed. He therefore formulated a major campaign for summer, aiming first, through 
preliminary offensive operations in the Crimea, to protect Rumanian oil centres from 
Soviet air attacks, and second, through a powerful thrust to the Don river and then into 
the Caucasus, to deliver that oil-rich region into German hands. 
In April 1942, the Fuhrer outlined his strategy in War Directive 1\10. 41 (see Appendix 
I), containing operational orders for all three branches of the Wehrmacht. Throughout 
Barbarossa, and especially during the difficult winter battles that followed, the Luftwaffe 
had served as a "fire-fighting" force, hastily concentrated at critical points to compensate 
for the army's lack of firepower. Now, with his armies understrength and deficient in 
armour and artillery, Hitler once more deployed the Luftwaffe in support of ground forces. 
x 
During the preliminary operations in the Crimea (see Appendix II) and the main campaign 
itself, the Luftwaffe would provide direct support, involving operations against targets on 
the battlefield, as well as indirect support, involving interdiction operations against march 
routes, supply lines, mobilization points and other targets in the enemy's rear. It is 
outside the scope of my dissertation to analyze the soundness of the Wehrmacht High 
Command's emphasis on tactical air warfare at the expense of a strong strategic bombing 
capability, suffice to say that during the campaign under study, as in the one preceding 
it, the eastern air fleets were almost exclusively committed to army support. 
Because all air operations during the 1942 campaign were closely connected to army 
operations, I describe and explain the latter in some depth, as I do the working relationship 
between the two service branches. Inter-service co-operation during the campaign was 
generally effective, thanks in large part to the efforts of General Wolfram von Richthofen, 
the senior air commander involved in most operations and the Luftwaffe's foremost expert 
on close support tactics. Von Richthofen, who often felt 'frustrated by the responsibilities 
and restrictions associated with this close-support orientation (and once described the 
Luftwaffe as "the army's whore"6), displayed generalship of the highest order as he 
implemented effective army support. Despite his faults, which I try not to gloss over, he 
was a superb tactical air commander, possibly the best of the Second World War. His 
centrality in my account stems from neither antipathy nor admiration, but from a clear 
recognition that, from the very moment he arrived in southern Russia. in April 1942, it was 
his air campaign. First as an air corps commander and then as head of the entire air 
fleet, he proved himself a courageous, resolute leader and a stern, rigid disciplinarian and 
administrator. He earned the respect and, in most cases, affection of his men. In spite 
of his arrogant, brusque manner, he was an excellent leader and, no less importantly, an 
energetic and reliable subordinate. At all times, he skillfully exploited his forces' limited 
capabilities to the fullest, producing satisfactory results under the worst of circumstances 
and superb results under the best. Even the British Air Ministry recognized his outstanding 
abilities, noting in 1943 that he was resolute and tough and that, j'with his good name and 
appearance, brutal energy and great personal courage, he is the German ideal of an Air 
Force General."7 
I\J atLi rally, people who wage war-including von Richthofen and many other prominent 
soldiers and airmen described throughout this work-do not lose their humanity when 
they pull on their boots and fasten the buttons of their tunics each day. Even the most 
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senior commanders, well-versed in the science of warfare, remain motivated by subjective 
factors of great complexity, and are prone, like us all, to ambition, jealousy, anger, fear 
and depression. Those factors often influence decision-making and leadership 
effectiveness. Therefore, as well as providing what I believe to be ample strategic and 
operational context and detail, I have attempted to draw from the diaries of key 
commanders, and, where possible, regular airmen, their personal prespectives of decisions, 
actions and events. Whilst those perspectives were often perceptibly distorted by the 
authors' values, biases and vantage points-von Richthofen's detailed but colourful diary 
entries are a prime example-they have neither been accepted at face value nor 
disregarded because of those "flaws", Rather, I have criticized those records according 
to accepted methodological principles, explaining internal inconSistencies, errors and 
examples of bias but not avoiding use of certain passages because of their subjectivity. 
Although I have tried to avoid all unnecessary anecdotes, however fascinating they are, 
I have quoted extensively from the diaries and personal papers of key airmen in the hope 
of bringing alive human aspects of both significant and mundane incidents as well as 
revealing the strengths and weaknesses of the commanders and troops who battled so 
hard to satisfy their leaders' strategic ambitions. 
Chapter I 
Fall B/au: Hitler's Utopian Strategy 
"If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must end this war. J1 
-Adolf Hitler! 12 June 1942 
1. 
When asked by his Allied captors in 1945 to what extent German military strategy had 
been influenced at various stages by economic considerations, Albert Speer, Hitler's 
Armaments Minister, replied that in the case of Operation Barbarossa the need for oil was 
certainly a prime motive.1 Indeed, even during initial discussions of his plan to invade 
the Soviet Union, Hit/er stressed the absolute necessity of seizing key oi/fields, particularly 
those in the Caucasus region, which accounted for 90 per cent of all oil produced in the 
Soviet Union. For example, during a war conference at the Berghof on 31 July 1940, 
Hitler revealed to senior commanders ~Iis intention to s/1atter Russia "to its roots with one 
blow".2 After achieving the "destruction of Russian manpower", he explained, the German 
Army must drive on to the Baku oilfield, by far the richest of those in the Caucasus and 
one of the most productive in the world. 
Despite Hitler's optimism, the 1941 campaign-which opened along a 2,000 kilometre 
front and involved 148 combat divisions-failed to shatter Russia "to its roots with one 
blow". Consequently, it failed to bring the oil region of the Caucasus under German 
control. After reverses during the winter of 1941/42, the Wehrmacht no longer had the 
means to undertake wide-ranging offensives along the entire front, by then over 2,500 
kilometres in length. The summer campaign of 1942, although still immense, was 
necessarily less ambitious. It opened along a front of around 725 kilometres, and involved 
68 German and 25 Allied divisions. Soviet oil remained a major attraction for Hitler. The 
offensive's objectives were to destroy the main Russian forces between the Donets and 
Don rivers, capture the crossings into the mountainous Caucasus region and then deliver 
the rich oilfields into German hands. The perceived importance of these oilfields to the 
German economy, and hence the war effort, cannot be overstated. On 1 June 1942, four 
weeks to the day before the summer campaign began, Hitler told the assembled senior 
officers of Army Group South that "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must 
end this war." 3 
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a narrative description of the planning 
of the 1942 campaign, but rather to reveal the central role which economic considerations 
2. 
played in the planning of that ill-fated endeavour. The following pages will appraise 
Hitler's preoccupation with the Caucasus region and its rich oilfields, and describe how 
Germany's own oil situation in the first two years of the war led him to believe that the 
capture of those oilfields was an essential prerequisite to waging a prolonged war of 
economic attrition. This chapter will then outline and explain the planning of the 1942 
campaign, which aimed firstly at protecting the vulnerable Rumanian oilfields-upon which 
the German war economy was already heavily reliant-and secondly (and more importantly) 
at possessing the far richer fields in the Caucasus. 
Oil: the "Achilles' Heel" of the Wehrmacht 
The immense Caucasus region, larger than Texas, is bounded by the Black Sea on 
the west and the Caspian on the east, and is traversed by the Caucasus Mountains. 
These massive mountains, many of which rise to over 5,000 metres (including Mount 
Elbrus, at 5,633 metres the highest peak in the range), run from the eastern shore of the 
Sea of Azov, oppOSite the Crimean Kerch Peninsula, 1,200 kilometres southeasterly to 
Baku, the capital of present-day Azerbaijan. 
The mountains separate the North Caucasus from Transcaucasia. The former, in 
present-day Russia, is composed mainly of steppes, rolling hills and desert lands. During 
the Second World War, it was a producer of grain, cotton and heavy farm machinery. Its 
two main oilfields-Maikop, near the Black Sea, and Grozny, near the Caspian-produced 
about ten per cent of all Soviet oil. 4 In 1942, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 
which had been monitoring the Soviet economy since the war began, calculated the 
annual outputs of these fields to be approximately 2,500,000 tons each.s A pipeline, 
running from Makhatchkala (320 kilometres north of Baku on the Caspian) to Rostov, 
connected these two fields. This pipeline was the normal carrier of Caucasus oil to the 
eastern Ukrainian industrial area, centred around Kharkov. It extended only as far as 
Rostov, from where the oil was taken westward to Kharkov by boat up the Donets river-
system, which was, even according to conservative German calculations, suitable for 
ships and barges of 1,000 tons for much of the way and 400 tons the rest.s 
South of the Caucasus Mountains lies the densely-populated region of Transcaucasia, 
today comprising the nations of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 1942, this heavily 
industrialized region had a population density greater than that of the state of New YorkJ 
Baku, capital of Azerbaijan and situated on one of the world's richest oilfields, alone 
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produced 80 per cent of all Soviet oil. It actually comprised several individual fields, 
including the new Nebit-Dagh "oil base" near Krasnovodsk, directly across the Caspian 
from Baku proper in the present-day nation of Turkmenistan. Crude oil from this source, 
accounting for about seven per cent of Baku's total yield, was shipped back to Baku for 
refinement. In 1942, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare calculated the phenomenal 
annual output of Baku's 8,000 wells to be approximately 24,000,000 tons.8 A pipeline 
ran from Baku westward through Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, to Batumi, a major oil export 
port on the Black Sea. all going to Moscow, Gorkii and the main industrial centres in 
the west was taken by ship to Astrakhan at the mouth of the mighty Volga river, then up 
the Volga to its destinations. Oil bound for the industrial areas of the Urals and Siberia 
was shipped up the Caspian to Gurev, where it travelled by pipeline to Ufa, almost 1,000 
kilometres to the north. From there it was taken to its destinations by raiLs 
The Caucasus was not only rich in oil but also in coal, peat, non-ferrous and rare 
metals. For example, the manganese deposits at Chiaturi in Transcaucasia formed the 
richest single source in the world. In 1940, the Chiaturi mines yielded 1,448,700 tons of 
manganese ore, or about 56.5 per cent of the Soviet Union's total.10 Additionally, the 
Caucasus, especially the Kuban region, was a major source of food supplies. This region 
was one of the nation's wealthiest agricultural areas, producing large harvests of wheat, 
corn, sunflower seeds and sugar beet. 
Hitler's strong desire throughout 1941 and 1942 to capture these resources, especially 
the oilfields, was not without precedent. During the last two years of the First World War, 
Germany experienced critical oil shortages and had to rely on Austria-Hungary and, to 
a far greater degree, Rumania for much of its supplies. General Ludendorff, whose words 
reveal the striking similarity between Germany's oil situation in both world wars, later 
wrote that during the Great War "Rumanian oil was of decisive importance." 11 Unfortunately, 
he added, "the production of oil in Rumania had increased to the limits of the possible, 
but this could not make good the whole shortage." 12 The German High Command, 
therefore, needed to obtain a new source of oil, and settled on a plan to seize the Baku 
oilfield, even then recognized as one of the richest in the world. Before they could 
achieve this goal, however, the British beat them to it in August 1918 by entering Baku, 
which they occupied (except when temporarily ousted by the Turks) until well after the 
end of the warY This, lamented Ludendorff, was "a serious blow for us". 
In order to make sense of Hitler's insistence on the capture of the Caucasus ollfields, 
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25 years after the first German attempt was abandoned, it is necessary to outline briefly 
the origin and significance of the Wehr macht's "Achilles' heel": its lack of oil. German 
economic strategists realized in the first years of Nazi rule that the nation's heavy 
dependency on overseas imports of crude oil would be a serious problem in the event 
of war. In 1934, Germany consumed around three million metric tons of gasoline, fuel 
oil and various other petroleum products. It imported around 85 per cent of this, mainly 
from the United States, Venezuela and Iran. The other 15 per cent came from domestic 
crude production, centred largely in the area around Hannover, and from a synthetic oil 
industry still in its infancy.14 
Immediately after coming to power, the National Socialist government took steps towards 
self-sufficiency in fuels and lubricants by seeking new wells and encouraging the expansion 
of the synthetic fuel industry. It paid subsidies to encourage exploratory drilling within 
Germany, which resulted in domestic crude oil production increasing from 238,000 tons 
in 1933 to 1,052,000 tons in 1940.15 The Bergius hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch 
processes for the synthetic production of oil had been perfected only in the late 1920s, 
and at the time the National Socialists came to power only three small plants were in 
operation. Despite the high cost of producing synthetic fuel, this industry was continuously 
enlarged throughout the 1930s, so that in 1938 the production of fuels, lubricants and 
other oil products from coal reached an annual rate of roughly 1,600,000 tons, and by 
September 1939, 2,300,000 tons.16 
In August 1936, Hitler had addressed a long and rambling memorandum to Hermann 
Goring, Commissioner of Foreign Exchange and Raw Materials, on the urgent need for 
Germany to increase its "defensive capacity" against what he called the Soviet Union's 
"will of aggression".17 Germany must be "capable of waging a worthwhile war against the 
Soviet Union", he stated, because "a victory over Germany by Bolshevism would not lead 
to a new Versailles Treaty but to the final destruction, indeed the extermination, of the 
German people." 
Hitler explained to Goring what he saw as the desperate immediacy of Germany's 
economic and military requirements and outlined future steps to correct perceived 
deficiencies. The ultimate solution to Germany's problems, insisted Hitler in terms echoing 
the views expounded in Mein Kampf 18, "lies in expanding the living space [Lebensraum] 
of our people; that is, in extending the sources of its raw materials and foodstuffs." (In 
his Weltanschauung, or world view, Lebensraum did not primarily mean space for 
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settlement, but land and resources for economic exploitation.) The short term goal, he 
continued to Goring, must be an immediate "economic mobilization" resulting in Germany 
quickly reaching a "position of political and economic self-sufficiency". The production of 
all raw materials essential for modern warfare must be increased. German fuel production, 
he emphasized, must be increased "at the fastest pace" and with great determination 
because "the future conduct of war will depend on the completion of this task rather than 
the stockpiling of gasoline." Hitler concluded by setting Goring two clear-cut tasks: "(1) 
the German army must be ready for war within four years, and (2) the German economy 
must be fit for war within four years." 
Goring responded to the memorandum by having his economic staff formulate a 
detailed "Four Year Plan" for the Reich's economic development. This plan was accepted 
by the Fuhrer, who announced it publicly on 9 September 1936 at the "Reich Party 
Congress of Honour" at Nuremberg19 and on 18 October formally placed Goring in 
charge of its implementation. The latter instructed his staff to formulate a comprehensive 
strategy for increasing Germany's oil production. This plan provided for an increase in 
total production from less than two million tons in 1936 to 4,700,000 tons in 1940. The 
most important part of this expansion in production was a planned increase in the amount 
of synthetic fuel produced by the Bergius hydrogenation process (the only synthetic fuel 
process which could produce urgently-needed aviation fuels20) from 620,000 tons in 1936 
to 2,730,000 in 1940.21 
On 12 July 1938, the Karinhall Plan (named after Goring's imposing manor house in 
the Schorfheide) superseded the Four Year Plan. This placed far greater emphasis on 
economic preparations for war.22 Realizing that Germany's present consumption of oil 
had risen to about 7,500,000 tons-and this was in peacetime-Garing's economic 
strategists resolved to overcome the glaring inadequacy of previous programmes by 
providing for an increase in the annual output of finished oil products to 11 million tons 
by the beginning of 1944.23 These production targets were soon revealed to be unrealistic. 
Consequently, Goring's staff drew up several new oil plans, beginning in September 1939 
with a revision of the Karinhall Plan and ending in January 1944 with the Mineralol Plan.24 
Regardless of its extremely high costs (synthetic oil costs four to five times as much 
as crude), Nazi economists in the pre-war period still considered the synthetic oil programme 
to be the best solution to Germany's oil problems, and the state spent hundreds of 
millions of Reichsmarks on the construction of production plants. At the outbreak of war 
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in September 1939, 14 hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch plants produced synthetic oil, 
and six other plants approached completion. The output of crude oil was also continuously 
expanded, and the total yield of oil products from domestic sources at that time amounted 
to three million tons.25 
Despite these intense efforts to improve rapidly Germany's oil situation, in 1938-the 
last full year of peace-only about a third of the 7,500,000 tons of oil Germany consumed 
was produced domestically by synthetic plants and oil refineries. The bulk of the other 
five million tons still came from the United States, Venezuela and Iran. A smaller, but 
nonetheless significant amount (451,000 tons), came from Rumania. 26 Accordingly, 
Germany's oil situation received a severe blow in September 1939 when its overseas 
imports ceased with the imposition of the Anglo-French naval blockade.27 
The cessation of oil imports was clearly a major cause of concern among German 
economists, although its effects were not immediately felt. During the pre-war months of 
1939, oil imports from overseas reached an all-time peak, so that despite the blockade 
from September onwards imports for the year as a whole amounted to 5,165,000 tons, 
up 200,000 tons from the previous year. 28 However, during the following year imports 
dropped dramatically; only 2,075,000 tons managed to enter the Reich in 1940, and this 
was only from other countries within the Continent. Just over one million tons of this 
came from Rumania29 and another 619,600 tons from the Soviet Union, in accordance 
with the German-Soviet trade agreements of 1939 and 1940.30 Naturally, oil imports from 
the Soviet Union ceased immediately when the fury of Operation Barbarossa was unleashed 
on 22 June 1941, although 256,300 tons of oil had already been imported in the first half 
of that year. 31 
Rumania, by far the largest oil producer in Europe (excluding the Soviet Union), was 
the only nation capable of replacing a significant portion of the lost overseas imports. In 
1938, Rumania exported 451,000 tons of oil products to Germany. On 23 March 1939, 
it signed an economic treaty with Germany, and on 27 May 1940 the two nations signed 
an oil pact.32 Accordingly, in 1939 it exported 974,000 tons to the Reich. In 1940 this 
amount rose to 1,007,000 tons. 33 In these last two years Rumania continued to export 
oil-around 1,500,000 tons each year-to non-Axis nations, but as it drew closer to the 
Axis powers after Germany's victories in the west in the spring of 1940 these exports 
dropped off considerably. On 30 August 1940 Rumania participated in the second of the 
Vienna Awards. On 23 November it acceded to the Tripartite Pact, and on 25 November 
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to the Anti-Comintern Pact.34 In 1941 Rumania became Germany's strongest economic 
and military ally when it joined whole-heartedly in the invasion of the Soviet Union. In 
addition to supplying its own troops at the front, it exported 2,086,000 tons of oil to the 
Reich that year, much of it going directly to the Wehrmacht in Russia. 
Germany's increasinging reliance on Rumanian oil during the first two years of the war 
was a major source of anxiety to Hitler, who frequently expressed his concern that the 
Ploesti oilfields in Rumania lay within striking distance of the Soviet Air Force's long-
range bombers. "Now, in the era of air power," he told his generals on 20 January 1941, 
"Russia can turn the Rumanian oil fields into an expanse of smoking debris ... and the 
very life of the Axis depends on those fields." 35 We shall see below how Hitler's fear of 
air attacks on Rumanian oilfields by Soviet bombers stationed on the Crimean Peninsula-
a fear shared by several of his top commanders-led him to conduct a lengthy campaign 
in 1942 to "clear up" the Crimea. 
The destruction of Rumania's oil industry would indeed have dealt a catastrophic blow 
to the German war effort. Oil was by far the most critical item in Germany's war economy, 
and, in 1940, the first full year of war, 94 per cent of its oil imports came from Rumania. 36 
Nonetheless, even without the benefit of hindsight it is clear that Hitler's concerns were 
unfounded, as his own military intelligence should have told him at the time. During the 
entire war the Soviet Union had, to quote historian Richard Muller, "only a rudimentary 
long-range bombing capability".37 The Soviet long-range bomber command had relatively 
few aircraft, and none with preciSion bombing capabilities until late 1943. It certainly could 
not assemble a bomber force of sufficient strength to deliver massed air strikes against 
the Ploesti oil installations, which were, in any event, protected by formidable anti-aircraft 
defences.38 Many raids by Soviet twin-engined medium bombers were attempted 
throughout the war, but these were weak, ineffectual and cost many aircraft. 
A far greater potential threat to the Ploesti refineries and plants was an air attack by 
a large strategiC force based in the Mediterranean but, although Hitler was unaware of 
it 39 , Britain lacked the resources to mount such an attack in the years 1939 to 1941. The 
threat of actual attacks on Ploesti from the Mediterranean increased-as did Hitler's fear 
of them-when the United States entered the war. However, although isolated and 
impotent attacks were made by the U.S. Army Air Forces in the middle of 1942, a heavy 
and continuous offensive against the Rumanian oilfields was not commenced by this air 
force, assisted by the Royal Air Force, until April 1944. 
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Another cause of anxiety for Hitler and his military economists was the very small size 
of Germany's accumulated stock of oil. All pre-war oil planning called for the accumulation 
of substantial reserve stocks, particularly of aviation fuel for the Luftwaffe and diesel fuels 
for the Kriegsmarine. However, at the outbreak of war in September 1939 the planned 
levels had not been reached. Germany had no more than 492,000 tons of aviation fuel 
in reserve, instead of the planned amount of 1,500,000 tons. Similarly, it had only 
1,118,000 tons of diesel and flJel oil instead of the planned figure of 2,800,000 tons. 40 
Indeed, the total accumulated stock at that point was only about a quarter of the Reich's 
annual consumption in peacetime. The oil reserves decreased dramatically during the 
first few months of war and subsequently never rose above 1 ,500,000 tons, which proved 
far from adequate. 
Germany's rapid conquests of Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries and France actually 
resulted in slight increases-albeit temporary ones-in its meagre reserve stocks of oil. 
During these Blitzkrieg campaigns the Wehrmacht consumed relatively little oil, mainly 
because of the small number of protracted battles and a heavy reliance on horse-drawn 
supply columns. According to the writers of one text on oil production and consumption, 
German forces "managed to win their victories [in 1940] using a mere 12 million barrels 
of oil products, or about the same as the United States produced every three days." 41 
Additionally, stocks of oil products captured during the short campaigns, especially that 
against France, were larger than the amounts consumed. For instance, 250,000 tons of 
aviation fuel alone (the equivalent of five months' production) were captured during the 
French campaign. 42 
Nonetheless, as historians Cooke and Nesbit point out, these increases were greatly 
outweighed by a new, long-term liability. "Through its conquests," they write, ''the Third 
Reich had made itself responsible for meeting the oil needs of a whole group of occupied 
countries, stretching from Norway to the Spanish border, which could no longer obtain 
supplies from outside Europe." 43 When Mussolini bombastically announced Italy's 
declaration of war on France and Britain on 10 June 1940, Germany's oil situation 
suffered another reverse. Italy had no significant domestic production of oil and, with the 
implementation of the Allied blockade which followed its declaration of war, could obtain 
only negligible amounts from Albania (which it had annexed in April 1939). Thus, from 
June 1940 onwards, Italy was almost totally dependent on Germany for oil and, as a 
result, became a serious drain on the latter's production and stocks.44 
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Barbarossa 
Unlike the rapid and startlingly successful German campaigns of 1939 and 1940, 
Operation Barbarossa, the massive and ultimately unsuccessful offensive launched on 22 
June 1941 to conquer the Soviet Union, seriously depleted the Reich's oil reserves. It 
was simply beyond Germany's ability to satisfy the oil requirements of the approximately 
3,600,000 German and allied soldiers (Finns, Italians, Rumanians, Hungarians and 
Siovakians), about 600,000 vehicles, 3,600 tanks, and over 2,700 aircraft participating in 
the offensive.45 Whereas Germany's war economy was capable of sustaining short 
Blitzkrieg campaigns it could not support the drawn-out war of economic attrition that 
developed when the Soviet Union did not collapse, as was widely expected by friends 
and enemies alike, within a few weeks. 
The prolonged campaign in the east quickly began to inflict severe economic burdens 
on the Wehrmacht. The production and supply of urgently-needed war materials, including 
oil products, could not keep pace with demand. Moreover, during the eastern campaign 
German units were unable to utilize captured fuel, as they had during the campaigns of 
1939 and 1940. This was because the octane content of Soviet petrol was too low for 
German vehicles. It could only be used after the addition of benzol in complex installations 
constructed specifically for that task. 46 
The oil situation of the eastern armies soon became desperate. For example, on 6 
September 1941 Hitler issued War Directive 35, which outlined Operation Taifun, the 
resumption of the offensive against Moscow.47 Five days later, Generaloberst Franz 
Halder, the German Army Chief of Staff, recorded in his war diary that the eastern forces 
needed 27 trainloads of fuel per day throUghout the rest of September and 29 per day 
throughout the entire following month if they were to carry out successfully the new 
offensive.48 However, wrote Halder, the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) 
argued that it could not supply this enormous quantity of fuel. It could supply only 22 
trainloads daily for the period to 16 September and, whilst it could provide the required 
27 trainloads per day for the last two weeks of that month, it could supply only 22 per 
day (less than 75 per cent of those required) for the whole of October. For the month 
of l\Iovember, when the daily requirements were estimated to be 20 trainloads, the OKW 
believed that only three (or 15 per cent of the required level) could be supplied each 
day.49 As it turned out, the OKW failed to supply even these lower quantities to the 
eastern forces. 
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Although the German Army had yet to lose a single major battle on the eastern front, 
it was already painfully clear to German military planners by October 1941 that the 
Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union had failed. Moreover, it was also clear by this stage 
that both German and Rumanian oil reserves were exhausted, and that current oil 
production in both nations was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Wehrmacht 
and industry (as well, of course, as civilian consumption). Rumania's oil supplies to the 
Reich had increased from 150,800 tons in June 1941 to 361,600 tons in August, but this 
increase was only possible because Rumania reluctantly supplied Germany with a large 
portion of the oil ear-marked for its own domestic consumption, which was exhausted by 
late-September.50 Accordingly, deliveries to the Reich decreased after that point. They 
dropped from a peak of 361,600 tons in August to 222,800 in October. In November they 
dropped further to 213,000 tons and, in December, when these problems were exacerbated 
by a short-lived quarrel between Germany and Rumania over payment, to a mere 104,000 
tons. In January 1942, they rose slightly to 111,000 tons, but fell sharply in February, 
when only 73,000 tons were delivered to the Reich.51 Although deliveries gradually rose 
again, the dramatic drop in the last months of 1941 proved almost disastrous for the 
German war effort. 
Even before the the eastern campaign started, German economists had been predicting 
these problems and issuing clear warnings to military planners. In March 1941, by way 
of illustration, General der Infanterie Georg Thomas, head of the War Economy and 
Armaments Office, had warned both Goring and Keitel in a detailed report that stocks 
would be exhausted by late October.52 From that time onwards, he argued, it would no 
longer be possible to offset the significant shortage of oil. The only possibility of alleviating 
the desperate shortage of oil in the event of a protracted war was for Germany to exploit 
Soviet oil production. "It is crucial," Thomas insisted, 
to seize quickly and exploit the Caucasus oilfields, at least the areas around 
Maikop and Grozny. In oilfields that have not been completely destroyed, it 
will take about a month to resume production, and another month for its 
transport; the areas concerned will have to have been seized by us by no 
later than the end of the second month of the operation: this includes transport 
facilities (tankers on the Black Sea, an operational route from Odessa to 
Przemysl on a Russian gauge so as to take advantage of Russian stocks of 
tank wagons). If this is not successful, we must expect the most serious 
repercussions, with unpredictable consequences for military operations after 
1.9.[1941] and for the survival of the economy.53 
Although many members of the German High Command believed in July that the 
Soviet armed forces were close to total collapse-for example, on 3 July the normally 
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cautious Halder jubilantly penned in his diary that "it would probably be no exaggeration 
to say that the campaign against Russia has been won within the first fortnight" 54_by late 
August it was clear that the eastern campaign was still far from a successful conclusion. 
On 26 August Thomas, whose earlier predictions were now proving correct, submitted to 
the OKWa new report on the oil situation. He argued that the small and rapidly diminishing 
reserve stocks of oil still available to Germany would be exhausted in the following 
months (a correct assessment, as noted above) and that current production levels were 
insufficient to satisfy demands. Moreover, he stated, even if production was "pushed to 
its limits it would be impossible to supply all the required oil. Accordingly, our only option 
is to cut consumption in accordance with the availability of supplies." 55 Cuts were to be 
made in all areas not directly affecting front-line military operations. The home requirements 
of the Wehrmacht, deliveries to Italy and to all other European countries dependent on 
Germany, as well as the civilian economy, were affected by this rationing. Accordingly, 
warned Thomas, these drastic measures would result in considerable "political, military 
and economic disadvantages".56 
Four days after Thomas submitted this report to the OKW, he attended a meeting with 
Genera/major Eduard Wagner, the Army's Quartermaster General, who explained that 
Army Groups South and Centre on the eastern front were experiencing critical fuel 
shortages, a situation exacerbated by major rail transportation problems.57 Wagner was 
of the opinion, nonetheless, that oil requirements for the following months could still be 
met if additional reductions were made in the consumptions of civilian and non-operational 
military sectors, as well as of the occupied territories. Despite this encouraging opinion, 
Wagner's conclusion was bleak: by the beginning of 1942 oil supplies would be exhausted 
and "new oilfields would have to be captured." 58 
In order to satisfy requirements for the campaign in the east, the oil quota for the 
civilian economy had, in fact, already been reduced by around ten per cent in May 1941. 
"The supply of fuel for the civilian sector is not at all going smoothly", Halder glumly jotted 
in his diary on 20 May.59 Indeed, a month later Walther Funk, the Economics Minister, 
expressed to Jodi, head of the OKW Operations Staff, his deep concern that the economy 
was now receiving "even less than 18 per cent of peacetime consumption" and that the 
requirements of the economy had been "threshed to the limit".60 However, despite 
conveying to Jodi his "gravest misgivings about any further curbs", Funk was unable to 
prevent cuts in the oil quota for the civilian sector made during the ensuing period. So 
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extensive were these cuts that British Air Ministry observers secretly referred to them 
early in 1942 as "the severest form of rationing".61 
On 7 October 1941, even as Generalfeldmarschall von Bock's Panzer spearheads 
sealed off massed Soviet forces in the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets (one of the most 
devastating double envelopments in military history), Thomas submitted another lengthy 
report on the constantly deteriorating oil situation. It was possible, the report stated, to 
satisfy requirements of urgently needed aviation fuel and lubricants until the end of the 
year. Nonetheless, this would leave only 31,000 tons of these products to start off the 
new year, a dangerously low level and a huge drop from 1 October, when there had been 
181,000 tons.62 Although there were still 289,000 tons of motor and carburetor fuel 
available, current productions levels were insuf'ficient to prevent this stock being completely 
exhausted by mid-November. Accordingly, by the end of that month there would be a 
shortfall of 32,000 tons, which would increase to as much as 97,000 tons by the end of 
December. These were not the only critical fuel shortages. On 1 October there were 
less than 250,000 tons of diesel available, and, at current rates of consumption, shortages 
of this fuel would be around 25,000 tons at the end of November, rising to 50,000 tons 
at the end of December. Similarly, whilst the heating oil situation was not yet desperate, 
production levels remained low and stocks were rapidly decreasing. It was clearly no 
longer possible to supply anything close to the 100,000 tons of heating oil the Italians 
emphatically stated they needed each month. Thomas predicted that only 60,000 tons 
could be delivered to Italy in October, and 55,000 tons per month in November and 
December.63 
To complicate matters, the oil situation of the Kriegsmarine had also grown slowly 
worse through 1941 (matching its fortunes against the Royal Navy). By late October it 
had become critical. On 13 November, GroBadmiral Erich Raeder provided Hitler with 
a lengthy situation report, which contained a detailed analysis of the Navy's "very difficult 
oil situation".64 The Navy's total stock of diesel oil (106,000 tons) and imports from 
Rumania (45,000 tons in November) were still sufficient to satisfy its current requirements. 
However, its total stock of fuel oil had dropped considerably to 380,000 tons, of which 
only about 220,000 tons were ready for use without additional chemical alteration. Monthly 
supplies of fuel oil to the l\Javy were insufficient to satisfy its requirements, and in l\Jovember 
alone the shortfall for both the German Navy and its Italian counterpart (supplied by 
Germany and Rumania) would come to 116,000 tons.65 Despite his grave concerns 
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about his own Navy's terrible oil situation, Raeder added stoically that he had complied 
with Keitel's recent order to transfer a further 30,000 tons of fuel oil to the Italian Navy. 
On 12 December, Raeder, who was painfully aware that the Navy's oil needs were 
considered by Hitler and his closest military advisers to be far less important than those 
of the massive armies on the eastern front, nonetheless informed the Fuhrer that the 
Navy's oil situation had now become "very critical".66 Its requirements, he pointed out, 
"have been cut by fifty per cent." This, he added sharply, was causing "an intolerable 
restriction on the mobility of our vessels." He was clearly disappointed that, despite this 
distressing situation and the temporary cessation of oil deliveries from Rumania, "90,000 
tons will have been handed over to the Italians" by 1 January 1942. 
Thus, it was clear to Hitler and his economic and military planners during the closing 
months of 1941 that the unexpectedly prolonged campaign on the eastern front had 
severely weakened Germany's oil situation. Moreover, they were acutely aware that 011 
shortages were now affecting the operational capability of even the troops in the east still 
struggling to deliver the final knockout blow to the Soviet armed forces. During a meeting 
between Wagner and the War Economy and Armaments Office on 22 October, for example, 
it was revealed that the forces on the eastern front, still slogging forward with dogged 
tenacity in clothing unable to keep out the wind and rain, were consuming far more fuel 
than previously calculated.51 This greater consumption was the result of worn-out engines, 
difficult terrain and appalling weather (it was already several weeks into the muddy 
season in central European Russia). The army was now only able to cover around 35 
to 40 kilometres on the amount of fuel considered sufficient for 100 kilometres, which 
meant that far more fuel had to be supplied. It was estimated that no less than 20 
trainloads were needed per day by the troops in the east, despite their heavy reliance on 
horse-drawn supply columns. However, even if this quantity of fuel was available, increases 
in deliveries could not be made because of transportation problems on the railways. 
Dozens of loaded trains were backed up, waiting for railway troops and battalions of the 
Reich Labour Service and Organization Toot to regauge rail lines, sidings and marshalling 
areas to the German width and to organize truck columns connecting rail heads with the 
advancing troops. This problem was exacerbated by the activities of Russian partisans, 
who did considerable damage to railways used by the Germans. Because the needed 
increases in fuel deliveries could not be attained, troop mobility (particularly in Army 
Group Centre) began to suffer. As it happened, this logistics problem actually proved to 
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be a blessing in disguise: when German fuel supplies came close to total exhaustion in 
mid~November, this backlog of trains (around 120 by then) served as an unexpected 
reserve and was able-to the relief of several worried corps commanders-to keep the 
eastern armies supplied. 
On 3 November, while von Bock's exhausted and frozen Army Group Centre was 
preparing for its final drive on Moscow, Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch, 
the beleaguered and soon~to~be-relieved Commander-in-Chief of the Army, paid a visit 
to the headquarters of Army Group South. This mighty force, commanded by the aloof 
and aristocratic Generalfeldmarscha/l Gerd von Rundstedt, occupied much of the central 
and eastern Ukraine and most of the Crimea. It was still advancing slowly eastward 
towards strategic objectives considered by Hitler to be more important than Moscow 
(which he had characterized back in July as "merely a geographical concept").68 To the 
dismay and frustration of many of Hitler's military advisers69 , these objectives (economic 
rather than military) included Kharkov, the fourth largest industrial centre in the Soviet 
Union; the Donets Basin, famous for its coal and iron industries; and the oil-rich Caucasus 
region. For instance, in his supplement to War Directive 34, dated 21 August 1941, Hitler 
had stated: 
The most important aim to be achieved before the onset of winter is not the 
capture of Moscow but, rather, the occupation of the Crimea, of the industrial 
and coal-mining area of the Donets basin, the cutting of the Russian supply 
routes from the Caucasus oilfields, and, in the north, the investment of 
Leningrad and the establishment of contact with the Finns." 70 
Attacks on the Rumanian oilfields and refineries were clearly still preying on Hitler's mind, 
because he emphasized in this supplement that "the capture of the Crimean Peninsula 
is of extreme importance for safeguarding our oil supplies from Rumania." The very next 
day he returned to this theme in a different document: 
Apart from the fact that it is important to capture or destroy Russia's iron, coal 
and oil reserves, it is of decisive importance for Germany that the Russian air 
bases on the Black Sea be eliminated, above all in the region of Odessa and 
the Crimea. 
This measure can be said to be absolutely essential for Germany. Under 
present circumstances no-one can guarantee that our only important oil-
producing region is safe from air attack. Such attacks could have incalculable 
results for the future conduct of the war.71 
Similarly, two days later he explained to Genera/oberst Heinz Guderian the absolute need 
to neutralize the Crimea, "that Soviet aircraft carrier for attacking the Rumanian oilfields".12 
The significance of Hitler's constant fear of Soviet air attacks on his main source of oil 
by Crimean-based bombers will become apparent below, when we discuss the reasons 
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for the time-consuming 1942 campaign to capture Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula. 
When Kharkov fell to von Reichenau's Sixth Army on 24 October, Hitler was delighted. 
However, when von StOlpnagel's Seventeenth Army (on the Sixth Army's right flank) 
moved into the Donets Basin, it discovered that much of the industrial machinery was 
gone. Many plants had been sabotaged, whilst hundreds of other industrial enterprises 
had been taken apart by Soviet engineers and technicians to be reconstructed at locations 
in the distant region of the Urals. This outstanding achievement, which required (in Nikita 
Khrushchev's words) a "superhuman effort and total cooperation", has received little 
scholarly attention, yet it must rate as one of the Soviet Union's greatest wartime 
achievements.13 
Cheated of his anticipated spoils, Hitler insisted that Army Group South push on 
towards his other objectives in southern Russia. During his visit to this army group on 
3 November, von Brauchitsch, although unhappy at being Hitler's mouthpiece, informed 
its stunned command staff that the Supreme Command and the High Command of the 
Army (OKH) still wanted the areas around Maikop (the northern-most of the Caucasus 
oilfields) and Stalingrad to be "captured at all costs this winter". Accordingly, he continued, 
"ways and means of attaining these objectives would have to be found. In the case of 
Maikop oil is naturally the incentive; in the case of Stalingrad [it is] the urgent necessity 
of destroying the Russian command's last 'major' north-south link." 74 
Army Group South continued to claw its way eastward. Almost three weeks later, on 
21 November, units of General der Kavallerie von Mackensen's III. Armeekorps (from von 
Kleist's First Panzer Army) occupied Rostov, at the mouth of the Don river. Despite 
intense resistance, they even managed to capture intact the main bridge over the Don 
leading to the south, towards the Caucasus. Not knowing that these numerically weak 
units would soon be driven from the city (it was retaken only eight days later) and that 
his Corps would be savagely mauled by the powerful Soviet Southern Front, von 
Mackensen believed he had cut the Russian supply routes from the Caucasus and, 
accordingly, saw his victory at Rostov as a major blow against the Soviet war machine. 
On the day that he took the city, he issued this Daily Corps Order: 
Soldiers of the III. Panzerkorps! The battle for Rostow has been won! ... We 
have finally cut off any effective contact to the Caucasus for the Russians. 
Now the task is to hold what we have captured so that we may open the gate 
to new victories.75 
Hitler, also largely unaware of the corning Soviet counteroffensive, was just as optimistic 
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as von Mackensen. The Caucasus oilfields, the nearest of which was now tantalizingly 
close (a mere 300 kilometres away), were still at the forefront of his plans for Army Group 
South. On the day it took Rostov, he gave this already overstretched force, together with 
First Panzer Army and Eleventh Army (the latter commanded by von Manstein, probably 
his most brilliant general), the unachievable task of cutting off "even the British and Soviet 
links over the Caucasus", beginning with the oilfields around Maikop. Seventeenth Army 
was given an equally unreasonable task: the capture of Stalingrad and its surrounding 
industrial areas, in order to "cut off the enemy's north-south link on the Volga"J6 
The successes of Army Group South, culminating in the capture of Rostov, had not 
gone unnoticed by Soviet military strategists, who recognized the severe threat to their 
oilfields. "If Germany succeeds in taking Moscow," explained Marshal Timoshenko in a 
secret speech to the Supreme Defence Council in Moscow, 
that is obviously a grave disappointment for us, but it by no means disrupts 
our grand strategy .... Germany would gain accomodation [that is, shelter from 
the cruel Russian winter], but that alone will not win the war. The only thing 
that matters is oil. As we remember, Germany kept harping on her own urgent 
oil problems in her economic bargaining with us from 1939 to 1941. So we 
have to do all we can (a) to make Germany increase her oil consumption, and 
(b) to keep the German armies out of the Caucasus.77 
The immediate task of the Red Army, he continued, was to throw the Germans back just 
far enough to destroy the caches of tanks and ammunition they had built up for their 
intended offensive into the Caucasus. 
The Red Army's offensive in the south, when it finally came, liberated Rostov and 
threatened to inflict enormous damage on the units of Army Group South as it drove them 
back westward. On 29 November, after their forces recaptured Rostov, Timoschenko 
and Khruschev jubilantly issued an order to the troops of the Southwest Front. "The 
armoured bloodsucker von Kleist," they declared with typical Soviet rhetoric (and 
exaggeration), 
attacked in the direction of Rostov.... [However,] in several days of bloody 
fighting, the units of the Red Army ... have dealt the enemy mighty blows, 
destroyed his best regiments and divisions, and plunged the remnants of the 
[Panzer] Group von Kleist, the select dogs of the deranged German fascists, 
into incurable misery. At the same time ... with support from our heroic pilots, 
Stalin's hawks, and from our fearless artillerymen and tank crews, the glorious 
regiments and divisions of the Red Army defeated the enemy, penetrated 
Rostow and recaptured it on 29.11, and pursued the enemy as he fled in 
disarray to the west.78 
The Soviet recapture of Rostov (the first major defeat suffered by the German Army 
in any war theatre up to that time) shattered Hitler's hopes of capturing and exploiting the 
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Caucasus oilfields for the oil-starved Reich-or even cutting off the Soviet Union's ability 
to transport oil from the Caucasus to its armies and factories-before the end of 1941. 
On 29 November, even as German troops were hastily evacuating Rostov in the face of 
overwhelming Soviet forces, Army Group South reported that, whilst its winter line will 
"more or less remain the same" (aside from some inevitable local changes), "the plan to 
clear out the Donets bend or reach Maikop will not now be carried out." 79 The following 
day, Von Rundstedt informed the Fuhrer that because of heavy losses of men and 
equipment, the vastly superior strength of the enemy's forces, and the appalling weather, 
Army Group South was forced to suspend all "operational movements". It was, he wrote, 
going over to the defence "on a tactically-acceptable line" (that is, a withdrawal to the line 
of Taganrog-Mius River-Bachmut). Hitler was (in Halder's words) "in a state of extreme 
agitation over the situation", and angrily forbade this withdrawal.so Von Rundstedt, whose 
greatest concern was the safety of his already-suffering troops, replied via von Brauchitsch 
that he could not comply with Hitler's order and asked that either the order be changed 
or he be relieved of his post. Hitler saw this as a direct challenge to his authority and, 
on 1 December, stripped von Rundstedt of the command of the army group and replaced 
him with Generalfeldmarschall von Reichenau (formerly in command of Sixth Army).81 As 
it turned out, von Reichenau also realized the hopelessness of the situation and pleaded 
with Hitler to withdraw his men to the line of the Mius river. This time the Fuhrer relented, 
and the hard-pressed forces around Rostov moved back to more defensible positions. 
Halder's diary entry for that day reveals his private loathing of Hitler's erratic behaviour: 
"Now we are where we could have been last night. It was a senseless waste of strength 
and time, and, on top of that, we also lost von Rundstedt." 82 
This withdrawal back to the Mius was a bitter pill for Hitler to swallow, who now 
realized that the oilfields of the Caucasus had slipped from his grasp, at least until the 
following year. He had actually feared this outcome for some time, despite his renewed 
optimism in the period immediately following the German capture of Rostov. On 7 
November, when he still believed Barbarossa could be broUght to a successful conclusion 
in 1941, he complained to the rapidly failing von Brauchitsch (who suffered a heart attack 
the following day) that the seizure of the oilfields would have to be delayed until the 
following year.83 Similarly, on 19 November he informed his closest advisers that the first 
objective for 1942 would be the Caucasus oilfields, and that the campaign launched for 
this purpose in March or April would aim to take German forces right to the "Russian 
southern frontier" (the Soviet-Iranian border).84 
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In the first week of December, the defeat at Rostov paled into insigni'ficance against 
events unfolding along the rest of the eastern front. In the far north, the vanguard of von 
Leeb's Army Group l\Iorth was in danger of encirclement at Tikhvin, east of Leningrad, 
forcing an angry Hitler to permit the retreat of these endangered forces back towards 
"Lenin's city". Things were even worse for Army Group Centre. In the middle of l\Iovember, 
the first solid frosts had permitted a renewal of the offensive against Moscow, and by the 
end of the month the fall of the city appeared certain. However, the exhausted Germans 
were halted within sight of the Kremlin's towers by a devastating combination of, on the 
one hand, diminishing troop strengths, major supply difficulties, savage frosts (of around 
-35·C) and paralysing blizzards; on the other, the courage and tenacity of warmly-
clothed and steadily-reinforced Soviet troops desperately fighting to save their capital. 
On 6 December, the Soviets launched their massive counteroffensive (over 100 Soviet 
divisions were thrown into battle in the area of Army Group Centre alone), which lasted 
until the middle of April 1942 when it petered out and the Germans were themselves able 
to prepare a renewed offensive. Hitler, stunned by events but trying to maintain a 
confident air in 'front of his generals, discussed with Halder the need of rehabilitation for 
the troops and argued that, whilst this was indeed necessary, he still had objectives to 
be attained during the winter. The oil of the Caucasus continued to feature prominently 
in his plans; as well as eliminating the Ladoga Front near Leningrad and linking up with 
the Finns, he said, the Donets bend in the south had to be secured, "as a jump-off base 
for Maikop". The following day, 7 December, Hitler was still talking inanely about renewing 
the drive to the south. "We must take the Maikop oil region", he stated. "Rostov should 
not be written off for this winter .... With decent weather we can launch counterattacks".85 
On 8 December, Hitler, apparently resigned at last to the failure of his Blitz campaign 
in the east, issued War Directive 39 to the three services. 86 I n this directive he 
acknowledged that the merciless winter, and the consequent difficulties in bringing up 
supplies, compelled his forces "to abandon immediately all major offensive operations 
and to go over to the defensive." "How these defensive operations are to be conducted," 
the directive stated, 
will be determined by the purposes they are intended to serve; namely: 
a) to hold areas of great operational or economic importance to the enemy, and 
b) to enable forces of the Wehrmacht in the east to gain as much rest and 
recuperation as possible, and 
c) through these requirements, to establish conditions suitable for the resumption 
of large-scale offensive operations in 1942. 
Although it outlined steps to be taken towards the rehabilitation of troops, even a 
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cursory reading of this directive reveals that Hitler did not intend there to be any major 
withdrawals in the east. Indeed, only two days earlier he had remarked that "the Russians 
have not voluntarily abandoned any ground; we cannot do it either. In principle, there can 
be no reduction in the line." 87 War Directive 39 firmly stated that there could be no 
withdrawals unless rear areas had been prepared which offered troops "better living 
conditions and defense possibilities". Given the difficulty of preparing such rear areas in 
the snow-covered Soviet wastelands, where the earth was frozen solid, very few of the 
tortured units at the front were able to move back. 
Hitler was furious with commanders who appeared to disobey his order. On 15 
December, for example, after hearing that von Bock was issuing orders to evacuate 
positions along Army Group Centre's hard-pressed front, he sent an angry message to 
the field marshal's headquarters, requiring him "to issue the following instructions to the 
organizations in his command: 'Stand and fight! Not another yard backward!'" 88 His 
anger at senior commanders culminated in his so-called Haltebefehl (stand fast order) of 
16 December, in which he ordered the "front to be defended down to the last man".89 He 
even sacked those commanders-including Guderian, his ablest Panzer commander-
who ignored repeated demands to stand fast.9() As it turned out, however, many of 
Hitler's senior commanders, including Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, were later to admit 
that his rigid Haltebefehl-which they considered insane at the time-was the right 
decision.91 
War Directive 39 also sheds considerable light on the topic at hand: Hitler's pursuit of 
Soviet oil. It reveals that, even despite the heavy battering his worn-out forces were 
receiving in the east, he still held fast to his goal of taking the Caucasus oilfields during 
1942. In order to free up the bulk of von Manstein's Eleventh Army for future missions, 
Sevastopol, the Soviet Union's main naval base and shipyard on the Black Sea, was to 
be captured as soon as possible. Then, "in spite of all difficulties," Army Group South 
must endeavour to establish conditions which, in favourable weather, even 
during this winter, would make it possible to attack and capture the Lower 
Don-Donets line. This would provide favourable conditions for operations 
against the Caucasus in the spring. 
The same day that Hitler issued this directive, the Operations Division of the OKH 
issued its own instructions to the troops in the east, comprising guidelines for "securing 
the occupied territories in the most advantageous, economical defence front" and 
rehabilitating the army over the winter months. 92 These detailed instructions-entitled 
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"Directives for the Tasks of the Eastern Army in the Winter of 1941/42"-were intended 
to clarify the nature and purpose of the operations outlined in Hitler's often-vague directive, 
and to describe how front-line commanders should go about implementing Hitler's 
instructions. As such, they do not deviate from Hitler's strategy; rather, they support his 
unpopular views on the situation in the east and direct the three army groups to undertake 
missions in accordance with his strategic ambitions. Army Group North was to continue 
its current operation south of Lake Ladoga, link up with the Finns, and thus deprive 
Leningrad of its supply routes. Army Group Centre was to discontinue all offensive 
operations (which it had already done) and establish a defensive front against enemy 
Soviet counteroffensives. Mobile divisions were to be rehabilitated behind the left flank 
of Army Group South, in order to prepare them for possible intervention in the event of 
a Soviet offensive from the Voronezh area. Army Group South, as well as preventing a 
Soviet breakthrough between the Donets and the Sea of Azov, was to hold Kharkov and, 
in cooperation with units of Army Group Centre, secure the important Belgorod-Kursk 
railway. Moreover, the Crimea would have to be made secure, even after the capture 
of Sevastopol by Manstein. Most importantly (for the purposes of this study), Army Group 
South was to retake Rostov and the Donets Basin to the north-east, in preparation for 
a future drive down into the Caucasus to capture the Maikop oilfields. 
Preparations for the New Year 
It became clear towards the end of the 1941/42 winter that Soviet counteroffensives, 
despite the severe destruction they inflicted, were not going to dislodge the bulk of the 
strained and exhausted German forces still stretched out along a front running from 
Leningrad in the far north to the Sea of Azov in the south. Accordingly, military planners 
and intelligence officers on both sides began making preparations for the coming spring 
and summer. 
Many Soviet General Staff officers-including Marshal Shaposhnikov, Chief of the 
General Staff, and Vasilevskii, his deputy-were acutely aware of the Red Army's lack 
of trained reserves and materiel. Accordingly, they became (in Vasilevskii's words) "'firmly 
convinced" that the Red Army should adopt a "temporary strategic defensive" posture for 
the spring and early summer of 1942.93 In a meeting at the end of March 1942, they 
stressed to Stalin the need to engage in defensive fighting within well-prepared positions, 
and, "in the process of this defensive action, to launch powerful counterblows against the 
assault groupings of the enemy." The aim of this defensive strategy was not only to 
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frustrate the inevitable German summer offensive, but to create a situation where Soviet 
forces could themselves launch a "decisive offensive with minimal losses". Principal 
attention during the transition to this strategic defense, they argued, should be focused 
on the "central sector" (in front of Moscow), where the German offensive was most likely 
to be launched. Therefore, the principal task of the country as a whole should be "the 
creation of mighty, trained reserves and the stockpiling of weapons, ammunition, tanks, 
planes, and other combat equipment as well as the necessary materiel with which to 
supply troops in the subsequent offensive." 94 
Stalin agreed with his General Staff that the inevitable German summer offensive 
would be a resumption of the campaign against Moscow. This view was apparently 
reinforced by effective German deception operations95 and the desperation with which 
Generaloberst Model's Ninth Army had successfully held on to Rzhev, a place with no 
visible importance to the Germans except in connection with a new offensive towards 
Moscow.96 Vasilevskii (who shared this view) later wrote that "the preconceived, erroneous 
idea that in the summer the main enemy strike would be launched in the central sector 
dominated the Supreme Commander in Chief all the way up to July." 97 Even the Soviet 
General Staff study of the Battle of Stalingrad, written in the middle of 1943, still argued 
that the main German target in 1942 was Moscow and that the actual attack in the 
southern sector, towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, aimed "not so much [at] the 
seizure of the oil fields as it did the drawing away of our main reserves to the south and 
the weakening of the Moscow front, in order in this way to increase the chances of 
success in the attack against Moscow." 98 In the first months of 1942, Soviet planners 
were not alone in holding this view. It was also widely expressed in contemporary British 
and American intelligence reports on the future course of the war in Russia. For example, 
a confidential report of the Military Intelligence Division of the U.S. War Department, 
dated 26 March 1942, states that "the German strategical plan will aim at the encirclement 
and destruction of the Russian central army group around Moscow".99 To attain this 
objective, German armies would probably launch a strong attack from the Kursk and 
Kharkov sectors. While this operation was being conducted, the report explains, a 
secondary drive would be made in the south w'ith the aim of capturing Stalingrad and 
driving Soviet forces back across the Don. The purpose of this secondary operation was 
not to clear the region for a drive to the Caucasus oilfields, but merely to contain Soviet 
forces during the main attack on Moscow. 
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Stalin normally favoured constant attack, a predisposition that had already resulted in 
both strategical and tactical blunders (and would again in the future). Nonetheless, 
during this period he appeared to be in general agreement with the sound strategic 
appreciation of his General Staff, who continued to argue that the Red Army should first 
wear out the enemy in defensive battles and then, when their own forces were suitably 
strengthened and supplied, and the enemy's were sufficiently depleted, launch powerful 
counteroffensives. This was not, however, the only plan presented to him in March 1942. 
Through his "Southwestern Theatre" Military Soviet, Marshal Timoshenko submitted a 
proposal for conducting a major offensive operation in May with the combined forces of 
three Fronts (the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern). His aim was to destroy Army 
Group South and reach the Gomel-Kiev-Cherkassy-Pervomaisk-Nikolayev line. Marshal 
Shaposhnikov begged Stalin not to be enticed by Timoshenko's ambitious plan, pointing 
out that the lack of men and materiel ruled out such a massive undertaking, which would, 
in any event, have required a major reinforcement of the Southwestern Front.10o 
Stalin ignored the logic of Shaposhnikov's argument. He remained skeptical of plans 
for an "active" defensive that did not include any significant offensives, and challenged 
what he perceived to be the foolishness of remaining idle and allowing the enemy to 
seize the initiative. "We cannot remain on the defensive and sit on our hands until the 
Germans strike first!", he lectured Shaposhnikov during a joint meeting of the State 
Defense Committee and the Stavka at the end of March.101 Whilst the Red Army should 
adhere to a basic strategic defensive, it was imperative also to conduct individual offensives 
over a wide front. He was particularly impressed with Timoshenko's revised and down-
scaled version of his plan to seize Kharkov. MarShal Zhukov, Stalin's most gifted 
operational commander, tried to persuade him not to carry out this plan but, instead, to 
adopt Shaposhnikov's policy of strategic defence and let his own Western Front make 
one significant but localized strike at the dangerous German forces in the central sector 
(still only 150 kilometres from Moscow). Zhukov, like Shaposhnikov, was brushed aside 
by the dogmatic Stalin, who scornfully referred to the former's plan as just a "half-
measure" .102 
The meeting concluded-to the bitter disappointment of Shaposhnikov, who took no 
further part in the discussion-with an order from Stalin to prepare and carry out in the 
coming months individual pre-emptive offensives near Leningrad, in the region of 
Demyansk, in the Smolensk and Lgov-Kursk sectors, in the Kharkov area, and in the 
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Crimea. Vasilevskii later described the "negative consequences" of Stalin's contradictory 
decision "to defend and attack simultaneously". This decision, he argued, 
resulted in an intolerable expenditure of forces. The events which unfolded in 
the summer of 1942 clearly showed that, had there been only the reversion 
to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front and had 
the conduct of offensive operations (e.g., the Khar'kov operation) been rejected, 
the country and its armed forces would have been spared serious defeats, 
and we could have resumed active offensive operations much sooner and 
could have again taken the initiative into our hands.103 
Indeed, Stalin's counteroffensives were outright failures, resulting not only in the strategic 
initiative being regained by the Germans but in the loss of hundreds of thousands of 
Soviet troops. The collapse of the Soviet offensive in the Crimea was followed by the 
capture of the entire peninsula by von Manstein's Eleventh Army, which was previously 
unable to dislodge the Soviets. An attempt by the Soviet Northwestern Front to defeat 
the German Sixteenth Army near Demyansk also failed. Even worse, despite a promising 
start, Timoshenko's ambitious bid to recapture Kharkov ended in a disaster of immense 
proportions. Within ten days 1,200 tanks and 2,600 artillery pieces were destroyed or 
captured, and 75,000 Soviet troops were killed and 239,000 more staggered into captivity. 
This brought the total of prisoners from Stalin's offensives to over 400,000. The failure 
of the Kharkov offensive placed the Donets river back into German hands and seriously 
weakened Soviet forces in the eastern Ukraine, through which Hitler planned his next 
major drive. For the Soviets this was not an auspicious start to the year's campaigns. 
As for German planning during the end of the 1941/42 winter for operations in the 
coming spring and summer, one notes that even at his bleakest moments Hitler's thoughts 
were with the coming spring offensive. On 3 January 1942, while the Soviets continued 
to penetrate German lines along the entire eastern 'front, he confided his plans to Oshima 
Hiroshi, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin. For the time being, he told Oshima, he 
would not conduct another offensive in the centre of the front, but was instead "determined 
to take up again the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus as soon as the weather 
is favourable." 104 It was absolutely vital to get first to the Caucasus oilfields and then 
to those in Iran and Iraq. l\Jot only would this greatly improve Germany's oil situation and 
damage the Soviet Union's, but it would collapse the Allied position in the Middle East 
and possibly unleash a freedom movement within the Arab world. Naturally, he added, 
he would also do everything possible to destroy Moscow and Leningrad. Two weeks 
later, on 18 January, Hitler also disclosed these intentions to von Bock before the latter 
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flew to Poltava to take command of Army Group South following the untimely death of 
von Reichenau. Von Bock, whose rebuilt army group would carry out the coming offensive, 
was given two missions: "to hold for the present and attack in the spring." 105 
Despite such optimistic-sounding statements about another campaign in the east, 
throughout December 1941 and the first few weeks of 1942 Hitler was racked with doubts 
as to whether his eastern armies could still be saved. Although months later he admitted 
to courtiers and confidants that during the height of the winter crisis he sometimes 
doubted he could stave off a catastrophe106, he was careful to keep these doubts hidden 
from his generals and, of course, the public. In a rousing speech he delivered in the 
Berliner Sportpalast on 30 January 1942, the ninth anniversary of his election to power, 
he spoke of his "unbounded confidence, confidence in my own person, so that nothing, 
whatever it may be, can throw me out of the saddle, so that nothing can shake me." 107 
This speech, an inspired Goebbels penned in his diary, was as successful as those of 
the early 1930s. It "charged the whole nation as if it were a storage battery .... As long 
as he lives and is among us in good health, as long as he can give us the strength of 
his spirit, no evil can touch US".108 
By the middle of February, even though Soviet offensives continued to inflict heavy 
damage on German forces, Hitler had shaken off the depression that gripped him in 
December and January and was regaining his confidence. 109 He was encouraged by the 
success of Rommel's brilliant counterattack at EI Agheila in Libya on 21 January, which 
caught the British Eighth Army off guard and, within ten days, forced it to abandon all 
recent gains in the Benghazi bulge. On 12 February, he was thrilled by the escape of 
the Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen, which dashed from Brest through the 
English Channel in broad daylight to safer waters in Norway. He could take personal 
pride in the success of this daring operation; the idea of these capital ships dashing 
through the Channel under the nose of the British had been his own. He was also 
heartened on 15 February by the news that Great Britain had suffered the worst military 
defeat in its history: the fall of Singapore to the Japanese army. During that same period 
the Japanese inflicted similar humiliations on the Americans in the Philippines. 
German fortunes on the eastern front also began to look promising. Repeatedly 
situations that appeared extremely perilous were, by means of superior tactics and 
tremendous endurance, stabilized and brought under control. Some were even transformed 
into minor successes. Hitler was especially pleased with the success of Army Group 
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Centre's attempts to close the various gaps in its line and form a new front. Although 
he knew that German and Soviet forces would remain locked in bloody battle for some 
time yet, and in places his men were only barely holding on, he felt that the worst was 
over and that he had accomplished his first objective; he had arrested the panic amongst 
his generals, and prevented a rout similar to l\Japoleon's in 1812. Moreover, he regarded 
his armies' successful resistance to the Soviet winter offensive as further proof that his 
"stand fast" order was the right decision and that the generals he dismissed were 
incompetent, cowardly and defeatist. His iron will had mastered the winter crisis, he 
believed. Now it would drive the summer offensive. 
The plan for a major offensive into the Caucasus to seize the oilfields was, to a much 
greater extent than the previous year's attack on the Soviet capital, Hitler's own strategic 
conception. Keitel, who thought the plan had considerable merit, wrote in his memoirs 
that the Fuhrer "conceived the idea entirely alone".11o During the height of the winter 
crisis Hitler had unfairly but repeatedly cursed the General Staff for having imposed its 
Moscow campaign on him. Now that he had pulled Germany back from the brink of 
disaster he was determined to trust his instincts and order a campaign to attain his own 
strategic objectives (which were clearly shaped by his awareness of the Reich's economic 
problems). Moreover, he would no longer limit himself to issuing general instructions, but 
would, in his new capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army (since von Brauchitsch's 
resignation on 19 December), take complete and immediate charge of the direction of 
operations.111 
Operation Barbarossa had been conceived in basic accordance with Karl von 
Clausewitz's fundamental rule of warfare that the proper objective of a campaign is the 
defeat of the enemy's military forces in the field and that the seizure of economic and 
political objectives must follow, not precede, this. However, Hitler's decision in the winter 
of 1941/42 to seize the Caucasus oilfields, rather than force a decisive battle on the 
Soviet armed forces, violated von Clausewitz's advice. He was certainly not unaware of 
von Clausewitz's teachings. Indeed, he was well versed in military theory and had 
studied most key works in this field, including von Clausewitz's. On occasions he would 
pompously point this out to generals who challenged him on matters of strategy. "There's 
no need for you to try to teach me", he lectured Guderian (whose own book on armoured 
warfare had greatly impressed him) during one particular disagreement. "I've studied 
Clausewitz and Moltke and read all the Schlieffen papers. I'm more in the picture than 
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you are!" 112 His decision to avoid a confrontation with the bulk of the Soviet forces, and 
aim instead at the conquest of the Caucasus in order to exploit its economic resources, 
was not based on ignorance of military theory, but on a deep concern over his struggling 
economy and the perceived lack of feasible alternative strategies. 
Heavy losses in the winter of 1941/42 meant that the Wehrmacht was no longer able 
to undertake wide-ranging offensives along the entire eastern front. By 31 January 1942, 
the armies in the east had suffered 917,985 casualties, including 28,935 officers, and the 
eastern Luftwaffe forces had suffered 18,089.113 Although large numbers of replacements 
were sent in the following months, they were nowhere near enough to offset the losses 
inflicted during the height of the winter crisis, let alone rebuild adequate reserves. The 
loss of materiel was also a sources of grave concern: 424 tanks were knocked out in the 
first three weeks of December alone, a rate of destruction that continued until well into 
January. Various endeavours were undertaken to replace these tanks, but their effects 
were not immediately felt. On 30 March, the OKH reported that the sixteen Panzer 
divisions deployed in the Soviet Union were left with only 140 operational tanks between 
them, which was less than the standard complement of a single division.114 Moreover, 
the mobility of the eastern armies was restricted by huge losses of horses and motor 
vehicles. By the end of January, 101,529 vehicles had been destroyed, including 42,851 
motorcycles, 28,942 cars and 41,135 lorries. Again, despite increases in production, 
these losses simply could not be offset. Indeed, once the objectives of the summer 
campaign were agreed during early spring, the units of Army Groups North and Centre 
were deprived of most of their motor vehicles in order to ensure that Army Group South, 
which was to carry out the offensive, regained at least 85 per cent of its former mobility. 
The removal of so many motor vehicles naturally led to a significant reduction in the 
combat effectiveness of Army Groups North and Centre, a situation exacerbated by the 
shortage of horses and fodder. Supply stocks were almost exhausted, and transportation 
difficulties held up the delivery of weapons and equipment already loaded on trains. 
As a result of'these problems and his realization that the German economy now had 
to cope with a prolonged war of economic attrition, on 10 January 1942 Hitler issued an 
order for the reorganization of the armaments industry.115 The long-term objective was 
still ''the build-up of the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine for the purpose of fighting the Anglo-
Saxon powers", but the "strategic demands of 1942 make it impossible, for the time 
being, to attain this objective through a reduction of armaments destined for the Army." 
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On the contrary, the Army would have to be given a disproportionately large share of 
manpower and armaments so that it could accomplish "the strategic tasks of 1942". In 
order to satisfy the "increased needs of the Army," the order continues, it may be 
necessary at times to make cuts in the allocations of armaments to the Air Force and 
Navy. The former service was to continue its current programmes, except for "a temporary 
curtailment of its ammunition and bomb production in all classifications where a sufficient 
supply exists". Similarly, the latter was simply to concentrate on the construction and 
maintenance of U-boats, and "because of the supplies on hand", there was to be a 
curtailment of the supply of ammunition in favour of the Army. The Army itself was to 
be made ready for offensive commitments by 1 May 1942. As well as assuring that the 
Army will have supplies sufficient "for about four months' continous operations", it was 
necessary to build up a "backlog of ammunition (excluding the original allotment) amounting 
to six times the average monthly consumption of the eastern campaign ... for the main 
weapons." 
Despite the long-term benefits of this reorganization of the armaments industry, which 
gave the highest priority to the acquisition of coal and oil, it could not, of course, immediately 
change the condition of the German Army. At the end of March 1942, only eight of the 
162 divisions deployed on the eastern front were fully operational for the coming offensive. 
Three more could be brought up to full offensive capability after a short rehabilitation 
period, and 47 could perform limited offensive tasks. The other 104 divisions could only 
be deployed for defensive duties. 116 Accordingly, in the late winter and spring of 1942, 
it was clear to Hitler and his military planners that it was simply no longer possible to 
conduct a wide-ranging offensive in the east that would force a decisive battle on the 
Soviet armed forces. Therefore, if an eastern offensive were to be conducted at all in 
1942-and there exists no evidence that the German High Command ever seriously 
considered the eastern forces adopting an essentially defensive posture-the one choice 
left to be made was in which sector to strike. Only Hitler's proposed drive to the 
Caucasus offered a solution to the glaring problems of the war economy, which were 
growing worse with every passing month. If the oilfields could be captured, their output 
would certainly relieve the severe shortage of oil products currently experienced by both 
Germany and Italy, and also allow their armed forces to continue the prolonged struggle 
against the growing list of nations now at war against them. 
By early 1942, existing sources were clearly unable to provide Germany with enough 
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oil to resume offensive operations against the Soviet Union on the scale of the 1941 
campaign, let alone to wage war on the western powers on a scale sufficient to bring 
about their defeat. Since the outbreak of war, only slight gains had been made in the 
domestic extraction of crude oil, which never accounted for over 20 per cent of the 
Reich's total supply. Synthetic production, on the other hand, had risen to 4,116,000 tons 
in 1941 (up from 2,200,000 in 1939) and would continue to rise steadily for another two 
years, until the synthetic fuel plants began to be targeted by Allied bombers.117 However, 
these gains in synthetic production were offset slightly by the declining outputs of the 
Rumanian oilfields. For various reasons, including the gradually decreasing productivity 
of the wells, their yield had dropped from 8,701,000 tons in 1937 to 5,577,000 in 1941.118 
Much of this amount was needed by Rumania itself, whose own economy was straining 
to cope with the demands of war. Also, as noted above, Rumanian deliveries to Germany 
had dropped off sharply in the last months of 1941, mainly as a result of depleted 
reserves and a quarrel with Germany over payment. At the beginning of December 1941, 
Marshal Antonescu had personally warned Hitler by telegram that, whilst he would do 
everything he could to increase deliveries, "in the last five months we exported to Germany 
and Italy amounts greater than the monthly output of 125,000 tons fuel oil, which exhausted 
our available reserves."119 Despite repeated assurances by Rumanian leaders that their 
nation "would do everything possible to increase her deliveries to Germany," 120 it appeared 
unlikely in the first months of 1942 that supplies of Rumanian oil would ever return to the 
levels of mid 1941. Indeed, on 12 February 1942 Antonescu informed von Ribbentrop 
that, "as for crude oil, Rumania has contributed the maximum which it is in her power to 
contribute. She can give no more." Alluding to the much discussed drive on the Caucasus, 
Antonescu added that "the only way out of the situation would be to seize territories rich 
in oil." 121 
This was certainly a compelling argument to use with the Navy. As noted above, 
Raeder was complaining as early as October 1941 to Hitler about the Navy's oil situation 
and had warned him on 12 December that it was now "very critical". By early 1942, the 
situation had deteriorated considerably, so that the Navy was (in the words of one 
historian) living "hand to mouth".122 For example, the naval base in Piraeus, Greece, had 
a stock of almost 11,000,000 litres of heating oil at the beginning of August 1941, but it 
had all gone by the end of the year.123 The dash of the Brest group through the English 
Channel and on to Norway had consumed 20,000 tons of fuel oil alone, and by 1 April 
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the Navy's oil reserves had dropped to 150,000 tons.124 Fortunately for Raeder, the 
shortage of fuel oil did not greatly hamper the operations of Donitz's U-boats-which 
were still coming far nearer than any other Axis force to strangling the Allied war effort-
because they operated on diesel oil and that was still in adequate supply. 
The oil shortage virtually immobilized not only the German surface fleet, but also that 
of the Italians. In December 1941 the Italian Navy had received 29,600 tons of fuel oil, 
instead of the 40,000 promised, and only 13,500 in January 1942. "There is only one 
dark spot-the lack of oil", Ciano jotted in his diary on 8 February 1942. "Just now we 
have barely a hundred thousand tons, and only a negligible quantity gets through to us 
from abroad. This immobilizes the Navy, particularly the large ships, which otherwise 
would enjoy total supremacy in the Mediterranean." 125 Part of the problem, he had 
claimed a month earlier, was that the Germans were (in Mussolini's words) "highway 
robbers," taking for themselves "the oil which was meant for us." 126 
The Luftwaffe was not quite as hard hit by the oil crisis as the other services, although 
in 1941 it had been forced to draw upon its reserves for more than twenty-five per cent 
of its consumption. As a result, the Luftwaffe's reserves of aviation fuel at the end of 
1941 amounted to only 254,000 tons, a huge drop from the reserves of 613,000 tons 
at the end of the previous year.127 During the winter of 1941/42, when it became 
apparent that the Blitzkrieg had failed and that a prolonged war was inevitable, Luftwaffe 
planners (including Goring) urgently insisted that far larger amounts of aviation fuel would 
be needed. Accordingly, attempts were made to expand the output of existing synthetic 
fuel facilities-still the principal source of aviation fuel-and begin the construction of 
additional plants.128 Despites these efforts, increases in synthetic fuel production could 
not be achieved overnight, and by the spring of 1942 the shortage of refined aviation fuel 
was significantly restricting the Luftwaffe's training programme and preventing the renewal 
of an air offensive on anywhere near the scale of the Battle of Britain. 
The Luftwaffe's oil situation did not go unnoticed by Allied intelligence agencies. The 
British Air Ministry, by way of illustration, stated in a February 1942 intelligence report 
that, whilst there was little chance at present of the Luftwaffe "being grounded for want 
of fuel and oil", there is every reason to believe that shortages of fuel will become "more 
and more acute." 129 Furthermore, despite German efforts to reduce oil consumption in 
order "to stave off disaster, ... without the Caucasus oil fields all this must be in vain so 
long as the Russian armies remain in being." This was not the only mention of German's 
urgent need to seize the Caucasus oilfields. The report also stated that: 
the Russian campaign, which so greatly exceeded in scale any previous 
mechanised battles, has run down even the considerable stocks which Germany 
had last June to a level which is uncomfortably low, and the "oil expert" can 
at last lay his hand on his heart and say the Germans are likely to run out 
of oil before very long-unless they get the Caucasus without delay. 
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Considering the potentially disastrous impact of these oil shortages on Germany's 
continued war effort, Hitler's plan to seize the Caucasus oilfields made perfect sense. As 
he argued to his generals early in 1942, their seizure would relieve Germany's critical oil 
shortages and enable it, if necessary, to continue fighting in a drawn-out war of attrition. 
Their seizure would also greatly offset the constant danger of Allied air attacks against 
the Ploesti plants in Rumania and its own synthetic fuel plants within the Reich itself. 
Additionally, Germany's armaments industry would benefit considerably from the seizure 
of extensive Caucasian manganese deposits. More importantly, the severance of the 
various railways between the oil and industrial regions and Moscow, the capture of the 
oilfields themselves and the blocking of the vital Volga river system would be a massive, 
and probably mortal, blow to the Soviet economy and war effort.130 
The surviving documentation reveals that very few OKW and OKH officers openly 
expressed doubts about the proposed campaign to seize the Caucasus oilfields, and that 
none actually challenged Hitler on the feasibility of the plan. It may be, of course, that 
after the dismissal of Von Brauchitsch and von Rundstedt, none were brave enough to 
risk the Fuhrer's wrath. It appears more likely, however, that Hitler's military advisers 
were in general agreement that, within the limited rallge of options available, his plan 
contained the most merit. Even Halder, who personally thought (but never made a strong 
case to the High Command131 ) that the eastern armies should maintain an essentially 
defensive posture for the time being, was apparently won over to the general plan. In 
response to the Navy's "Suez Memorandum" of 3 April, which advocated the urgent 
capture of the Suez Canal by Rommel's forces, Halder emphatically stated to the OKH 
Naval Liaison Officer, Kapitan zur See Konrad Weygold, that the conquest of the Caucasus 
was "absolutely vital" for Germany's continued war effort.132 If the oilfields are not captured, 
"the Reich will not survive for long". The Caucasus, he explained "has more or less the 
same importance as Silesia once had for Prussia." Having doubtless studied carefully 
the detailed briefings of the War Economy and Armaments Office, he knew that Germany's 
oil situation was critical. On 16 February, for instance, this office had grimly warned, in 
its conclusion to a sixteen-page report on Germany's fuel situation, that: 
One thing is now clear: without Russian oil we simply cannot utilize fully the 
regions of Russia we now occupy. But above all, without Russian oil the 
German war machine must from now on become increasingly more impotent.133 
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Indeed, as the year progressed it became increasingly evident to senior German 
planners that Hitler's emphasis on the capture of oil resources was well-founded. For 
example, on 6 June (three weeks before the start of the campaign), the OKW glumly 
reported that oil supplies throughout the rest of 1942 would be "one of the weakest points 
in our defensive capabilities". The significance of this comment is obvious; defensive 
actions require far less oil than offensive actions, so the situation must certainly have 
looked grim. Because oil shortages were so critical, the report continued, "the operational 
freedom of all three services will be restricted, and the armaments industry will also 
suffer. Reserves have been reduced almost to nothing, so we are now forced to rely on 
production." 134 
It appears that during this period there was little discussion between Hitler and his 
military advisers over the important question of how Caucasus oil was to be transported 
to the Reich. A quarter of a century earlier, this problem had also vexed Ludendorff and 
the German High Command, who never arrived at an adequate solution.135 The over-
worked FOhrer may not even have realized the importance of this matter, considering it 
best simply to cross that bridge when he came to it. Apparently he supposed Axis 
convoys would carry much of the oil across the Black Sea to Rumanian ports, whilst the 
remainder would be carried across that sea, through the Bosporus and Dardanelles into 
the Aegean Sea. From there it would travel to Italian and occupied Greek portS. 136 He 
had almost certainly not read the March 1941 report by Generalleutnant Hermann von 
Hanneken of the War Economy and Armaments Office, which was appended to a letter 
sent by Keitel to the OKH. This report warned that, even if the Caucasus oilfields could 
be captured intact, very little oil (only 10,000 tons per month) could be carried overland 
to Germany.137 Moreover, even if the Black Sea could be made safe for shipping, there 
would be no ships available for the transport of Caucasus oil up the Danube because the 
Danube river tankers were already working to capacity transporting Rumanian oil.138 The 
only remaining route was across the Black Sea, through the Dardanelles, and on to 
Mediterranean ports. Accordingly, the report concluded, "the opening of the sea routes 
and the security of the tankers in the Black Sea is the prerequisite for the use of Russian 
supply sources in sufficient quantity to support the further continuation of the war." Clearly, 
to attain this prerequisite was virtually impossible by early 1942; the Germans would have 
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had to wipe out the Soviet Black Sea Fleet (which still had, according to Raeder, "naval 
supremacy ... [allowing] great freedom of movement" 139) and eliminate British air and sea 
power from the eastern Mediterranean. 
Despite not considering how best to solve this logistics nightmare-which never 
occurred, because the German Army captured only the already-destroyed Maikop oilfield-
Hitler was well aware of the need to make the Black Sea safe for German shipping. 
However, both he and Raeder appear to have worried more about supplying German 
armies via the Black Sea than of shipping Caucasus oil back to the Reich or Rumanian 
refineries. 140 
When planning the forthcoming campaign, both Hitler and the German High Command 
placed considerable emphasis on the need to advance on the Caucasus oilfields so 
rapidly that the Soviets would not have time to destroy permanently the oil wells and 
refineries. If the latter were destroyed, the bulk of the Caucasus oil would have to be 
refined elsewhere until new refineries could be constructed. Only Rumanian refineries, 
which still had a considerable surplus refinement capacity141, could handle large quantities 
of additional crude, but (for the reasons mentioned above) it would be extremely difficult 
to ship significant amounts of oil from the Caucasus to Rumania. 
An "Oil Detachment Caucasus" had been formed a year earlier, in the spring of 1941, 
when the capture of the oilfields was still a principal objective of the forthcoming attack 
on the Soviet Union. Its purpose was quickly to repair damaged wells and refineries so 
that exploitation of the oilfields could be commenced as soon as possible. In early 1942, 
when the capture of the oilfields became the objective of the forthcoming attack, this 
detachment was expanded considerably and renamed the "Oil Brigade Caucasus". The 
expansion was necessary because recent experiences in the Ukraine and the Donets 
Basin indicated that the Caucasus oilfields would probably not be captured before at least 
some attempts were made to destroy existing wells and refineries. As a result, this 
unusual para-military force was brought to a strength of 10,794 men, issued with 1,142 
vehicles and six aircraft and ordered to stand by, ready to move into the Caucasus 
oilfields immediately behind the combat troops.142 
During the planning stage of the campaign into the Caucasus, Hitler and the German 
High Command were encouraged by typically optimistic (and typically inaccurate, as it 
turned out) Intelligence reports on the status of the Soviet armed forces issued by the 
Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East), the department of the OKH responsible for 
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the evaluation of all military intelligence about the Soviet Union. On 23 March 1942, for 
example, the FHO issued a detailed estimate of Soviet reserve strengths, which argued 
at length that the Soviet manpower potential was "by no means inexhaustible," but, 
rather, almost completely drained.143 Similarly, in the first week of April the FHO issued 
another report, which concluded that "The enemy can no longer withstand losses such 
as he took in the battles from Bialystok to Vyazma-Bryansk [June to October 1941]. He 
also cannot for a second time throw reserves into the scales the way he did in the winter 
of 1941/42."144 
War Directive 41 
On 28 March, after a lengthy period of discussion, the OKH presented Hitler with a 
plan for the Caucasus offensive-to be code-named Fall Blau, or Case Blue-which 
closely paralleled his wishes.145 Hitler gave his endorsement to the basic concepts of the 
plan, and turned it over to the OKW operations staff to write an implementing directive. 
After he "drastically amended" the draft Jodi submitted to him146, War Directive 41 was 
finally issued on 5 April. 
"The winter battle in Russia," Hitler proudly stated in the preamble to this directive, "is 
approaching its end. Through the unequalled courage and self-sacrificing devotion of our 
soldiers on the Eastern Front, a defensive success of the greatest scale has been 
achieved for German arms." 147 W~lilst this was certainly a fair and accurate appraisal, 
the following passage shows that he either misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented 
the fighting capability of the Soviet armed forces. "The enemy," he wrote, "has suffered 
the severest losses in men and materiel. In an effort to exploit apparent initial successes, 
he has expended during the winter the bulk of his reserves earmarked for later operations." 
Spelling out the aim of the new offensive, he declared that "as soon as the weather 
and the state of the terrain provide the necessary prerequisites," it was important once 
again to seize the strategic initiative and, through German military superiority, "force our 
will upon the enemy." The objective this time was not only to wipe out the remaining 
Soviet military potential, but also to "deprive them of their most important military-economic 
sources of strength." It was necessary, therefore, to deploy "all available forces of the 
German Armed Forces and our Allies," although the occupied territories in western and 
northern Europe, especially the coasts, had to remain secure under all circumstances. 
The general plan involved Army Group Centre holding fast, whilst an effort would be 
made to "bring about the fall of Leningrad and link up with the Finns north of the city", 
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and, in the region of Army Group South, a major campaign would be launched into the 
Caucasus. Nothing was said about Moscow. Clearly, it could wait. Because of the 
damage inflicted upon the eastern army in the winter months, these objectives (Leningrad 
and the Caucasus) would "have to be achieved only one at a time." Initially, therefore, 
all available forces are to be assembled for the main operation in the southern 
sector, with the objective of destroying the enemy forward of the Don, in order 
to secure the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasus 
[mountain range] itself. 
Before tile major offensive into the Caucasus could commence, the directive stated, 
it would be necessary "to clear the Kerch Peninsula in the Crimea and to bring about the 
fall of Sevastopol." In preparation for this campaign, the Luftwaffe, and later the 
Kriegsmarine, would have the task of "energetically hindering enemy supply traffic in the 
Black Sea and the Kerch Straits". Along with these preliminary operations in the Crimea, 
army units would have to "cut off and destroy" the Soviet forces within the Izyum bulge. 
Because of the general manpower shortage, and the difficulties involved in bringing up 
available units, the main operation "to seize the Caucasus front by decisively smashing 
and destroying Russian forces located in the Voronezh area to the south, west or north 
of the Don ... will have to be carried out in a series of consecutive, but interconnected 
and supplementary, attacks." During these attacks, the directive stated, it was essential 
to conduct small, tight encirclements, because the sweeping maneuvers of the previous 
year had given too many Soviet troops "the possibilty of escaping destruction." 
The first phase of the offensive would commence with "an enveloping attack or 
breakthrough from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh. Of the two Panzer 
and motorized formations forming the pincers, the northern one will be stronger than the 
southern." The objective of this breakthrough was "the capture of Voronezh itself". Then, 
whilst certain infantry units were to establish a strong defensive front between Orel, the 
starting point of the attack, and Voronezh, Panzer and motorized formations were to 
"continue the attack south 'from Voronezh along the Don with their left wing to support 
a second breakthrough towards the east, which was to be made from the general area 
of Kharkov". The primary objective of this second phase of the offensive was "not to crush 
the Russian front as such, but, in conjunction with the motorized formations advancing 
down the Don, to destroy the Russian forces." The third phase of the offensive was to 
be carried out so that the forces advancing down the Don could link up in the Stalingrad 
area with forces advancing from the Taganrog-Artemovska area between the lower 
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course of the Don and Voroshilovgrad across the Donets to the east. These forces, as 
well as attempting to "establish bridgeheads east or south of the Don", were to "link up 
finally with the Panzer army advancing on Stalingrad." 
Ironically, in light of the fact that the campaign has come to be associated with the 
name of that city, the capture of Stalingrad was actually not a major objective. It was 
certainly considered by Hitler to be far less important than the Caucasus. The directive 
only stated that an attempt should be made "to reach" Stalingrad "or at least to subject 
this city to the bombardment of our heavy weapons to such an extent that it is eliminated 
as an armament and transportation centre in the future." As the historian Gerhard 
Weinberg points out, it is ironic that "the place whose name will always be associated 
with one of the great battles of World War II was largely ignored by the Germans 
beforehand and renamed Volgograd by the Soviet Union afterwards." 148 
Hitler was aware that this offensive had a significant weakness; it would leave a long 
and exposed flank on the Don. Accordingly, his directive stated, during the offensive it 
would be necessary to ensure not only "the strong protection of the northeast flank of the 
attack operation, but also ... the immediate strengthening of the defensive positions along 
the Don." In a decision he would later curse himself for making, Hitler allotted this vital 
task to Italian, Hungarian and Rumanian divisions: 
Allied units will primarily be used to occupy the Don front as it lengthens in 
the course of this operation, whilst German troops will be deployed as a 
strong supporting force between Orel and the Don, and in the Stalingrad 
sector. At the same time, individual German divisions are to remain behind 
the Don front as a reserve. The troops of our Allies will mainly be deployed 
so that the Hungarians are farthest north, then the Italians, and the Rumanians 
furthest to the south-east. 
Because the Hungarians and Rumanians did not get on well, it was considered best to 
keep their forces apart. Hitler had long realized, however, that it was essential to use 
these forces in the 1942 offensive to bolster his own depleted armies.149 In the weeks 
preceding the issue of War Directive 41, Keitel had visited the various capitals on Hitler's 
behalf, and succeeded in persuading the Italians and Hungarians to provide a full-strength 
army each and the Rumanians to provide two further armies in addition to their formations 
already on the eastern 'front.150 
The Fuhrer was also aware of the frightful death toll caused during the previous winter 
by the lack of prepared defensive positions. Although he firmly believed his new campaign 
would bring victory (at least in the southern sector) before the onset of another winter, 
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he was not prepared to risk leaving his men exposed, without strong defensive positions, 
to the danger of both the winter and Soviet counterattacks. Particular emphasis, therefore, 
was "to be laid on very strong anti-tank defenses. From the beginning these positions are 
to be prepared with a view to them being possibly used in winter, and are to be equipped 
for such in every possible way." 
Hitler insisted on a strong concentration of Luftwaffe forces for this offensive, and 
ordered that, as in previous campaigns, their first task once the main operation got 
underway would be the destruction of "the enemy Air Force and its ground organization 
in the zone of battle ... with the concentration of all available forces." Then, aside from 
directly supporting the Army, it must "cover the deployment of forces in the area of Army 
Group South by intensifying air defenses. This applies especially to the railway bridges 
across the Dnieper." If a concentration of the enemy's forces is perceived, "his principal 
roads and the railways leading to the battle area are to be brought under constant attack 
well into the rear area. To this end, the first priority will be to direct destructive attacks 
against the railway bridges across the Don." Emphasizing that major 'fighting (either 
offensive or defensive) could commence on other sectors of the eastern front immediately 
after, or even during, the Caucasus offensive, Hitler's directive also stated that "the 
possibility of a rapid transfer of Air Force units to the central and northern battle zones 
must be ensured, and the ground organization necessary for this must be maintained as 
far as possible." 
Finally, before stressing the need for absolute secrecy, Hitler's directive outlined briefly 
the main task allotted to the meagre Kriegsmarine forces operating in the Black Sea. The 
German Black Sea Fleet-part of Admiral Marschall's Marine-Gruppenkommando Sud, 
which also controlled the German naval forces in the Aegean Sea151-was, "insofar as 
our combat and escort forces and and our tonnage permit, to assist in supplying the Army 
and Air Force by sea." Recognizing that the combat power of the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet remained "unbroken", Hitler ordered that "light naval forces" be transferred there 
and made ready for operations as soon as possible. The Kriegsmarine would not, of 
course, ignore its important duties in other theatres, or even in the far north of the Soviet 
Union. On the contrary, "the Baltic Sea will be secured by cutting off the Russian naval 
forces in the inner waters of the Gulf of Finland." 
Hitler was optimistic about the coming offensive and, although he could give away 
none of his plans, was determined to inspire the German people and his Axis partners 
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into supporting another major drive to the east. On 26 April 1942, three weeks after 
issuing the directive for the campaign, he confidently announced before the Reichstag 
that "a world struggle was decided during the winter," and, contrasting at length his own 
persistence and Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow in 1812, boasted that "we 
have mastered the destiny that broke another man 130 years ago." 152 The Wehrmacht, 
he added, had prevailed in its terrible trial in Russia and was ready to move forward 
again. This year Stalin's evil regime would be destroyed once and for all. 
This widely-transmitted speech to the Reichstag was well received by most sections 
of German society. It also had a positive effect on the Hungarians and Rumanians, who 
were, for reasons of national prestige, still enthusiastic about participating in the struggle 
to destroy Bolshevism. The war-weary Italians, whose military successes had been few 
and relatively insignificant, were generally unimpressed. It had "a depressing effect in 
Italy," noted Ciano, who personally felt its tone was "not very optimistic". Mussolini, on 
the other hand, was inspired by the speech, privately calling it "excellent and strong".153 
Three days after Hitler gave this speech, he met both Ciano and Mussolini at Klessheim 
Castle in Salzburg. While the Fuhrer talked privately to Mussolini, it was left to Ribbentrop 
to explain to Ciano the nature of the campaign outlined in Hitler's directive of 5 April. 
Pointing out the great economic gains to be made, Ribbentrop stressed the campaign's 
"politico-military objective" and insisted that "When Russia's sources of oil are exhausted 
she will be brought to her knees." 154 During a top-level military conference held at the 
Berghof the following day, Hitler made the same point to Mussolini,155 German forces, 
he said, already occupy the Soviets' main agricultural areas. As a result, "the Russians 
in the central regions must have terrible nourishment difficulties, a problem exacerbated 
by the confiscation of tractors for military purposes." "The strangulation of the civilian 
sector of Soviet society," he continued, 
must directly influence the military sector. To start with, based on existing 
supplies the Russian must have adequate nourishment to survive another five 
months. But his harvest this year cannot be brought in and distributed before 
October. 
This, he told Mussolini, was the decisive factor: "If we now succeed in cutting him off from 
his oil, his traffic must grind to a standstilL" 
According to Paul Carell, author of several books on the eastern front, Hitler's directive 
for the summer campaign of 1942 was, next to the original directive for Barbarossa, "the 
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most fateful paper of the second world war".156 Indeed, it committed the German armed 
forces on the eastern front to a major campaign with economic objectives taking precedence 
over strictly military objectives, yet the attainment of these economic objectives had the 
potential to deliver a heavy, possibly mortal, blow to the Soviet Union. That the campaign 
ultimately failed, and led to the greatest defeat in German military history, does not mean 
that it could not have ended in triumph. As in 1941, the German armed forces very nearly 
brought their eastern offensive to a successful conclusion. The following pages will show 
just how close Hitler actually came in 1942 to attaining his principal objectives in the east 
and, with a particular emphasis on the Luftwaffe, this work shall closely examine the 
nature and scope of the vital role that airpower played in the campaign. 
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Map 1: Summer Campaign Projected in Hitler's War Directive of 5 April 1942 
Chapter II 
The Necessity of "Clearing Up" the Crimea 
November 1941-May 1942 
"The fall of Sevastopol should not be far distant. With it, any serious 
possibility of Russian naval interference in the Black Sea will collapse." 
-Adolf Hitler to Count Ciano, 27 November 1941 
39. 
Hitler's directive for the 1942 summer campaign in the east clearly reflects the unfinished 
nature of the previous year's campaign. Although the Fuhrer claimed to Mussolini on 30 
April 1942 that, with the exception of just a few "blemishes which will shortly be eradicated, 
... the Crimea finds itself in our hands," the reality was very different.1 In April 1942 the 
Crimea was neither firmly nor entirely in German hands, as Hitler well knew. It was 
certainly not the "bastion in the Black Sea" that he described to his Italian counterpart. 
On the contrary, powerful Soviet forces still held both Sevastopol, the Soviet Union's 
main naval base and shipyard on the Black Sea, and the strategically important Kerch 
Peninsula, which Hitler planned to use as a springboard to the Caucasus. Therefore, as 
he stated in his directive for the 1942 summer campaign, before the major offensive into 
the Caucasus could commence it would be necessary "to clear the Kerch Peninsula in 
the Crimea and to bring about the fall of Sevastopol." 
The reasoning behind the Crimean campaign has been criticized by a number of 
historians. They insist that, because most of the Crimea was already in German hands 
in early 1942 and there was no major threat from those regions still occupied by Soviet 
forces, the campaign was a waste of valuable time, manpower and materiel. For example, 
Gerhard Weinberg declares that Hitler should have drawn "the obvious conclusion" that 
there was "no need for a preliminary campaign to clear the Crimea." "Once the Germans 
took over the Soviet Black Sea coast," he argues, "any Soviet forces left on the Crimea 
would be doomed anyway." 2 In order to understand Hitler's and the German High 
Command's strategic reasoning behind this time-consuming "prerequisite", and to judge 
the merits of its critics' arguments, we need to focus briefly on the events that unfolded 
in the Crimea during the last months of 1941 and the first months of 1942. 
The First Crimean Campaign 
As early as 22 July 1941, exactly one month after Barbarossa commenced, Hitler had 
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ordered the eventual capture of the Crimea3, principally because of what he continued to 
perceive as the danger to Rumanian oilfields of Crimea-based Soviet bombers.4 He 
apparently also saw the capture of the Crimea as a prerequisite for the planned offensive 
into the Caucasus. Von Manstein's powerful Eleventh Army, once it had taken Sevastopol, 
was (wrote the General himself) "to have been been taken across the Straits of Kerch 
to the Kuban to intercept the enemy forces falling back on the Caucasus from the lower 
Don". 5 Hitler himself stated in August that elements of the Eleventh Army-the "mountain 
troops" in particular-might be moved over the Straits of Kerch to reinforce an offensive 
to seize the Caucasus oilfields.6 
The Crimean campaign commenced in early October 1941. By 16 November, von 
Manstein's Eleventh Army, supported by Generaloberst Alexander LOhr's Luftflotte IV, 
had forced its way across the strongly defended Perekop Isthmus into the Crimea and 
had managed, despite Soviet numerical superiority (both in the air and on the ground), 
to seize almost the entire peninsula. Enemy air attacks were extremely heavy, von 
Manstein later complained. ''The Soviet Air Force dominated our airspace! Its fighters 
and fighter-bombers incessantly attacked any discernable targets." 7 The situation was 
clearly grim: 
Not only did the front-line infantry and batteries have to dig in, but it was also 
necessary to dig pits for every vehicle and horse behind the battle zone as 
protection against the enemy aircraft. It got so bad that Flak batteries no 
longer dared to fire in case they were immediately destroyed from the air. It 
wasn't until the last days of the offensive, after [fighter ace Werner] MOlders 
and his fighter group had been called in to assist the Army, that the sky could 
be kept clear during the day. And at night not even MOlders could prevent the 
enemy air attacks. 
The Red Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily, or VVS) did not have things entirely 
its own way. Luftwaffe units (and not, of course, merely MOlder's own) provided German 
ground troops with effective support, both 'indirect' and 'direct'. The powerful bomber and 
dive bomber forces of Fliegerkorps IV struck first at all enemy airfields in the Crimea8 , 
then attacked "troop concentrations, vehicular columns, tanks, field fortifications [and] 
bunkers," providing Manstein's troops with excellent support.9 Meanwhile, units of both 
this air corps and Fliegerkorps V attacked the Soviet supply system, inflicting heavy 
damage on Soviet merchant shipping ill the Black Sea and Sea of Azov as well as on 
harbour installations at Jeisk, Novorossiisk, Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, Rostov and Kerch.10 
Luftwaffe activity "on the whole of the rest of the [eastern] front", noted concerned British 
Air Ministry observers, "has been practically at a standstill, except in the Crimea where 
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long range and dive bombers have heavily attacked Sebastopol and its harbour, and 
other towns and shipping along the coast of the Crimea." 11 
Despite this pounding, by early December:-when strong Soviet counterattacks began 
to drive German troops back from the gates of Moscow-von Manstein's own exhausted 
army had failed to capture the fortress-city of Sevastopol. The fall of this fortress would 
have been, to quote another secret British Air Ministry report, "a serious blow to the 
Soviet fleet, as it would mean that Russian warships would be compelled to use the 
greatly inferior ports of Novorossiisk, Batumi and possibly PotL" 12 The main naval ports 
on the northern coast, Odessa and Nikolayev, had already been captured by Axis forces. 
As noted below, Manstein's attack on Sevastopol in October and November, although 
unsuccessful, did force the bulk of the Soviet 'fleet to disperse to I\lovorossiisk, Tuapse, 
Batumi and other ports on the Caucasian coast,13 
In December, Hitler still believed that the Crimea would have to be "neutralized" 
entirely in order to protect permanently Rumanian oilfields from Soviet bombers. This 
view, it should be noted, was not only shared by von Manstein14 , whose battered Eleventh 
Army would have to do the fighting in the Crimea, but also by Lahr, whose air fleet would 
have to support von Manstein's ground assault.15 Perhaps more importantly, it was also 
shared by Marshal Antonescu. His oilfields and refineries had been attacked (as had key 
bridges and harbour installations) as many as 95 times since Barbarossa began by twin-
engined bombers of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet's naval air arm based at Odessa and on 
the Crimea itself.16 These air attacks were generally weak and ineffectual, thanks to 
substantial German air defences around the oilfields and refineries. When Barbarossa 
commenced there were no less than 24 heavy and numerous light Flak batteries around 
Ploest! alone.17 The presence and quantity of these forces, which included strong fighter 
units, reflects Hitler's deep concern over the safety of his main source of oil. 
Although one scholar recently stated that oil production was "unaffected" by these air 
attacks18, on several occasions they caused significant damage and heightened fears for 
the fields' safety. On 13 July 1941, for example, a raid left 17 oil tanks ablaze at Ploesti's 
Orion refinery. Although the fires were extinguished within 24 hours and around 12,000 
tons of oil were saved, this attack caused considerable damage and losses and claimed 
the lives of seven firemen. In total, 9,000 tons of oil and 17 railway tanker wagons were 
destroyed in various raids against the Orion refinery alone. 19 Ploesti's Vega refinery was 
another frequent target, and on one occasion, the night of 18 July 1941, an attack 
42. 
resulted in the loss of around 2,000 tons of much-needed auto fuel.20 These attacks 
would have greatly reinforced Hitler's belief that the Rumanian oilfields were highly 
vulnerable to air attack and that the Crimea, the only feasible base for Soviet long-range 
bomber fleets after the loss of the Ukraine, would have to be "neutralized" entirely in 
order to protect those oilfields from possible destruction. 
Hitler also believed that the capture of the Sevastopol naval base and shipyards would 
significantly diminish the operational capability of the troublesome Soviet Black Sea Fleet. 
"The fall of Sevastopol", he told Count Ciano late in November, "should not be far distant. 
With it, any serious possibility of Russian naval interference in the Black Sea will collapse." 21 
It was essential, he reasoned, to remove immediately the threat posed by that fleet to 
Axis shipping, especially to the supply convoys he planned to use in support of his armies 
as they advanced into the Caucasus. Much to his chagrin, the Soviet fleet (commanded 
by Vice-Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrskii) had suffered only negligible damage from 
air attacks by units of Luftflotte IV and continued to dominate totally the vast Black Sea, 
an expanse of water larger than the Baltic Sea.22 Far stronger than its German and 
Rumanian counterparts, it consisted of no less than a battleship, five cruisers, two flotilla 
leaders, fifteen destroyers and 41 submarines, as well as numerous torpedo boats, mine-
layers, mine-sweepers, patrol boats, fast gunboats and auxiliary vessels. It also 
commanded the many light naval vessels of Rear-Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's Azov Flotilla 
and an Air Arm with over 300 aircraft, half of which were fighters. 23 
In the first months of Barbarossa, vessels and aircraft from this powerful naval force 
had attacked Constanza, the Rumanian naval port serving as main base to the small 
Rumanian fleet and, later, the even smaller German fleet A defensive minefield claimed 
the flotilla leader Moskva, prompting the Soviet command to keep its surface vessels 
away for several months. The fleet's Crimea-based aircraft continued to strike at Constanza, 
however. They conducted as many as 34 day and 25 night attacks on that city and its 
surroundings by the end of 1941.24 They also attacked the Rumanian naval bases of 
Galatz (inland, on the Danube) and Sui ina, as well as strategic targets such as the great 
railway bridge across the Danube at Chernovod (the most vulnerable point of the oil 
pipeline-which they badly damaged on 9 October) and the Ploesti installations. Results 
were generally poor and losses always high. In the first four months alone, the Luftwaffe 
mission in Rumania claimed 143 enemy aircraft destroyed, 69 by anti-aircraft guns and 
the rest by fighters. 
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The Soviet fleet had also greatly hindered Axis efforts to seize Odessa, the commercial 
port and naval base on the northwestern coast of the Black Sea. The German High 
Command had been hoping to capture this port quickly and use it and nearby Kherson 
to supply troops operating on the southern flank. In August, they even had a number of 
small transport vessels anchored at Burgas and Varna (Bulgaria's main ports on the 
Black Sea), loaded with ammunition and equipment, waiting for a signal to set sail for 
Odessa.2s However, the Soviet fleet ensured that German troops would have to wait for 
those supplies. Its cruisers and destroyers (and occasionally its aircraft) pounded the 
Rumanian units which first tried to take Odessa in August. It then landed fresh 
reinforcements and equipment in time to slow down the advance in September of a large 
German-Rumanian combined force, which suffered a very high casualty rate. The fleet 
also began evacuating civilians, wounded soldiers and equipment. Finally, when it became 
clear to o ktyabrskii in mid-October that the city could not be held and that the troops 
there could be used more effectively in the defence of the Crimea, the Soviet naval and 
merchant fleets conducted an impressive Dunkirk-like evacuation. Despite unremitting 
attacks from aircraft of Fliegerkorps IV, perhaps as many as 350,000 soldiers and civilians 
and 200,000 tons of materiel were ferried to Sevastopol.26 Several ships were sunk and 
many others damaged by German dive bombers, but losses were surprisingly low for 
such a large undertaking. Operating from the well-equipped Sevastopol base, vessels 
from the Soviet naval fleet continued to upset German attempts to supply its eastern 
army by sea. Submarines struck at German, Rumanian and Bulgarian traffic along the 
west coast of the Black Sea, sinking 29,000 GRT (gross registered tonnage) before 
year's end. Its warships (including those anchored in the harbour itself) unleashed their 
full fire-power on German positions in the southwestern Crimea. The capture of Sevastopol, 
Hitler fumed, could wait no longer. 
Just as importantly, the Fuhrer believed that the total clearing of the Crimea would 
have a favourable effect on the attitude of neutral Turkey, which he constantly feared 
would succumb to what Gerhard Weinberg recently described as the "endless efforts, 
projects, schemes, and hopes on the part of the British" for it to join the side of the 
AlliesY The Turks had a largely obsolete but still sizeable fleet in the Black Sea and 
numerous well-equipped divisions stationed along their borders with Russia, Bulgaria and 
Greece. Their intervention alongside the Russians or Western Allies would be a major 
setback for the Germans. Moreover, Turkey was the Reich's major source of chromium, 
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a metal essential for the manufacture of almost all armaments. Since the imposition of 
an Anglo-French naval blockade, Germany had become reliant on Turkey for this precious 
substance. It was therefore essential, the FOhrer reasoned, to convince the Turkish 
government that his forces, not Stalin's, were dominant in the regions immediately to the 
north and that no alliance with the Allies should be made. 
Accordingly, in War Directive No. 39, issued on 8 December, Hitler insisted again upon 
Sevastopol's immediate capture.28 Resigned to the temporary breakdown of his Blitz 
campaign in the east, he admitted in the directive that, because of the early and severe 
onset of winter and consequent logistical problems, his forces were compelled "to abandon 
immediately all major offensive operations and to go over to the defensive." However, 
even despite the pounding his eastern forces were receiving, he insisted that Army Group 
South continue to push on towards its objectives in the Crimea and then, if possible, 
towards those in the Caucasus. 
The assault on Sevastopol (first planned for 27 November) was now scheduled to 
commence on 10 December, but bad weather severely disrupted Eleventh Army's 
preparations and caused a further seven-day delay.29 Von Manstein believed that he 
could take the city before the end of the year. Even if he could not, he reasoned, he could 
drive a deep wedge through the northeastern perimeter to a point allowing his heavy 
artillery to sweep Severnaya Bay, thereby cutting off the vital Soviet naval lifeline to the 
historic fortress-city.30 Aware that the fortress would be a difficult nut to crack, he 
committed six of his seven divisions to the attack, leaving only one German division and 
two Rumanian brigades to protect the rest of the Crimea, including the vulnerable Kerch 
Peninsula.31 In other words, he left fewer than 20,000 men to guard an area the size of 
Belgium. 
On 17 December, Eleventh Army, supported by a special Luftf/otte IV close support 
force, launched its attack on Sevastopol (quickly placed by the Transcaucasian Front 
under Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii's direct command).32 Advancing under cover of a heavy 
air and artillery barrage, von Manstein's troops initially made encouraging progress. The 
fortress's outer ring of fortifications was broken on the first day, and significant but 
steadily smaller gains were made for several more days. By 22 December, the 22nd 
Infantry Division had pushed its way through the second defensive line and, in spite of 
stiffening resistance, was bearing down on the third and final line, within sight of Severnaya 
Bay. The previous day, however, Oktyabrskii managed to bring in by ship (despite the 
45. 
fact that the harbour had been repeatedly mined from the air by aircraft of Fliegerkorps 
IV 33) a rifle division, a naval infantry brigade, and 3,000 replacements. These fresh 
troops, coupled with supporting fire from cruisers and destroyers from the Soviet fleet, 
soon slowed the German attack to little more than a snail's pace.34 
Things got considerably worse for von Manstein in the last week of 1941. Commencing 
the day after Christmas, Gorshkov's Azov Flotilla and vessels from Oktyabrskii's main 
fleet, supported by the latter's air arm, landed troops on the Crimean side of the narrow 
Straits of Kerch (less than four kilometres wide in places). These landings were hastily 
organized and executed in a primitive manner-without proper landing craft or equipment 
barges-and, as a result, most were unsuccessful. Troops landed at no less than ten 
locations on the Kerch Peninsula, but were able to make good their foothold at only four. 
However, they quickly established strong bridgeheads at those four sites: on either side 
of Kerch (26 December), Feodosiya (three days later) and Eupatoria (5 January 1942).35 
Oktyabrskii was an extremely cautious man with little tactical imagination. He was 
apparently shaken by the loss of the flotilla leader Moskva in June 1941 and the cruiser 
Chervona Ukraina in August (sunk by Stukas during an attack on Sevastopol harbour). 
These were acceptable losses, given the size of his 1'Ieet and the seriousness of the 
situation, but he now adopted an almost completely defensive strategy. It was only in 
response to direct orders from his superiors that he took great risks to ensure the 
success of the daring Kerch landings that they had ordered, such as using his largest 
warships to carry troops in heavy fog through mined stretches of partly ice~bound water 
easily within reach of German bombers. The first wave at Feodosiya, for instance, consisted 
of 23,000 men, carried by two cruisers, seven destroyers, six mine~sweepers, 15 sub~ 
chasers, and 14 transport ships. German air attacks were sporadic and light and caused 
only minor damage; the only vessels from this initial convoy put out of action were a 
mine-sweeper and a guard boat. 36 
The success of the main landings made it patently clear to the command staff of 
Fliegerkorps IV that its air-mining efforts around the coastline of the Kerch Peninsula, 
conducted in conjunction (but not close co-operation) with Admiral Schwarzes Meer, the 
Germans' own Black Sea fleet, had been an outright failure. "The results of the air-mining 
operations bear no relationship to the effort expended", the air corps staff bitterly complained 
in a radio message to both the admiral of that so-called fleet (in reality only a flotilla of 
light naval vessels) and the Naval Liaison Officer with von Manstein's army.37 Because 
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the mining missions bore no fruit and only resulted in "a useless wasting of Fliegerkorps 
IV's stretched-out forces," the radio message continued, the German fleet should stop 
insisting on these missions. "The aircraft thus 'freed up can better help the Army in its 
struggle on the ground and against the ships it needs to target." As it was, thick fog, 
low cloud and snowstorms in this period prevented all but a few of Fliegerkorps IV's 
aircraft from attacking the first waves of Soviet troops. General Otto Hoffman von Waldau, 
head of the Luftwaffe's Operations Staff, was clearly frustrated that his airmen were 
powerless to counter the initial landings. "I only hope," he noted in his personal diary on 
29 December, "this weather will clear!"38 His hope was realized, but not for several 
days. By then it was too late; the enemy was 'firmly dug in. 
General Halder had actually feared these landings since early December, when he 
first learned of "unusual [Soviet] movements on the east shore of the Sea of Azov".39 The 
Soviet troop buildup had been detected and monitored by reconnaissance units of Luftflotte 
IV, which passed this information on to the High Command as well as to local Army and 
Navy commanders. Its warnings to Admiral Schwarzes Meer, for instance, can be found 
in the fleet's extensive war diaries.40 Nonetheless, the meagre and quickly outnumbered 
German and Rumanian forces protecting the Crimea were unable to prevent the landings 
or dislodge the more than 40,000 troops dug in at Kerch and Feodosiya by 29 December. 
Fearing that his soldiers would be cut off and destroyed by the rapidly-reinforced 
troops landed at Feodosiya, Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck, commander of the 
German troops defending the Kerch Peninsula, ordered his men to withdraw to the 
Crimean mainland. Von Manstein, who still thought it possible to contain the bridgeheads, 
tried in vain to countermand Sponeck's order and direct his men to throw back the 
Soviets before they could consolidate their positions. Because of alleged radio 
communication difficulties, however, his instructions were apparently never received and 
the withdrawal continued. 41 29 December was, Halder jotted unhappily in his diary, "a 
very heavy day!".42 "In the Crimea", he continued, "Count von Sponeck withdraws the 
46th Division from the Kerch Peninsula at the first impression of an enemy landing at 
Feodosiya. He has immediately been removed from his post, but the damage done can 
hardly be made good." Two days later ("another heavy day!") Halder noted that von 
Manstein had suspended the assault on Sevastopol in order "to 'free up forces for 
Feodosiya. There the enemy has reinforced and expanded [his beachhead]." 43 Vice-
Admiral Oktyabrskii, relieved that his risks had paid off handsomely, was as delighted as 
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Halder was dejected. "The troops of the Transcaucasian Front and the s~lips of the Black 
Sea Fleet," he informed Sevastopol's defenders on 30 December, "have taken the towns 
of Kerch and Feodosiya. The fighting continues ... [but now] our units are moving into 
the rear of the enemy troops besieging Sevastopol." 44 
In close but not always effective co-operation with Soviet ground and air forces, 
Oktyabrskii's fleet worked tirelessly and courageously in this otherwise chaotic period. 
On 5 January 1942, it landed a battalion of naval infantry at Eupatoria, a Black Sea port 
on the western side of the Crimean Peninsula, whilst its destroyers covered them from 
the sea with their gunfire.45 AlthoUgh the 150th Infantry Regiment (hastily diverted by von 
Manstein from Sevastopol) was able to destroy these forces in just over two days, the 
Soviet fleet continued reinforcing by sea the troops already on the Kerch Peninsula.46 
"The situation in the Crimea remains serious for the Axis forces", reported British Air 
Ministry intelligence officers, who had cracked the Luftwaffe's "Enigma" codes and were 
reading its secret radio communications. 47 Encouraged by the continuing Soviet landings, 
they optimistically stated that the threat to Sevastopol appeared to be "neutralised" for 
some time. 
The Straits of Kerch froze over twice during the winter, allowing Soviet engineers to 
build an ice road. During the twenty-seven days this ice road was open-28 December 
to 1 January, and 20 January to 11 February-they sent across to the Kerch Peninsula 
an impressive amount of men and materiel, including 96,618 well-equipped troops, 23,903 
horses, 6,513 motor vehicles and hundreds of artillery pieces. 48 If von Manstein hoped 
to recapture this region with his exhausted army (many companies were without 
commissioned officers and had only forty or fifty men out of a normal complement of 150 
to 200), he clearly had a fight on his hands. 
The short-lived Sonderstab Krim 
Painfully aware that the situation in the south was now as critical as in the other 
sectors of the eastern front, Goring hastily organized a new tactical operations staff to 
provide maximum air support to ground forces engaged in particularly severe defensive 
battles in the southern zone.49 The man he chose to head this new operations staff was 
much respected even by his opponents50 : General der Flieger Robert Ritter von Greim, 
commander of Fliegerkorps V, whose impressive career included distinguished service in 
the First World War and, in an organizational capacity, with Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese 
48. 
Air Force in the 1920s. 
Goring, who invited von Greim to Karinhall on 7 January 1942 for a personal briefing, 
instructed the latter to organize this operations staff quickly from members of his 
Fliegerkorps headquarters, which had recently been transferred from near Rostov to 
Brussels. With his staff he was to proceed urgently to Poltava (450 kilometres due north 
of the Crimea) and report to Generaloberst Lohr's Luftflotte IV, the over-worked air fleet 
he was to assist.51 Von Greim's air corps had actually belonged to Luftflotte IV from the 
onset of Barbarossa until 30 November 1941, when half its staff and various units were 
transferred to Brussels in order to be used for mine-laying operations against the British.52 
At that time Goring, Jeschonneck and the Luftwaffe High Command actually believed the 
war in the east was almost over. Therefore (although it seems foolish in hindsight), they 
even began sending air units back to Germany for rehabilitation or further transfer to the 
west and south.53 On 29 October, Hitler himself promised Mussolini (after telling him that 
the war in the east was already won) that he would send a significant part of Kesselring's 
Luftflotte /I-then supporting Amy Group Centre-to assist Axis activities in the 
Mediterranean. Much to the horror and disgust of Genera/feldmarscha/l von Bock, still 
battling forward towards Moscow, the first units of Luftflotte /I were withdrawn on 5 
November.54 In December, when he was forced to admit that the struggle in the east was 
far from over, Hitler had to order many air units back to the eastern front, especially to 
reinforce the understrength and overworked Fliegerkorps VIII, commanded by General 
der Flieger von Richthofen.55 After the transfer to the Mediterranean of LuftfJotte /I and 
Fliegerkorps /I (minus Nahkampffiihrer II, a close air support unit which remained behind), 
von Richthofen's air corps was operating virtually alone in the critical central zone before 
Moscow. 56 
In the absence of von Greim's air corps, the vast regions of the German-controlled 
Soviet south were also proving far too difficult for Luftflotte IV's single corps headquarters 
(General der Flieger Kurt Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV 57) to manage by itself. FJiegerkorps 
IV's massive zone of operations, excluding the Crimea, was an area almost the size of 
pre-war Germany. This air corps helped First Panzer Army and Sixth and Seventeenth 
Armies stem Soviet advances further to the north in the regions around Taganrog, the 
Donets Basin and Izyum. It also committed numerous squadrons to attacking the Soviet 
Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla and supporting the small German fleet and von Manstein's 
troops in the Crimea.58 
49. 
That is not to say that Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV provided von Manstein's troops with 
little support in their desperate efforts to hold the Crimea. On the contrary, units of 
Pflugbeil's overworked corps, flying from Kherson and Nikolayev in appalling weather 
conditions, continued to fly reconnaissance missions and hammer away at the Soviet 
beachheads, harbours and supply ships.59 The Soviet buildup at Feodosiya in the days 
following the successful initial landings, by way of illustration, was severely hampered by 
air attacks. "In a troop supply and support sense," a Red Army General Staff report of 
1943 states: 
the fact that from the moment of the occupation of Feodosiia enemy aviation, 
using the proximity of airfields, attacked the port, the town, and approaching 
transports was of great significance. Four large transports, including the 
"Tashkent" (one of the powerful ships most adaptable for the transport of a 
large number of horses), had sunk very quickly and sat on the bottom in port. 
Much ammunition and food had sunk with the transports. 
Enemy aviation operated with impunity, since our fighters, operating from 
inadequate and distant airfields on the Taman Peninsula [which forms the 
eastern bank of the Straits of Kerch], rarely appeared for 10-15 minutes. 
When our fighters arrived, the enemy was leaving; he bided his time until the 
departure of our planes, then he fiercely attacked Feodosiia again. It was a 
great mistake that the transport of sufficient antiaircraft artillery was not planned 
in the first supply trains.5O 
This report greatly disparages the important role played in the landings by the VVS. 
Soviet aircraft were not, as claimed, only flying from bases on the other side of the Straits 
of Kerch; fighter units flew from Sevastopol and, once airfields on the Kerch Peninsula 
were recaptured, from Feodosiya, Semikolodsy, Beregov, Kerch, and (across the Straits) 
Tamanskaya. Bombers flew from airfields in the Krasnodar-Krymskaya area (in the 
northwestern Caucasus).61 These units were "very active" in support of the advancing 
Soviet ground forces, according to one writer, and "although a much smaller number of 
German planes eased the situation to some extent, [they] could not change it." 62 Indeed, 
the numerically-inferior Luftwaffe units battled valiantly in the Crimea against both the 
Red Air Force and Army, but whilst its attacks inflicted considerable damage on the 
Soviets (particularly on the ground), they were unable to do more than slow down the 
Soviet advance. Nonetheless, in light of the prevailing conditions, this was still a significant 
achievement. Even Halder, who ordinarily paid little attention to Luftwaffe activities, 
noted in his diary on 2 January 1942-"a day of wild fighting"-that "In the Crimea a 
temporary check has been imposed on the enemy by the Luftwaffe." 63 
Owing to the inability of existing forces to drive the Soviets from the Crimea, L6hr 
diverted von Greim's new operations staff, then en route to Poltava, south to the Crimean 
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town of Sarabus, where von Manstein had his headquarters.64 It arrived on 15 January, 
the very day von Manstein's troops launched their attack on Feodosiya and other Soviet-
held positions in the eastern Crimea. Von Manstein's attack on Feodosiya (then defended 
by more than three Soviet divisions) had been planned for 11 January, but was postponed 
several times because of adverse weather conditions.65 The attack's initial progress was 
very good, prompting a relieved von Waldau to jot in his diary that it had "taken the 
Russians by surprise" and that hopefully the possibility now existed ''to resolve the situation" 
at Feodosiya.66 
When von Greim arrived in Poltava, a conference was hastily arranged to discuss 
military objectives, the intended role of the Luftwaffe and methods of coordinating air and 
ground activities. Luftflotte IV created a new tactical air command for von Greim, named 
Sonderstab Krim (Special Staff Crimea), which was to support von Manstein's Eleventh 
Army as it attempted to drive the Soviets from the Crimea. For this purpose, Sonderstab 
Krim was initially assigned the 4th Squadron of the 122nd Long-Range Reconnaissance 
Group. the Headquarters Staff and the 3rd Group of the 77th Fighter Wing, the 2nd and 
3rd Groups of the 77th Dive Bomber Wing, the 3rd Group of the 27th Bomber Wing, the 
3rd Group of the 51st "Edelweiss" Bomber Wing and the 1st Group of the 100th Bomber 
Wing.67 Most of these units, which arrived at various times throughout January, were 
based at Sarabus in the Crimea, although a few had to operate from more remote 
airfields at I\likolayev and Kherson. Oberst Wolfgang von Wild's recently-formed 
FliegerfOhrer SOd (Air Commander South) was also subordinated to Sonderstab Krim, 
because its specialized sea bomber and mining squadron (Blohm und VoB BV 38s) and 
naval reconnaissance units (Arado Ar 196s), which were to be transferred to airfields at 
Saki in the Crimea, would be invaluable in surveillance and anti-amphibious operations.68 
The operational strength of the units assigned to Sonderstab Krim was low, due to 
difficulties experienced by the hastily assembled ground organization and, more importantly, 
to supply and maintenance problems caused by the unusually severe winter.69 Snow and 
mud frequently prevented spare parts and other supplies reaching their destinations. 
Runways had to be constantly cleared of snow and warming equipment, of which there 
was far too little, employed to get engines starting. In most cases, this equipment consisted 
of tin ovens (often made from gasoline cans) connected to long flexible tubes directing 
the heat onto engines and control surfaces. To ensure that aircraft on standby-alert duty 
had engines warm enough to start at short notice, "alert boxes" were frequently used. 
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These were heated wooden shacks with large holes cut in one side, into which the noses 
of aircraft were inserted. Low-viscosity lubricants and special hydraulic fluids that did not 
freeze in extreme temperatures were essential. On many occasions even the tools used 
by maintenance personnel had to be heated to prevent them causing frost burns to the 
users.70 
The morale of airmen and ground crews-who generally lived in poor accomodation, 
often with little or no heating-dropped in keeping with the temperature. Very few had 
received leave, not even a day off, since the eastern campaign first began. The constant 
snow and biting blizzards made life for many seem unbearable. lVIedical officers reported 
an increase of men suffering not only from frostbite and other physical effects of the cold, 
but also from nervous exhaustion. 
Although weather conditions were not quite as harsh in this zone as in the far north, 
or even before MOSCOW71 , barely a third of Sonderstab Krim's aircraft were operational in 
mid-January 1942.72 Operational levels this low were not limited to air units operating in 
the southern zone. Indeed, they were extremely low along the entire eastern front. On 
10 January 1942, the Luftf/otten in the east had a combined actual strength of 1,591 
aircraft (excluding transport and army service planes), of which only 633 (40%) were 
operational.73 When one considers that the eastern Luftf/otten had deployed 2,703 aircraft 
on the eve of Barbarossa (with the same exclusions), and 2,080 (77%) were then 
operational, one can note the poor state those Luftf/otten were in by January 1942.74 
Sonderstab Krim was formed just in time to participate in the recapture of Feodosiya, 
which von Manstein accomplished on 18 January after several days of bitter fighting. Its 
fighters chased off their Soviet counterparts, still operating from Sevastopol, Semikolodsy, 
Beregov, Kerch, and Tamanskaya. Its dive-bomber units provided von Manstein's men 
with effective support as they pounded enemy troop concentrations, artillery batteries and 
airstrips. The bomber units now assigned to this staff had already done considerable 
damage to the harbour installations in Feodosiya, and they continued to target this and 
other ports in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov as well as Soviet supply ships en route 
to the Kerch Peninsula.75 Von Manstein had previously doubted whether he could expect 
any Luftwaffe assistance at all, because bad weather over the last few days had kept 
most aircraft grounded. However, he later wrote, when Feodosiya was recaptured "it 
now turned out that, despite the dreadful weather conditions, the Luftwaffe had actually 
done a fine job, having sunk several transport vessels." 76 
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Von Manstein's advance was quickly carried forward as far as the heavily defended 
Parpach Line, the narrow, eighteen-kilometre-wide isthmus joining the Kerch Peninsula 
to the rest of the Crimea. Despite this good start, von Manstein's intention to destroy the 
Soviet forces huddled behind the Parpach Line suffered a major setback. On the very 
day that Feodosiya was recaptured, a crisis developed 400 kilometres to the north, 
forcing both Army Group South and Luftflotte IV to shift quickly their operational focuses. 
Troops of Marshal Timoshenko's South-western Front had poured across the Donets 
river on either side of the town of Izyum, 116 kilometres southeast of Kharkov, and torn 
a large and constantly expanding hole in the thin line of the over-stretched German 
Seventeenth Army?7 "We shall go through difficult days before this crisis is resolved", 
Halder noted unhappily in his diary on 19 January/8 Indeed, the Soviets rapidly expanded 
this breach to more than eighty kilometres wide and nearly as deep, thereby seriously 
endangering Seventeenth and Sixth Armies, their railway supply and communications 
routes and those of First Panzer Army.79 "The worst thing is that we have nothing that 
can meet the enemy tanks on anything approacrling equal terms," Halder complained the 
following day.so 
Luftflotte IV immediately perceived the danger, and directed Fliegerkorps IV to 
concentrate all available aircraft against the Soviet breakthrough, particularly in the region 
of Seventeenth Army.81 It also directed Sonderstab Krim to release key units for commitment 
in the Izyum area, thereby effectively breaking up von Greim's new command before it 
could attempt with the mass of its forces the task for which it was recently formed: the 
destruction of Soviet forces still in the Crimea. Von Greim had to send north some of 
his best units, including a fighter group, a dive bomber group and two bomber groupS.82 
Although necessary, the transfer of Fliegerkorps IV and Sonderstab Krim units to the 
Izyum area was also a case of "robbing Peter to pay Paul". It left ground forces in the 
vast areas to the south with barely adequate air support. Special missions involving 
concentrated airpower were out of the question. General von Waldau, for instance, noted 
in his diary on 24 January that, because of severe frosts in the Caspian Sea region, 
large-scale Soviet oil shipments were now having to travel overland by rail (instead of by 
sea). They thus became a superb target for the Luftwaffe. "Unfortunately," he lamented, 
"we are stuck with the mass of our forces at Izyum." 83 
As it happened, bad weather conditions seriously impeded the performance of the air 
units supporting Armee-Gruppe von Kleist (the army command hastily formed by von 
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Bock and placed under von Kleist's operational command) as it struggled to to stem the 
Soviet tide surging forward past Izyum towards Dnepropetrovsk.84 Nonetheless, when 
conditions allowed they still managed to make their presence felt. Their interdiction 
attacks on the Red Army's railheads and mobilization points, supply systems and march 
routes made it difficult for the Soviets to advance or regroup effectively (and, on rare 
occasions, even to move large bodies of troops in the open). They airlifted supplies to 
isolated German troops, assisted the penetration of defences and, in close co-operation 
with ground forces, destroyed enemy positions, pockets of resistance and spearheads. 
The Soviet attack lost momentlJm as it cut deeper into German-held territory in the last 
days of January. It was hampered both by stiffening German defences and the difficulty 
of maintaining supply lines during unremitting snowstorms and temperatures as low as 
-35°C. The Soviet thrust was also handicapped by its isolated nature, which allowed von 
Bock to shore up steadily both shoulders of the bulge and, by 11 February, to seal off 
the breakthrough. 
Meanwhile, the transfer to the Izyum region of much-needed air units, and several 
valuable army units (including a tank battalion), had been the last straw for von Manstein, 
who realized that he now lacked the forces to exploit immediately his success at Feodosiya. 
These ill-timed transfers coincided with a renewed Soviet attack on Sudak, a town on the 
south Crimean coast halfway between Yalta and Feodosiya. A small naval infantry force, 
supported by three destroyers and several smaller vessels, landed at Sudak and struck 
at von Manstein's southern flank until beaten back (and evacuated by sea) several days 
later. The frustrated general was forced to postpone his attack on the Parpach Line until 
after he had dealt with this threat to his flank and built up again the supplies and forces 
necessary to complete the main task.85 He was bitterly aware that this postponement 
worked to the Soviets' advantage; air reconnaissance missions revealed that, despite the 
valiant interdiction efforts of von Greim's remaining air units, thousands of Soviet 
reinforcements were pouring across the Straits of Kerch and digging themselves in behind 
the Parpach Line. As he later recorded in his memoirs: 
We soon discovered that the enemy was pushing reinforcements across to 
the Kerch Peninsula. Now having his "Kerch ice road", he could put up with 
the loss of Feodosiya harbour. Air reconnaissance continually showed the 
enemy to be concentrated in strength in his Black Sea harbours and the 
airfields in the area north of the Caucasus. As early as 29 January an 
assessment of the enemy showed his forces on the Parpach front to be more 
than nine divisions, two rifle brigades and two tank brigades [with new T-34s]. 
What's more, the Sevastopol front, especially the artillery, was also becoming 
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active again.as 
Indeed, under the cover of darkness or foggy conditions vessels from Oktyabrskii's fleet 
continued to carry reinforcements, heavy weapons and supplies into Sevastopol. They 
also evacuated the wounded and fired at German positions with their heavy guns.a7 
Von Manstein was gravely aware that his depleted and worn-out forces, committed to 
containing possible Soviet breakouts from both ends of the Crimea (from Sevastopol on 
the west and the Kerch Peninsula on the east), had to keep the Soviet troops bottled up 
until he could gain enough reinforcements to plan further offensive actions of his own. 
This, he knew, could take months. In the meantime, he could not allow the Soviets to 
exploit their recent achievements in the Crimea, "where their control of the sea offered 
them especially good prospects." "Success here," he later explained, 'could have had 
significant repercussions on the entire situation in the east-politically with regard to the 
attitude of Turkey and economically through the recovery of the peninsula for air attacks 
against the Rumanian oil regions." 88 
The dissolution of Sonderstab Krim 
Meanwhile, von Greim was struggling to forge the remains of his command into a 
cohesive and effective fighting force. This proved to be an extremely difficult task; 
Sonderstab Krim, still only a few weeks old, had been hastily formed to support the army 
in a region without a developed ground organization or supply system.89 Fuel, ammunition, 
spare parts and other essential supplies arrived slowly and in insufficient quantities. This 
resulted in lower operational levels than bad weather was otherwise causing. The control 
of operations was continually hampered by poor communications, due in part to the 
weather but mainly to woefully insufficient signals personnel and equipment. Also, existing 
airfields on the Crimean Peninsula itself, of which there were few, were unsatisfactory for 
large scale operations. Unfortunately, no materials or equipment were available for the 
construction of even makeshift runways. As a result, bombers could not operate from 
these fields but had to fly from distant fields at Kherson and Nikolayev. This increased 
flying distances to the targets and reduced the bomb loads that could be carried. Moreover, 
for much of January and February 1942 the entire region was covered by low cloud or 
extensive ground fog, or whipped by strong winds or snowstorms. As already noted, 
these weather conditions adversely influenced air operations over the Crimea. 
Despite these difficulties, von Greim was determined to contain the Soviets. Fearing 
55. 
further landings at any moment, he directed his reconnaissance units to conduct unremitting 
surveillance missions over Crimean coastlines and, in co-ordination with light German 
naval forces, over the vast expanses of the Black Sea. He ordered other units to interdict 
traffic on the "ice road" across the Kerch Straits and to attack vessels still supplying 
Soviet forces at both ends of the Crimea. Ground attack units were to strike at those 
forces, especially the divisions dug-in behind the Parpach Line, whilst fighters were to 
keep the sky clear of their Soviet counterparts and attack their airfields.90 
Many of von Greim's units were not suitably trained or equipped for these tasks. 91 For 
example, the 1st Group, 100th Bomber Wing (UK.G. 100), was a mine-laying unit with 
no specialized training in anti-shipping attacks, the difficult task assigned to it. The 3rd 
Group, 27th Bomber Wing ("UK. G. 27), was given this same assignment but, because 
of supply problems, received no suitable bombs or detonators. These supply problems 
also curtailed the operations of the 3rd Group, 51st Bomber Wing ("UK.G. 51), recently 
returned from the Izyum area. This unit was trained for anti-shipping operations, but 
received too few bombs and had to operate from the unprepared Saki airfield on the 
western Crimea. As a result, it was able to undertake only a small number of missions. 
A lack of specialized equipment and suitably-equipped airfields (with navigational beacons, 
boundary lights, "visual lorenz" systems and flare-paths) also thwarted plans for 
concentrated night attacks against supply movements to Sevastopol by all bomber groups. 
Superb anti-aircraft defences within the fortress inflicted prohibitive losses on aircraft 
attempting daylight raids. Accordingly, such missions were cancelled, except for times 
when weather conditions provided aircraft with adequate cover. On those occasions, of 
course, the aircrafts' own gun- and bomb-aiming accuracy was greatly diminished. 
Because of the many problems resulting from its hasty formation, Sonderstab Krim 
never had the ability to make a significant impact on the conduct of operations in the 
Crimea and Black Sea. Nor was it given time to overcome its unavoidable "teething 
problems" and prove its real worth. On 11 February 1942, Goring ordered its dissolution.92 
Units originally drawn from Fliegerkorps V reverted to their original corps headquarters. 
Two months later (as described below) that corps headquarters, still under von Greim's 
leadership, became the nucleus of Luftwaffenkommando Ost (Air Force Command East). 
This new command was formed on 10 April to provide air support for Army Group Centre 
in the absence of von Richthofen's powerful Fliegerkorps VIJI, which had, ironically, been 
sent westward for brief rehabilitation in preparation for its participation in the siege of 
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Sevastopol. 93 
Despite its many problems and its dissolution after just one month of service, Sonderstab 
Krim had not been been a failure. On the contrary, in its short life it provided local air, 
naval and ground forces with the best reconnaissance information weather conditions 
permitted. It claimed to have destroyed 67 enemy aircraft, of which 23 were shot down 
in the air. It sunk or put out of action a total of 25,000 tons of Soviet shipping, and badly 
damaged a pilot boat and lightly damaged an E-boat. It also wrecked various harbour 
installations at Kerch and Kamysh-Burun. Its claimed destruction of ground targets included 
335 motor and horse-drawn vehicles, 14 artillery batteries (of which three were anti-
aircraft), 14 railway trains, seven locomotives, 10 fuel tank trucks, one fuel depot, one 
cantonment camp and one supply depot. Additionally, its attacks on troop and material 
concentrations, headquarters, and defence installations often produced pleasing results. 94 
Von Greim was replaced by Oberst Wolfgang von Wild, whose FliegerfOhrer SOd (Air 
Command South) assumed command of the remaining air units in the Crimea on 18 
February. Von Wild proved an excellent choice of commander. During the First World 
War he had served as a cadet in the Imperial German Navy, and was commissioned into 
the Weimar Republic's small fleet in 1923. In the mid-1930s he transferred to the newly-
formed Luftwaffe, and by the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 had risen to the rank of Major. 
With his naval background, it was appropriate that he saw action during the Polish 
campaign in one of the coastal air units. From April to October 1941 he commanded 
FliegerfOhrer Ostsee (Air Command Baltic), which distinguished itself in the far north by 
its excellent reconnissance and anti-shipping work, conducted in close cooperation with 
the local naval command. This force sank or otherwise put out of action 83,000 tons of 
Soviet shipping (including five destroyers), and inflicted less serious damage on many 
other vessels, including a heavy cruiser, 17 destroyers and 132,000 tons of merchant 
shipping. It also destroyed 46 enemy aircraft in the air and 12 on the ground (against 
a loss of 20 of its own aircraft).95 When Air Command Baltic was disbanded in October, 
von Wild, his staff and various elements (notably Aufkl. Gr. 12S-the 125th Reconaissance 
Group) were sent, after rehabilitation in Germany, to the far south, where they resurfaced 
as FliegerfOhrer SOd. Thus, as well as having already briefly commanded sea mining and 
bombing squadrons and long-range naval reconnaissance units over the Black Sea, von 
Wild brought solid experience in naval support and anti-shipping operations to his new 
post as commander of all air units in the Crimea. 
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Like his predecessor, the new Crimean air commander was very worried about further 
Soviet landings on the Crimea or southern coast of the Black Sea. Accordingly, the 
principal mission he assigned to his units was the surveillance of enemy activities. His 
reconnaissance units were to conduct constant surveillance missions over Crimean and 
Sea of Azov coastlines and, in co-ordination with the light German naval forces in some 
regions, over the expanses of the Black Sea. The other main mission was the interdiction 
of enemy supply movements. AlthoUgh von Wild had fewer bomber and destroyer units 
at his disposal than von Greim previously had, he directed them to attack enemy supply 
vessels in the Straits of Kerch and en route to Soviet forces on the other end of the 
Crimea. These missions involved increasingly closer co-operation with the small but 
steadily expanding German Black Sea Fleet. Consequently, it may be appropriate at this 
point to shift brie'fly the spotlight away from the main players in the drama-the Luftwaffe 
units in southern Russia-and onto the supporting cast: the naval forces operating in the 
Black Sea, which have to date received little scholarly attention. 
The German Black Sea Fleet 
While the invasion of the Soviet Union was still in its early planning stage, Hitler and 
his military advisers had been well aware of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet's impressive 
size96 and the need to destroy it in order to ensure the safety of both Axis shipping and 
the southern flank of the German advance. GroBadmiral Raeder, for instance, informed 
the FOhrer on 4 February 1941 that oil shipments to Greece and Italy would have to travel 
across that expanse of water, through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and into the Aegean 
Sea.97 It was also important, he said, to reinforce strongly the Rumanian coastal defences-
but probably not those of Bulgaria to the same degree-in order to safeguard the southern 
flank of the army. In fact, the transfer of two coastal batteries to Constanza was already 
in progress. It would be necessary to appoint a German admiral to co-ordinate the 
deployment of German and Rumanian forces along the Rumanian coast That admiral 
would need authority to direct the Rumanian units of the coastal defences, comprising its 
small Black Sea Fleet, Danube flotillas, coastal batteries, mining vessels, and naval 
reconnaissance units. The task of destroying the Soviet Black Sea Fleet (and its Baltic 
counterpart), he continued, would be given to the Luftwaffe, which would undertake 
"surprise attacks" on bases and ships. Support for these operations would be given by 
Rumania and Bulgaria, who were to provide mines and coastal guns. 
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Six weeks later, on 18 March, Raeder reported to Hitler that the Naval Mission to 
Rumania (under Vizeadmiral Fleischer) had taken up its duties alongside its Army and 
Air Force counterparts, which had been in Rumania since October 1940.98 They had 
entered ostensibly at the invitation of Antonescu, who claimed they were there merely to 
"train" his own forces, but in reality they had two tasks: to protect the oilfields and prepare 
for deployment against Soviet forces in southwestern Ukraine.99 Raeder further reported 
that the Naval Liaison Staff in Bulgaria, far smaller than Vizeadmira/ Fleischer's in Rumania, 
had also taken up its duties (attached to the Bulgarian Naval High Command in Sophia). 
Whereas the former naval command was created in preparation for the coming attack on 
the Soviet Union, the latter was intended principally to co-ordinate German-Bulgarian 
operations during the planned invasion of Greece. In return for Bulgaria's assistance-
it was to allow German forces to build up and attack from within its borders-Hitler 
promised that it could take from Greece the Aegean coastal province of Thrace (except 
for a narrow strip along the Turkish border). The German naval staff in Bulgaria, which 
followed the establishment of an Air Force mission almost three months earlier, was 
supposedly necessary to co-ordinate that nation's defences against possible Turkish 
agression should it choose to intervene in the Balkans. It was also needed because 
Britain's naval position in the eastern Mediterranean had purportedly been improved by 
her exploitation of bases in Crete, the Peloponnese and Lemnos. 
It is worth noting that Hitler ordered this campaign against Greece not because of any 
territorial designs on Greece or the other Balkan states, but because Italy's own impetuous 
offensive against Greece late in October 1940, which stalled almost immediately, had 
brought British forces into the region. Honouring an earlier commitment to Greece, 
Britain landed air and ground units on the islands of Crete and Lemnos a few days after 
Mussolini's troops had crossed the border. Hitler was furious about the Duce's "regrettable 
blunder". British aircraft were now within striking distance of Rumanian oilfields, he fumed, 
and if Allied armies attempted a full-scale landing on the Greek mainland, Germany's 
entire pOSition in the Balkans would be jeopardized.1°O The British War Cabinet, as it 
happened, was aware of the Reich's dependence on Rumanian oil. During the weeks 
following the Italian invasion of Greece, cabinet members trying to determine what type 
of military response to make almost unanimously accepted the decision eventually to 
launch air attacks against the oilfields. 101 
Despite the reinforcement of some sections of the Rumanian and Bulgarian coastlines 
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and the establishment of a full naval mission in Rumania and a small naval liaison staff 
in Bulgaria, Hitler and his military advisers actually placed little importance on the need 
for strong naval forces in the Black Sea. The bulk of the Soviet fleet would be destroyed 
by sudden blows from the air, they reasoned, and the remaining vessels would be bottled 
up in their harbours by minefields and light naval forces until all the Soviet ports had been 
captured by land forces. "In this theatre," one Soviet Admiral later wrote, "such a plan 
was comparatively reasonable since the enemy had but limited naval forces at his disposal 
and could not challenge the Soviet Black Sea Fleet in action." 102 Indeed, when Barbarossa 
commenced on 22 June 1941, Germany had no naval forces in the Black Sea region 
except for some river gunboats and minesweepers of the Danube Flotilla.103 Back in 
March, the German Naval Staff had dropped its idea of transporting small submarines 
overland to Rumania because, it concluded, they were sorely needed elsewhere (especially 
in home waters and the English Channel) and would take at least four months to arrive.104 
The Rumanian Navy, with its main base at Constanza, was certainly no match for the 
Soviet fleet. When the war in the east began, it comprised just four destroyers (two 
dating from the First World War), one modern submarine of 700 tons, two more not yet 
ready for service, three heavy torpedo ships (launched before the First World War), three 
modern motor torpedo boats, three obsolete gunboats (also launched during the First 
World War) and some mine-layers, patrol boats, tugs and auxiliaries.105 The Bulgarian 
Fleet was even smaller. With only six antiquated patrol boats, two mine-sweepers, two 
motor torpedo boats (Bulgaria's only vessels constructed after 1918), three training ships 
and a few light gunboats, it posed no threat to the Soviet fleet. As the German Naval 
Staff complained in February 1942: "the material worth of the Bulgarian naval forces ... 
is very insignificant".106 
The Soviet Black Sea Fleet began the war with few experienced senior officers. Most, 
including Admiral I. K. Koshchenov, its commander (and the seven other Soviet admirals), 
had disappeared during Stalin's purges of 1937 and 1938.107 After Koshchenov, who had 
commanded the Black Sea Fleet for six years (1931-1937), came P. I. Smirnov (1937), 
I. S. lumashev (1938-1939), and finally Oktyabrskii (from mid-1939).108 The latter, a 
member of the Communist Party since 1919, certainly benefitted from the purges. Altho(~gh 
he had been in the Navy since 1917 and had trained at the Petrograd Communist 
University in 1922 and the M. V. Frunze Naval College in 1928, Oktyabrskii only rose to 
high command when Stalin decided to "retire" whole echelons of purportedly disloyal 
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officers. When he took over command of the powerful Black Sea Fleet in mid-1939, 
Oktyabrskii had no previous command experience with large warships. Throughout the 
1920s and 1930s he had served on and eventually commanded torpedo boats, and 
before he took over the Black Sea Fleet he was in charge of the insignificant Amur 
Military Flotilla.109 
The main consequence of Stalin's purges was a mass promotion of junior officers to 
take the place of those removed. Sergei Gorshkov, for example, became Captain, First 
Class, at the age of 28 and rose to Rear-Admiral only three years later when he took over 
command of the Azov Flotilla in 1941. Unlike this commander, few of the prematurely-
promoted officers possessed sufficient natural acumen to compensate during the first 
months of war for their dearth of experience. Nonetheless, what the Black Sea Fleet 
lacked in command experience, it made up for in crew training, discipline, and morale, 
which were all excellent due to new training schools and programmes. Having benefitted 
from recent building programmes, the fleet was also very powerful. When war commenced 
it comprised numerous heavy warships, including the Pariskaya Kommuna, a 23,000-ton 
battleship. AlthoUgh this ship had been launched in 1911, it was significantly reconstructed 
and modernized in 1937 and now, with its twelve 305-mm guns, packed a strong punch. 
The fleet also contained five cruisers, two of them new and another fully modernized. 
Amongst its other modern vessels were three flotilla leaders, ten fast destroyers with 
powerful modern guns, and almost four dozen submarines. As well as scores of light 
vessels, most deployed in squadrons at individual naval bases, the Black Sea Fleet also 
possessed a Naval Air Arm with no less than 626 aircraft (about half of them fighters).11o 
Although many were inferior to those of the Germans and their Axis partners in the 
region, these naval aircraft initially outnumbered their enemy counterparts. They carried 
out reconnaissance missions, mined enemy waters, protected naval bases and escorted 
merchant and naval vessels at sea. 
Moreover, operating in the shallows of the Sea of Azov were the light vessels of the 
Azov Flotilla, commanded by the adroit and courageous Gorshkov. He would quickly 
overshadow Oktyabrskii, his immediate superior, and later go on to command the Black 
Sea Fleet himself (1951-1955) and finally become Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet 
Navy (1956-1985). The Azov Flotilla was formed in 1941 as an ancillary but subordinate 
section of Oktyabrskii's main Black Sea Fleet. Determining its total complement at the 
outbreak of hostilities is difficult, but even in mid-1942, after losing numerous vessels to 
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German mines and air attacks, it still comprised four gunboats, a monitor, three river 
gunboats, three patrol ships, four armoured launches, seven torpedo boats, 12 mine-
sweeping launches and 56 light patrol boats.111 
When Axis forces carved their way into the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Luftwaffe 
immediately commenced attacks against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Genera/oberst 
Alexander Lahr's Luftf/otte IV had recently been withdrawn from the Balkans and was 
given a new operational sector, which stretched eastward from Rumania up towards Kiev 
and across towards the Crimea, Rostov and the Black Sea. Fliegerkorps IV, the air corps 
on the southern wing of this huge sector, was primarily engaged in destroying enemy air 
forces and supporting the advance of the German Eleventh Army and the Rumanian 
Third and Fourth Armies into the Ukraine. It also had to perform a variety of other tasks 
in the far south, including the defence of Rumanian oilfields and German, Rumanian and 
Bulgarian shipping along the west coast of the Black Sea and through the Bosporus 
(carried out in cooperation with Rumanian air units), long-range reconnaissance, anti-
naval and interdiction operations over the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.112 
Fliegerkorps IV initially operated from Rumanian soil, but as the front steadily moved 
eastwards the bulk of its units were transferred to captured bases and airfields in the 
southern Ukraine. Consequently, flying distances to targets on the farthest coasts of the 
Black Sea decreased, allowing more sorties per day, and penetration ranges increased, 
allowing raids on previously unreachable targets. Its primary targets in the Black Sea 
during the first months of the conflict were the major naval bases and commercial ports 
of Odessa and Nikolayev (where there were large shipyards), the commercial port of 
Kherson, the naval base at Novorossiisk, and the mighty fortress-city of Sevastopol, with 
its naval base (the most important in the Black Sea), commercial port and shipyards.113 
The railhead at the Novorossiisk end of the main railway from the Caucasus and the oil 
pipelines in Tuapse and Batum (the latter at the very limit of Fliegerkorps IV's operational 
'range) were also singled out for attack. All these targets were repeatedly bombed and, 
in special missions, the ports of Odessa, Nikolayev and Sevastopol were mined from the 
air.114 
The Soviet naval and merchant fleets were located, kept under constant surveillance 
and subjected to harassing attacks by units of Fliegerkorps IV, which only rarely co-
ordinated its operations with the few Axis naval forces in the Black Sea. Because those 
forces had little offensive capability and kept to the sea's western reaches-and possibly 
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because of inter-service rivalry-they were apparently considered by local air commanders 
to be of little consequence. These airmen were acutely aware that they had been delegated 
the task of destroying the enemy fleet only because of the weakness of the paltry Axis 
naval forces in the Black Sea. 
At the outbreak of hostilities, many of the larger Soviet warships were anchored in 
Sevastopol harbour. Sizeable freighter fleets were docked in Odessa. Anti-naval air 
attacks (especially against heavily-defended warships) were always difficult, but when 
vessels were caught by surprise riding at anchor or whilst evacuating troops from cities 
under siege, they presented aircrew with excellent targets. On 18 August-to give a 
noteworthy example of how destructive such attacks on stationary shipping could be in 
good weather-over 30,000 tons of shipping (both warships and merchant vessels) were 
sunk or permanently put out of action during a single raid on Odessa.115 Landing troops 
behind enemy lines was also dangerous for Soviet vessels. For instance, on 21 September, 
a small but powerful convoy comprising two cruisers, four destroyers and various smaller 
craft left the relative safety of Sevastopol to undertake a landing behind Rumanian lines 
near Grigorevka, west of Odessa. Although the landing was successfully accomplished, 
the convoy lost a destroyer, a gunboat and a tug and had two other destroyers damaged 
during fierce attacks by Stukas of St.G.77.116 In general, however, it was possible for 
Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii's large warships, bristling with anti-aircraft guns and aided by 
the powerful Soviet air forces stationed on the Crimea, to protect Soviet shipping lanes 
around the Black Sea coasts and ferry reinforcements to Red Army positions. 
Luftflotte IV's commanders quickly realized that possession of the Crimea was the key 
to success in the Black Sea. This would not only deny Oktyabrskii's fleet its well-equipped 
main base and other important harbours, but significantly alter the balance of power in 
the air, which still favoured the Soviets. Moreover, if they could capture the Crimea's 
many airfields, their own aircraft would command the Black Sea and be capable of 
striking heavily not only the distant Caucasian bases of the Soviet fleet, including Batum, 
but also cities and industrial centres deep in the heart of Transcaucasia. Unfortunately, 
von Manstein's assault on the Crimea late in 1941 made slow progress, and it was not 
until the return of units from the Moscow front to provide air support that the Germans 
succeeded in taking the peninsula (except, as already noted, for Sevastopol). This check 
was to prove an important factor in delaying the establishment of the Luftwaffe on 
operational bases in the Crimea, from which further activity in the Black Sea area could 
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be carried out. To assist Fliegerkorps IV in its anti-shipping work in the Black Sea and 
Sea of Azov, von Wild's Fiiegerfuhrer Sud arrived in the region shortly after the German 
breakthrough into the Crimea. 
By Christmas 1941, German ground forces had captured the key naval bases of 
Odessa, Nikolayev, Feodosiya and Kerch, in addition to the commercial ports of Kherson, 
Eupatoria, Balaklava, Yalta, Dvuyakornaya Bay, Kamysh-Burun. Several of these ports 
had only recently been refitted to serve the Navy. Three cruisers and three destroyers 
remained in Sevastopol to provide naval gunfire support for the besieged ground forces. 
The rest of Oktyabrskii's main fleet was now forced to operate from inadequate bases on 
the Caucasian coast. Similarly, his Azov Flotilla's main bases were Mariupol and Rostov, 
but when these ports fell to the Germans late in 1941 urgent measures had to be taken 
to transform the commercial and fishing ports of Jeisk, Primorsko-Akhtarskaya and Temryuk 
into makeshift naval bases. 
The loss of proper naval bases caused o ktyabrskii considerable maintenance and 
supply problems. Many merchant vessels and troopships and several warships had been 
sunk or badly damaged during the evacuation of Odessa and Kerch and the supply of 
Sevastopol. By the end of 1941, the fleet had lost a cruiser, a flotilla-leader, seven 
destroyers and numerous submarines. The Luftwaffe destroyed the cruiser, a destroyer 
(and another under construction) and three submarines; minefields claimed the rest,117 
Ships were difficult to replace now that the great shipyards at Odessa and Nikolayev had 
fallen into German hands. Construction and repair facilities existed at Sevastopol, 
Novorossiisk and Tuapse, but were vulnerable to air attack and incapable of building and 
repairing vessels quickly enough to prevent a slow but steady decrease in the fleet. 
Su bmarines fared slightly better than surface vessels. Due to the construction of eight 
new submarines at Sevastopol, at the end of 1941 the Soviet fleet still had 43 in 
commission, almost as many as it had when hostilities commenced.118 The Soviet admiral 
had other logistical problems. Novorossiisk and Poti were each well-equipped to service 
the needs of a dozen or so naval vessels, but lacked sufficient docks, cranes and storage 
facilities to cope with more traffic. They were incapable of docking, refueling and loading 
large numbers of both merchant and naval vessels at the same time. Many warships, 
therefore, had to use the smaller Caucasian ports of Tuapse and Batumi, which were not 
equipped as naval bases. Before the war they had served only for loading oil and 
manganese ore. However, despite being handicapped by mounting losses and these 
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logistical difficulties, Oktyabrskii's !'Ieet managed to retain a high operational capability. 
The successful landings on the Kerch Peninsula in December 1941 and January 1942 
demonstrate that it was still able to lIndertake large-scale operations. 
Thus, German air units in and around the Crimea during the winter of 1941/1942 
proved incapable of significantly restricting the operations of the Soviet fleet. More 
importantly, whilst Luftwaffe units identified and attempted to interdict unusually large 
troop movements around the Sea of Azov and the Caucasus coast near the Kerch 
Straits, they failed to prevent those troops embarking on Gorshkov's and Oktyabrskii's 
vessels and making major landings on the Kerch Peninsula and other key points on the 
Crimea. 
The strategic importance of those amphibious landings must be emphasized. They 
compelled von Manstein to break off the siege of Sevastopol, allowing the Soviets time 
to reinforce it by sea with men and materiel. "In this way," writes one German naval 
historian, "the siege was prolonged by six months, a delay which had not been allowed 
for in the calculations of the German General Staff." 119 Accordingly, by February 1942 
it was clear to German military planners that they had underestimated the strength of the 
Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which had embarrassed them in a series of successful naval 
operations, and overestimated the Luftwaffe's ability to secure the Black Sea for Axis 
shipping. Because most aircraft were not designed or equipped for anti-naval missions, 
and few pilots and aircrew were trained for them, the Luftwaffe had not destroyed the bulk 
of the fleet by sudden blows from the air, as the High Command had originally planned. 
I\lor had its bombing and air-mining efforts succeeded even in preventing vessels slipping 
in and out of their ports, let alone conducting major operations. 
Raeder and the Naval Staff were naturally concerned that the Soviet fleet still posed 
a major threat to Axis shipping, especially to vessels supplying the Army by sea. "Russian 
naval forces in the Black Sea must be attacked and destroyed", Raeder told the FOhrer 
on 13 February 1942.120 "The degree of success obtained will determine the outcome 
of the war in the Black Sea area." It is important, he said, to occupy all enemy bases 
and ports there. "Measures", he added, "are being taken to improve our position in the 
Black Sea. E-boats, Italian anti-submarine vessels, small submarines, landing craft (MFPs) 
etc., are being added to our forces; minefields are being laid." 
The decision to increase substantially Germany's maritime presence in the Black Sea 
had actually been reached as early as November 1941, when Hitler still thought it possible 
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in coming weeks to "continue to advance toward the southeast in the direction of the 
Caucasus and to destroy the Russian Black Sea Fleet".121 The supply of his eastern 
armies by sea was clearly still at the forefront of the Fuhrer's mind. Because his overland 
logistical network was continuously upset by primitive roads, a lack of rolling stock and 
guerrilla attacks, he urgently needed a less vulnerable supply route into the Ukraine. In 
War Directive No. 39, issued on 8 December, he insisted that: 
The number of small ships being constructed in Germany, allied and occupied 
countries for supply purposes (particularly for use across the Black Sea and 
in the Aegean) must be increased still further even if it means abandoning all 
claims and security measures which are not absolutely essential.122 
German shipbuilders had already been working for several weeks at shipyards in Rumania 
and Bulgaria, especially at Burgas and Varna, building new light vessels and repairing 
ships captured at Odessa, Rostov and l\likolayev.123 These ships, destined to join the 
German Black Sea Fleet, could not have been repaired in situ because most of the 
shipyards and repair facilities, and a number of warships under construction, had been 
blown up by the Soviets as they fled. 
After the fall of Odessa in mid-October 1941, the Germans had opened their new sea 
transport route between Constanza and Ochakov (on the Dnieper river mouth), and had 
sent through three supply convoys by the end of the year. The convoys were protected 
by defensive minefields, units of the Rumanian Air Force and motor torpedo boats and 
other small escort vessels. 124 Realizing the potential significance of these convoys to 
German logistics, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii immediately dispatched warships to the Black 
Sea's western reaches. Offensive minefields were laid and submarines and motor torpedo 
boats sent in to attack the vessels. These actions (especially the minefields) caused 
frustrating if not severe losses to the convoys. On the first convoy run, for instance, three 
tugs sank after hitting mines. On the following run, the convoy lost its flagship and two 
Rumanian motor torpedo boats.125 o ktyabrskii could have achieved more spectacular 
results if he had sent in heavier warships, but he was apparently reluctant to expose them 
to heavy air and coastal attack (except in dire need or when directly ordered) and, more 
importantly, they were needed for the coming landings on the Kerch Peninsula. In any 
event, the convoys soon came to a halt as the icy winter closed in. Operating conditions 
became impossible after mid-December, forcing the German ships to return to the Danube 
for the winter. 
Realizing after the Soviet landings on the Kerch Peninsula that the enemy 1'leet was 
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far from defeated and still upsetting all German plans in the region, the German Naval 
Staff undertook measures to enhance its own offensive capabilities. First, it worked to 
increase the effectiveness of forces already in the Black Sea. In previous months, the 
German and Rumanian flotillas had generally operated independently of each other. On 
the command level, the German Naval Mission in Rumania worked in close collaboration 
with that nation's naval authorities. However, communication difficulties between German 
and Rumanian naval squadrons, and between those and air squadrons, prevented effective 
co-operation on an operational level. The Naval Mission was smaller than its Army and 
Air Force counterparts, and accordingly received far fewer liaison officers fluent in 
Rumanian. As a result, the liaison staffs attached to Rumanian naval squadrons were 
small and often poorly equipped to overcome differences in radio communications and 
procedures. Also, liaison efforts were hindered at times by a shortage of Rumanian 
officers fluent in German, which led to a dependence on inexperienced Volksdeutsch 
(ethnic German) Rumanians, many unacquainted with military processes or terminology.126 
The reluctance of German seamen (of all ranks, including officers) to work as equals 
alongside their Rumanian "Allies", and the Rumanian sailors' unhappiness at finding 
themselves practically (although not at first officially) under German command, doubtless 
further hampered the liaison process. 
This state of affairs, the German Naval Staff insisted, simply had to change. Only 
when these flotillas were forged into an organized, cohesive, German-led "fleet" which 
coordinated its efforts with those of the Luftwaffe and the small Rumanian Air Force 
would it be possible to alter, even slightly, the balance of naval power in the Black Sea. 
Accordingly, in the last weeks of 1941, the German Naval Missions worked hard in 
conjunction with the Rumanian and Bulgarian Naval Staffs to improve communications 
(as did the Army and Air Force Missions with their corresponding Staffs). Efforts to 
standardize radio, telephone and teletype equipment and procedures were intensified 
but, despite supplying their Axis partners with new equipment and training teams, the 
Germans were not entirely successful in persuading them to adapt their communication 
methods to German systems, to use prepared ciphers, and to translate and distribute the 
German radio regulations. In order to overcome the shortage of interpreters, liaison 
personnel and members of the officer corps familiar with German military concepts, 
practices and terminology, the German Missions increased the number and quality of 
training programmes for both interpreters and officers.127 These training programmes 
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(also conducted by the other two service branches) were generally well-received by the 
Bulgarian armed forces, which had not yet been tested in battle and were keen to learn 
the principles behind Germany's string of recent military successes. They were not, on 
the other hand, well-received by the Rumanian armed forces, which had been trained 
along French lines, suffered high losses so far in the war, and now had an aversion to 
anything German. Even the Rumanian Army, in combat alongside the Wehrmacht since 
the eastern campaign started, disliked these training programmes. "Resistance to German 
influence in training went so far," a German General noted after the war, "that many 
Rumanian commanders of field units 're-schooled' officers and soldiers returning from 
German training courses." 128 
Despite Bulgaria's willingness to receive German military training, Hitler's Naval Staff 
realized that they could not· yet use that nation's naval forces openly in offensive missions 
against the Soviet fleet. Unlike Rumania, Bulgaria had not declared war on the Soviet 
empire and would not, therefore, use her small fleet in a combat role. Many Bulgarians 
felt culturally and ethnically akin to the Russian people, and fondly remembered that 
Russia had once helped them throw off the shackles of Ottoman rule. As a result, 
although Bulgaria had publicly demonstrated its loyalty to the Axis cause by signing the 
Tripartite Pact in March 1941, by allowing the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia to be 
launched from its territory the following month and by declaring war on Britain and the 
United States that December, it never severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 
Nonetheless, to the dismay and disgust of the Soviet Government (which strongly 
protested129), Bulgaria overtly allowed German warships to make extensive use of naval 
bases at Burgas and Varna, German shipbuilders to use shipyards and repair facilities 
at those ports, and Axis merchant vessels to use port facilities in order to supply German 
armies in southern Russia. 
Despite all the problems and difficulties mentioned, the German, Rumanian and 
Bulgarian Naval Staffs did manage to create a proper German-led command structure 
directing and overseeing all naval activities. To co-ordinate and supervise effectively Axis 
maritime operations in the Black Sea, Admiral Schwarzes Meer, the small German flotilla, 
assumed direct control of all shipping outside (and influenced most inside) Rumanian and 
Bulgarian territorial waters. Admiral Schwarzes Meer was really only a redesignated 
version of the German Naval Mission to Rumania, although its new name (effective from 
2 January 1942) was clearly intended to indicate the small command's new 
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responsibilities.130 
Although Admiral Schwarzes Meer was led by Vizeadmiral Gotting and exercised local 
autonomy, it formed part of Admiral Marschall's Marine-Gruppenkommando SOd (Naval-
Group Command South), the naval staff commanding all German shipping in the Aegean 
and Black Seas,131 This naval staff had been formed after the rapid conquest of Greece 
in April 1941 in order to protect the coasts against Allied invasion, prevent the establishment 
of air bases in the Aegean (for raids on Rumanian oil'fields), and secure Axis shipping 
routes through the Dardanelles, Aegean Sea and eastern Mediterranean. It had its 
headquarters in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, and its major bases at Piraeus, Salonika, 
Crete (all in Greece), Varna (Bulgaria) and Constanza (Rumania). 
The expansion of Admiral Schwarzes Meer was a slow process. In the closing days 
of 1941, Raeder ordered the transfer of easily-transportable warships (initially a squadron 
of six MTBs and various small patrol boats) from the l\Iorth Sea and the Baltic, but they 
did not arrive at their destination for several months. First, they had to travel down the 
Elbe to Dresden. Then, as much weight as possible (including the engines) was removed 
before they were lifted by cranes onto special oversized trucks which carried them along 
the Autobahn to the Danube below Regensburg. Finally, they travelled down the Danube 
to wharves in Constanza, where they joined the German fleet.132 The largest vessels to 
enter the Black Sea by this route were six submarines of 250 tons, which were shipped 
down the Danube in pieces and then assembled in Rumanian ports. 
Although it had already provided numerous vessels for Marschall's Aegean flotilla, the 
Royal Italian Navy (Regia Marina) agreed to supply the Black Sea Fleet with submarines, 
torpedo boats, patrol boats, mine-sweepers, as well as small transports, tankers and 
other supply ships. The initial consignment consisted of four MTBs, four small motorboats, 
each armed with a torpedo, and four small submarines.133 These vessels could not travel 
through the Dardanelles for fear of British warships in the eastern Mediterranean and 
Soviet warships in the entrance to the Black Sea. Instead, they had to travel across the 
Alps on massive trucks, like modern-day Hannibal's elephants, then float down the Danube 
on barges to the Rumanian port of Galati. 
Additional vessels were produced in the Black Sea region itself. German technicians 
had struggled since August 1941 to repair the great shipyards at Nikolayev, which the 
Soviets left heavily damaged and littered with wrecks. By early 1942 they were able to 
make limited use of the facilities. They began constructing "naval ferry barges" (Marine-
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Fahrprahme) , flat-bottomed, self-propelled barges of around 200 tons. They armed many 
of these (which they then designated "artillery carriers", or Artillerietri:iger) with anti-aircraft 
weapons, including their superb 88-mm guns. They also built large, 700-ton "war 
transporters" (Kriegstransporter), some of which they converted into submarine chasers. 134 
These actions resulted in the slow but steady growth of Axis naval strength in the 
Black Sea during the early months of 1942. In 1941, Axis vessels had conducted very 
limited escort and transport operations. By the middle of 1942 they would be capable 
of performing those tasks more effectively, following in the wake of advancing armies to 
assume the duties of coastal and harbour defences in occupied territories, and even 
carrying out minor offensive operations against the enemy fleet. 
Realizing that Admiral Schwarzes Meer would soon be able to playa greater combat 
role in the Black Sea, on 2 February 1942 Luftflotte /V requested the small fleet to supply 
it with a naval liaison officer. The air fleet expla.ined that it was "strengthening its 
operations against the Russian Black Sea Fleet" and, therefore, needed an experienced 
naval officer at its headquarters "in order to guarantee close co-operation between the 
air fleet, [Marine-]Gruppe Sud and Admiral Schwarzes Meer".135 Admiral Marschall 
complained in Marine-Gruppenkommando Sud's war diary that, whilst he would provide 
Luftflotte /V with a suitable officer, it would be extremely difficult for the new appointee 
to have much influence on inter-service planning because of his "limited resources, 
unfamiliarity with other service branches, and lack of tactical and operational knowledge".136 
Despite his grumbling, Marschall was clearly keen to increase co-operation between 
his small but steadily-growing fleet and the three air commands then within Luftflotte /V's 
operational zone: Deutsche Luftwaffe Mission in Rumanien, Fliegerkorps IV and Sonderstab 
Krim. Accordingly, on 9 February he radioed the Naval Staff a request for a suitable 
officer.137 "Success against the Russian Fleet will depend," he insisted, "on close co-
operation between S-Flottille [the planned MTB squadron], submarines and Luftwaffe 
units." The air force's marked intensification of operations against shipping and the 
transfer of small Axis warships and submarines to the Black Sea means that "still closer 
operational and tactical co-operation with Luftflotte IV, especially Fliegerkorps IV is crucial". 
He requested, therefore, the appointment of a "suitable officer with fleet experience." The 
last thing he wanted was a glorified desk clerk. The new liaison officer, he stated, should 
be a "sea-going reserve officer with naval combat experience", To ensure that the new 
appointee gained a working knowledge of air command matters and tactics, Marschall 
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continued, he should 'first be sent away for specialized training. In the meantime, he 
recommended, the Naval Staff should give the job to Korvettenkapittin von Bothmer, 
Chief of Staff to See Kommandant Ukraine (l\Javal Commander, Ukraine). An experienced 
and capable officer, he had been largely responsible for the repair and successful 
exploitation of various Ukrainian ports and the laying of defensive minefields (carried out 
mainly by Rumanian destroyers and mine~layers) along sections of the Ukrainian coastline. 
He could serve as Naval Liaison Officer to Luftflotte IV whilst fulfilling his regular duties. 
The Naval Staff agreed, and gave von Bothmer the job. 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer's war diaries reveal that both von Bothmer and his eventual 
successor, Konteradmiral von Eyssen (appointed in lVIay) , worked vigorously in their 
positions as liaison officers to break down inter-service rivalry and ensure that no strategical 
or tactical dissention existed between their fleet and local German air units. Their task 
was made easier by recent improvements to the radio communication system in the 
region, resulting in a steady transfer of up-to-the-minute intelligence information between 
the various naval and air commands. This information-on weather conditions and the 
activities and position of enemy vessels-was gathered mainly by sea and air 
reconnaissance and a sophisticated radio intercept service. Communication between 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer and local Rumanian and Bulgarian air units remained poor, 
however, mainly due to language problems. 
By late-February-even before most of the expected warships had arrived and 
undergone sea-trials-the Naval Staff was able to formulate a strategy for Admiral 
Schwarzes Meer, which now had the potential to make a significant contribution to the 
coming eastern campaign. On 23 February, Raeder issued Marine-Gruppenkommando 
SOd a detailed directive for "Operations in the Black Sea".138 Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii's 
fleet, he complained, still possesses naval supremacy in the Black Sea. This allows the 
Soviets to act almost as they wish, and threatens the security of the Army's southern 
flank as well as Axis supply convoys in support of the planned Army offensive. As soon 
as the ice situation permits, Raeder stressed, those seaborne supply transports must 
commence again because: 
it must not be forgotten that any transport of supplies by sea, even though 
only a small part of the Army's requirements, relieves the difficult land transport 
situation to a perceptible degree, and that any increase in sea transports, 
even if it is only small, will be considered essential by the Army. 
Soviet forces, with their "well-known toughness and ruthlessness", will not only attempt 
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to thwart any Axis offensive actions, but also to strengthen their own position in the 
Crimea. To achieve this, the Soviets will continue to rely on their naval forces. The 
strength of those forces, observed Raeder, "together with the lack of any sort of defence 
on our part," allows strong Soviet landings behind German lines. These landings must 
be prevented at all costs. 
The Army's first objective in the coming months, he continued, is to seize as soon as 
possible Sevastopol and the sections of the Crimea recently recaptured by the Soviets. 
When this is accomplished, it is important to hold the Crimea with as few Army forces 
as possible so that divisions are freed up to partiCipate in the major campaign to the east 
and southeast. This is only possible if German forces block the Straits of Kerch and 
prevent further amphibious landings on the Crimean and Sea of Azov coasts. Accordingly, 
there are now several key tasks for the German naval forces in the Black Sea. First, as 
soon as the ice situation permits it is necessary to start sending Army supplies by sea 
to the south Ukrainian, western Crimean and western Sea of Azov ports. Later, when 
the Army pushes into the Caucasus, supply transports must be sent to ports on the 
eastern coast of the Black Sea. Second, all measures must be taken to secure this 
supply traffic. Third, the Army must receive maximum naval support when it launches its 
offensives against Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula and later, during its occupation 
of the Crimea. Fourth, Soviet landings behind German lines must be prevented at all 
costs. "In order to carry out these tasks ... we must stop Russian naval forces operating 
undisturbed on the supply routes and along the occupied coasts, or we must at least 
make it difficult for them to do so." 
''The most effective way to do this would be to destroy the Russian means of combat", 
wrote Raeder, stating the obvious. Acknowledging that German air forces had performed 
the lion's share of offensive operations in the Black Sea, he noted that so far "only the 
Luftwaffe has been able to combat the Russian naval forces, which form the backbone 
of their operations." It was hoped that Luftwaffe units would maintain, if not increase, 
their level of anti-naval operations but, he cautioned, this air support should not be 
counted on once the main summer campaign commences: 
The air forces on the Crimea have been reinforced, to be sure, for the necessary 
task of fighting Russian naval forces and transports, and Reichsmarschall 
Goring has especially recognized the necessity of using them for that task. 
Nevertheless, when the Army offensive begins they will be used mainly to 
support the Army, and will be available for attacking the Black Sea Fleet only 
occasionally. 
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The German Navy would clearly have to do more itself. Raeder knew that Vice-Admiral 
Oktyabrskii lacked aggression and operational imagination. Rather than using his fleet's 
numerical superiority to great advantage (possibly by launching full-scale attacks on 
Rumanian or German-occupied Ukrainian cities, ports and naval bases on the western 
coasts of the Black Sea), he had been frightened by early losses and subsequently 
dissipated his superiority on missions supporting the Army and protecting supply traffic 
in the eastern reaches. Experience thus shows, Raeder claimed, that the Soviet fleet is 
unwilling to engage in high-risk activities and might surrender its initiative if hard-pressed 
by opposing naval forces. Despite the on-going transfers of Axis vessels to the Black 
Sea, he admitted that Marine-Gruppenkommando Sild still had "very inadequate means" 
for carrying out aggressive measures. "The Naval Staff believes," he nonetheless added, 
... that there are still possibilities for preventing the enemy from keeping the 
initiative everywhere entirely undisturbed, if the few means available are utilized 
to the very fullest and numerous improvisations are resorted to. Certain losses 
must be reckoned with. If our countermeasures succeed in paralyzing the 
activity of the Russian naval forces against the occupied coasts, harbours, 
and supply routes, then these losses are absolutely justified in the face of the 
advantage won. 
Raeder concluded his directive with a brief discussion of mining operations in Soviet 
ports. These operations had not produced significant results in the first six months of the 
conflict (as the present study has already demonstrated), prompting Marine-
Gruppenkommando Sild to place them low on its list of priorities. The Gr08admiral, on 
the other hand, argued that they should continue. They were essential for securing 
transport routes to the Dnieper and the northwestern Crimean ports and, later, to harbours 
on the southern coast of the Crimea and in the Straits of Kerch. "Group South," he 
stated, "calls these operations defensive and hardly important, but they can certainly be 
considered effective with a view to securing the main operations later." 
Thus, by February 1942 the strength of Admiral Schwarzes Meer had grown, and 
would continue to grow at an increasingly accelerated pace for several more months. 
The range of missions it received for the coming campaign had also greatly expanded. 
The High Command clearly expected the fleet to begin playing a far greater part than it 
previously had. As well as conducting escort and transport operations-still its main 
mission-it would lay defensive minefields in its own coastal waters and offensive minefields 
in those of the enemy. It would provide coastal and harbour defences in the occupied 
territories, especially the Crimea, and engage, where pOSSible, in offensive operations 
against the Soviet fleet. Although in February the Luftwaffe still performed the vast 
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majority of these tasks, the increasing participation of the Navy in coming months would 
(as we shall see) result in greater inter-service co-operation and noticeable changes in 
the tactical deployment of air units assigned to anti-shipping duties. 
Fliegerfiihrer Slid 
Both von Wild and von Manstein-to return to the events of mid-February-were 
gravely concerned by the constant threat of a major breakout, either from the Kerch 
Peninsula or Sevastopol, or further landings elsewhere on the Crimea. Von Manstein, 
acutely aware of the huge Soviet build-up of men, materiel and fortifications in the 
Parpach region, urgently requested fresh reinforcements and directed his existing forces 
to regroup and consolidate their positions in preparation for the inevitable breakout attempts. 
Von Wild was determined to provide his colleague with maximum support, and sent 
out his aircraft to strike Soviet batteries, bunkers, field fortifications and defence lines, as 
well as railheads, marshalling yards and mobilization pOints behind the front. However, 
his anti-naval work, including the prevention of further enemy landings, remained his 
highest priority. He ordered his reconnaissance units to conduct constant surveillance 
missions over Crimean coastlines and, in co-ordination with Admiral Schwarzes Meer, 
over the vast expanses of the Black Sea. They covered a massive area stretching from 
the northern reaches of the Sea of Azov to the coasts of Turkey. He also ordered the 
interdiction of enemy supply movements, especially in Sevastopol, Kerch and Kamysh-
Burun and the presumed Soviet supply and embarkation ports of Anapa, Novorossiisk 
and Tuapse. Although he lacked sufficient bomber and destroyer units, he directed the 
ones he did have to attack enemy supply vessels in the Straits of Kerch and en route 
to Soviet forces at the other end of the Crimea. 
February 24, for example, was a "typical" day for Fliegerflihrer Slid. A total of 97 
aircraft (47 fighters, 26 dive-bombers, 23 bombers, and one reconnaissance plane) took 
to the air.139 Throughout the daylight hours-from 0600 to 1710 hours-Bf 109 fighters 
of III./J.G. 77 struggled for air superiority. They also conducted surveillance and protection 
missions over the German-occupied Saki airfield, naval reconnaissance over Sevastopol, 
surveillance of the enemy front, weather reconnaissance, and escort duties for the 
vulnerable Ju 87 Stukas and Ju 88 medium bombers. Two dozen Stukas of /JUSt.G. 77 
bombed battery installations near Semisotka and Ak Monai, behind the Parpach Line, 
recording direct hits on many of them. 
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At 0910, eight Ju 88s from the 3rd Group of the Edelweiss bomber wing were dispatched 
to attack the Soviet battleship Pariskaya Kommuna, which had been pounding German 
positions with its massive guns and was recently seen in Sevastopol harbour. When they 
arrived over the target area they came under fire from both medium and heavy flak and 
the guns of a single enemy fighter. They suffered no losses on that occasion, but were 
unable to locate the battleship. Instead, they bombed a heavy cruiser near the headland 
of Yushnaja Bay, near Sevastopol, which they apparently failed to sink despite scoring 
a hit on the stern with a heavy 1,000-kg bomb which set her on fire. 
Five He 111 medium bombers from UK. G. 100 were sent out on various missions 
during the day. Two were directed to locate the battleship, which they failed to do. 
Therefore, one attacked enemy railheads and embarkation points while the other attacked 
enemy aircraft. The latter hit a flying boat with cannons and machine-guns, and watched 
it disappear, leaving a thick trail of smoke. Both He 111s came under fire from heavy flak 
and the guns of a tanker. A third He 111 unsuccessfully searched for an enemy convoy, 
but despite engine trouble still attacked the city of Sevastopol. The other two He 111s 
of IJK.G. 100 to fly on 24 February conducted night bombing raids on the centre of 
Sevastopol with their massive 1,800-kg bombs, and returned safely to base despite the 
best attempts of the city's searchlight operaters and anti-aircraft gunners to bring them 
down. A Soviet night-fighter almost accomplished the task, filling one plane with holes 
and knocking out an engine. Nine He 111 s of IIUK. G. 27 also bombed the city, and 
another the shipbuilding yards, but this time with incendiary bombs. They caused a major 
explosion and left the city aflame in several places. 
At 1535, a solitary J u 88 from the 4. (F) 122 long-range reconnaissance group finally 
located the battleship Pariskaya Kommuna, which had elljded von Wild's units for most 
of the day. This aircraft had been sent seven hours earlier on a long-distance mission to 
reconnoitre the ports of Sevastopol and Kerch on the Crimea and Novorossiisk, Anapa 
and Tuapse on the Caucasus coast. Over Sevastopol it reported the presence of a 
heavy cruiser, which was almost certainly the same vessel that the bombers from IIUK. G. 
51 had earlier tried to sink. It also revealed the existence of 30 enemy aircraft on an 
airfield at Anapa. The Pariskaya Kommuna, which had apparently sailed undetected from 
Sevastopol, was now safely docked in Novorossiisk, along with a flotilla-leader, three 
destroyers and various smaller vessels. As long as it remained there, protected by its 
own guns and those of the other vessels and port flak battalions, it was in no serious 
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danger. 
Increasing attacks during this period by Fliegerfuhrer Sud, and occasionally by elements 
of Fliegerkorps /V, concerned Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii so much that he instructed his 
captains to exercise extreme caution in regions patrolled by enemy air forces. It was no 
longer possible for ships to bombard enemy positions in the Crimea as often and openly 
as before. Destroyers and flotilla-leaders, he ordered, could only undertake artillery 
attacks on German positions at night and whilst moving (that is, they must not fire whilst 
stationary or riding at anchor).14o They were also to change headings more often and 
avoid shelling from the same locations. Naturally, this greatly diminished the frequency 
and accuracy of their bombardments. Use of the older cruisers for fire support was 
permitted only when poor weather prevented the Luftwaffe taking to the skies, and the 
Pariskaya Kommuna and the two new cruisers were not to be risked in these missions 
at all without the Vice-Admiral's permission. 
On 21 February, Halder noted in his diary that a major Soviet offensive on the Crimea 
was imminent.141 He did not have long to wait. As von Manstein later recalled: "After 
weeks of apparent quiet that were really loaded with tension, the enemy finally launched 
his expected major attack on 27 February." 142 Powerful thrusts were made simultaneously 
from Sevastopol and Kerch, aided by the Soviet fleet, which shelled German coastal 
positions.143 The German commander knew he would probably contain the Sevastopol 
offensive, but realized that his troops were vastly outnumbered by the forces surging 
across the Parpach Line. Desperate to prevent a massive enemy breakout into the 
interior of the Crimean Peninsula, he threw everything he possessed into the fray. The 
Soviet forces achieved local penetrations, especially in the northern sector of the Parpach 
Isthmus (held by Rumanian units), but were unable to shatter the defences of the German 
Army.144 
During the first two days of the attack, bad weather prevented Fliegerfuhrer Sud from 
assisting von Manstein's beleagured troops. On 27 February, only three aircraft made 
it into the air, two of which were sent out to search for the crew of a missing bomber. 
The third was sent to Sevastopol on a torpedo mission, which had to be broken off 
because of the weather. 145 Two days later, the temperature rose several degrees, creating 
unexpected thaws which temporarily relieved the situation for the German soldiers by 
bogging down the enemy advance, particularly in the marshy northern sector.146 The 
increase in temperature also allowed von Wild's air units to provide direct support of the 
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army on the battlefield. On 1 March, for example, no less than 120 aircraft-including 
53 fighters, 40 Stukas and two dozen bombers-were able to take to the skies.147 Their 
Schwerpunkt (point of main emphasis) was the sector around Tulumschak, where the 
enemy had almost broken through the weakening Rumanian lines. The slow but deadly 
Stukas performed their typical duties as the army's "'flying artillery". With sirens screeching, 
they attacked Soviet tank assembly points near Tulumschak. They claimed 13 tanks and 
three motor vehicles destroyed, and damaged at least five other tanks. They bombed the 
village of Tulumschak itself, destroying houses, storage centres and supply trucks. They 
also bombed and machine-gunned troop concentrations in and around the village. These 
troops suffered not only from Stuka attacks, but also heavy raids by twenty Ju 88 medium 
bombers, which left much of the village in flames. Other bombers struck at troop 
concentrations in Ak Monai (leaving the station and a train burning) as well as troops, 
tanks, artillery batteries, and field fortifications in different sectors of the Parpach Line. 
Only one aircraft, a Ju 88 from the 3rd Group of the Edelweiss wing, failed to make it 
back to base. 
Supporting the hard-pressed Eleventh Army was clearly von Wild's highest priority; 
only four aircraft (He 111s, carrying torpedoes) were used that day for anti-shipping 
missions.148 During their flights over the western coast of the Crimea, two failed to locate 
any shipping targets. The third made two unsuccessful attempts to torpedo a 5,000 ton 
merchant vessel. As no bubble paths could be seen, the pilot reported, the torpedoes 
apparently failed to activate upon hitting the water. The final He 111 conducted a detailed 
search for enemy shipping off the southern coast of the Crimea, but failed to sight a 
single vessel. 
For the next two days, FliegerfOhrer SOd continued to pound enemy forces at both 
ends of the Crimea, with several noticeable successes. Bombers attacked troop 
concentrations and armoured columns on the roads between Kerch and Ak Monai, for 
instance, inflicting considerable damage on tanks and trucks, whilst a He 111 on a joint 
reconnaissance-torpedo mission over the enemy harbours along the Caucasus coast hit 
and sunk a 6,000 ton supply ship with two torpedoes.149 Losses continued to be low; 
only a single Bf 109 failed to return from a mission during these two days. 
During this period, von Manstein's headquarters-fearful of enemy landings on the 
south Crimean coastline-instructed both Admiral Schwarzes Meer and the sea-mining 
units of Luftflotte IV (mainly belonging to von Wild's force) to mine the waters in the Kerch 
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Straits and around the Crimea. However, on 6 March Luftf/otte IV's command staff 
informed Vizeadmiral Getting that it simply could not undertake any mining missions at 
present.150 If it were to carry out its "also-requested long-range reconnaissance and 
defensive missions," the air fleet explained, it would be "unable to spare even a single 
aircraft for other duties in the Crimea and the greater part of Army Group South's combat 
zone during the entire period of the mining operations." That would clearly be unacceptable. 
If von Manstein's command really wanted the mining operations to go ahead, the air fleet 
continued, then "Luftflotte /V's operations against ground targets at the front must be cut 
back." Needless to say, no Luftwaffe units were withdrawn from combat duties in order 
to drop mines around the coasts. Instead, defensive minefields in front of Feodosiya, 
Yalta and Eupatoria harbours were laid by a motley collection of Rumanian vessels 
commanded by Admiral Schwarzes Meer.151 
Meanwhile, the first Soviet breakout attempt had gradually lost momentum and by the 
evening of 3 March German troops felt they had come through the worst of the storm. 
At Sevastopol the Soviets were pushed back into their previous pOSitions. Their attack, 
the British Air Ministry noted in its secret Intelligence Summary for that week, "does not 
appear to have effected any material change in this area." 152 At the other end of the 
Crimea the German defensive line had been battered but not broken, although it now 
receded 12 kilometres further west in the northern sector. "A period of exhaustion on 
both sides then ensued," von Manstein later recalled.153 
That period of inaction was short-lived. On 13 March, the Soviets (under Lieutenant-
General D. T. Kozlov, commander of the Crimean Front) began another mass attack from 
the Parpach Line, this time with eight rifle divisions and two tank brigades. It was a bloody 
battle. "We were able to knock out 136 tanks in the first three days of the attack," von 
Manstein wrote, 
but as it progressed a number of heavy crises developed. The harshness of 
the fighting is illustrated by the fact that the regiments of the 46th Division, 
against which the heaviest blows fell, each had to fend off between 10 and 
22 attacks during the first three days alone. On 18 March the 42nd Corps was 
forced to report that it was now incapable of withstanding further heavy attacks. 
The defenders surrendered a few kilometres in certain sectors but managed to contain 
the enemy breakout, even though at great cost in men and materiel. To stave off defeat, 
the German commander had to throw the newly-constituted 22nd Panzer Division into the 
'fray, despite the fact that it had just arrived at the front and had not yet been put through 
its paces in exercises. A heavy rainstorm deprived this "green" division of air support 
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during an attempted counter-attack on 20 March. AlthoUgh it bungled its part in the 
operation and suffered high losses (32 tanks were knocked out in only a few short 
hours 154), its very presence at the front added significant weight to the defence and 
helped bring the main enemy attack to a gradual standstill. Lieutenant-General Koslov 
was as tenacious in attack as von Manstein was in defence; "in waves that rose and 
receded every several days," wrote historians Ziemke and Bauer, the Soviet General 
"stayed on the attack into the second week of April, coming close at times but never 
succeeding in breaking out of the isthmus."155 Indeed, by 11 April, his armies had 
suffered such high losses that their offensive capacity was spent. It would soon be their 
turn to bear the brunt of a powerful attack. 
The situation had often been so critical during March and the first days of April that 
dive-bombers, fighter-bombers and other tactical aircraft of Fliegerkorps IV were frequently 
diverted from the Izyum area to support the smaller FliegerfOhrer SOd in the Crimea. This 
diversion of forces was only posible because the situation in the region around Izyum had 
improved in recent weeks. German troops there had sealed off and destroyed the large 
Soviet penetration that threatened to rip apart the front in January and February and were 
now successfully beating off a series of renewed attacks, each slightly weaker and more 
disorganized than its predecessor. Fliegerkorps IV provided these troops with the maximum 
support permitted by the slowly improving but still hostile weather conditions. In April, as 
the immediate threat of a Red Army breakthrough dissolved, units of Fliegerkorps IV also 
conducted interdiction missions against Soviet rail traffic east of the Donets river and 
difficult counter-partisan operations in the vast forests south of Bryansk.156 They also 
undertook three heavy night raids on "strategic" targets: an explosives factory in Tanbov, 
an aircraft factory in Voronezh and a tractor works and gun factory in distant Stalingrad.157 
Meanwhile, the reinforcements hastily diverted south from the Izyum area in March 
and early April joined with units of FliegerfOhrer SOd to attack the well supplied and 
organized Soviet force of over 200,000 men on the Kerch Peninsula158, as well as ports 
and naval bases on the Crimea and the Caucasian coast. The Luftwaffe Historical 
Branch reported in 1944 that: 
During March, Luftflotte IV's operational pOint of main effort [Schwerpunkt des 
Einsatzes] was the fight against Crimean harbours and supply traffic across 
the sea. The harbours of Sevastopol, Kerch, Kamysh-Burun, Tuapse and 
Novorossiisk were repeatedly attacked.159 
Despite urgently needing the assistance of these other air units to provide Eleventh 
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Army with adequate air support, cut off enemy supply routes and prevent further amphibious 
landings, Fliegerfuhrer Sud proved its worth as a fighting force in a way its short-lived 
predecessor (Sonderstab Krim) had been unable to. Its ground organization and logistical 
network had improved, as had the number and condition of suitable airfields. This, coupled 
with a gradual rise in temperature-which turned everything into a mud lake for a short 
time-resulted in higher operational rates and an increase in daily missions. As the 
situation on the ground gradually improved, various units were even sent westward for 
long-overdue leave or refresher training, which, along with these other improvements, 
doubtless led to an increase in morale. Throughout this period, FJiegerfuhrer Sud, operating 
alongside units of Fliegerkorps IV, conducted effective battlefield support and interdiction 
missions in support of Eleventh Army's efforts to contain the Soviets on the Kerch Peninsula. 
The bulk of the "direct support" burden still rested with the slow but deadly Stukas 
(frequently protected from enemy fighter attack by Bf 109 escorts). Acting on some days 
as an on-call "fire brigade" to pach up frontline difficulties, von Wild's Stuka groups 
knocked out dozens of enemy tanks, assault guns and trucks, and wrecked scores of 
dug-in tanks, bunkers, artillery batteries and field installations. 
Destroying tanks and other armoured vehicles from the air was no mean feat. At that 
stage Stukas had no guns capable of penetrating thick armour; the only weapons they 
carried capable of damaging a tank were their bombs, but scoring a direct hit on a moving 
tan k on the battlefield was extremely difficult and placed the aircraft in grave danger from 
flak and even small-arms 'fire. In the confined spaces of the Parpach Isthmus, however, 
the massed Soviet armour thrust into the attack had no cover or room to manoeuvre. 
Moreover, although some of the tanks deployed were the fast and heavily-armoured T-
34s, most were old and incapable of surviving much punishment. As Halder noted in his 
diary on 18 March: "At Kerch, the number of tanks committed is extraordinary, but the 
majority are worthless, obsolete types from training units and so on." 160 As a result, the 
remarkable tank kill rates alleged by Stuka pilots may not be as exaggerated as they first 
appear. Having said that, it is worth noting that most of Fliegerfuhrer Sud's army support 
missions during this period were not directly over the battlefield, but were of the "indirect" 
type. Stukas, Ju 88s and He 111s repeatedly struck (and did considerable damage to) 
targets in the Soviet rear areas, including harbours, airfields, mobilization points, railheads 
and supply and maintenance systems. 
Von Wild committed almost every available aircraft to ground attack during these times 
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of crisis, but never neglected his reconnaissance and anti-s~lipping duties in favour of 
army support. On the contrary, as the danger to German ground forces steadily decreased 
through March and early April, von Wild increased FliegerfOhrer Sad's surveillance, 
convoy interdiction and naval attack missions at a corresponding rate. His aircraft attacked 
shipping en route to the Crimea and flew reconnaissance missions over, and bombing 
raids against, Sevastopol, Kerch, and other ports in the region. 
These missions, and those of the Fliegerkorps IV units assigned anti-shipping work, 
were conducted according to strict instructions from the OKL's Operations Staff. Realizing 
that the small number of aircraft in the Crimea was incapable of performing effectively a 
wide variety of tasks, on 12 March the Operations Staff issued Luftflotte IV a list of 
instructions.161 It insisted that "the Schwerpunkt of anti-shipping operations in the Black 
Sea is to be the ports of Sevastopol, Kerch, and Kamysh-Burun and their sea-lanes. 
Sevastopol, in particular, is to be the point of maximum effortl" As a result, the OKL 
instructions state, "anti-shipping missions in the sea's wider expanses are to be curtailed". 
Even Novorossiisk was to be left alone, at least until all shipping in Crimean waters had 
been attacked. Routine air reconnaissance missions should only be carried out in regions 
of the Black Sea where bombers or torpedo planes can intercept ships, and very few 
aircraft should be used for longer-range missions. For anti-shipping operations to be 
successful, the instructions continue, "the local command must keep suitable combat 
aircraft in a high state of readiness, so that they can respond to vessel sightings by air 
reconnaissance as soon as the radio message comes in." To add weight to these 
instructions, especially the section stating that shipping in and around Sevastopol was to 
be the main target, the OKL order concluded: "The Fahrer himself expects that, from now 
on, the steady shipping traffic around Sevastopol comes to a halt." 
FliegerfOhrer Sad's daily operational reports for March and April reveal that von Wild 
responded to these instructions by continuing his ground attack missions in support of 
von Manstein's army whilst focusing his anti-shipping missions more closely on interdiction 
of sea routes to each end of the Crimea. Attacks on merchant shipping along Crimean 
coastlines increased in frequency, whilst raids on, and reconnaissance missions over, 
Novorossiisk and other Caucasian ports decreased. To overcome his force's numerical 
weakness, he ordered raids on enemy vessels to be carried out in rapid successive 
attacks by small groups of bombers or torpedo aircraft. Strikes against Sevastopol and 
other Crimean harbours were conducted in the same manner, although fighter escorts 
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were needed to protect the bombers from VVS fighters stationed on airfields on the Kerch 
Peninsula and in the northwestern Caucasus. As it happened, the vast diversity of tasks 
performed by German air forces did not pass unnoticed by the commanders of those 
airfields, who tried to exploit the chaotic conditions in the Crimea by launching bombing 
raids against key German command centres and military installations. In the first week 
of March, for example, VVS bombers launched raids on Nikolayev, Feodosiya and Saki 
and, on 19 March, struck Feodosiya, Ak Mechet and other German-held Crimean centres. i62 
They encountered almost no opposition in the air. Nonetheless, because of powerful flak 
defences and the weakness of participating bomber forces, they proved incapable of 
inflicting significant damage and suffered heavy losses. 
Aware by the middle of March that von Manstein was planning a campaign to take 
Sevastopol and recapture the Kerch Peninsula, von Wild initiated a programme of regular 
exchanges and reliefs in order to bring his units back up to strength. i63 Moreover, in 
antiCipation of the coming campaign he stepped up both the number o'f raids on enemy 
ports and shipping and the number of aerial photographic missions undertaken by the 4. 
(F) 122 long-range reconnaissance group. In order to provide ground commanders with 
clear and detailed photographs of all relevant locations, he ordered photographic 
reconnaissance of enemy fortifications, mobilization pOints, supply depots and routes on 
the Crimea, the presumed embarkation and supply ports along the Caucasus coastline, 
and airfields and transportation routes in the northern Caucasus. On 25 March, for 
instance, Ju 88s of 4. (F) 122 photographed enemy ports on the Crimea and in the Straits 
of Kerch (Sevastopol, Kerch, Kamysh-Burun and Tamanskaya) and those along the 
Caucasus coast (Novorossiisk, Tuapse and Saki), as well as Soviet airfields and train 
stations in the northwestern Caucasus (Krymskaja, Krasnodar and Kropotkin).i64 
According to Luftwaffe general Hermann Plocher, FliegerfDhrer SOd's anti-shipping 
operations, usually conducted in co-operation with units of Fliegerkorps IV, "could scarcely 
halt the Soviet supply movements by land or sea".i6S Individual missions, he wrote, were 
"usually highly successful, but the cumulative effect on Russian supply traffic in the entire 
Black Sea area amounted simply to that of nuisance raids." Plocher is certainly correct 
about the performance of certain individual missions. Many were extremely successful. 
On 23 March, for example, 9 Ju 88s from the 3rd Group of the "Edelweiss" wing attacked 
enemy shipping in Tuapse Harbour, sinking one submarine and damaging two others.i66 
On the same day, a 5,OOO-ton and two 2,OOO-ton merchant ships were sunk with torpedoes 
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by He 111s of I/.lK. G. 26 during a reconnaissance mission over Sevastopol.167 Plocher 
is wrong, however, about the "cumulative effect" of these missions. Whilst they resulted 
in the sinking or damaging of relatively few enemy warships, they were certainly more 
than a "nuisance" to the Soviet logistical networks and sea suppy convoys. The authors 
of the 1943 Red Army General Staff study on the organization of the Crimean Front 
during this period reported that: 
By this time the enemy had activated his aviation and intensified raids on the 
ports of Kerch', Kamysh-Burun, and Novorossiisk. The Novorossiisk Port was 
particularly subjected to frequent enemy raids. Thus, on 7 and 8 April the 
enemy succeeded in burning part of the storage depots in Novorossiisk as a 
result of a massive air raid; 600 tons of hay, 190 tons of rusks, 700 inner 
tubes and tires, and 60 tons of tomatoes were destroyed, and 150 meters of 
station road were damaged. A second raid against the port sunk two transport 
ships and damaged another. 
Torpedo-carrying airplanes were often used. In night raids enemy aviation 
mined Novorossiisk Bay and especially the Kerch' Strait and Kamysh-Burun 
Port. In the first ten days of April alone, six ships with an overall displacement 
of 22,000 tons were sunk by bombing and mining, and much valuable cargo 
was lost. 
Without going into an account of the losses we suffered in April and the 
necessary measures taken against tile particularly intensive actions of enemy 
aircraft, it should be mentioned that the effectiveness of enemy aviation raids 
was felt very strongly.168 
Tilis discussion of German air operations in the vast regions of southern Russia and 
the Black Sea has reached the point in April 1942 when Hitler issued War Directive 41, 
which (as already noted) called for the "clearing up" of the Crimea before the summer 
campaign into the Caucasus could commence. Throughout the previous two months, the 
FDhrer and his senior military advisers had frequently discussed the absolute necessity 
of holding back and eventually destroying the powerful Soviet forces at both ends of the 
Crimea. Because of the peninsula's strategic significance, both as a potential "aircraft 
carrier", 'from which the enemy could launch attacks on Rumanian oilfields, and as a 
springboard for German advances into the Caucasus, there could be no question of 
leaving the enemy forces bottled up there. To prevent them bursting out into the Crimean 
mainland, and to free up the army presently containing them, they would have to be 
destroyed. As the weather usually improved first in the south, and because the Crimea 
was needed as a springboard for German troops into the Caucasus, it was logical to 
achieve this before the major summer offensive. The only question-assuming that von 
Manstein's battered defences would not crack, which looked likely several times in February 
and the first half of March-was whether to start the offensive with Sevastopol or the 
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Kerch Peninsula. 169 Von Bock, the Commander of Army Group South, had wanted to start 
with the mighty fortress, whilst von Manstein, whose Eleventh Army would again have 
to do the 'fighting, knew that he faced a far greater threat 'from the Soviet armies bottled 
up behind the Parpach Line.170 Hitler apparently agreed with him that it was better to 
confront the Soviets where they were strongest than to have them at his back. Early in 
March, therefore, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel signed an order summarizing the various 
instructions issued by the FDhrer in recent weeks. Describing the future missions of Army 
Group South, he insisted that the Kerch Peninsula would have to be captured before the 
siege of Sevastopol could be started. 171 The following chapter will describe and analyse 
the decisive role played by the Luftwaffe in the two enormous battles to "clear up" the 
Crimea: first, Operation Trappenjagd: the offensive to destroy the well-equipped armies 
lying in wait behind the Parpach Line; and then Operation Storfang, the second siege of 
Sevastopol, the strongest fortress in the world. 
1. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen in 1941 when, as a Generalleutnant, he commanded 
Fliegerkorps VIII, the Luftwaffe's premier close support force. A brain tumour caused his 
retirement from active service in Novem ber 1944, at the rank of Generalfeldmarschall, 
and he died on 12 July 1945. 
2. Genera/oberst Alexander Lohr (shown in the uniform of General der Flieger) ably 
commanded Luftflotte IV throughout the Crimean campaigns of May and June 1942 
and the first weeks of Operation Blau (June and July 1942). Hitler then promoted him 
to GeneralfeldmarschaJI and transferred him to the Bal kans, where he commanded all 
Wehrmacht forces. After a flimsy trial, he was executed for alleged war crimes by the 
Yugoslavs in 1947. 
3. Working closely with Genera/oberstvon Richthofen, Genera/oberst Erich von Manstein 
carefully co-ordinated his army's operations in the Crimea with those of the Luftwaffe. 
His successful recapture of the Kerch Peninsula and assault on Sevastopol earned him 
promotion to Generalfeldmarschall. 
4. Von Manstein recalled in his memoirs that "one was always meeting von Richthofen 
at the front, where he would visit even the most advanced units to get a clear picture 
of the possibilities of providing air support for army operations. Our co-operation ... 
was always excellent." Here von Manstein (looking through field glasses) and von 
Richthofen (with peaked cap) observe operations on the Kerch Peninsula. 
5. During critical periods, von Richthofen spent more than an hour each day on the 
telephone, issuing instructions to group and squadron leaders and conferring wIth 
Genera/oberst Hans Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe's Chief of the General Staff. 
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Chapter III 
Operation "Bustard Hunt" 
May 1942 
"Un/ess the weather itself stops us, no Russian will/eave the Crimea alive." 
-Genera/oberst von Richthofen's diary, 9 May 1942 
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Genera/oberst von Manstein grimly realized that the destruction of the enemy forces 
on the Kerch Peninsula and in Sevastopol would be extremely difficult with the forces 
likely to be at his disposal. Aerial reconnaissance revealed that they substantially 
outnumbered his own. He recalled after the war that "the ratio of forces in the Crimea 
provided no grounds for any real optimism regarding the outcome of both massive 
undertakings." 1 Sevastopol, he continued, was defended by as many as seven Soviet 
rifle divisions, one rifle brigade, two naval brigades and one dismounted cavalry division. 
Once the Kerch campaign got underway, the only Axis forces available on the northern 
and eastern fronts of Sevastopol to contain them were the 54th Corps and the newly-
arrived 19th Rumanian Division, which had been sent there to release the German 50th 
Division for Kerch. The only Axis force left on the southern· front would be the 72nd 
Infantry Division.2 The entire south coast of the Crimea would have to be protected 
against surprise enemy landings by the understrength Rumanian Mountain Corps, which 
then comprised only the 4th Mountain Brigade. 
On the Kerch front the Soviets' numerical superiority was even greater than at 
SevastopoL "At the end of April," von Manstein wrote in his memoirs, "they had seventeen 
rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, two cavalry divisions and four tank brigades-a total 
of twenty-six large formations." 3 The Field Marshal's account, detailed as it is, fails to 
reveal clearly the awesome strength of the three armies formed by these divisions: the 
44th, 47th and 51st. For instance, he scarcely mentioned their defences, logistics system 
and state of combat readiness and totally ignored the participation of the 47th Army 
(perhaps because only half of it was ever used against his own force), even though as 
many as 40,000 of its men were deployed on the Kerch Peninsula.4 
The Soviet Command had more troops on that peninsula than it could conveniently 
deploy in its confines. The front itself, stretching along the line of the Ak-Monai positions, 
measured only 18 kilometres in width, yet behind it waited no fewer than 210,000 well-
equipped troops.5 This led in some sectors to what even a Red Army General Staff 
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report called "an unacceptable density of forces." 6 The 51st Army, to give an example, 
crammed nine full divisions in and behind the northern part of the front which, after recent 
gains, now protruded westward. This narrow sector measured less than six kilometres 
across? This means that there were more than seventeen soldiers to every metre of 
front. On the other hand, the huge amount of available manpower on the peninsula-
the same report notes that both the front and army rear areas were "saturated" with 
reserves-allowed the Soviet Command to stage a defence in massive depth. At least 
theoretically, this defence would increase in strength further east where the peninsula 
widened to as much as fifty kilometres, allowing troops to be used far more effectively 
than in the congested narrows of the isthmus.8 To reach the ports of Kerch and Kamysh-
Burun, situated on the Kerch Straits 75 kilometres behind the front, the Germans would 
have to bulldoze through three carefully-prepared defensive lines: the Parpach Line, 
extending across the isthmus at its narrowest point; the Nasyr Line, running parallel to 
it eight kilometres to the east; and the Sultanovka Line, stretching across the peninsula 
at one of its broadest points 30 kilometres in 'front of Kerch.9 
Although the Sultanovka Line (the so-called "Turkish Wall" that followed the remains 
of ancient fortifications) was formidable, the Parpach Line easily surpassed it in strength. 
This had a ten-metre-wide and five-metre-deep anti-tank ditch, first built in 1941 but 
substantially expanded by Soviet engineers after the amphibious landings in mid-winter. 
Behind it lay wide minefields and barriers of barbed wire, and further back countless 
"spanish horsemen" (huge iron hedgehogs of welded-together railway tracks) protected 
concrete bunkers, artillery positions and machine-gun posts.10 
Because the sea on either side of the Parpach Line excluded the possibility of outflanking 
manoeuvres, von Manstein accepted that his main attack would have'to be frontal. He 
also knew, however, that the forces at his disposal-five German infantry divisions and 
the 22nd Panzer Division, augmented by two Rumanian divisions and a brigade-would 
be outnumbered by almost three to one and, therefore, that a purely frontal assault along 
the front was unlikely to achieve anything. He racked his brain for an alternative plan; 
one that would allow his troops not only to break through the strong Parpach defences 
but also to destroy the main bulk, or at least a substantial part, of the enemy formations 
in the process of the first breakthrough. 
There was, von Manstein concluded, only one possibility. During recent attacks the 
enemy had managed to extend his front in the northern sector of the narrow front by 
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around seven kilometres. The Soviet Command was gravely aware that this protruding 
section was highly vulnerable, especially after the failed attempt of the 22nd Panzer 
Division to stab into the base of the small salient and destroy the cut-off forces. As a 
result of these heightened fears, the Soviet Command significantly reinforced the bulge. 
This explains why the 51st Army was so densely packed there. The German general 
learned from ground and air reconnaissance that "the Soviets had massed two-thirds of 
their troops (both front-line and reserve) in and behind this northern sector alone. In the 
southern sector they deployed only three divisions in the line and two or three in reserve." 11 
Accordingly, he devised a plan which would see his troops, strongly supported by the 
Luftwaffe, burst through the Parpach Line "not in the protruding enemy sector, but down 
in the southern sector along the coast of the Black Sea; that is, where they least expected 
it." 12 After four or five kilometres these forces-two infantry divisions and the 22nd 
Panzer Division-would be through the main line. They would then wheel north and drive 
into the rear of the enemy divisions concentrated in and behind the bulge, cutting off and 
eventually destroying them. While this took place, other Axis forces would advance 
rapidly towards Kerch, thereby protecting the eastern flank of those encircling the "pocket" 
and preventing the enemy in the rear from organizing any counter-offensive operations. 
On 31 March, von Manstein issued a preliminary directive for the operation, to be 
code-named Trappenjagd ("bustard hunt"). War diaries of German officers in the Crimea 
reveal the humour in this strange choice of name; they describe how von Manstein and 
other senior officers (including von Richthofen, after he arrived13) occasionally liked to go 
on hunting expeditions. Their game was not the wolf or bear, or any other dangerous 
predator in the region, but the harmless great bustard, the largest land bird in Europe. 
Vast numbers of these prized gamebirds, well-known for their timidity and remarkable 
running speed, lived around the Black Sea. According to several diarists, they tasted 
delicious when slowly roasted. Despite the humorous imagery, von Manstein was acutely 
aware of the great risks involved in his forthcoming "bustard hunt", and two days later told 
both the OKH and von Bock, commander of Army Group South, that he still considered 
the discrepancy in forces too great.14 Von Bock replied that, whilst the OKH might make 
another division or two available late in May, the operation should commence as soon 
as possible to prevent the Soviets themselves seizing the initiative in the meantime. On 
16 April, von Manstein took his Trappenjagd plan to Hitler, who approved everything 
except for the Luftwaffe dispositions. He would see to them himself.1s 
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The Fuhrer was by inclination and experience an "army man" who, despite his superb 
grasp of technical details, lacked experience in air tactics and strategy.16 During the 
successful first years of the war he had rarely meddled in air force affairs. He was content 
to leave most decisions to Goring, the Luftwaffe's pompous Commander-in-Chief, and 
Milch, the latter's capable and dedicated deputy. Over the winter of 194111942, however, 
the Fuhrer came to appreciate the key role played by air support. In numerous places 
along the eastern front, he had seen the Luftwaffe patch up frontline difficulties, sometimes 
even significantly affecting the outcome of battles. Clearly impressed, he began to 
interfere in air matters-often without consulting Goring. Late in February, to illustrate 
this point, Genera/oberst Georg von KOchler, commander of Army Group l\Jorth, had laid 
plans for a counter-attack near Volkhov in the far north. On 2 March, Hitler personally 
ordered a "thorough air preparation of several days" before the opening of the attack.17 
The weather was so unfavourable, however, that few aircraft could take to the air. 
Consequently, the Fuhrer expressly ordered von KOchler, who was anxious to get underway, 
to postpone the offensive "until weather conditions permit the full deployment of the Air 
Force." 18 A month later he lectured him on the importance of close air support. Back 
in January, he said, Toropets would not have been lost, and with it key German fuel 
dumps and supply depots, if the group commander had fully understood the potential of 
this support.19 Perhaps with this "failure" in mind, Hitler decided to organize the deployment 
of air units for the important Kerch offensive himself. 
That offensive, he had stated late in February, demanded "massed airpower".2o On 
17 April he held a lengthy conference with his Air Staff to work out the nature and level 
of this "massed airpower".21 Until he could discuss the situation with Genera/oberst von 
Richthofen, whose powerful Fliegerkorps VIII he planned to use in the Crimea alongside 
Lohr's Luftf/otte IV! Hitler initially dealt only with the dispositions of Lohr's fleet. Heavy 
Siege guns were being sent to the Crimea for the assault on Sevastopol, he said, including 
the 800-mm railway cannon "Dora", the heaviest gun in the world. Because these Siege 
guns were difficult to move and impossible to camouflage, their defence from air attack 
was absolutely crucial. Luftf/otte IV, he pOinted out, was solely responsible for their 
safety. Its lone anti-aircraft unit was incapable of protecting them, so a second would be 
sent from the Rumanian or Bulgarian area. Both were to be equipped with light and 
heavy searchlights. The transportation of the guns and equipment was to be protected 
by light flak guns on the trains themselves and by the deployment of fighter aircraft. 
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Luftflotte IV, said Hitler, was to ensure that the guns and equipment arrived safely and 
(just as importantly) on time. The air fleet was also ''to test whether or not the possibility 
exists, shortly before the arrival of those trains, to destroy on the ground the enemy 
aircraft situated at the airfields of Sevastopol by an attack with strong forces." Moreover, 
it must report immediately on the current availability of flak units before Sevastopol and 
the Kerch front, and whether these units were being strengthened before each attack 
commenced. Acutely aware that Rumanian troops had, as von Manstein later complained, 
"limited usefulness in an offensive role," 22 Hitler also ordered Luftf/otte IV to pay special 
attention to the 18th Rumanian Division's sector and to "rebut with strong air support" any 
attacks made against it from Sevastopol. 
If the Kerch campaign were to succeed, Hitler emphasized, it was absolutely necessary 
to cut off Soviet forces from their supplies. Luftflotte IV, therefore, must note that: 
During the period until the attack itself begins, the supply of the Kerch Peninsula 
must be interrupted in the strongest manner. Because of the short travel time 
of the ships between Novorossiisk and Kerch, it will often be impossible to 
attack them at sea. The point of main effort [Schwerpunkt] of the fight against 
supplies will therefore be the harbours of Kerch and Kamysh-Burun as well 
as Novorossiisk and Tuapse. 
Despite this energetic fight against supplies to the Kerch Peninsula, he added, the 
operational readiness of the units of LuftfJotte IV must be further increased. To enhance 
the fleet's offensive capabilities, it would be given temporary authority over the 55th 
Bomber wing. Also, GOring, as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, would supply 
enough new aircraft to bring the fleet up to full strength. To boost the number of experienced 
airmen for the operation (and especially for the He 111 units), Luftf/otte IV was to draw 
personnel from the fourth (training) group of each wing. When selecting aircrew from 
these groups, it was important to note that even pilots unable to fly by instruments alone 
would be used during periods of good weather. They would be placed under the command 
of older and more experienced flight leaders. 
New airfields on the Crimea must immediately be created and supplied, Hitler added, 
so that the approach flights-not only of the fighters and Stukas, but also of most bombers-
could be kept as short as possible and the number of operations increased. If the supply 
of those airfields by road and rail could not be achieved in time for the attack then air 
transport must be used. Should this situation arise, Luftf/otte IV must request assistance 
from the Quartermaster General of the Air Force. The fleet itself and not the army, Hitler 
stressed, was responsible for the protection of its airfields. 
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The Fuhrer placed great emphasis on the employment of the deadly and effective SD2 
fragmentation bombs, developed during the previous year specifically for use in the east. 
These small 2-kg bombs-christened "Devil's eggs" by aircrew-fragmented into between 
50 and 250 pieces of shrapnel, which sprayed out in a five-metre radius. Large numbers 
could be dropped at once, and detonated on impact or just above the ground with 
devastating effects on troop concentrations. SD2s, Hitler explained, "are best used 
against living targets. A satisfactory result can only be achieved when the bombs are 
used against crowds." The equipping of Luftf/otte /V bomber units with these bombs was 
to be speeded up. Regardless of whether the production goal was reached or not, he 
added, it was essential that the special canisters they needed (of which around 6,000 
were supposed to be available by the end of April) would be delivered immediately to that 
air fleet The supply of the bombs themselves must be regulated so that no shortages 
could possibly occur. To determine how many were needed, planners were to base their 
calculations on the assumption that the campaign against the Kerch Peninsula would 
take 14 days. 
Hitler knew that the Parpach Line would be extremely hard to break through. Soviet 
artillery batteries and other installations, he therefore insisted, were "to be hit with the 
heaviest available bombs. The air fleet must also ascertain whether it is possible, by 
using the heaviest bombs, to create a safe path for German tanks across the massive 
enemy anti-tank ditches." Goring must fully strengthen LuftfJotte IV in time for the attack 
against the Kerch Peninsula. Whilst the air fleet in general was to be strengthened, the 
heaviest possible concentration of airpower for the capture of Kerch was to be obtained. 
So important was this operation, he stressed, that once it got underway the other sectors 
of the front in the southern zone would have to go without air support. The only exception 
permitted, Hitler concluded, would be the defence of troops attacked 'from Sevastopol. 
The Advent of von Richthofen 
One historian claims that shortly after this conference "the potential for concentrating 
German air power in the Crimea increased dramatically. Richthofen, who interceded 
personally with Hitler, convinced the FOhrer of the need to employ Fliegerkorps VIII in the 
operation." 23 Genera/oberst Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen certainly did meet Hitler at 
this time, and his powerful close air support force was subsequently sent to the Crimea 
to support Luftf/otte /V's attacks on Kerch and SevastopoL But even a cursory reading 
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of von Richthofen's personal diary for April reveals that the decision to send him to the 
Crimea was made in his absence and without his prior knowledge by Hitler and Jeschonnek, 
the Luftwaffe Chief of Staff. "Arrived in LOneburg on 12 April for a four-week holiday," 
von Richthofen penned on 18 April. 
At last! But on 18 April, while entertaining guests, received a phone call from 
Jeschonnek: By order of the Fuhrer, I must immediately leave again, to work 
at Kerch. Get there quickly, get everything started! Then I can again take a 
few days off. Formal orders still to come. No use complaining. 24 
The following day he flew to Berlin in a Fieseler Fi 156 Storch and, in Jeschonnek's 
company, rang Hitler from the Air Ministry. "The Fuhrer," he wrote that night, "insisted in 
a very respectful manner that I should take part at Kerch, because I'm the only person 
who can do the job." The risk of failure, Hitler emphasized, "must be minimized, because 
the first blow struck this year must be successfuL" 25 
Hitler clearly thol\ght that the transfer to the Crimea of von Richthofen's F/eigerkorps 
VIII, a specialized close support force with an unparalleled combat record, would guarantee 
that his "first blow" against the Soviets in 1942 would be a success. Von Richthofen was 
an arrogant and aggressive man (whose diary entries are full of harsh and often unfair 
criticisms of both superiors and subordinates), but he was an extraordinarily successful 
and influential tactical air commander. He was, as another historian wrote, "certainly one 
of the best tacticians in the history of air warfare".26 
Von Richthofen was born into an aristocratic family in Barzdorf, Silesia, on 10 October 
1895,21 As a young ensign, he served in the 4th Hussars Regiment from March 1913 
until September 1917. He then transferred to the Imperial Air Service, eventually joining 
the famous Richthofen Squadron, whose first commander had been his cousin Manfred, 
the legendary "Red Baron". After the war he studied engineering, eventually gaining a 
doctorate. He resumed his military career in November 1923, and throughout the 1920s 
his Reichswehr service included time in the cavalry, infantry and artillery. From April 
1929 to October 1932 he served as air attache in the German Embassy in Rome, where 
he befriended Italo Balbo, the Fascist hero and Italian Minister of Aviation. 
In October 1933, von Richthofen joined the fledgling Reich Air Ministry, which evolved 
into the Luftwaffe two years later. In 1936 he served as Chief of Staff to both Genera/major 
Hugo Sperrle and his successor, Genera/major Helmuth Volkmann, commanders of the 
"Condor Legion" which earned fame (and infamy, after the bombing of Guernica) during 
the Spanish Civil War. In November 1938, promoted to Genera/major himself, he became 
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the final commander of that unit. During the Spanish War he experimented with close air 
support tactics and aircraft (including a few early Ju 87 Stukas) and, no doubt influenced 
by his experiences as both a soldier and pilot during the Great War, developed tactics 
and a ground-air liaison system improving air support effectiveness. Also, his experiences 
in Spain removed his earlier doubts about the dive-bomber. Realizing that the dive-
bomber was far more accurate than current horizontal bombers-and, therefore, more 
useful for tactical purposes-he returned to Germany as one of its advocates. 
Because of his outstanding successes in Spain and his competence in the use of the 
dive-bomber and new methods of tactical air employment, which had a significant effect 
on German air planners, von Richthofen was quickly hailed as the Luftwaffe's expert in 
this field. In July 1939, he formed a special close support force (FliegerfOhrer z.b. V.), 
which quickly expanded into the powerful Fliegerkorps VIII. Under his command, this 
specialized ground attack corps distinguished itself in Poland and France by its excellent 
support of advancing Panzer spearheads (for which he won the Knight's Cross and 
promotion to General der Flieger). 
His sluggish Stukas, on the other hand, proved so vulnerable to enemy fighters in 
regions where air superiority had not been attained that he was compelled to provide 
fighter escorts. Even so, they were severely mauled by British fighters during the Battle 
of Britain, forcing the air fleet commanders hastily to withdraw them. However, von 
Richthofen's corps provided exemplary close support in the absence of enemy fighters 
during the Balkans campaign and the airborne invasion of Crete. Enjoying the luxury of 
almost total air superiority, his Stukas inflicted heavy losses on Allied troops, transports 
and shipping. For his dynamic leadership he was awarded Oak Leaves to the Knight's 
Cross. 
Von Richthofen's air corps won further laurels in the eastern campaign, especially 
during the height of the winter crisis when, operating by itself after the transfer of 
Kesselring's units, its support of the army in the critical central zone before Moscow was 
outstanding. In recognition of these achievements, he was promoted to Generaloberst on 
1 February 1942. This was a unique honour for an air corps commander; he now had the 
same rank as the air fleet commanders and the most senior Luftwaffe staff officers, such 
as Jeschonnek and the late Udet. 
In preparation for the major summer campaign, the various units of Fliegerkorps VIII 
had been sent in early April back to their home bases in the Reich for rehabilitation. The 
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rebuilding of the badly-battered units was still in progress when von Richthofen flew to 
Luftflotte IV's headquarters in Nikolayev on 21 April, accompanied by his good friend, 
Jeschonnek. The latter explained that von Richthofen's refitted corps, when it finally 
arrived in the region, was to work in close co-operation with Luftflotte IV. However, 
contrary to the previous custom of placing all corps under the control of the fleet in the 
region, von Richthofen's was not going to be placed under LuftfJotte IV's authority. 
Fliegerkorps VIII, under his command at all times, would actually take charge of air 
operations during the offensive and answer only to Goring.28 It would also provide the 
lion's share of the army's close support. 
This greatly offended the honour of Luftflotte IV's senior officers, especially Gunther 
Korten, the air fleet's Chief of Staff. Korten, an intuitive and talented officer who later 
succeeded Jeschonnek as Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, demanded that he lead the air units 
himself.29 This demand fell on deaf ears, to the indignation of his colleagues. They were, 
von Richthofen recorded in his diary, "deeply peeved and viewed my arrival with 
considerable mistrust".30 His criticisms of their "not very convincing preparations" for the 
offensive only made things worse. Eating in the officers' mess, he sarcastically wrote, 
"was like sitting in a house with a corpse .... in the evening the fleet drowned its grief in 
alcohol". 
The following day he flew to the Crimea in order to talk with local air commanders. He 
was not impressed by how apathetic they appeared and, to their distaste ("they pull 
stupid faces"), angrily informed them that they "must be woken from their winter sleep." 31 
He also had a lengthy meeting with von Manstein. This conference went surpringly well, 
despite the potential for a major ego clash between these two brilliant but conceited 
personalities. "Manstein was surprisingly mellow and accomodating," the air commander 
jotted that evening. "He understood everything. It was extremely uplifting". On many other 
occasions he described his army counterpart in similarly glowing terms. The respect was 
clearly mutual. "Baron von Richthofen," the army general later recalled, "was certainly the 
most outstanding air force leader we had in World War II." 32 "He made great demands 
on his units," the general continued, 
but always went up [in an aircraft] himself to oversee important attacks. 
Moreover, one was always meeting him at the front, where he would visit 
even the most advanced units to get a clear picture of the possibilities of 
providing air support for army operations. Our co-operation, both at Eleventh 
Army and later at Army Groups South and Don, was always excellent. 
The partnership of these men, two of the most talented operational commanders of the 
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Second World War, was probably unrivalled during that great conflict. The spectre of 
petty rivalry revealed itself extremely rarely, and even then it appeared only in the pages 
of their private diaries. There were no public squabbles or instances of major strategical 
dissention. This cannot be said for the professional relationships of many top Allied field 
commanders, where ego clashes and strategical differences often caused significant 
problems (the case of Montgomery and Patton in the Mediterranean and in northwestern 
Europe springs to mind). One has to search hard for evidence that the two Germans 
operated in anything but total unison. On 28 April, to show how insignificant the exceptions 
are, von Richthofen recorded in his diary that he felt snubbed that day by his partner: 
"Waited for Generalfeldmarschall von Bock [commander of Army Group South]. Said 
'Guten Tag' to him, after which Manstein apparently tried to prevent me meeting further 
with him." 33 Despite feeling annoyed, he said and did nothing to inflame the situation, but 
a few days later took great delight in beating von Manstein in a debate over tactical 
differences in front of the 30th Army Corps' command. "Victory!," he jubilantly penned that 
night, "It's pathetic to say, but I'm 'top genera!!'" 34 
In close consultation, they meticulously co-ordinated their operations and created joint 
Schwerpunkte (pOints of main effort). Von Manstein knew that his own forces were 
numerically weak and would, therefore, require the best possible air support. Poor 
communications could prove disastrous, so he stressed the need for effective liaison 
between ground and air forces. Orders from the 30th Army Corps, for example, which 
doubtless originated 'from him, instructed its staff to deal directly with Fliegerkorps VIII 
rather than proceed through normal air fleet channels as in past campaigns.3S 
Von Richthofen's main task in this period was to ensure that all air preparations for 
the attack were going to plan. When he arrived back in Nikolayev on 27 April, the day 
before his command staff arrived in the Crimea and three days before he assumed formal 
command, he was very disappointed by Luftflotte /V's preparations for the offensive, due 
to commence on 5 May. While having coffee with Alexander Lt>hr, the Austrian-born air 
fleet commander, he lectured his own senior officers about their poor preparation efforts. 
"They were," he recorded that evening, "extremely inferior". This was apparently not a 
popular message, as revealed by his next comment: "Some friction and difficulties".36 
During this time he travelled constantly from base to base in his light Storch aircraft, 
which often came under enemy fire and occasionally had to make forced landings. He 
took these risks in order personally to brief his wing and group commanders and flak 
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battalion leaders, and to exhort them to speed up their preparations. Believing that 
commanders are only as good as the men they command, on many occasions he 
addressed not only officers, but also large groups of assembled troops. 
His concerns about the operational readiness of local air units was exacerbated by the 
slow arrival of others returning from rehabilitation in the west. "Two fighter groups and a 
ground-attack wing", he complained in his diary on 2 May, "are stranded in Silesia 
because of bad weather. They were supposed to have arrived today in Luftflotte IV's 
sector." 37 He was clearly unhappy, and asked Jeschonnek whether the campaign should 
be postponed until they arrived. He also discussed the situation with von Manstein, who 
agreed to postpone it for two days (that is, until 7 May).38 The army leader was well aware 
that the success of Trappenjagd depended on the strongest possible air support. It is a 
ground operation, he explained to his corps and division commanders that day, but its 
main effort is in the air. Aircraft would have to "pull the infantry forward." 39 Only the day 
before, he had enthusiastically stated that the operation would have "concentrated air 
support the like of which has never existed." 40 On 4 May, however, von Richthofen was 
forced to postpone the operation a further day because enemy air attacks on forward 
airfields prevented him positioning his fighters close to the front,41 When the missing 
ground-attack wing turned up in Nikolayev the following day, without the two fighter 
groups, which were then in Rumania and Bulgaria, he wanted to postpone it again. 
However, after consulting weather reports, which predicted good weather on the scheduled 
start date, and learning that the groups were on their way (they actually arrived the 
following day), he decided against delaying the attack. It would go ahead, as arranged, 
on 8 May. 
Von Richthofen realized that he had a remarkably strong force at his disposal, comprising 
no fewer than eleven bomber, three dive-bomber and seven fighter groups. Despite his 
unhappiness at the general state of preparations, he never doubted that Trappenjagd 
would be successful and that his air units would playa decisive role. "I actually have the 
impression," he wrote in his diary after inspecting the front on 28 April, "that, compared 
to the middle front, the battle here will be very light and easily accomplished at no great 
cost." Repeating himself, he closed his entry that night with the words: "I believe the 
battle will be very easy." 42 That evening, von Bock recorded in his own diary his feelings 
about the offensive. He was far less optimistic. Whilst he was impressed by the army's 
"careful preparations" for the attack, he still worried about the "extraordinary risk" it 
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entailed.43 His anxiety grew as the launch date approached. He was especially concerned 
about the enemy's defensive depth and, on 5 May, even proposed giving up the wheel 
to the north.44 Von Manstein insisted that this crucial northward turn was the only way of 
destroying the bulk of enemy forces in the first breakthrough. The army group commander 
relented, and allowed the operation to go ahead as planned. 
In recent days, von Manstein had done everything possible to convince the Soviets 
that he was gOing to attack in the northern sector and that they should continue to mass 
troops there. Radio messages meant for the enemy's listening posts were sent, deceptive 
reconnaissance missions and troop movements were undertaken, and false artillery 
positions were constructed.45 He also recruited von Richthofen's units, which pounded 
the enemy in the northern sector. The air commander was keen to help out, seeing the 
deception operations as excellent opportunities to test his units' combat capabilities. He 
was clearly pleased with the result. "Giant fire-magic!", he wrote after witnessing a 
bombardment on the eve of the attack, "The infantry should see what we have to offer. 
It would increase their courage." 46 He had actually tried a week earlier to deploy his 
aircraft in a diversionary attack, believing it would deceive the enemy, put his units 
through their paces, and raise morale.47 On that occasion, however, he was unable to 
persuade von Manstein, who quickly squashed the idea, arguing that it would divide 
available air assets and, with more than a week to go until the start date, forfeit the 
advantage of surprise.48 
Before we analyze the course of the battle itself, which commenced in the early hours 
of 8 May, it is necessary to describe and briefly explain the Luftwaffe's recent activities 
in the region. After all, during the operation's planning stages in the first weeks of April 
and before von Richthofen's units finally arrived in and around the Crimea later that 
month, local air units continued to perform their various tasks. Von Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps 
IV performed the vast majority of all air operations in the massive southern sector of the 
eastern front. Most of von PfJugbeil's units were deployed in support of German armies 
in the Ukraine but, as already noted, several operated alongside FliegerfOhrer Sad in 
support of von Manstein's troops in the Crimea. In April, the latter units were called upon 
to perform a wide range of anti-shipping tasks, including sea-mining. To prevent enemy 
forces dug-in on the Kerch Peninsula gaining reinforcements by sea 'from the Kuban, and 
to ensure that no full-scale, Odessa-style evacuations occur, von Manstein requested that 
Fliegerkorps IV mine the Kerch Straits. 49 
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On 2 April, units commenced mining operations in the straits, which continued 
sporadically for several weeks.50 Reluctant to "waste" its already over-taxed resources 
on what it perceived to be a low-priority task, the air corps committed only a small number 
of aircraft (He 111s and Ju 88s) to the mining missions. As no more than three magnetic 
mines could be carried in each, they proved incapable of laying dense minefields. The 
mines they dropped were never more than a nuisance to enemy ships plying the sea 
lanes. Admiral Schwarzes Meer, aware from air reconnaissance that Soviet mine-sweepers 
still patrolled the straits, actually antiCipated this poor result: "Because of Russian mine-
sweepers reportedly in the Kerch Straits, one must accept that the contamination of these 
waters from the air will not be effective until Kerch itself is once again in our hands." 51 
Von Wild's Fliegerflihrer Slid, still operating alongside Luftflotte IV units, ceaselessly 
bombed and strafed enemy field installations, artiUery batteries, troop concentrations and 
army rear areas in the Kerch Peninsula, and struck at Sevastopol's defensive strongpoints 
and supply centres. His small force was also determined to interdict sea supply routes 
and prevent enemy landings or evacuations during the coming offensives. As a result, 
it kept all Soviet forces, supply lines and possible reinforcement routes in the region 
under close and constant surveillance. Even Soviet naval historians acknowledged after 
tl1e war that Fliegerflihrer Slid's reconnaissance work was of the first order. "In February 
1942," wrote Achkasov and Pavlovich, 
previous high-sea convoy routes were replaced by new routes, since enemy 
aerial reconnaissance had increased on the former. However, in April we had 
to stop using the new routes, because they too were discovered by enemy 
reconnaissance. 52 
Fliegerflihrer Slid also hammered enemy ports and potential embarkation points on the 
Crimean and Caucasian coasts. "In the southern sector of LuftfJotte IV's combat zone," 
Luftwaffe historians noted in 1944, "the heaviest weight of the fighting fell on the harbours 
in question, which supplied Sevastopol and the enemy forces dug in on the Kerch 
Peninsula." 53 Von Wild's force lacked the resources necessary to immobilize totally the 
Soviets' shipping operations. In particular, it proved incapable of preventing Soviet vessels 
laying both offensive minefields in sea-lanes now starting to be used by German supply 
ships and defensive minefields around Sevastopol and the south Crimean coastline.54 
Nonetheless, through careful deployment and constant attacks, FJiegerflihrer Slid was 
able to destroy many harbour installations and disrupt a substantial amount of enemy 
supply shipments. 
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German air units did not have the skies over the Crimea and the Black Sea entirely 
to themselves. During the winter, the Soviet aviation industry, now safely relocated 
beyond the Urals, had slowly regained and then increased its pre~war productive capacity. 
Accordingly, VVS forces, including those in the south, slowly recovered their strength. 
The Luftwaffe estimated at the beginning of March that the VVS had no fewer than 722 
aircraft based on 40 separate airfields throughout Luftflotte IV's huge combat zone.55 
Although this estimate is more than 15 per cent too high, the VVS certainly had at least 
as many aircraft in the region as the Germans. Desperate to regain the Crimea, the 
Soviets operated fighters, fighter~bombers and bombers from four airfields on the Kerch 
Peninsula and 10 in the northwestern Caucasus. Few of the fighters, however, were the 
excellent new models (such as the Yakovlev Yak~7B and the Lavotchkin La~5) now being 
produced in the Urals. The majority of those went straight to the central zone in anticipation 
of a new German campaign to take the capital, as did most of the lend-lease British and 
American aircraft already reaching the Soviet Union. Whilst the VVS units in the south 
did receive some of the latest aircraft, by March the vast bulk of their fighters and 
bombers were stili antiquated and inferior types posing no real threat to the Luftwaffe's 
latest Bf 109s. Their fighters included the Poli karpov 1-153 Chaika (Gu II), the 1-15 Chato 
(Snub~nose), and the truncated 1~16 Rata (Rat), all dating from the Spanish Civil War 
period. The first two, both biplanes, were no match for their vastly superior German 
counterparts, and even the latter, a monoplane of better design, usually came off worst 
in aerial combat. As a result, these fighters "feli like fli es". 56 
Determined to keep the airspace over von Manstein's troops free of enemy aircraft, 
FliegerfOhrer SOd devoted a great deal of effort to the surveillance, bombing and strafing 
of enemy airfields, both on the Kerch Peninsula and in the northwestern Caucasus. 
Powerful enemy flak defences made this a dangerous task, but von Wild's units still 
managed to damage significantly many airfields and occasionally destroy aircraft caught 
on the ground. Of course, they also had to protect their own airfields from air attacks, 
wrlich were constantly attempted but rarely accomplished by the courageous though out~ 
classed Soviet fliers. In April alone, von Wild's units claimed 92 enemy aircraft destroyed 
in the air and a further 14 on the ground, suffering only seven recorded losses.57 The 
most successful single day was 30 April, when Bf 109s of II./J.G. 77 and III./J.G. 52 shot 
down 24 Soviet fighters and bombers attacking their airfields (almost all of Spanish Civil 
War vintage), for no 10sses.58 These figures, it should be pointed out, relate only to 
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Fliegerflihrer Slid. Units belonging to Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV and, after their arrival 
late in April, von Richthofen's Fliegerkorps VIII, racked up their own impressive tallies. 
On 2 May, for example, von Richthofen's fliers engaged ememy aircraft during a bombing 
raid on their airfields. "32 verified kills," the air commander proudly jotted in his diary, "with 
no losses." 59 The VVS proved unable, therefore, to hamper significantly German 
preparations for their Crimean campaigns. By the time Trappenjagd commenced, local 
Soviet air forces had been severely weakened and German air superiority won. 
When von Richthofen's illustrious air corps arrived in the Crimea, it immediately assumed 
operational command (informally at first, officially during the assault on Sevastopol) of 
von Wild's far smaller force. As a result, even the Luftwaffe's own historians, when 
looking back on the 1942 Crimean campaigns, focused closely on Fliegerkorps VIII's 
sensational support of von Manstein's army, but failed to mention specifically the role 
played before and during the campaigns by the less glamorous Fliegerflihrer Slid. The 
daily operational reports of von Wild's command, however, reveal that its contribution to 
German successes was significant. From 18 February, when it replaced Sonderstab 
Krim as the principal air force in the Crimea and Black Sea regions, until the opening of 
Trappenjagd on 8 May, Fliegerflihrer Slid did an effective job with the limited forces at 
its disposal. During that period, it conducted extensive reconnaissance and dropped no 
less than 350,000 propaganda leaflets over enemy lines. It rained bombs down on 
Sevastopol and the ports in the Kerch Straits, sinking 68,450 tons of enemy shipping (a 
third by torpedoes) and two submarines.60 It critically damaged another submarine, 
which probably also sank, and less seriously damaged a large number of ships, including 
42,000 tons of merchant shipping, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, four submarines 
and a tug. Its list of "probably damaged vessels" includes 21,500 additional tons of 
merchant shipping, a further submarine and a patrol boat. 
Fliegerflihrer Slid also reported that it shot down as many as 204 enemy fighters and 
bombers and smashed another 30 on the ground. On the battlefield (mainly at Kerch) it 
blew up three flak batteries and five artillery installations and heavily damaged 25 others. 
It knocked out no fewer than 64 tanks, damaged another 29, put 98 trucks off the road 
for good and left a further 36 damaged. Its attacks on army rear areas were equally 
effective, resulting in the destruction or incapacitation of seventeen locomotives and 
trains, and the total destruction of five petrol dumps, various railway and industrial 
installations and numerous bridges. Heavy blows against ammunition dumps, infantry 
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installations and troop concentrations "also produced good results". It is clear, therefore, 
that von Wild's force contributed significantly to German achievements in the critical 
period leading up to the opening of Trappenjagd. Its ability to contribute substantially to 
all forthcoming campaigns in the region, including both Trappenjagd and Storfang, was 
by no means diminished by the arrival of von Richthofen's powerful corps. 
Trappenjagd: the Bustard Quickly Caught 
On 7 May, von Richthofen held his final briefings with Oberst von Grodeck, whose 
motorized "Grodeck Brigade" had been set up as von Manstein's reserve force, and later 
with Lohr and Korten, Luftflotte /V's Commander and Chief of Staff. With less than 24 
hours until the campaign commenced, they stili had matters to discuss, including inter-
service cooperation, the latest situation reports and their intentions for the following day's 
offensive. General Schulz, von Manstein's new Chief of Staff, paid von Richthofen a visit 
later that evening. He did so, the latter scathingly wrote, "in order to get some backbone." 61 
Even as they talked, the preliminary operations for the attack got underway. Four 
companies of combat engineers and infantrymen climbed into thirty small assault boats 
and pushed off from Feodosiya harbour into the darkness of the Black Sea. This secret 
fleet's mission was to land just behind the Parpach anti-tank ditch at the same time as 
the main frontal offensive reached it early the next morning. This was only possible 
because the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was relatively inactive around Crimean coastlines at 
that time. Increasing air attacks on his ships by FliegerfOhrer SOd and elements of 
Fliegerkorps IV had, as mentioned above, concerned Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii so much 
back in February that he had ordered his captains to take great care in regions patrolled 
by enemy air forces. In particular, they were to conduct coastal bombardment missions 
only under cover of darkness and were to risk none of their larger vessels except during 
periods when poor weather grounded the Luftwaffe. At that time, of course, the long 
hours of winter darkness provided Oktyabrskii's vessels with excellent protection from air 
attack. Now, with far shorter nights and better weather conditions, plus much stronger 
Luftwaffe forces in the Crimea, far fewer naval missions were undertaken. Armed 
merchantmen, usually escorted by cruisers or destroyers, were still supplying Sevastopol 
most nights, and a few destroyers continued bombarding occasionally German positions 
on the southeast coast of the Crimea, but the Black Sea Fleet was only lightly and 
sporadically patrolling the Kerch Peninsula's southern coast.52 
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Also during the night of 7/8 May, von Manstein's divisions carried out last-minute 
preparations and moved into position for the attack. To hold the northern section of the 
front, von Manstein had committed General von Matenklott's 42nd Army Corps, comprising 
one German and three Rumanian divisions. Three infantry divisions of the 30th Army 
Corps were to rip a hole in the southern part of the front. The corps' 22nd Panzer and 
170th Infantry Divisions were then to race through and drive deep into the Soviet rear, 
before wheeling north in the planned enveloping move. 
At 0315, the German artillery erupted in a deafening barrage, accompanied by heavy 
howitzers, rockets and guns from von Richthofen's anti-aircraft units used in direct fire 
against ground targets. The infantry surged forward ten minutes later, followed shortly 
after by waves of Fliegerkorps VIII's bombers and Stukas, pounding the formidable 
enemy defensive lines and shattering bunkers and gun implacements. Ground-attack 
planes struck enemy airfields, logistics systems and almost anything moving in the Soviet 
rear. These initial air operations, which created havoc in both forward and rear areas, 
were conducted in accordance with detailed and specific requests from the two army 
corps. 
Many bomber units operated 'from airfields in Nikolayev and Kherson in Ukraine and, 
therefore, flew 330 and 270 kilometres respectively to reach the Kerch front. Others 
operated from fields in the central Crimea (many centred around Saki, Simferopol and 
Sarabusy) and were able, as a result, to fly far more missions and carry heavier bomb-
loads. Most Stukas and other ground-attack aircraft, including the brand-new Henschel 
Hs 129 (which "made a good impression" on von Richthofen63), flew from these and 
newly-prepared fields even closer to the front. The Grammatikovo base, for example, was 
only 40 kilometres west of Ak Monai. 
German fighters ceaselessly patrolled the skies above the Kerch Straits, preventing 
most enemy aircraft based on airfields on the Taman Peninsula breaching their screen. 
The VVS desperately tried to stop Luftwaffe operations by putting up every available 
fighter, but their counter-attacks were poorly organized and their vastly outclassed and 
outnumbered fighters proved little more than sitting ducks. No fewer than 82 were shot 
down on the first day alone by German fighters combing the skies for enemy planes as 
they sought, and gained, air superiority over the battlefield.54 After the war, the official 
Soviet history placed blame for the VVS's poor showing squarely on the shoulders of 
Lieutenant-General D. T. Koslov, the Crimean Front commander, and Commissar 1st 
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Rank L. Z. Mekhlis, the Stavka's Front representative. "The Command of the Front," 
states the official history, "absolutely failed to effect co-ordination of ground and air 
forces. Our aviation operated outside the general plan of the defensive operation and 
despite existing opportunities was not able to damage the enemy's air forces." 65 German 
losses were indeed low. The first day was by far the worst: ten aircraft lost with their 
crews, and a further ten damaged. 
Von Richthofen arrived that first morning at his forward command post "just as the first 
bombs were falling".66 Remarkably, in light of his previous optimism, he suffered butterflies 
in his stomach: "Usual attack tensions," he complained that evening, "combined with 
morning chill. Always the same strange atmosphere, which only gradually loses its tension 
with its frequency." He was soon delighted, however, by the performance of his air units, 
which conducted an impressive 2,100 missions and provided "giant fire-magic the entire 
day". 
An hour after the artillery barrage first began, the assault boats shot towards the 
section of coast where the anti-tank ditch ended in the sea. Under cover of Bf 109s 
strafing the bunkers and gun nests on the rim of the ditch, the boats sailed right into the 
ditch itself, allowing the troops to leap ashore and begin spraying machine-gun fire at the 
startled Soviets. Meanwhile, the infantry divisions of Fretter-Pico's corps, assisted by 
artillery and covered by a constant stream of fighters and dive-bombers, had struggled 
through barbed wire entanglements and mine-fields and, under a hail of enemy machine 
gun fire, succeeded in crossing the ditch itself. Aided by the troops from the assault 
boats, they were able to penetrate the enemy's forward positions. "l'Jevertheless," recalled 
von Manstein, 
the battle was certainly not easy. The ground won on the far side of the tank-
ditch was not yet sufficient for the [22nd] Panzer Division to be moved over. 
Additionally, the following attack by the 42nd Army Corps could only move 
forward with great difficulty. All the same, we had already encountered ten 
enemy divisions in the front and shattered its southern wing. Furthermore, the 
enemy's reserves appeared to remain behind his northern wing.67 
During the night of 8/9 May, the 22nd Panzer Division was unable to advance across 
the anti-tank ditch. Although engineers had blasted the ditch's steep walls with explosives 
in order to create several crossings, they were not yet wide or 'firm enough to take the 
division's tanks.58 Fretter-Pico, therefore, decided instead to send first the lighter "Grodeck 
Brigade", comprising a Rumanian motorized regiment and two German truck-mounted 
infantry battalions. At noon, Oberst von Grodeck's brigade surged across the ditch and 
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past the 132nd Infantry Division, with orders to head towards Kerch with all possible 
speed. Stunned by the speed of the brigade's advance, Soviet divisions in its path ''fled 
back and disintegrated".69 As it happened, von Richthofen glumly wrote that evening, the 
brigade "advanced so fast that, when it reached the eastern Tartar Ditch [the Sultanovka 
Une], it ran straight into our bombs. There were several losses." 70 
Eleventh Army units had previously been instructed to mark their positions clearly in 
order to prevent "friendly fire" incidents like this.71 As in earlier campaigns, they were 
supposed to layout white identification panels and, if necessary, use flares and smoke 
pots.12 Ground troops were not yet able to establish direct radio contact with aircraft 
overhead. Inter-service communication was facilitated instead by Fliegerverbindungsoffizier 
(air liaison officers, or Flivos) , specially-trained air force officers attached to forward 
ground units. In constant radio communication with their air corps, FJivos appraised the 
corps of the situation and the intentions of the ground units, advised army commanders 
on the most practical use of airpower and passed on their requests for air assistance.13 
This system worked well when Luftwaffe units were attacking clearly-defined enemy 
positions during static or slow-moving operations, but not satisfactorily during operations 
like Trappenjagd, when the situation on the ground was far more fluid. 
The fluid nature of the battle created another problem for von Richthofen. He liked 
to direct his forces from command posts as close to the front as possible. Because the 
front itself moved forward many kilometres each day, he constantly moved his command 
posts to keep pace. This created enormous problems for his signals teams, who struggled 
to relocate radio equipment and lay telephone wires (connecting his new posts to airfields 
and army posts) fast enough. On 12 May, for example, von Richthofen furiously wrote 
in his diary that a certain signals expert who disagreed with him "is and remains worthless 
and a pompous ass!" Similarly, two days later he complained that his signals teams took 
so long to wire up a new command post that he had to wait several hours for vital reports 
to arrive. "The signals personnel here are pathetic and fail constantly," he seethed. 
Despite his constant hounding, his Signals teams proved incapable of satisfying his often-
unfair demands. Right up until the day Kerch fell, he complained about their performance. 
Late in the afternoon of 9 May-to return to the battle-the 22nd Panzer Division 
finally crossed the Parpach ditch and, accompanied by infantry, rolled eastward several 
kilometres. It beat off an attack by a Soviet tank brigade, then swung, as planned, to the 
north. Everything was going far too slowly for the army commander. "Back to the 
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command post," von Richthofen recorded, "where von Manstein was. In my opinion, he 
was worried. I calmed him down and pointed to our decisive actions planned for the next 
few hours. He remained skeptical." 74 Despite von Manstein's concerns about the rate of 
progress, things were actually going according to plan. If the 22nd Panzer Division kept 
pushing northward, it would reach the sea before dark, trapping the greater part of the 
two Soviet armies still fighting in the northern sector of the front. However, an hour before 
dusk, all operations ground to a halt when a heavy spring rain poured down, quickly 
turning the ground into a muddy morass. Von Richthofen, whose air units had flown more 
than 1,700 sorties and shot down 42 enemy aircraft that day, with only two losses, felt 
frustrated by the weather but confident of ultimate success. "Unless the weather itself 
stops us," he bluntly wrote, "no Russian will leave the Crimea alive." 
The 22nd Panzer Division struggled forward through the mud until several hours after 
dark. A thick fog covered the saturated ground the next morning, preventing the early 
resumption of both air and ground operations. Throwing up mud and carving deep track-
marks in the loamy soil, the tanks, still supported by infantrymen, finally began churning 
forward again in the early afternoon. A powerful Soviet artillery barrage hit the division 
with punishing blows until von Richthofen, watching from his Storch high above the 
battlefield (which almost cost him his life when enemy flak filled his plane with shrapnel), 
threw every available aircraft into the fray. The Soviet guns were quickly silenced. Von 
Grodeck was stili pushing forward towards Kerch but wanted air support to take some of 
the heat off his brigade. However, von Richthofen's planes were no use to him, because 
pilots and gunners were unable to distinguish German from Russian troops in the chaotic 
conditions on the ground.75 The air commander's jubilant diary entry for that evening 
reveals that, all things considered, the operation was progressing well: "By sunset we 
have isolated ten Red divisions, except for a narrow gap. The pocket is almost closed. 
In the morning the extermination can begin." 
During the night of 10 and 11 May, poor visibilty curtailed the Luftwaffe's operations 
against the narrow gap in the pocket centred around Ak-Monai. Dense ground fog in the 
morning hampered operations until 1100, but once the fog lifted von Richthofen's units 
attacked in mass the enemy units still holding open the gap. "Only after plenty of air 
support," he claimed, "were they [the 22nd Panzer and 132nd Infantry Divisions] able to 
break through to the Sea of Azov and close the pocket, out of which the enemy has been 
streaming since last night." No fewer than ten panic-stricken divisions were trapped, but 
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those who had managed to escape and flee eastward were hardly better off. They made 
splendid targets for von Richthofen's ground attack aircraft, which rained down bombs of 
all calibres, including "devil's eggs" and other anti-personnel projectiles. The air leader 
was initially delighted by the "wonderful scene".76 "We are inflicting the highest losses 
of blood and materiel", he wrote. However, after overseeing air operations on other 
sectors of the Kerch Peninsula-where, he alleged, the army "still had winter fear in their 
bones" and were not attacking the enemy aggressively enough-he flew again over the 
area where the gap in the pocket had been. This time he was amazed by the level of 
destruction. "Terriblel Corpse-strewn fields from earlier attacks ... I have seen nothing like 
it so far in this war." He was so shocked, in fact, that the following day he took General 
Martini, the Luftwaffe's Chief Signals Officer, to see the grisly sight. 
On 12 May, the 50th Infantry and 28th Light Divisions remained around the pocket, 
which steadily disintegrated throughol.Jt the day, while all other available German forces 
raced eastward along essentially the same path that von Godeck's brigade had taken. 
By dusk, the 132nd and 170th Infantry Divisions were within sight of the Sultanovka Line, 
with the 22nd Panzer Division, which had turned east immediately after closing the 
pocket, steadily advancing behind them. Von Grodeck's brigade was now in a vulnerable 
pOSition on the eastern side of the Sultanovka Line, but was able to fight off heavy attacks 
with the aid of urgently-requested fighter aircraft. 
Things were going poorly indeed for the Soviets. Two days earlier, the Stavka had 
ordered Koslov to pull his armies back to the Sultanovka Line. They were to hold this line 
at all costs. However, the commander vacillated and delayed executing the order for 
almost 48 hours. He then failed to organize the withdrawal properly.77 Thus, when 
German troops appeared on 12 May at the Sultanovka Line, far behind Koslov's 
headquarters, the Soviet command structure collapsed. Numerous divisions, broken and 
disoriented, began retreating eastwards in various states of disorder. Koslov's command 
was no longer capable of effecting decisive actions. The few remaining VVS units in the 
region, for instance, were never ordered to provide retreating columns with air cover. As 
the official Soviet history states: 
Frontal aviation was not employed by the command in a reasonable manner. 
It did not even attempt to organize mass strikes on the most important enemy 
groupings and cover the pull-back of its [ground] forces, who were subjected 
to constant attack by enemy aviation.78 
Enjoying total air supremacy, von Richthofen's units flew over 1,500 sorties that day. 
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They provided the army with excellent support by dropping ammunition to von Grodeck's 
brigade, pounding the enemy columns streaming eastward and troops dug-in behind the 
Sultanovka Line, and hammering Kerch and the other ports on the peninsula's eastern 
tip. Von Manstein's earlier prediction that Trappenjagd would have "concentrated air 
support the like of which has never existed" was apparently being fulfilled. That 
notwithstanding, 12 May was an unhappy day for von Richthofen. To his horror, the 
Luftwaffe High Command ordered him hastily to send many of his key units 500 kilometres 
north to Kharkov, where a major Soviet offensive had just struck. (To allow a proper 
narrative flow, the Luftwaffe's deployment during the Kharkov defensive 'fighting will be 
described below after the conclusion of the Crimean campaigns.) His diary entry for that 
day has a matter-of fact tone: "Apparently Kharkov is a colossal mess; the Russians 
broke through with tanks in two places. We must release one fighter, one dive-bomber 
and two bomber groups!" 79 His entry for the following day reveals more clealy his 
feelings on the matter: "The matter at Kharkov stinks considerably. I must give up further 
bomber groups, two fighter groups and two dive-bomber groups. That is, practically 
everything! By order of the Fuhrer. I report, therefore, that the successful completion of 
Kerch now looks questionable." 
Despite the air commander's angry statement, the likelihood of German success on 
the Kerch Peninsula was certainly not questionable; when the 132nd and 170th Infantry 
Divisions broke through the Sultanovka Line in the morning of 13 May, followed a few 
hours later by the 22nd Panzer Division, total success seemed imminent. Nonetheless, 
between them and Kerch lay columns of fleeing Soviet troops, who hoped to save 
themselves by crossing the narrow straits to the Caucasian mainland, but also pockets 
of stiff resistance. The following afternoon, the 132nd Infantry Division brought Kerch 
under fire from the south, while the 170th Infantry Division pushed right into the city's 
outskirts. Resistance remained fierce. Von Richthofen knew that the Soviets hoped to 
hold back the German advance long enough to allow the troops massed on the beaches 
to be ferried by small vessels of the Black Sea naval, merchant and fishing fleets across 
the straits in a Dunkirk-like evacuation.so He was also acutely aware that his air corps no 
longer possessed sufficient forces to contribute substantially to the battle. "The Russians 
are sailing across the narrows in small craft," he fumed on 14 May, "and we can do 
nothing about it. It makes me sick!" 81 The next day, Jeschonnek arrived at his command 
post ("which is now superfluous because I have nothing left to command"), in order to 
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inspect the front. The highly-frustrated commander took Jeschonnek to Kerch. "One isn't 
sure whether to cry or curse," he bitterly wrote that night: 
The Reds remain massed on the beaches and cross the sea at their leisure. 
Infantry and tanks can't advance because of the desperately-resisting Reds 
and we [the Luftwaffe] can't do anything because we don't have adequate 
forces. The whole situation will yet turn out badly.82 
Kerch fell on 15 May, prompting Halder prematurely to state that "the Kerch offensive 
may be considered closed. Only the promontory north of the city must still be cleared 
up." 83 Two days later, however, he had to admit that certain enemy units continued to 
put up "fanatical resistance". Despite suffering terrible losses, they clearly still hoped to 
hold back German troops long enough for a seaborne evacuation to be organized. Although 
von Richthofen's account suggests that his units were powerless to prevent any attempts 
to evacuate the terrified Soviets, between 13 and 17 May aircraft of Fliegerfilhrer Sild 
made constant attacks against troop concentrations on the beaches and gunboats and 
other small vessels in the Kerch Straits. 84 Despite their numerical weakness, they destroyed 
various flak and artillery installations, bombed assembly and embarkation pOints, sank 
and damaged a number of small vessels, and forced several others aground. Their 
efforts, coupled with those of the army, which laid a blistering artillery barrage on 17 May, 
quickly brought the improvised Odessa-style evacuation to an end. Von Richthofen, who 
had constantly fumed in his diary that the army lacked aggression, was relieved to see 
the result of the army's concentrated gunfire: "Finally the army brings every available gun 
together and fires with 80 batteries into the narrows. Infantry advances and breaks 
through. By sunset the battle is all but over. At last!" 85 John Erickson, a British historian, 
graphically described the same scene: 
Over the remnants of the Crimean Front Manstein now laid a mass artillery 
barrage, blowing men, guns and tanks to pieces; with more gunfire the Germans 
drove off the Black Sea Fleet motor gunboats trying desperately to lift the 
troops off the beach where they were being battered to death. In this 'ghastly 
mess' ... [the Soviet Command] struggled to exercise some control over the 
situation but this broke down in the great welter of chaos and confusion. 86 
Sporadic fighting on the Kerch Peninsula continued for another week, but on 19 May 
von Manstein felt sufficiently satisfied with the situation to declare Trappenjagd completed. 
It was a stunning success. "According to our reports," he recorded in his memoirs, 
around 170,000 prisoners, 1,133 guns and 258 tanks fell into our hands. Five 
German infantry divisions and one Panzer division, as well as two Rumanian 
infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade, had destroyed two full armies [and 
the greater part of a third] comprising 26 major formations. Only insignificant 
elements of the enemy were able to cross the Straits of Kerch to the Taman 
Peninsula.87 
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Although he failed to mention it, the Wehrmacht had also smashed Crimean VVS forces. 
They destroyed airfields, hangars, supply systems and as many as 323 aircraft during the 
two-week battle.88 The only VVS unit left in the Crimea was the Third Special Air Group 
of the Sevastopol Defense Region, operating from airfields within the fortress area.89 It 
now comprised a meagre 60 obsolete aircraft, a substantial drop from its November 1941 
strength of more than 300. Vastly outclassed and outnumbered (more than ten to one) 
by German aircraft, these old machines would prove incapable of contributing to the 
defence of the fortress during the coming siege. 90 
Not wishing to suggest that his army had won the Battle of Kerch by itself, von 
Manstein praised von Richthofen's air corps for its outstanding support. ~~Fliegerkorps VIII 
contributed decisively to this successful outcome," he added. "A true battle of annihilation 
was victoriously fought." 91 The air corps-which flew between 1,000 and 2,000 missions 
per day before the diversion of key units to Kharkov, and between 300 and 800 after-
had certainly lived up to expectations. In particular, the crushing blows it dealt the enemy 
in the first days of the battle, including precision attacks on field headquarters and 
command posts, enabled Axis ground forces to overcome their numerical inferiority and 
break through the apparently-impregnable defensive lines. After the war, the Soviets 
blamed themselves for Fliegerkorps VII/'s effectiveness in those first days: 
The unconcern of the Army and Front staffs, the insufficiently camouflaged 
command posts, and the failure to periodically move their locations, facilitated 
the German aviation, which bombed these posts in the first attacks, destroying 
wire communications and the control of troops. The staffs were not prepared 
for the utilization of radio and other means of communication.92 
Von Richthofen was naturally delighted by his corps' superb performance over the last 
two weeks of furious combat but realized, even during the euphoric days after fighting 
finished, that a much tougher task for his men lay ahead: the siege of Sevastopol, 
probably the world's strongest fortress at that time. After spending the afternoon of 19 
May surveying the carnage on the beaches near Kerch-where "dreadfully many dead 
horses and Russians lay strewn, and stinking accordingly"-he had a lengthy telephone 
discussion about the future with Jeschonnek and Martini.93 "One sees," he noted in his 
diary, "that the OKW are too optimistic regarding future deadlines and the army's combat 
strength. I have doubts!!" 
Before we turn our attention to the assault on Sevastopol, the strategic significance of 
the Kerch victory should be emphasized. First, it enabled von Manstein to concentrate 
almost all forces in the Crimea for a massive assault on Sevastopol without fear of being 
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struck in the back. Second, with the peninsula now in his hands and the narrow straits 
under the sweep of his guns, Hitler had his planned "springboard" into the Caucasus. As 
one historian wrote: "Manstein's victory had kicked open the back door to Stalin's oil 
paradise." 94 
Sevastopol: a "tough nut to crack" 
On 20 May, von Richthofen and the Eleventh Army commander met to discuss the 
coming campaign. According to the airman's diary, von Manstein heartily agreed that the 
attack on the fortress required at least the level of air support provided in previous weeks. 
The assault would not be possible if Fliegerkorps VII/ was (as in the Kerch campaign's 
latter stages) prematurely diverted elsewhere or its combat strength reduced.95 Two days 
later, after flying back to the Reich to brief his superiors, von Richthofen had the opportunity 
to emphasize that the maximum concentration of airpower was needed at all times during 
the attack. He found Hitler most attentive: "I give a short talk about our experiences at 
Kerch and the requirements for Sevastopol. The Fuhrer seems to agree .... Then we were 
alone [for dinner]. The Fuhrer is very nice, calling me his specialist, etc." 96 They got on 
famously, even laughing together about the eccentricities of Goring and the hunting 
fraternity. Apparently mocking the Reichsmarscha/l's "quest for trophies," the War Lord 
jokingly asked why "soldiers don't hang the jawbones of dead Russians in their rooms." 
Although Goring may never have learned that he had been the butt of Hitler's jokes that 
night, he was well aware that his own star had fallen in recent months and was clearly 
annoyed that von Richthofen, for whom he had no affection, had dined alone with the 
Fuhrer. "The Reichsmarschall has bawled out Jeschonnek," the bewildered air corps 
commander noted in his diary four days later, "because I was with the Fuhrer." 97 
Goring was the subject of another of von Richthofen's discussions on 21 May, this 
time with Jeschonnek. The leadership of Luttf/otte IV, Jeschonnek had said, was going 
to change as soon as the initial operations of the coming summer campaign got underway. 
Alexander Lohr, the talented air fleet commander, would be promoted and sent to the 
Balkans, where he would serve as Commander-in-Chief, Southeast. Goring wanted to 
replace him with Bruno Lorzer, his close friend and commander of Fliegerkorps II. 
Fortunately, Hitler and Jeschonnek had other plans. After the siege of Sevastopol, von 
Richthofen would himself assume command of Luftflotte IV. A "hands-on" commander 
who liked nothing better than to be in the thick of the action, he was not thrilled by the 
news of his pending promotion, feeling that his "level of effectiveness would decrease 
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sharply." 98 However, the Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, he noted in his diary that night, remained 
adamant. "Jeschonnek maintains-rightly so-that the higher Luftwaffe command is lousy, 
so I must move up, where the action is. I must show them how things should be done." 
After four days with the Reich's top military leaders, including Jodi, Goring and Milch, 
von Richthofen climbed aboard a He 111 at LOneburg at dawn on 25 May for his six-hour 
flight back to Simferopol in the Crimea. After lunch and attending to the pile of paperwork 
that had built up in recent days, it was back to business as usual. To catch up on recent 
events in the area and to brief his senior officers on the coming campaign, he held a 
meeting that lasted until late in the evening. The defence of the Kerch Peninsula, where 
sporadic fighting continued in the stone quarries north of Kerch (a further 3,000 Soviets 
had been captured only the day before) was high on the agenda. It was essential to 
prevent a repeat performance of the enemy landings on the peninsula, which had taken 
place while the army's back was turned during the previous siege of Sevastopol. Moreover, 
it was important to cut off the supply ships which slipped into Sevastopol each night. Von 
Wild's Fliegerfiihrer Siid, he said, would assume responsibility for the Kerch Peninsula's 
security and for naval reconnaissance over the Black Sea. 99 
Von Wild doubtless received this news with mixed emotions; because the powerful 
Fliegerkorps VIII would again carry out the vast bulk of ground attack missions, his own 
small force would be able for the first time in months to concentrate solely on the anti-
naval tasks for which it was formed. It would no longer have to dissipate its strength by 
undertaking a wide range of missions. However, his command would no longer need, 
for anti-naval missions alone, many of the ground attack units it possessed late in April, 
when it carried out a multitude of different tasks. 10o Accordingly, he knew that von 
Richthofen, who had already poached some of his units for the Battle of Kerch, would 
strip his already-small force to the bone, leaving it greatly weakened. This did, in fact, 
occur. When the initial air and artillery assault on Sevastopol began on 2 June, Fliegerfiihrer 
Siid comprised only one fighter, one torpedo bomber and one long-range reconnaissance 
group. Its other fighters, dive-bombers and bombers had been formally absorbed into 
Fliegerkorps VII1.101 
Although Fliegerfiihrer Siid was given responsibility for the Kerch Peninsula's security 
and for naval interdiction and reconnaissance over the Black Sea, it would not be patrolling 
the southeastern Crimean coastlines alone. Units of both Fliegerkops IV and VIII, trying 
to cut off seabornes supplies to the fortress, would also patrol the sea lanes around 
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Sevastopol. They were not the only other Axis forces trying to cut off these supplies; early 
in June, small warships of Admiral Schwarzes Meer began operating in Crimean waters. 
Their presence had been requested by von Manstein's command staff, which wanted 
them "to interfere with incoming and out outgoing naval traffic at the start of the Battle 
for Sevastopol".102 By the time the ground battle commenced on 7 June, this force would 
comprise a German flotilla of six MTSs and a few light patrol vessels (based in Ak 
Mechet) and an Italian flotilla of four MTBs, six midget submarines and four armed motor 
boats (based in Yalta).103 This force would grow even stronger in following weeks. 
Marine-Gruppenkommando SOd had originally planned to deploy all these vessels 
from Yalta, under the joint command of the Italian flotilla commander, capitano di (regata 
Bimbelli, the German flotilla commander, Leutnant Birnbacher, and the commander of the 
local air force, Oberst von Wild himself.104 However, V;zeadmiral Gatting persuaded his 
superiors to keep the forces separate, arguing that "the massing of all forces in the small 
harbour at Yalta constitutes an unwarranted risk, as slJch a concentration of boats would 
not escape the enemy's notice and would lead to heavy air attacks".105 Realizing that his 
forces could only contribute to the battle if deployed in close co-operation with the Luftwaffe, 
Gatting considered the idea of a joint command far more reasonable. Accordingly, he 
ordered Birnbacher "to proceed to [von Wild's headquarters at] Saki to confer with Air 
Commander South and Commander Mimbelli and set up a common operational H.Q. 
there for the period of operations in the sea area off Sevastopol." 106 
As instructed, a naval-air command was established in Saki under Birnbacher's, 
Mimbelli's and von Wild's joint command. To improve inter-service communication, naval 
signals teams constructed powerful new radio transmitters in the Crimea.107 These 
greatly accelerated the dissemination of important information-especially vessel sightings 
by reconnaissance aircraft-amongst the various air and naval commands and bases. 
To increase inter-service co-operation, Marine-Gruppenkommando SOd also sent 
Konteradmiral Eyssen, the Naval Liaison Officer to Luftflotte IV, to work at von Wild's 
headquarters.108 Relations soon became extremely good; von Wild even informed his 
naval colleagues that they could request air reconnaissance missions as they saw fit. His 
willjngness to work closely with them did not pass unnoticed. The naval command in 
Sofia, for example, was clearly impressed. Von Wild "has himself been a naval officer," 
it reported, "and possesses an extraordinary understanding of naval combat leadership." 
As a result, "co-operation between naval and air forces in the operational zone exists, 
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and without friction." 109 
Events during the assault on Sevastopol show that even the best attempts at inter-
service co-operation can be hampered by simple misunderstandings. For example, shortly 
after the initial air and artillery assault began on 2 June, the Italian and German IVITBs, 
midget submarines and armed motor boats began anti-shipping missions in the sea-lanes 
around Sevastopol. Despite von Wild's own desire for close co-operation between his 
aircraft and these naval forces, von Richthofen, his boss, felt frustrated by their presence. 
Although Admiral Schwarzes Meer had ordered its vessels to display larger and more 
prominent identification markers 110, von Richthofen feared they were still at risk from 
attack by German aircraft mistaking them for Soviet ships. Accordingly, on 10 June 
Eyssen sent Getting, commander of Admiral Schwarzes Meer, the following radio message: 
As it is impossible always to be informed if and when submarines and light 
forces of the German and Italian navies are in Crimean waters, Commanding 
General, 8th Air Corps [von Richthofen], has given orders prohibiting his 
planes from making any attacks whatsoever on any submarines or light forces-
including Russian vessels in the entire Black Sea. 111 
Getting was stunned. "There is no valid reason," he insisted, "why these air attacks on 
submarines and light forces should be prohibited in the whole Black Sea area, as at 
present the German and Italian E-boats and submarines are only operating in the Crimean 
area." 112 He ordered Eyssen to get this ridiculous prohibition modified so that aircraft 
could resume all operations over the vast expanses of the Black Sea. The only areas in 
which anti-shipping attacks should be avoided are the sea-lanes around the Crimea. On 
12 June, Eyssen discussed the prohibition with a disbelieving von Wild, who commanded 
the only aircraft operating outside the requested small restriction zone. Agreeing that von 
Richthofen's prohibition was counter-productive, the air commander immediately modified 
it according to Getting's request. Accordingly, anti-shipping missions over all sea regions 
outside the Crimean restriction zone quickly resumed. 
Preparations for the Attack 
We left von Richthofen in the last week of May, making preparations for the coming 
assault on Sevastopol. Both he and von lVIanstein knew that Sevastopol would be (as 
American Intelligence officers graphically wrote a few months later) a remarkably "tough 
nut to crack".113 "Its main defenses," wrote Hermann Plocher, 
were directed seaward, with powerful defensive positions extending along the 
coastal area from Mamashni through Cape Kherson to Balaklava. Its land 
defenses consisted of two converging belts of fortifications, the outer perimeter 
of which encircled the city at a distance of 9 to 12 miles, running from Balaklava 
to Belbek. The inner belt of forts circled the inner city and the port south of 
Severnaya Bay at a distance of 3 miles. Innumerable defense installations of 
all sorts were distributed throughout the entire fortress area, and virtually no 
part of the terrain was without its fortifications. 
To the north of Severnaya Bay were 11 strongpoints, some of which were of 
modern construction ... Since November of 1941, almost the entire local 
population of the area had participated in the intensive work on Sevastopol's 
fortifications. Russian civilians blasted hundreds of bunkers and gun and mortar 
positions out of the rugged, rocky and vegetation-covered terrain, and laid 
numerous mine-fields throughout the area. To increase the strength of these 
defenses still more, they constructed additional field fortifications such as anti-
tank ditches and barbed-wire entanglements.114 
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The defenders themselves constituted a substantial force. General I. E. Petrov's 
Independent Maritime Army comprised seven rifle divisions, four brigades, two regiments 
of marines, two tank battalions and various other units. In total, aside from civilians, who 
had fiercely resisted previous German siege attempts and could be counted on to repeat 
their valiant efforts, there were no fewer than 106,000 front-line troops in the fortress. il5 
They were well armed, having around 600 artillery pieces, of various calibres, and more 
than 2,000 mortars, and were steadily supplied and reinforced by vessels of Oktyabrskii's 
Black Sea Fleet. 
Von Manstein assembled his own strong force of seven and a half German and one 
and a half Rumanian divisions (and each German division was around 20 per cent larger 
than its Soviet counterpart), excluding four other divisions assigned the task of guarding 
the Kerch Peninsula and south Crimean coastlines. li6 Determined to shatter the city's 
formidable defences, the German commander amassed an impressive number of artillery 
pieces-1,300 guns and 720 mortars in total-which formed 121 individual batteries. His 
heavy siege artilley included huge 19-cm cannons and 30.5, 35 and 42-cm howitzers, as 
well as two 61.5-cm howitzers ("Thor" and "Odin"). These massive guns, which fired 
2,200-kg shells, were specially designed for use against concrete installations. Even so, 
they were not the heaviest guns in von Manstein's arsenal. That honour went to the 
mighty "Dora", which, with its 80-cm calibre and 32-metre-long barrel, was easily the 
heaviest cannon of the Second World War. il7 Originally designed to bombard the Maginot 
Line but not completed in time, "Dora" was a monster. The transportation of its components 
to the Crimea required 60 railway cars. At Bachtschisarei, 30 kilometres northeast of 
Sevastopol, it sat on two double railway tracks and (as per Hitler's instructions to Luftflotte 
IV) required the constant protection of two flak battalions. It could hurl high-explosive 
shells weighing almost five metric tons a distance of 47 kilometres, or seven-ton armour-
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piercing shells (the height of a two~story house) a distance of 38 kilometres.118 
The great strength of von Manstein's firepower was substantially enhanced by the 
presence of an unprecedented concentration of combat aircraft. Von Richthofen's 
Fliegerkorps VIII, which had proved its worth as "airborne artillery" during recent massive 
bombardments of fortifications and strongpoints on the Kerch Peninsula, would again join 
forces with Eleventh Army. Von Richthofen planned to deploy his 400 or so combat 
aircraft alongside von Wild's FliegerfOhrer Sad and elements of P1:lugbeil's Fliegerkorps 
IV, which would put a total of almost 600 aircraft under his operational command. If the 
High Command granted him the units he wanted, he would have three long~range 
reconnaissance squadrons, five fighter, two ground~attack, three dive-bomber, and six 
bomber groups.119 Late in May, however, he was gravely concerned that the High 
Command would deny him this strength by not returning to him the key air units recently 
sent to other sections of the eastern front. Hitler had apparently decided that those units 
should be retained and used for planned counter-offensives in the Kharkovand Izyum 
regions. 120 "Jodi, an old artillerist, keeps telling the Fahrer that artillery is enough for 
here", he glumly wrote in his diary on 30 May.121 "Manstein passes my pleas against this 
view on to Bock and Halder. Jeschonnek won't take a stand". To his great relief, his pleas 
had the desired effect. "In the evening", he continued, "arrived the the decision that two 
further bomber groups are being sent here, so that we [Fliegerkorps VIII alone] now 
possess three dive~bomber, six bomber and three fighter groups." He was still not 
entirely happy, complaining that even these forces are ''few enough". As it happened, by 
the time the assault on the fortress commenced, he commanded no fewer than 600 
aircraft, comprising three reconnaissance squadrons (one being long-range), four fighter, 
three dive-bomber, and seven bomber groups.122 
This powerful force was slightly stronger in bomber aircraft than von Richthofen originally 
planned, but lighter in ground-attack and fighter aircraft. Although he doubtless lamented 
the loss of ground-attack aircraft, he was not unduly concerned by his fighter strength. 
After all, the pathetic enemy air force in the Crimea, with only 60 old planes, was 
outnumbered ten to one. His air corps, therefore, could begin air operations immediately, 
without having first to wage a time-consuming battle for air superiority. Moreover, because 
his bombers would encounter little enemy air opposition, far fewer fighter escorts than 
normal were needed. 
Because the VVS posed no threat to German forces in the Crimea, von Richthofen felt 
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able to commit the majority of his flak units (which formed the 18th and 27th Flak 
Regiments) to ground combat missions. He did, of course, comply with the Fuhrer's 
instruction that "Dora" and the other massive siege guns receive strong anti-aircraft 
protection, but committed most other flak units to service alongside von Manstein's regular 
field artillery. Powerful leaders often find delegation difficult, and von Richthofen, who 
liked to involve himself in all aspects of combat operations, was no exception. He simply 
refused to place his l:lak units even temporarily under tile operational command of Eleventh 
Army's artillery officers, insisting instead on directing their use himself. Additionally, 
rather than dispersing his flak units amongst army divisions, as the artillery officers 
requested, he insisted they remain together so that their gunfire could be concentrated 
at crucial points as the need arose.123 This decision would, as we shall shortly see, 
cause inter-service friction during the middle stages of the assault on the fortress. 
Aside from tllis disagreement over the employment of flak batteries, relations between 
von Richthofen and his army counterpart, von Manstein, remained excellent. As with the 
previous Kerch campaign, they held a number of inter-service conferences to iron out 
minor conceptual differences, co-ordinate operations and create joint Schwerpunkte. Von 
Manstein divided Eleventh Army into three attack forces, positioning them north, east and 
south of the fortress. From the north, 54th Army Corps (comprising the 22nd, 24th, 50th 
and 132nd Infantry Divisions and the reinforced 213th Infantry Regiment) would strike 
suddenly and with great force, with the aim of shattering the formidable enemy defensive 
lines and securing the northern shore of Severnaya Bay and the heights around Gaytany.124 
From the south, 30th Army Corps (with the 72nd and 170th Infantry Divisions and the 
28th Light Infantry Division) would conduct an assault, three days later, in order to occupy 
the Sapun Heights south and southeast of tile city. Sandwiched between these two large 
attack forces was the far smaller 6th Rumanian Mountain Corps (the 18th Rumanian and 
1st Rumanian Mountain Divisions), assigned the task of containing enemy forces east of 
the city whilst protecting the other two corps' flanks as they carried out the main operations 
in the north and south. 
The campaign would commence on 2 June with a five-day "artillery preparation"-
starting first with a particularly strong "fire strike" (feuerschlag)-designed "to shatter the 
defenders' morale, destroy strong and important enemy combat installations, and pin 
down elements of the enemy's artillery in advance of the [German] infantry's attack." 125 
Because Fliegerkorps VIII would provide much of the firepower during this five-day artillery 
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barrage, lengthy inter-service meetings were held late in May to co-ordinate closely the 
operation. Von Manstein's command proposed the following programme: 
First, the initial "fire strike" is to be delivered mainly by the Luftwaffe, which 
is to repeat its massive attacks each following day. Aircraft are to target 
enemy reserves beyond the range of German artillery and wthin the fortified 
regions of Sevastopol. 
Second, continuous destructive air raids are to be made, during both day and 
night, against the city and harbour, supply installations in rear areas within the 
fortress region, airfields and shipping traffic. 
Third, systematic attacks to neutralize enemy artillery and mortar batteries are 
to be undertaken in co-ordination with German artillery. These batteries are 
to be located by spotter planes. Air units are also to destroy particularly 
troublesome targets, such as coastal batteries, which are beyond the reach 
and accurate observation of ground forces. 
Finally, when the infantry launches its attack, it is to receive the maximum 
support available as it pushes through the enemy's defensive lines. On the 
first day of the ground assault, the main emphaSis will be in the 54th Army 
Corps' sector. Then, as the operation unfolds, emphasiS can be shifted to the 
30th Army Corps' and 6th Rumanian Mountain Corps' sector.126 
Von Richthofen was in general agreement with this programme, although he stressed 
that his air force would not, of course, be able to perform all these "direct" and "indirect" 
support tasks simultaneously. Some tasks would clearly have to take precedence over 
others, depending on the way the operation unfolded. He personally believed that his 
force's greatest contribution would be the "shattering of the fighting morale of those inside 
the fortress." 127 Accordingly, he stated to his units on 2 June, throughout the five-day 
artillery preparation the enemy is to be kept under constant pressure so that "without any 
pause for psychological recovery, their morale collapses wherever they are attacked, 
and, furthermore, they suffer the highest losses.128 
Determined to crush the enemy's fighting spirit, the air commander deployed the vast 
bulk of his units against the fortress, leaving anti-shipping missions almost entirely to von 
Wild's small FliegerfOhrer Sad and the German and Italian naval flotillas patrolling Crimean 
coastlines. The fact that he committed few other units to these sea reconnaissance and 
interdiction missions, and left only numerically weak air and naval forces to carry them 
out, reveals how low they came on his list of priorities. This pOint is reinforced by von 
Richthofen's disdain for FliegerfOhrer Sad. On 27 May, for example, he bitterly (and 
unfairly) complained in his diary that its state of readiness (including the establishment 
of observation posts and air warning networks) was appalling. "Nothing has been done 
in the last months", he wrote, "and, despite orders to FliegerfOhrer Sad, still nothing has 
been done in the last weeks."129 The following day, he described in equally harsh terms 
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an air attack on an enemy convoy, which included a heavy cruiser and several destroyers. 
"Fliegerfuhrer Sud attempted [to sink it] with the J1./K.G. 26, the old group from LGneburg. 
Absolutely pathetic. They fired off 29 torpedoes without any success!!" 130 His scathing 
remarks were certainly unwarranted and reveal his poor knowledge of naval combat 
matters; aiming torpedoes accurately was hard enough for slow-moving U-boats, but 
remarkably difficult for aircraft attacking ten times faster and usually without the benefit 
of surprise. Additionally, German torpedoes were so unreliable in this period that, even 
when aircraft (and U-boats, for that matter) managed to hit enemy vessels, their torpedoes 
often failed to detonate. Gro8admira/ Donitz complained in his memoirs, for instance, that 
more than a third of all torpedoes fired during the first half of the war failed to detonate 
and that, "until the introduction of the new magnetic detonator in December 1942, the 
effectiveness of our torpedoes was no greater than it had been in the First World War." 131 
Chapter IV 
Operation "Sturgeon Catch" 
June-July 1942 
"German aircraft were literally raging over the battlefield, bombing and 
strafing machine-gun nests and wiping out the last pockets of resistance. II 
-Soviet eyewitness Vladimir Karpov 
117. 
On the morning of 2 June 1942, von Richthofen awoke at 0330 and pulled on his 
uniform and boots. By 0545, after breakfast, conferring with his Chief of Staff and taking 
care of a few last-minute matters, he was flying in the cloudless sky above the combat 
zone in his Fieseler Storch. Within minutes, the stillness of early dawn was broken by 
the thunder of 1,300 German guns and the incessant scream of Stukas and rumble of 
bombers as the most intense artillery and aerial barrage to date in the eastern campaign 
commenced. Most of Fliegerkorps VIII's aircraft operated from airfields around Saki, 
Sarabus and Simferopol, all within 70 kilometres of the city, so they scarcely had time 
to climb to attack altitude before they reached their target areas.1 
Their first massive strike, from 0600 to 0630, was directed against barracks northeast 
of the city and reserve concentrations and mobilization points in the villages of Schablykina 
and Balossowa, to the southeast.2 It was followed at 0700 by twelve hours of "rolling 
attacks" on the city itself by almost all units, with the notable exception of I/I.IL. G. 1, which 
attacked flak and artillery installations. Scores of Stukas attacked key installations, including 
the city's harbour facilities, submarine bases, water pumps, reservoirs and electricity 
stations. Dozens of fires broke out, especially in the oil depots on the south shore of 
Severnaya Bay. Von Richthofen, now watching the "impressive picture" from a tall, 
specially-constructed observation tower near the front, was amused by the havoc caused 
by his aircraft. "During the first attack an oiltank begins to burn", he wrote. "The Russians 
are apparently trying to extinguish it. The fire begins to die out after half an hour or so. 
Then comes a new wave, the Russians duck for cover, and the fire begins to grow again. 
After lunch they finally give up and just let it burn!" 3 While combat units rained bombs 
down on the city, which was well aflame by evening4 , reconnaissance aircraft of 3. (H.) 
13 directed the fire of the army's artillery batteries.s For the Luftwaffe, it was an impressive 
first day; 723 missions were flown, 525 tons of high explosive bombs dropped (including 
one massive 1,700-kg and seven 1 ADO-kg bombs, designed to shatter concrete 
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fortifications) and six enemy aircraft had been shot down. Two of these were destroyed 
over Sevastopol, the other four over the Kerch Straits whilst trying to reach the Crimea 
from airfields in the Caucasus. Despite heavy flak, German losses were remarkably low: 
only one Ju 87 failed to return to base.6 
Throughout the next four days, artillery and aircraft incessantly pounded the fortress, 
now continuously aflame. The Schwerpunkt on 3 June was the defensive line facing the 
30th Army Corps south of the city, on 4 June the line facing the Rumanians in the east, 
and on 5 June that facing the 54th Army Corps in the north. On 6 June, the day before 
the infantry began its assault, it was again the line facing the 30th Army Corps? Von 
Richthofen usually watched the bombardment from his observation tower but, as the 
tower was situated south of Sevastopol, he had to watch attacks on the northern and 
central sectors from his Storch. He was especially pleased by his air units' performance. 
Between 3 and 6 June, they conducted a further 2,355 missions, showering down almost 
1,800 tons of high explosive bombs and, to keep the city burning, 23,800 small, 1.1-kg 
incendiary bombs.s In order to weaken further the fighting spirit of the city's defenders, 
German air units also dropped an enormous number of propaganda leaflets exhorting 
troops to throw down their arms and surrender, thereby preventing an inevitable bloodbath. 
In the two weeks from 24 May to 6 June, they dropped no fewer than 638,000 such 
leaflets, or an average of almost 50,000 per day.9 
The Luftwaffe had scattered countless leaflets over Soviet troops since Barbarossa 
began almost a year earlier, but there is no way of gauging how effective they were in 
persuading troops to desert or surrender. They were probably no more inl'luential than 
leaflets dropped by the Royal Air Force over Germany, the value of which "Bomber" 
Harris, head of Bomber Command, summed up nicely: "I always said that the only thing 
leaflet raids would achieve would be to supply Germany with toilet paper for the rest of 
the war!" 10 Whilst the Wehrmacht occasionally attributed increases in Soviet desertion 
rates to the impact of leaflets drops11, it certainly received little reward for the amount of 
time and energy devoted to this work. Leaflets were relatively cheap to produce but, 
because of their bulk, took up valuable space on trucks, trains and transport planes. They 
also occupied a lot of space in aircraft bomb-bays, greatly reducing the amount of bombs 
that could be carried simultaneously. 
Despite the steady rain of propaganda material, the defenders' fighting spirit remained 
unbroken. Their courage and fortitude were remarkable, considering the blistering intensity 
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of the artillery and air bombardment. For the soldiers and citizens huddled in their 
bunkers, it was like a scene from Dante's Inferno. "About 2,000 guns and mortars," 
recalled Lieutenant-General Laskin, 
kept firing at our positions without a moment's interval. Shells whined overhead 
and exploded on all sides. The thunder of guns merged into a deafening roar, 
splitting our eardrums. Bombers in groups of twenty to thirty attacked us 
without caring for their targets but coming in wave after wave and literally 
ploughing up the earth throughout our defence area. 
German aircraft were in the air above olJr positions all day long. We could not 
hear their engines in the continuous thunder of guns and shell explosions. 
Groups of bombers following in rapid succession looked like countless flocks 
of fantastic black birds. A whirlwind of fire was raging at all our positions. The 
sky was clouded by smoke from explosions of thousands of bombs and 
shells. Yet planes kept coming in wave after wave and showered us with a 
hail of bombs .... An enormous dark grey cloud of smoke and dust rose higher 
and higher and finally eclipsed the sun.12 
This hellish blitz was far more ferocious than those in'flicted thus far in the war on 
Warsaw, Rotterdam, London or Malta. Because it made survival above-ground almost 
impossible (except for troops protected by metres of solid concrete in larger forts and 
defensive installations), most soldiers and citizens retreated to numerous bunkers, cellars, 
tunnels and caves honey-combing Sevastopol and surrounding ravines and valleys. In 
one of these underground refuges, carefully prepared in recent months but still inhospitable, 
the Soviet Command did what it could to plan and direct the city's defence. It was a 
miserable existence, described graphically by Boris Voyetekhov, a Soviet journalist living 
in this subterranean world deep beneath the rubble of broken buildings. In the Military 
Headquarters, he wrote, 
dim electric lamps, supplied by local storage batteries, helped one to grope 
one's way .... In the gloom, people jostled or bumped into one another. Many 
doors opened off the corridors into small rooms where tense, energetic people 
worked, and from them you heard snatches of telephone conversations, radio 
voices, signals, and the rattle of typewriters, insistent voices of switchboard 
operators, the uproarious laughter of writers of anti-Fascist leaflets, the slow, 
studied words of the decipherers, the occasional screams of the wounded, the 
abrupt answers of officers on duty, and the clanking of a sentry's tread .... 
When the municipal supply of electricity failed [after heavy blows by von 
Richthofen's Stukas] and one diesel [generator] broke down and the fans 
stopped, the crowds of people working below the ground rapidly consumed 
the air and it became difficult to breathe. It was a tragic sight to see the 
women workers, who were unsparing in their toil. Their pale sallow eyes were 
inflamed day in and day out, they gasped for breath at telephones or typewriters, 
in canteens and in barber shops.13 
Throughout this period, to provide a contrast, von Richthofen directed his forces from 
the security and comfort of a spacious Tartar castle in Bachtschisarei. In rooms adorned 
by paintings and tapestries, he held frequent briefings and conferences with senior 
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commanders, including his own flak and the army's artillery officers. These meetings 
were not always cordial. His flak leaders, for instance, resented the fact that their army 
counterparts were still trying to control their guns. The air commander was furious and, 
during a heated argument on 3 June, informed the army that it must stop interfering with 
Luftwaffe operations. Flak units were his to direct, not the army's. The next day, he 
discussed the situation with von Manstein but, despite their bond of mutual friendship and 
respect, they failed to reach a solution agreeable to both services. Arguments over the 
control of flak guns continued sporadically until the city fell to Axis forces early in July. 
For example, von Richthofen noted unhappily in his diary on 13 June that there had been 
a "great squabble with army commands (division, corps and army) over flak operations." 
"I keep all flak guns subordinate," he explained, 
and deploy them together in great concentration at Schwerpunkte against 
ground targets. The army wants formally to control them and spread them 
throughout divisions and, therefore-as always, like last time at Kerch-fritter 
them away. The most basic reason: the competitive jealousy of the army's 
artillery [officers], to whom I cannot give my flak guns because they are senile 
and want to deploy them according to the tactical viewpoints of Wallenstein 
[leader of the Habsburg forces in the Thirty Years' War of the Seventeenth 
Century]. I remain stubborn and let the army commands continue to rage. i4 
The Infantry's Turn 
When the massive "preparatory" bombardment finished after five days and nights, von 
Manstein's infantry began its own assault on the fortress. In the pre-dawn hours of 7 
June, the 54th Army Corps moved forward under cover of an earth-shaking air and 
artillery barrage. On the morning of 7 June, von Manstein recalled, 
even as the first reds of morning turned gold, and the shadows of dawn faded 
in the valleys, our artillery opened up with all its force as a prelude to the 
infantry's assault on the enemy, whilst squadrons of the Luftwaffe plunged 
down on their designated targets. i5 
Von Richthofen and Jeschonnek-who had flown to the Crimea especially to watch the 
infantry advance-viewed the "excellent fire magic" from high above the battlefield in the 
former's Storch. To their dismay and disgust, ground troops appeared to be afraid of their 
own artillery fire and failed to advance closely behind the curtain of falling shells and 
bombs stretched out across the enemy's defensive positions. i6 Moreover, they made 
almost no headway against enemy forces which were clearly neither broken nor 
demoralized. "The infantry," von Richthofen cursed that evening, "suffered heavy losses 
as it struggled to gain a single kilometre of this difficult terrain. The anticipated large and 
fast breakthrough sim ply failed to materialize. Apparently even our heaviest artillery failed 
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to achieve anything at all." 17 Indeed, Soviet defenders had been lying low, waiting for 
the appearance of German infantry before they unleashed their own savage artillery 
attack from guns positioned in solid rock strong points or steel and concrete bunkers. "The 
Russian artillery and armoured fortifications spring to life everywhere", the air commander 
continued, "The whole horizon is one tremendous gun-flash." To counter this unexpected 
opposition, he threw every available aircraft into the battle, forcing many aircrew to fly up 
to eight sorties daily. It was a remarkable achievement for both fliers and ground personnel; 
his units conducted an impressive 1,368 sorties that day, dropping as many as 1,300 tons 
of bombs.18 However, despite ceaselessly pounding Soviet positions until midnight, von 
Richthofen's aircraft were unable to silence the enemy's guns. "The entire day," he 
complained, "was a real disappointment". 
The following few days were not much better, with the infantry gaining little ground and 
suffering heavy losses. Its advance was blunted by the fire of Soviet artillery pieces, 
which pounded out a ground-shaking percussive beat, accompanied by the steady cadence 
of scores of lighter but no-less-deadly flak guns. "We hope gradually to beat down the 
enemy by mass-bombing", the frustrated von Richthofen explained on 8 June, during 
which his aircraft conducted a further 1,200 sorties "and dropped as many tons of bombs".19 
His ground organization, he added with relief, was beginning to run smoothly. although 
conducting that many missions-almost non-stop between 0300 and 2400 hours-was 
"extremely strenuous". Werner Baumbach, who ended the war as Commander of Bomber 
Forces, recalled that: 
our work at Sevastopol made the highest demands on men and material. 
Twelve, fourteen and even up to eighteen sorties were made daily by individual 
crews. A Ju 88 witl, fuel tanks full made three or four sorties without the crew 
stretching their legs. It meant tremendous wear and tear for the aircraft and 
the ground staff, those unknown soldiers who could not sleep a wink in those 
days and nights and were responsible for the safe condition of their machines.20 
Fortunately for the exhausted Luftwaffe service and maintenance personnel, working 
in sweltering heat (up to 105"F), the army's operations decreased slightly in intensity over 
the next two days as commanders met and discussed new tactics. As a result, demands 
on Fliegerkorps VIII were not as great. On 9 June, 1,044 sorties were flown and 954 tons 
of bombs dropped; the next day, 688 sorties and 634 tons.21 However, even these 
slightly lower quantities, coming as they did after a week of constant bombing missions, 
placed enormous demands on von Richthofen's logistical network. On 11 June-another 
heavy day of fighting, during which his aircraft flew 1,070 sorties and dropped around 
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1,000 tons of bombs22-he noted unappily that he no longer had sufficient bombs and 
fuel to keep up mass-bombing raids and that, at the present rate of consumption, he had 
"only enough left for 1.5 more days of bombing!"23 He was clearly worried, adding that 
''the spectre of failure now seriously looms." 
As it was no longer possible to "carpet bomb" the fortress-that is, by dropping large 
tonnages of bombs across wide areas in order to destroy all obstacles and defensive 
positions-von Richthofen immediately ordered a change in bombing procedures. From 
now on, fewer positions would be attacked simultaneously and aircraft would strike at 
designated targets in long and narrow lines. This "column bombing", he explained in his 
diary on 12 June, would keep enemy strongpoints under constant pressure without wasting 
bombs on low-priority targets and allow the replenishment of both his fuel and bomb 
stocks. As it happened, even these new tactics failed to solve Fliegerkorps VIII's logistical 
problems. On 14 June, for instance, he complained that he still experienced a "bomb 
calamity" and, three days later, his units were able to drop only 800 tons of bombs, 
instead of the planned 1,000 tons, because of an acute shortage of aircraft fuel. 24 
Almost every night during this period, VVS units on the Caucasus mainland launched 
raids against German positions in the Crimea, including Simferopol, Theodosiya, Eupatoria 
and, in particular, Yalta.25 Having radar stations able to track bombers' flight paths but 
lacking specialized equipment for night air interception, Fliegerkorps VIII was almost 
powerless to stop them.26 All it could do was illuminate them with spotlights and pound 
away at them with their flak guns, hitting very few. These VVS bombing missions, 
however, were hampered by a lack of precision navigation and bomb-aiming equipment 
and were poorly directed, perhaps because the Luftwaffe's massive strength in the region 
had prevented thorough and detailed air reconnaissance in previous weeks. Accordingly, 
they seldom inflicted significant damage on the most important targets: German airfields 
and army logistics routes and centres. The few VVS aircraft present in the Sevastopol 
Defence Region managed to conduct a small number of nuisance attacks against German 
positions. Yet after their airfields were identified and brought under the sweep of the 
Luftwaffe's horizontally-fired flak guns, their ability to undertake daylight missions fell off 
sharply. During the day, von Richthofen could see the enemy's airfields from his 
observation tower and noticed that, when enemy pilots started their engines before take-
off, large clouds of dust were blown up. Each time he saw these tell-tale dust clouds, he 
immediately radioed the information through to his flak batteries, which opened fire on the 
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airfields at the very moment the aircraft prepared for take-off, and to his fighter units, 
which dispatched aircraft to catch and shoot down any Soviet planes managing to get 
airborne. "Destroyed 18 Russian [planes] in this manner today," he chuckled on 13 June, 
"four by bombing. It is great fun!" 
Despite this brief expression of pleasure, von Richthofen was far from happy. He 
gravely feared that, because progress at Sevastopol was slow and army losses disturbingly 
high-10,300 casualties in the first five days27-the High Command would convert the 
operation into a regular siege and re-deploy the bulk of his units further north in preparation 
for the beginning of Operation B/au. Hitler had threatened this on the 'first day of the 
ground assault, when reports of the infantry's slow progress first reached him. However, 
after cooling down (and doubtless learning of Eleventh Army's emphatic requests for 
Fliegerkorps VIII to remain 28) the Fuhrer decided to give von Manstein three more regiments 
and von Richthofen a little more time. That time, the latter worried, was fast running out. 
Things appeared to go better on 13 June, when Fort Stalin, with one of its massive turrets 
cracked open by fire from "Thor", "Odin" or "Dora", fell to the 22nd Infantry Division and 
other local gains were made north of the city. Although von Bock was still impatient, and 
counted on having the greater part of Fliegerkorps VIII near Kharkov in time to start B/au 
on 20 June, von Richthofen received a short breathing space. His units would remain in 
the Crimea for the time being. "Therefore, I feel reassured", he noted, "and can continue 
fighting in peace until we achieve final victory!" 29 
Axis forces would certainly soon gain "final victory" at Sevastopol but not, as von 
Richthofen expected (and most historians still believe30), with himself in direct operational 
command of air forces. On 15 June, Goring informed him by telephone that he would 
soon be transferred 750 kilometres north to Kursk, where he was to prepare new 
headquarters for F/iegerkorps VIII so that it could move north and commence operations 
as soon as Sevastopol fell. Naturally, he would retain formal command of the air corps, 
at least until given leadership of Luftf/otte IV, but Oberst von Wild would take over direct 
control of air operations against Sevastopol. The latter would be guided and assisted by 
Oberst/eutnant Torsten Christ, Fliegerkorps VII/'s Chief of Staff, who would remain behind 
in the Crimea.31 
Von Richthofen was clearly disgusted by Goring's decision, calling it "dreadful and, 
from a combat and troop perspective, weird." He accused the Reichsmarschall of doing 
nothing for the Luftwaffe's interests, "let alone those of his people and units." 32 He was 
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also bitterly disappointed that he would not be present when the fortress fell, lamenting 
on 22 June that "I am ordered to go immediately to the north. I have only three days to 
get there, instead of the previously-mentioned seven!" "It is a pity," he continued, "that 
one can never finish what one starts here in the east. After a while, it takes away all the 
pleasure." 
Wanting a smooth transfer of power to Oberst von Wild, the air commander invited his 
successor to his quarters for a chat on 16 June.33 He was well aware that he had 
disparaged Fliegerfuhrer Sud's efforts on several recent occasions, and had at one time 
even placed Oberst Koster, commander of K. G. 51, in charge of one or two major anti-
shipping missions. That left von Wild, an expert on air-naval matters, feeling that his own 
substantial aC~lievements in recent months were not valued. Accordingly, von Richthofen 
acted towards him in a friendly and conciliatory manner. His previous criticisms, he 
explained, sprang neither from personal nor professional enmity but an awareness that 
von Wild simply "lacked experience in every respect". To overcome this handicap, he 
must share power with Oberstleutnant Christ, who, although his junior, was more 
experienced in the day-to-day running of an air corps. Far from placating von Wild, these 
insensitive instructions left him feeling deeply insulted. Not only was Christ of lower rank, 
but in recent weeks he had made no secret of his own disdain for his superior. Still, as 
a professional soldier von Wild accepted that he had to concern himself more with 
winning battles than gaining promotions. He agreed to work with Christ as equals. The 
next day, 17 June, the two met to iron out their differences. 
Cutting the Enemy's Life-line 
Von Wild took over the daily running of Fliegerkorps VIII on 23 June, a day before von 
Richthofen flew to his new headquarters in Kursk. Not only have scholars failed to 
describe and explain von Wild's role in the battle after receiving this "promotion", but they 
have scarcely mentioned his activities during the previous weeks of bloody fighting. 
Throughout that period, von Wild planned and directed Fliegerfuhrer Sud's daily 
reconnaissance and anti-shipping operations, carefully co-ordinating them with missions 
of the [ocal Axis naval forces. Although these air and naval forces caused little material 
damage to enemy vessels (which doubtless explains their lack of interest to most historians 
of the eastern front), they still made a noteworthy contribution to the Axis offensive. In 
particular, their operations forced the Soviet Command to curtail its naval fire support 
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missions and to reduce, and finally stop, its supply convoys to the besieged city. 
It has already been noted that in recent months Soviet warships had repeatedly 
shelled Axis positions along Crimean coastlines and often supported Sevastopol's heroic 
defence by firing on elements of von Manstein's army as they regrouped for their new 
assault. Even more importantly, cruisers, destroyers and submarines risked air attack on 
most nights to keep the city supplied with food, medicines, ammunition and reinforcements, 
and to evacuate women, children and wounded soldiers. By the middle of May, the 
Luftwaffe's large presence in the Crimea had forced Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii to reduce 
the number of coastal bombardment missions carried out, but warships and submarines 
continued supplying Sevastopol. After the new assault began on 2 June, responsibility 
for cutting the city's naval lifeline fell on FliegerfOhrer SOd and the light naval forces about 
to begin operations from Yalta and Ak Mechet. 
FliegerfOhrer SOd, almost impotent after von Richthofen poached most of its combat 
units for attacks on the fortress, was unable to do more than keep enemy vessels under 
constant surveillance and, if any were seen, send out small attack forces. On the first day 
of the massive air and artillery bombardment, for instance, von Richthofen's corps 
conducted as many as 723 sorties. Only 56 of these were by FliegerfOhrer SOd's aircraft; 
33 by fighters, the rest by torpedo bombers and reconnaissance planes.34 The fighters 
flew escort missions and patrolled the skies over the Kerch Peninsula, searching for 
enemy aircraft operating 'from Caucasian airfields. A few bombers participated in raids 
on Sevastopol, but most reconnoitred Caucasian ports and the Black Sea's vast expanses 
between the Crimea and the Turkish coast. These long-range missions were important; 
they revealed that Oktyabrskii's powerful fleet rode at anchor in various Caucasian ports 
and, therefore, posed no immediate threat to Axis forces in the Crimea. Von Manstein, 
who still feared enemy amphibious landings, was doubtless relieved to learn this. 
FliegerfOhrer SOd's offensive missions were also valuable; Bf 109s shot down four of the 
six enemy aircraft destroyed that day and He 111s, after spotting a small convoy headed 
for Sevastopol, sank by torpedo a 4,000-ton tanker. 35 
Throughout the rest of the initial five-day artillery and air bombardment, FliegerfOhrer 
SOd followed this operation pattern. Fighters patrolled the skies above the Kerch Straits, 
preventing most enemy aircraft based on airfields on the Taman Peninsula and north 
Caucasus from breaching their fighter "screen" during daylight hours. A few bombers 
attacked Sevastopol. The rest, armed with machine-guns and torpedoes, flew long-range 
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reconnaissance and naval interdiction missions. Offensive operations, however, bore less 
fruit than on the first day; between 3 and 7 June FliegerfOhrer Sad made a small number 
of bombing raids on Sevastopol, destroyed only three aircraft over Kerch and, despite 
attacking a few convoys and lone warships, neither sank nor badly damaged any of 
them.36 
Because enemy supply convoys sailed mainly at night, they were extremely difficult to 
detect from the air. Flares were dropped to illuminate Sevastopol's harbour installations 
and sections of the Crimean and Caucasian sea-lanes where convoys were believed to 
be. l\Jonetheless, as this location method was based mainly on guesswork and random 
checking, it proved woefully inadequate. Admiral Schwarzes Meer's signals teams in 
Constanza and the Crimea intercepted Soviet naval radio communications, and were 
thus often able to plot sailing courses, but many intercepted messages proved to be 
decoy signals sent by small torpedo boats and minesweepers in order to disguise the 
genuine location of large warships and merchantmen. Even when FliegerfOhrer Sad 
managed to locate vessels, either by reconnaissance or signal interception, they usually 
slipped away under cover of artificial smoke screens or the protection of fighters urgently 
dispatched from north Caucasian airfields.37 As a result, von Wild's airmen failed to 
prevent warships, merchantmen and submarines slipping into Sevastopol each night. 
Around 7 June, German and Italian midget submarines, MTBs and armed motor boats 
commenced operations from Yalta and Ak Mechet, enhancing the ability of Axis forces 
to block the sea-lanes leading into Sevastopol. Friedrich Ruge, a German naval historian 
and former admiral, noted that these light forces inflicted little material damage on enemy 
vessels, but "their presence made the situation still more difficult for the Soviet Navy." 38 
Indeed, as soon as Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii learned of their presence-during the night 
of 8 and 9 June, Soviet destroyers unsuccessfully attacked midget submarines with 
depth-charges after spotting them on their radar screens39-he ordered his captains to 
reduce further the number of gunfire support missions carried out in Crimean waters. 
They also had to switch to area fire (as opposed to individual target bombardment) whilst 
underway and without stopping or slowing to check and correct the accuracy of their 
gunfire.40 Even more importantly, he cut back the number of supply missions undertaken 
by surface vessels, ordering instead a substantial increase in the number carried out by 
his less-vulnerable submarines. 
The transport of vital supplies aboard submarines began early in May. Yet even with 
127. 
all spare fuel, torpedoes and ammunition removed, their cargo capacity (only 80 to 90 
tons) remained far lower than that of merchantmen or destroyers.41 Consequently, until 
the light Axis naval forces began patrolling Crimean waters early in June, Oktyabrskii 
used few submarines for supply purposes. By the middle of the month, however, he 
perceived the risk to his surface vessels to be so great that he ordered half his 40-strong 
submarine fleet to carry out the vast bulk of supply missions. He could not deploy the 
entire fleet on these vital missions because he also needed them to attack German 
shipping elsewhere in the Black Sea, especially the increasing number of convoys plying 
the sea-lanes between Rumania and Ukraine. The official Soviet history states that: 
With every day it became more difficult to bring troops, ammunition, armaments, 
and foodstuffs into Sevastopol; and to evacuate wounded and sick from the 
besieged city. Only battle ships and fast-moving transports of the Black Sea 
Fleet could operate on the sea communications lines. In June, because of the 
pressure of the situation, submarines began to be used for transport. 42 
As it happened, submarines were almost as vulnerable as surface ships; because they 
carried far less fuel and more cargo than usual, their operational range dropped significantly. 
As a result, they had to sail to Sevastopol by the shortest route and on the surface, 
submerging only when detected by Axis aircraft, MTBs and submarines.43 Despite this, 
submarines distinguished themselves as blockade-breakers. During the month-long assault 
on the fortress, they completed 78 supply missions, delivering almost 4,000 tons of food, 
medicine, ammunition and gasoline (carried in their ballast tanks). On their return voyages, 
they evacuated more than 1,300 civilians and wounded troops.44 
FliegerfOrer SOd always operated in close co-operation with the German and Italian 
MTB, armed motor boat and midget submarine flotillas. Their respective strengths and 
weaknesses complimented each other. As already noted, FliegerfOhrer SOd was unable 
to contribute substantially to night combat operations, but it did provide Axis naval forces 
with up-to-the-minute reconnaissance information. During the long summer days, it flew 
constantly over Soviet ports and sea-lanes and was able, as a result, to inform its naval 
partners which enemy vessels were in port, which were at sea, on which courses they 
sailed, and where they were likely to be when they reached Crimean waters after nightfall. 
Because Axis naval forces were vulnerable during daylight hours to attack by Soviet 
aircraft and vessels, but were hard to detect at night, they operated only during the hours 
of darkness. Using radio intercepts and the detailed reconnaissance information provided 
by FliegerfOhrer SOd, they patrolled the sea-lanes in the vicinity of Cape Sarych and the 
approaches to Sevastopol Bay. They stalked Soviet warships and transports hoping to 
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sneak into the besieged city under the cover of darkness protecting them from air attacks. 
Their patrols were even assisted on occasions by von Wild's aircraft, which dropped 
illuminating 'flares and attacked Soviet warships pursuing them. 
Despite the disdain for Italian military efforts commonly expressed by both Allied 
opponents and German "friends" (not to mention most postwar military historians), the 
Italian flotilla in the Crimea proved very successful, far more so, in fact, than its less-
aggressive German counterpart. Equipped with better torpedoes, the Italian flotilla was 
responsible for almost all enemy ships damaged or destroyed by Axis naval forces. After 
several recent unsuccessful torpedo attacks on convoys, its first offensive success came 
during the night of 10 and 11 June. MTBs and armed motor boats attacked a small Soviet 
convoy near Cape Khersones (ten kilometres from Sevastopol) and succeeded in "probably" 
sinking a 5,000-ton Soviet motor boat.45 Although the Italian crews were unable to 
observe the vessel sinking after being torpedoed, reconnaissance planes from Fliegerfilhrer 
Sild later found an empty rescue dinghy and a large oil patch.46 Two nights later, Italian 
MTBs and armed motor boats scored their first confirmed "kill", although credit had to be 
shared with the Luftwaffe. Attacking another convoy near Cape Khersones, the Italian 
vessels hit and badly damaged a 10,000-ton freighter with two torpedoes. The Soviets 
attempted to tow the listing and burning ship into Sevastopol Bay, but a lone Ju 88 on 
a reconnaissance mission swooped down and finished it off with two 500-kgbombs.47 
On 19 June, an Italian MTB patrolling the sea-lanes around Sevastopol scored a "kill" 
which it did not have to share; it attacked and sank a 3,000-ton troop transport evacuating 
wounded troops from Sevastopol. There were apparently no survivors.48 
Axis warships and submarines attacked each night not only surface vessels, but also 
enemy submarines en route to Sevastopol. On 15 June, a midget submarine torpedoed 
and sank a surfaced Soviet submarine sailing off Cape Sarych.49 Three nights later, a 
different midget submarine destroyed a second Soviet submarine in the same stretch of 
water.50 The following night, 19 June, two Italian MTBs left their base in Yalta to chase 
a submarine sighted by reconnaissance aircraft off Cape Ay-Todor (five kilometres west 
of Yalta). They caught and sank it near Cape Sarych.51 By that time, the panic-stricken 
Oktyabrskii had already ordered a sharp reduction in the number of supply missions 
undertaken by warships and merchantmen, prompting the observation "Enemy naval 
activity has greatly decreased" to be typed into Admiral Schwarzes Meer's war diary on 
19 June. 52 
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After sinking numerous surface vessels during the previous two weeks, including two 
destroyers, several large freighters and a few MTBs53 , Fliegerfuhrer Sud scored its first 
submarine kill on 26 June. He 111s struck a convoy sailing along the southeast Crimean 
coastline, sinking not only a submarine but also a destroyer.54 After that, Oktyabrskii 
stopped all supply missions by surface vessels; only submarines, MTBs and fast patrol 
boats would now attempt the perilous voyage to Sevastopol. A few days later, at dawn 
on 1 July, Stukas attacked a small flotilla of patrol boats near Cape Khersones, sinking 
one. Later that day, He 111s destroyed four more. 55 During the following two days and 
nights, He 111s managed to sink several others.56 Yet for von Wild's aircrew, the 
pleasure of destroying these vessels was far surpassed by the joy felt on 2 July, when 
the flotilla-leader Tashkent was sunk (and the cruiser Komintern, a destroyer and several 
large freighters were badly damaged) by bombers and Stukas during a raid on Novorossisk 
harbour.57 To the constant frustration of these aircrew, Tashkent had made more than 
40 supply trips between Novorossisk and Sevastopol during the previous month, sometimes 
shelling German positions as it steamed along Crimean coasts.58 During those trips it 
survived no fewer than 96 air attacks, dodging 400 bombs and ten torpedoes. On 27 
June, Tashkent had actually been the last Soviet surface warship to enter Sevastopol. It 
carried 944 troops into the fortress and evacuated 2,300 civilians and wounded soldiers.59 
It is ironic that this seemingly-unsinkable warship was destroyed on 2 July, the day after 
the fortress fell to von Manstein's army. 
Axis naval successes, it should be pointed out, were not achieved without cost. When 
Oktyabrskii first learned on 9 June that German and Italian naval forces operated in 
Crimean waters, he immediately ordered their destruction. When told that Italian midget 
submarines, MTBs and armed motor boats operated from Yalta, he felt both dismayed 
and disgusted. Yalta had been bombed repeatedly in previous weeks by Soviet aircraft 
flying from bases in the northwestern Caucasus. That the Italians were able to establish 
a naval base there during that period showed how ineffectual those raids were. Oktyabrskii 
not only demanded that bomber units strike Yalta with everything available, but also 
directed his own light warships to attack the port. 
Soviet air units straight away made Yalta their main target, bombing it every night in 
increasingly heavy raids. After several attacks left MTBs and motor boats with minor 
damage, Konteradmiral Schweinitz, Naval Commander, Crimea, urgently asked Admiral 
Schwarzes Meer on 12 June for permission to disperse the Italian vessels amongst 
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several Crimean harbours.6o Even before Schweinitz received a reply, the Soviets dealt 
Yalta a punishing blow. Before dawn on 13 June, bombers struck harbour installations 
and docks. Even as anti-aircraft guns burst into life and naval personnel rushed to their 
air-raid shelters, a lone enemy MTB slipped into the harbour and fired several torpedoes 
at the berthed vessels before speeding off under the cover of a dense smoke screen.61 
These torpedoes did considerable damage, sinking a midget submarine and spraying 
several other craft with shrapnel. 
Stunned by this audacious attack, Schweinitz immediately requested Fliegerkorps VIII 
to establish in Yalta an additional flak battery and Admiral Schwarzes Meer to send 
strong anti-torpedo nets to both Yalta and Ak Mechet.62 These requests were approved, 
but the guns and nets did not arrive for over two weeks. In the meantime, Soviet air and 
naval attacks on Yalta and other German-held Crimean ports continued. Although many 
of these attacks caused minor damage to harbour installations, few inflicted substantial 
damage to vessels. The worst came on 19 June, when VVS bombers severely damaged 
two midget submarines and crippled an MTB.63 Overall, however, these attacks achieved 
little; Axis naval losses remained low and combat successes high. 
The Axis flotillas' nightly patrols, which perfectly complimented FliegerfOhrer SOd's sea 
reconnaissance and interdiction missions, had an impact on the Battle of Sevastopol far 
outweighing the material damage they inflicted on enemy vessels; these naval and air 
operations compelled Oktyabrskii to curtail his fleet's fire support missions and to reduce, 
and finally stop, its vital supply convoys to the besieged city. The gradual cutting of the 
city's lifeline had a major affect on its defenders' ability to resist von Manstein's assault. 
Not only did the blockade disrupt and finally prevent troop reinforcements, but it gradually 
starved defenders not only of food and medicine but also of ammunition. Late in June, 
for example, they became so desperate for the latter that they sent down naval divers 
to retrieve shells (and anything else of value) from the wrecks of ships lying on the bottom 
of Sevastopol harbour.64 Even the tons of shells they brought up were incapable of 
satisfying the demands of artillery and flak gunners. Their guns became increasingly 
quiet, to the delight of Admiral Schwarzes Meer, which rightly claimed in its war diary on 
28 June that their gunfire decreased "as a result of the disruption of their supplies by our 
naval forces and planes." 65 
The Fall of the Fortress 
Despite von Richthofen's impatient criticisms during mid-June, the army actually made 
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steady progress. After taking Fort Stalin on 13 June, 54th Army Corps pressed forward 
relentlessly and with heavy losses towards the northern shore of Severnaya Bay, gradually 
beating back courageous and tenacious Soviet forces. Over the next four days, it 
succeeded in taking several other major defensive installations, including Forts Cheka, 
GPU, Siberia, Volga and Maxim Gorki 1.66 
Taking Maxim Gorki I was certainly 54th Army Corps' most difficult task. On 17 June, 
Oberleutnant Maue, a Stuka pilot from St.G 77, earned his place in airpower rlistory by 
scoring a direct hit on the seemingly-impregnable fort's eastern turret, knocking out its 
massive 30.5-cm naval guns.57 The other guns were put out of action by repeated hits 
from von Manstein's heavy siege howitzers and the explosives of engineers who finally 
reached the fort later that day after several previous attempts. Even then, however, the 
1,000 men inside the three-level fort fanatically defended every room and passageway. 
Suffering appalling losses but determined to fight to the last cartridge, they held on for 
over three days. Their last radio message to the Soviet Command in Sevastopol reveals 
the horror of the situation: "There are twenty-two of us left! We are preparing to blow 
ourselves up. We are signing off now. Farewell!"68 When German sappers finally forced 
their way through corpses and rubble into the fort's innermost parts, they were relieved, 
but probably also shocked, to find only 40 badly-wounded men still alive. 
In the south, meanwhile, the 30th Army Corps had also made substantial progress, 
having fought through dense bush and craggy ravines to drive a deep wedge into the 
defensive lines in front of the Sapun Heights. Also suffering heavy losses, it captured the 
fortfied strongpoints of Chapel Mountain, North Nose, Ruin Hill and Kamary, whilst the 
1 st Rumanian Mountain Division succeeded in taking Sugar Loaf. 
Fliegerkorps VIII played a key role in these successful but costly operations. Its units 
ceaselessly pounded not only the forts and major defensive installations, but also secondary 
defences, artillery and flak batteries, and army rear areas. "During the night," von Richthofen 
penned in his diary on 17 June, "the 54th Army Corps positioned itself, then [during the 
day] overran the Red front lines and took the majority of the forts north of Severnaya Bay. 
We [air units] pin down the artillery east of Sevastopol and at the front and destroy much. 
We [strike] the forts again and again".69 Between 13 June, when Fort Stalin fell, and 17 
June, when the other major forts in the north were taken, his corps flew a total of 3,899 
sorties and dropped 3,086 tons of bombs.1° Despite the persisting fuel and bomb shortages, 
this average of 780 sorties per day is only a slight drop from the average of 835 during 
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the offensive's first eleven days. 
By 19 June, the sector north of Severnaya Bay was entirely in German hands, except 
for Fort North and other fortifications on "Battery Headland", the peninsula dominating the 
bay's entrance. On the evening of 17 June, von Richthofen's units had delivered massi've 
blows to these forts, prompting him to write with pleasure that "our giant fire-magic fell 
on Battery Headland. The infantry were very enthusiastic!" His units continued pounding 
the forts-inflicting on them, so he claimed, far more damage than the artillery-until 54th 
Army Corps finally succeeded in capturing them on 21 June.11 
Throughout this period, Fliegerkorps VI/I also battered the city of Sevastopol itself. To 
its terrified inhabitants, for instance, 19 June was like a nightmare. From first light until 
noon, bombers conducted immense "rolling attacks" with high explosive bombs against 
supply depots, barracks, hangars and other key buildings in the city. They also hit flak 
and artillery batteries to the east and southeast. From noon until dusk, they repeated 
their attacks with incendiary bombs.72 That evening, von Richthofen noted with delight 
that the entire city was "a sea of flames" with smoke clouds reaching 1,500 metres and 
stretching from Sevastopol to Feodosia, 150 kilometres awayP These clouds of smoke 
were so dense that at times they hampered air operations the following day.14 
54th Army Corps found it extremely difficult to drive Soviet troops from their last 
fortified defences north of Severnaya Bay. After capturing the forts, they still had to 
destroy forces fighting defiantly from the scores of caves and tunnels honeycombing the 
rocky cliffs and ravines. Civilians and troops had previously prepared many of these 
strongholds for defence, storing ammunition and supplies and even giving some protective 
steel gates. When German sappers attempted to break into the first of these keeps, its 
fanatical occupants blew it up, killing themselves and many sappers. By 21 June, however, 
German troops had captured most of the other strongholds intact and gained control of 
the entire sector north of Severnaya Bay. They quickly brought the still-smouldering city 
and its naval base under the sweep of their guns. The only obstacle separating them from 
the city, with its buildings in ruins and people in hiding, was the 1,OOO-metre-wide bay 
itself. 
30th Army Corps also drove slowly but relentlessly forward, taking the Eagle's Perch 
strongpoint and the Fedyukiny Heights. These gains set up the corps nicely for an 
assault on the strategically-important Zapun Heights, along which the Soviets had their 
strongest fortifications south of the city. The Rumanian Mountain Corps also made slow 
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but steady gains, so that German troops possessed almost all of Sevastopol's outer 
defensive positions by the morning of 26 June.15 They would now be able to pull tight 
the noose around Sevastopol. 
During the previous week, Fliegerkorps VIII had flown 4,700 sorties and dropped 3,894 
tons of bombs in support of the army's efforts.76 This daily average of 671 sorties and 
556 tons of bombs, whilst still substantial, was a 15 per cent drop from that of the 
previous week, which was itself 10 per cent lower than that of the week before. Considering 
that the air corps' rate of operational readiness had increased significantly in the last 
month (from 49.8 to 64.5 per cent 77), this mission decrease reveals the severity of the 
chronic fuel and bomb shortages. 
The least active days in this period, however, were apparently not caused by these 
shortages, but by the change of operational command. During the four days following von 
Richthofen's departure for Kursk on 23 June, the daily mission average fell dramatically 
to only 400.18 This infuriated von Wild, who refused to let the units now under his 
command slacken their efforts. By 'flying from base to base, admonishing local commanders 
for their flagging performance, he managed quickly to pull it back up again. In fact, for 
the last five days of the Sevastopol campaign the daily mission average rose to 961, the 
highest it had been in over three weeks.79 Ironically, this excellent performance rate 
could not have been achieved without the fuel and bomb reserves built up during the 
corps' most slothful days. 
In the week or so up to 26 June, Fliegerkorps VIII had devoted around half its efforts 
to "direcf' army support missions. In order to help 54th Army Corps break through the 
strong defences north of Severnaya Bay, the air corps bombed and strafed caves, tunnels, 
bunkers, trenches and pockets of resistance. It also attacked enemy artillery and flak 
batteries still inflicting heavy losses on von Manstein's infantry. The corps devoted the 
rest of its efforts to "indirect" army support missions. It struck barracks, reserve centres, 
communication systems, dockyards, fuel dumps, supply depots, transport columns, and 
roads. Both types of missions were successful. The corps destroyed not only numerous 
strongpoints, bunkers and gun batteries, but also several key logistics centres and supply 
columns. Stukas, far more accurate than conventional horizontal bombers, again proved 
their worth against such targets. For example, one account of the operations noted that: 
On 21 June '" IJSt. G. 77 flew three missions against anti-tank batteries and 
two days later they caught and destroyed a whole horse transport column 
accompanied by a few tanks in ravines at Inkerman .... Unable to winkle out 
Russian defenders in the natural caves and caverns of this region, St.G. 77 
sealed them in, blocking the exit tunnels to one such system at map reference 
G9B with some precision bombing. Another horse transport column along with 
tanks and troops was decimated in ravine 1'J2C.80 
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The constant scream of Stukas, rumble of medium bombers, and pounding of artillery 
tormented the burning city's defenders. Still, the tenacious inhabitants refused to give in, 
even when von Manstein's divisions had captured virtually all their outer defensive positions 
by 26 June and von Wild's aircraft and the light naval forces had cut their naval lifeline 
by about the same date. They were also not swayed by the 2,776,000 propaganda 
leaflets rained down on them since the campaign began (1,152,000 in the last week 
alone81 ). They would defend their ruined city to the bitter end. 
Despite the Soviets' extraordinary tenacity, von Manstein's troops had managed (albeit 
at great cost in men and materiel) to push them back into the fortress' inner defence 
zone. The fjord-like cliffs on Severnaya Bay's southern shore formed this zone's northern 
front, whilst the heights of Inkerman (site of the old but strong Inkerman fort), the precipitous 
Zapun Heights, and the cliffs around Balaclava formed its eastern and southern fronts. 
These natural geographical obstructions, dotted with numerous fortifications, gun positions 
and bunkers, presented von Manstein with a major tactical dilemma. "The [Eleventh] 
Army Command," he later wrote, "now had to decide how this inner fortification belt would 
be prised open."82 Attacking the city from the north would require elements of 54th Army 
Corps to cross the exposed, 1,000-metre-wide Severnaya Bay, which was protected by 
dozens of guns positioned along the southern shore. On the other hand, attacking the city 
from the south or east would require regiments of 30th Army Corps to assault the well-
defended and seemingly-impassable Zapun Heights. 
Against the advice of his senior commanders, von Manstein decided upon tl1e former 
course of action. Under the cover of darkness, dense smoke screens and heavy artillery 
and air attacks, an infantry regiment and an engineer battalion of 54th Army Corps would 
launch a powerful amphibious attack across Severnaya Bay.sa In the meantime, 30th 
Army Corps would assail the Zapun Heights from the southeast. Its assault would 
doubtless divert the enemy's attention before, and dissipate his forces during, the attack 
across the bay. Once the assault troops reached the southern shore, they would Join the 
battle by storming the Heights from the other side. The amprlibious operation would take 
place on the night of 28 and 29 June. 
On 28 June, as the assault teams prepared their boats and equipment for that night's 
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perilous operation, 54th Army Corps sent one of its divisions, the 50th, across the Chernaya 
river east of the bay to attack the old Inkerman fort. This division succeeded in taking 
the fort, but not without witnessing one of the most tragic moments in the dying city's last 
days. Enormous caverns, used by the Soviets as ammunition dumps and refuge centres 
for thousands of civilians and wounded troops, existed inside the cliffs above the old fort. 
As German troops entered Inkerman, the ground beneath their feet shuddered from the 
impact of a tremendous detonation deep inside the caverns. "A few fanatical commissars," 
to quote von Manstein, blew up the cavern to prevent Germans seizing their ammunition. 54 
The blast killed thousands of refugees and wounded troops. It was, he concluded, "a 
clear sign of the contempt for human life which has become a principle of this Asiatic 
power!" 
At 0100 hours on 29 June, von Manstein's assault teams shot across Severnaya Bay 
under cover of dense smoke screens. Praying that they would cross without detection, 
the army commander had directed his artillery batteries not to open fire until the enemy 
did. To his great relief, the first wave was not spotted until the boats had reached the 
south shore and their crews spilled out, firing their automatic weapons at stunned Soviets. 
From then on, German guns and Stukas blasted every enemy artillery position revealed 
by its muzzle flash, allowing other assault teams to cross the bay with acceptable losses. 
Even as this attack took place, 30th Army Corps' artillery roared into life, smashing 
enemy defences on the Zapun Heights, followed half an hour later by its infantry, which 
slowly but steadily forced its way forward. By early afternoon, 54th Army Corps' assault 
teams had established a solid beachhead on Severnaya Bay's southern shore and advance 
regiments of the other German corps had gained a foothold on the Heights. 
Co-operation between the three service branches (ground, air and naval forces) was 
excellent. Under von Wild's capable direction, Fliegerkorps VIII had "kept up an incessant 
raid on the city ... in order to muffle all noise from the northern shore." 85 Indeed, the 
air corps had begun pounding enemy positions on the cliff-tops of the bay's southern 
shore and, in particular, on the Zapun Heights before the assault boats left the bay's 
northern shore.86 Fliegerkorps VIII operated at a furious pace all day, pinning down and 
destroying enemy positions in both combat areas. "German aircraft were literally raging 
over the battlefield," wrote Vladimir Karpov, "bombing and strafing machine-gun nests 
and wiping out the last pockets of resistance." 87 Conducting a staggering 1,329 missions 
and dropping 1,218 tons of bombs, the air corps performed far better than it had since 
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the opening days of the battle more than three weeks earlier.as Because most Soviet flak 
batteries had already been destroyed, and those surviving were short of ammunition, the 
corps' losses were extremely low; only two Ju 87s failed to return to base, and even their 
crews survived. 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer's light forces had also supported the amphibious operation. 
The previous night, its Italian MTBs had escorted numerous army assault boats as they 
carried out a feint landing operation near Cape Feolent.89 The Soviets fell for the ruse, 
believing the deceptive manoeuvre to be a genuine operation and diverting forces from 
other streches of coastline to protect that particular stretch. The deception fooled even 
the authors of the postwar official Soviet war history, who complacently claimed that "the 
Hitlerites had unsuccessfully attempted to execute a night amphibious landing at Cape 
Feolent".90 Also on the night before the real amphibious operation, the 17th Defence 
Flotilla's naval ferry barges had cleared a route for the assault boats through suspected 
enemy mine-fields in Severnaya Bay. Additionally, when von Manstein's troops finally 
shot across the bay in their 70 combined operations assault boats and 12 rubber ferries 
(apparently all provided by Admiral Schwarzes Meer 91 ), MTBs from the 1st E-Boat Flotilla 
protected them on the seaward side from Soviet naval attacks. Their assault and flak 
guns, ammunition and provisions immediately followed in four of the German fleet's naval 
ferry barges.92 
By the evening of 29 June, German commanders realized they would not wait long for 
the city to fall. Von Manstein recalled that: "After the successful crossing of the bay, the 
fall of the Heights of Inkerman and the 30th Army Corps' breakthrough of the Zapun 
positions, the fate of the Sevastopol fortress was sealed." 93 The following day, 54th 
Army Corps took Fort Malakoff, scene of bitter fighting in the Crimean War, 87 years 
earlier, and broke into the city's outer ring of fortifications. 
At the same time, 30th Army Corps breached the Zapun line. The 28th Light Infantry 
Division took the English Cemetery, which the desperate defenders had turned into a 
strong point. The battle was bloody. Von Manstein recalled that, amongst the shattered 
marble monuments once erected for the British dead in the Crimean War, corpses of 
Soviet troops lay strewn over graves torn open by shelling. Rolling up the Zapun positions 
in a southward direction, the 72nd Infantry Division made faster progress, taking "Windmill 
Hill" and with it the main road into Sevastopol. 
Von Manstein was deeply impressed by the courage and fanatical fighting spirit of the 
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ruined city's defenders. Even now, he knew, with their city reduced to rubble and their 
once-powerful formations broken into motley groups of poorly-equipped and starving 
soldiers, they would not surrender. 94 His own men would have to take the city street by 
street, building by building. In terms of losses, he had already paid a terrible price for 
the city. Unwilling to pay more, but well aware that house-to-house fighting would be 
extremely costly, he directed his artillery to mount a massive, day-long bombardment of 
the city. He also requested von Wild (not von Richthofen, as some authors assert95) to 
smash the city with everything available. 
Although his ground and air crews were physically and mentally drained by the previous 
day's ceaseless operations, and his bomb and fuel reserves were almost exhausted, von 
Wild agreed to the army commander's request. On 30 June, his flak guns joined the 
artillery bombardment, his fighters attacked any visible troops, vehicles and vessels, and 
his bombers and dive-bombers again pulverized the city. These units performed as well 
as the day before, conducting 1,218 sorties and releasing 1,192 tons of bombs.96 After 
Sevastopol was "ruthlessly bombarded" this time, wrote Vladimir Karpov, it was again left 
"in flames and veiled in black smoke rising from its ruins."97 As the bombardment 
reached its dreadful crescendo, terrified citizens and many troops-now without the barest 
means of survival, let alone resistance-fled through streets covered with bricks, twisted 
girders, and broken pipes to the beaches west of the city. There they huddled in caves, 
waiting in vain for small boats to take them off the cursed Crimea. 
Oktyabrskii was now incapable of planning and directing even small-scale defensive 
operations in the city. Late on 30 June, the grieved Vice-Admiral assembled what 
remained of the Military Soviet in his subterranean headquarters deep beneath the flaming 
ruins. 98 The Stavka, he announced, had decided to evacuate Sevastopol in view of the 
futility of its further defence. Stalin himself had ordered that senior commanders, Party 
and administrative officials were to leave the city aboard submarines. Except for rear-
guard units, troops were to withdraw to the Khersones Peninsula and its neighbouring 
bays at the very western tip of the Crimea, where they would continue fighting until they 
could be evacuated at night as vessels became available. 
That night, Oktyabrskii, Petrov (the garrison commander), and other senior officers 
and officials fled the city. They left Major-General Novikov, commander of an infantry 
division (that no longer existed except for a few scattered remnants), in charge of all rear-
guard actions.99 After setting up his command post in the 35th Coastal Battery, Novikov 
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hurriedly formed new units from the remains of muddled and broken regiments. In order 
to protect tens of thousands of civilians and shell-shocked and wounded soldiers now 
fleeing to the beaches, he also tried to erect a defensive line across the Khersones 
Peninsula west of the city. His efforts proved inadequate. 
Von Manstein's artillery and von Wild's air units began their assault at dawn on 1 July. 
They pounded not only the coastal batteries in which the defenders sought refuge and 
the hastily-prepared defensive field positions, which offered no shelter from these vicious 
bombardments, but also the vehicle-littered beaches where panic-stricken civilians and 
soldiers alike threw themselves against the sides of cliffs, desperately praying for 
evacuation. Fliegerkorps VII/'s attacks were especially devastating, as Victor Gurin recalled: 
At dawn ... the first German aircraft attacked our positions. Coming from the 
side of the sea, wave after wave, they bombed and strafed the shore defences 
and the cliffs where our men were entrenched and dropped leaflets demanding 
our surrender. Our casualties were severe.100 
These nightmarish attacks, which caused swirling, choking black smoke to envelop the 
beaches, snapped the nerves of many defenders. Boris Voyetekhov described their terror: 
They ran with maddened eyes, with tunics torn and flopping; panic-stricken, 
bewildered, miserable, frightened people. They seized feverishly any kind of 
craft they could find-rafts, rubber floats, automobile tyres-and flung 
themselves into the sea. Nobody harmed them. "Let them go their way," the 
men of the rear guard muttered as they chose positions for their last battle.101 
Despite this frightful state of affairs, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet made no attempt to 
evacuate the civilians and troops trapped on Cape Khersonese, although insignificant 
numbers were taken off under cover of darkness by fishing boats and light coastal 
vessels. The fleet had been savagely mauled in recent weeks, with numerous submarines, 
destroyers, MTBs, patrol boats and transport vessels being damaged or destoyed. 
Realizing that they still had a long war to fight, its commanders concluded that they 
simply could 110t afford the high losses likely to be inflicted during an evacuation attempt 
which the enemy no doubt expected. 
Not only were Axis light naval forces patrolling the waters off Cape Khersonese, these 
commanders reasoned, but those waters were now under the sweep of German heavy 
guns. Even more importantly, the numerous powerful Luftwaffe forces in the Crimea 
were able, now that they had concluded their missions against Sevastopol, to turn their 
attention to the fleet. Indeed, just to make sure that the fleet did stay away, von Wild 
kept Cape Khersonese under steady air attack for several days and, on 2 July, dispatched 
78 bombers, 40 dive-bombers and 40 fighters to attack the fleet's Caucasian bases.102 
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In Anapa, Taman, Novorossiisk, and a few smaller ports, they badly damaged numerous 
large warships (including, as already mentioned, the Tashkent and Komintern) , freighters 
and harbour facilities. After this blow, an evacuation attempt was out of the question. 
Although Novikov's troops on the peninsula held out for several more days, fighting 
courageously until they exhausted their rations and ammunition (and often, at that pOint, 
blowing up themselves to prevent their batteries or bunkers falling into enemy hands), 
Eleventh Army occupied Sevastopol in the afternoon of 1 July. Von Manstein felt worn 
out but greatly relieved to take the fortress at long last; no fewer than 196 days had 
passed since 17 December, when tlis troops first broke through its outer ring of 
fortifications. 
Back at the Wolf's Lair in East Prussia, the Fuhrer was ecstatic. Despite his generals' 
peSSimism, 1942 was turning out to be a splendid year. A month earlier, his eastern 
armies had thrown back a major Soviet offensive at Kharkov and, in a superb counter-
attack, humiliated Stalin by destroying the attacking forces. Only ten days earlier, Rommel 
had stung British pride by storming Tobruk and taking 33,000 prisoners. Now von Manstein 
had captured the city which Stalin repeatedly swore would never fall: Sevastopol, the 
world's strongest fortress and the gateway to the Caucasus. Hitler immediately sent the 
exhausted army commander the following radio message 103: 
In grateful appreciation of your outstanding services in the victorious battles 
of the Crimea, culminating in the annihilation battle of Kerch and the conquest 
of the fortress of Sevastopol, mighty in both its natural and constructed 
fortifications, I hereby appoint you Field Marshal. By your promotion and the 
creation of a commemorative shield for all [your] Crimean soldiers, I pay 
tribute before the entire German people to the heroic achievements of the 
troops fighting under your command. 
-Adolf Hitler 
Despite the fact that Fliegerkorps VIII had contributed substantially to the battle's 
successful conclusion, its commander did not receive a similar promotion from the Fuhrer. 
Hitler intended no snub. Back in May, he had informed von Richthofen that he would be 
given command of Luftf/otte /V once Operation B/au got underway. That promotion was 
now due to take effect in a few weeks. Raising him to Field Marshal before then, or even 
shortly afterwards, would certainly not be appropriate; he was still a corps commander 
and had only recently been made Genera/oberst, the same rank as air fleet commanders. 
Also, in the last week or so Hitler had promoted to Field Marshal a number of distinguished 
generals long overdue for the honour, including Rommel, von KOchler and now von 
Manstein; despite rlis superb record to date, von Richthofen would have to prove himself 
140. 
as an air fleet commander before he joined these eminent warriors in the highest of 
ranks. 
After learning on 1 July that the fortress had been captured, von Richthofen, busy 
directing air operations north of Kharkov, felt disappointed that his role in the battle had 
been down played (which it had not) by other participants. Disguising his feelings, however, 
he noted curtly in his diary that "Sevastopol has reportedly fallen". The following day, he 
received a special report on the matter, apparently from Alexander L6hr (whom he 
affectionately referred in his journal to as ''the little Japanese Emperor", because of his 
high cheek bones, small and narrow eyes and diminutive stature).104 He also received 
a telegraph from von Manstein. Considering Fliegerkorps VIII's outstanding support of 
Eleventh Army, this telegraph was surprisingly short and lacking in the respectful 
expressions common to this type of message. "On the day of Sevastopol's fall," it simply 
said, "the commander and troops of 11th Army think of you with special gratitude. Von 
Manstein, Generalfeldmarschall." 105 The air commander was clearly annoyed by the 
telegraph's brevity, and by his army counterpart's promotion. Unable to disguise his 
feelings this time, he jealously wrote that "Manstein is now a Field Marshal. I'm so glad; 
once again someone has won [Hitler's] special favour".106 Mocking von Manstein's 
background, he added spitefully that "after all, the Prussian aristocracy are the best at 
playing soldier." 
Meanwhile, Oberst von Wild, who had demonstrated sound tactical judgement and 
boundless energy in recent weeks, but received only a simple note of thanks from his 
absent superior, remained busy in the Crimea. Shortly before Sevastopol fell, he began 
transferring various elements of Fliegerkorps VIII north to the Kursk area, where they 
again came under von Richthofen's direct control. After he had finished the main "mopping 
up" missions around Sevastopol, he sent the rest northwards. Fliegerfuhrer Sud, comprising 
several more units than it had even before the Battle of Kerch, would stay in the Crimea 
under his command. It would have three main tasks in the coming months: to protect 
German positions in the Crimea 'from persisting attacks by enemy aircraft based in the 
northern Caucasus; to keep the enemy fleet under constant surveillance and attack, 
ensuring that it undertook no amphibious operations in the region; and, when the time 
came, to support the German army's advance towards the Caucasus oilfieJds. 
Although a few isolated pockets of resistance remained for several more weeks, Axis 
forces concluded their main "mopping up" operations around Sevastopol on 4 July. Only 
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then were their commanders finally able to reflect on the previous month of ferocious 
fighting. It had been a bloody campaign; the city's stubborn defence by both soldiers and 
civilians-which has appropriately gone down in history as a paragon of heroism and self-
sacrifice-cost von Manstein dearly in materiel. His units exhausted the contents of 103 
trains, including 46,750 tons of general munitions and 20,000 tons of bombs.107 However, 
the battle cost him far more dearly in men. According to official German statistics 
published at the time, 4,337 German officers and men were killed, 1,591 missing and 
18,183 wounded. Rumanian sources stated that their own casualties came to around 
2,500 killed, missing and wounded. 108 The Soviets, on the other hand, claimed that Axis 
casualties amounted to "approximately 150,000".109 Based on the battle's rate of progress, 
the number of German reinforcements required, and the time needed afterwards to bring 
Eleventh Army back to full strength, it is clear that German figures are too low and Soviet 
figures too high. Those factors indicate that the total number of Axis casualties (killed, 
missing and wounded) was probably around 75,000.110 This was an extremely high price 
to pay. 
Despite their heavy losses, von Manstein's commanders considered the campaign to 
have been successful. Their forces took the city, smashed the armies defending it, killed 
many tens of thousands of troops and citizens, and took over 90,000 prisoners (30,000 
at Cape Khersones on 4 July alone111 ). They also captured an impressive amount of 
booty, including 467 guns, 758 mortars, 155 anti-tank and flak guns, and two dozen 
tanks.112 
Even more importantly, Axis forces had severely weakened the enemy's position in the 
region and greatly strengthened their own. They had destroyed or damaged many vessels 
from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and deprived it of its main base. Weak and forced to 
operate from greatly inferior bases along the Caucasus coast, the fleet no longer posed 
a major threat to German plans for the coming months. Additionally, Axis forces had 
shown Turkey that they, and not Stalin's forces, controlled the Black Sea region and that 
the Turks should not consider entering an alliance with the Allies. They had also removed 
the threat of enemy air attacks on Rumanian oilfieds from bombers based in the Crimea. 
Finally, they were now able to move troops across the Straits of Kerch into the oil-rich 
Caucasus, without having to worry about guarding their rear from attacks by powerful 
Soviet forces in Sevastopol. 
Fliegerkorps VIII's contribution to the victory was substantial. In the corps' after-action 
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report to G5ring's Command Staff, dated 3 July, it claimed without exaggeration that its 
"unremitting fire on the city, port and airfields inflicted on the enemy the heaviest losses 
in men and materief'.113 Since 2 June, the air corps, including von Wild's subordinate 
Fliegerfuhrer Sud, had conducted no fewer than 23,751 sorties and dropped 20,528 tons 
of bombs. Despite working ceaselessly every day, mainly in bombing missions against 
Soviet positions in front of the advancing infantry, but also in a wide variety of other tasks, 
it lost only 31 aircraft to flak and none to enemy fighters. 
Bombers and dive-bombers had markedly aided the infantry by attacking almost 
eveything that moved on the ground, both on the battlefield and in rear areas. They were 
frequently directed to their targets by tactical reconnaissance aircraft, which also directed 
the army's artillery fire. They were protected by strong 'fighter forces, which, the report 
stated, also "maintained constant surveillance of the battlefield, using bombs and other 
weapons to attack field positions and batteries, motor and horse-drawn traffic, as well as 
sea traffic in the port itself." 
The corps' after-action report clearly reveals that its impressive mission rate was 
matched by its "kill" rate. Its aircraft destroyed a huge amount of enemy equipment, 
including 611 motor vehicles, 123 aircraft (18 on the ground), 38 artillery pieces, 10 tanks, 
a locomotive, and a large barge mounted with flak guns.114 They damaged hundreds 
more motor vehicles and seven other artillery guns. Their attacks on enemy defensive 
installations and logistics systems also produced impressive results. They silenced 48 
artillery batteries, demolished 28 barracks and industrial buildings, 20 bunkers, 11 
ammunition depots, 10 fuel depots, an observation post and a bridge, and damaged 
another 43 batteries, two barracks and a bridge. 
Few of the corps' 600-odd aircraft had operated routinely against enemy shipping, 
which shows how unimportant von Richthofen considered these missions. Those that 
were deployed against shipping, however, performed well and contributed substantially to 
the success of the sea blockade. Directed by Fliegerfuhrer Sud, von Wild's specialized 
anti-naval unit, these bombers and dive-bombers scoured the sea-lanes around the Crimea 
and the Caucasus coast in search of enemy warships and supply convoys. Excluding the 
Axis naval forces' own "kills", they succeeded in sinking four destroyers, a submarine, 
three MTBs, six coastal vessels, and four freighters with a combined weight estimated at 
10,800 tons. 115 They also managed to damage another two destroyers, 10 coastal 
vessels and two freighters together reckoned to weigh 12,000 tons. 
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Air units were not the only Luftwaffe forces to make a large impact during the month~ 
long assault on Sevastopol. Flak units, most belonging to Flak-Regiment 18, also 
distinguished themselves. The regiment's superb high-velocity "eighty-eights" were deadly 
not only when blazing at flying enemy aircraft, but also when shooting directly at tanks, 
bunkers and artillery positions. These alone fired 181,787 rounds, whilst lighter guns fired 
another 231,146.116 
Usually employed alongside the artillery but remaining, as noted, under the Luftwaffe's 
command, Flak-Regiment 18's guns proved invaluable to Eleventh Army's attack. As 
well as destroying 24 aircraft (two on the ground), they blew up 105 vehicles and silenced 
44 artillery batteries, another 20 guns and 93 machine~gun nests.117 They knocked out 
355 bunkers, field fortifications, fortified houses and other strongpoints. Their remarkable 
firepower also contributed significantly to the destruction of several major forts, including 
Forts Stalin, Molotov, Volga, Balaclava and GPU. 
Flak-Regiment 18 struck not only these obvious battlefield targets, but also key objects 
in rear areas. It destroyed or left burning numerous ammunition and fuel depots, and 
demolished an electric power station and various barracks and aircraft hangars. It also 
played an important part in the maintenance of the sea blockade, sinking eight small 
freighters and several other light vessels. 
It is clear, then, that von Richthofen's units performed superbly and that their outstanding 
achievements played an essential part in the city's fall. Functioning mainly as "flying 
artillery", they provided tl1e army with an unprecedented level of tactical air support. 
However, this level of support was accomplished only because of a unique combination 
of circumstances. First, because most of the eastern front was relatively quiet in April, 
May (except for the short-lived Soviet offensive at Kharkov) and most of June, von 
Richthofen had been given a strong air force at a high level of operational readiness. 
Second, this powerful force faced weak aerial opposition in the Crimea. As a result, both 
air and flak units could commence army support operations without having first to wage 
a time-consuming and costly battle for air superiority and then spend a considerable 
number of sorties on escort and protection operations. Third, almost the entire force was 
deployed against a single target (although it was, of course, extremely strong). Finally, 
it operated against that target from well-prepared airstrips in the immediate vicinity, which 
allowed a very high number of missions to be conducted each day. 
This remarkably favourable set of circumstances existed nowhere during Operation 
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B/au, the coming summer campaign. In contrast, Luftwaffe forces would soon be dissipated 
along the eastern front and even within the southern campaign zone itself. They 
encountered increasingly-powerful VVS forces, which cost them time, effort and high 
losses. They also often had to operate from poorly-prepared airfields, sometimes far 
from their targets, which were widely scattered over a vast area. The Luftwaffe's close 
air support level reached a peak at Sevastopol, and it would not be equalled in the 
coming push towards the Caucasus oilfields. 
6. During the first months of 1942, Soviet forces constructed hundreds of concrete 
bunkers like this along the Parpach Line, stretching across the strongly-defended "neck" 
of the Kerch Peninsula. Von Manstein's forces overran them with surprising speed. 
7. A Luftwaffe photograph of Sevastopol's northwestern defences. The octagonal 
Nordfort (North Fort) was one of many strong fortifications around the perimeter of this 
heavily-defended city. Constantine Battery (pictured overleaf) was situated on the spit 
shown in the bottom left-hand corner. 
8. Constantine Battery guarded the entrance to Severnaya Bay. It was repeatedly 
attacked by bombers and dive-bombers of von Richthofen's air corps, like all fortifications 
in and around Sevastopol. 
9. This floating flak platform was also repeatedly struck by the Luftwaffe. It actually 
proved to be more of a nuisance than a help to the Soviet defenders, occasionally 
breaking its moorings during rough seas and drifting helplessly until tugs could tow it 
back into sheltered waters. 
10, 11. Fliegerkorps VIII continuously bombed Sevastopol throughout June, inflicting 
substantial damage and forcing its terrified inhabitants to flee from the city or hide in 
tunnels and cellars. 
12. On 19 June 1942, von Richthofen noted in his diary that Sevastopol was a "sea 
of flames", with smoke clouds rising 1,500 metres. To keep the ruined city burning, 
Fliegerkorps VIII dropped thousands of small, 1.1-kg incendiary bombs each day. 
13. FliegerfOhrer SOd and elements of Fliegerkorps VIII sank or damaged several 
Soviet destroyers and other warships attempting to break their "sea blockade". Stukas 
scored direct hits on the stern of this destroyer as it attempted to unload supplies in 
Severnaya Bay. 
14. Another warship sunk by the Luftwaffe in the shallows of Severnaya Bay. Fortified 
tunnels, in which Soviet troops and civilians sought refuge and stored ammunition and 
weapons, line the base of the cliff. 
15. The Luftwaffe also attacked merchant vessels, both in ports along the Black Sea's 
Caucasus coast and en route to Sevastopol. Stukas of the 77th Dive-Bomber Wing 
sank this merchant ship in Novorossiisl< harbour. 
16. The powerful 305-mm (12-inch) guns of the Soviet battleship Pariskaya Kommuna 
blast at German positions in the Crimea. By June 1942, Vice-Admiral o ktyabrs kii, 
commander of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, had become so fearful of his capital ships 
being sunk by the Luftwaffe that he withdrew them to the relative safety of Poti and 
Batumi, where strong flak defences afforded them protection. They sheltered there 
until the Luftwaffe's strength in the eastern Black Sea region dwindled when von 
Ricllthofen began steadily transferring air units to the Stalingrad sector several months 
later. 
17. In Poti harbour, Soviet crewmen load torpedoes into a submarine while the cruiser 
Krasny Krim rides at anchor in the background. Although the Soviet Black Sea Fleet 
began the war with 47 submarines, they contributed little to its offensive operations, 
mainly due to their commanders' lack of aggression and fear of Luftwaffe attacks. Their 
only substantial achievement during the first two years of war in the east was their 
series of courageous supply missions to Sevastopol during June 1942. 
18, 19. In June 1942, Admiral Schwarzes Meer, the German Black Sea Fleet, sent 
several submarine and torpedo boat flotillas to the Crimea. Operating in close co-
operation with FliegerfOhrer Sad, the Luftwaffe anti-shipping command stationed in the 
Crimea, they proved effective against Soviet warships and merchantmen attempting to 
carry supplies into Sevastopol. Shown above is a torpedo being lowered onto a motor 
torpedo boat of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla; shown below is a German submarine (U-23) 
returning from a "hunt". 
Chapter V 
Stampede to the Don 
June-July 1942 
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"The enemy was heavily smashed, and fled in disarray towards the northeast. JJ 
-Generaloberst von Richthofen's diary, 6 July 1942 
Long before Sevastopol fell on 1 July, the Luftwaffe had played a key part in smashing 
a major Soviet offensive around Kharkov, over 500 kilometres to the north. FJiegerkorps 
IV and elements of Fliegerkorps VIII distinguished themselves in a series of non-stop 
defensive missions, then greatly aided the army as it threw back and destroyed the 
Soviet forces. Fridericus (Frederick), the brilliant German counter-offensive, grew into 
1942's first large-scale batte of encirclement and annihilation. It also placed important 
areas of the Donets Basin in German hands, thereby giving Axis forces an excellent 
staging area for the coming summer campaign. Accordingly, before turning to the 
Luftwaffe's central role in that ill-fated campaign, its successful operations at Kharkov will 
be discussed. 
In March, as noted above, Stalin had rejected the sound advice of his army Chief of 
Staff, who argued that the Red Army should adopt a temporary strategic defensive 
posture for 1942's spring and early summer. Instead, the Soviet leader, still claiming that 
constant attack was the best strategy, supported Marshal Timoshenko's plan to launch 
individual pre-emptive offensives near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk 
and Lgov-Kursk sectors, in the Kharkov area and in the Crimea. The Crimean campaign-
really only a series of attempts by armies trapped on the Kerch Peninsula to break into 
the Crimean mainland-ended miserably. As will now be shown, the Kharkov campaign, 
the only other offensive in the combat zone under study, ended not only in outright failure, 
but also in a disaster of staggering proportions. 
Timoshenko, in overall command of both the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, had 
640,000 men, 1,200 tanks, 13,000 guns and mortars and 926 combat aircraft at his 
disposal.1 His plan called for Southwestern Front to launch two convergent attacks. The 
main force, compriSing Lieutenant-General Gorodnyanskii's Sixth Army and Major-General 
Bobkin's "Army Group", would strike from the Barvenkovo area, south of Kharkov.2 The 
slightly weaker force, comprising Twenty-Eighth Army and formations drawn from Twenty-
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First and Thirty-Eighth Armies, would drive out of the Volchansk area, north of the 
Ukranian capital. The two pincers would strike westwards and meet behind Kharkov, 
thereby recovering the city and trapping the bulk of General der Panzertruppen Paulus' 
Sixth Army. 
Southwestern Front's powerful force of 23 rifle divisions, two cavalry and two tank 
corps easily outnumbered the German formations they directly opposed: 14 infantry and 
two tank divisions of Paulus' Sixth Army and an infantry division of Armee-Gruppe von 
Kleist.3 The rest of this Gruppe-actually formed from Seventeenth Army and First 
Panzer Army-faced the exhausted Southern Front. Because this Front had not yet 
recovered from recent batterings, Timoshenko planned to use it during his offensive only 
to protect the vulnerable south face of the Izyum salient. 
German forces in the Kharkov region were themselves preparing to launch an offensive, 
code-named Fridericus, in the middle of May. Generalfeldmarschal/ von Bock intended 
this offensive to eliminate the dangerous Izyum salient, destroy the Soviet forces trapped 
within and establish secure positions on the left bank of the northern Donets river. These 
positions would serve as the staging area for the main summer campaign. The plan was 
relatively simple: Sixth Army would thrust into the bulge from the north, whilst Army Group 
von Kleist would do so from the south. They would meet in front of Izyum, having cut off 
a large part of an enemy Front. However, before von Bock could implement Fridericus, 
the Soviets struck first. 
At dawn on 12 May-as von Manstein's tanks and von Richthofen's aircraft were 
closing the Ak Monai pocket on the Kerch Peninsula, far to the south-Timoshenko 
launched his mighty offensive. Striking with stunning speed and ferocity and greatly 
outnumbering their opposition, his formations smashed through Sixth Army's defences 
both north and south of Kharkov.4 By midday, forward units had advanced to within 20 
kilometres of the city. Within a day or two at the most, Timoshenko claimed, it would 
again be in Soviet hands. 
Paulus, whose army bore the brunt of the savage attack, immediately appealed to von 
Bock for reinforcements. The latter, who now felt that Fridericus could not proceed as 
planned, gave him the 23rd Panzer Division, which was to have been used as one of the 
offensive's spearhead units.5 This angered Halder, the German Army's Chief of Staff. 
During a heated telephone conversation that afternoon, he told von Bock that he must 
not waste the troops earmarked for Fridericus on repairing minor "blemishes". This 
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comment stung the army group commander, appalled by his superior's ignorance of the 
situation at the front. "Its not a question of patching up local blemishes," he angrily 
replied. "Its neck or nothing!" 6 
Despite their disagreement, it appears that von Bock finally managed to convince the 
Army Chief of Staff that the situation at Kharkov was extremely critical. The latter stressed 
this to the Fuhrer, who immediately ordered von Richthofen to dispatch to the Kharkov 
region most of his bomber and dive-bomber units, which were still fighting furiously at 
Kerch? After learning that these aircraft were on their way, and having seen the Luftwaffe's 
decisive contribution to numerous defensive battles, von Bock told his worried Sixth Army 
commander "not to be in too great a hurry and not, in any circumstances, to attack 
without air support".8 
Hitler certainly needed to transfer aircraft urgently from the Crimea. When Soviet 
divisions first smashed through German lines near Kharkov, lohr's Luttf/otte IV had very 
few aircraft to throw against them. Most of its units-half of Fliegerkorps IV and all of 
Fliegerkorps VIII and Fliegerfuhrer Sud-were concentrated in the Crimea. Half of General 
der Flieger Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV remained in the Ukraine, but (to quote its after-
acton report of 12 J Line) it had "only weak fighter forces at its disposal, because the mass 
of fighters, as well as almost all its bomber and dive-bomber units, had been relinquished 
for the execution of the Kerch operation".9 
Pflugbeil's fighters attacked Soviet forces with their machine-guns, cannons and small 
bombs from the opening moments of the offensive10, but were unable to do more than 
occasionally disrupt supply columns and pin down infantry formations. They did manage 
quickly to wrestle air superiority over the battlefield from their VVS counterparts, who 
greatly outnumbered them but were poorly trained and deployed.11 However, without 
bombers, dive-bombers and ground-attack aircraft, Pflugbeil's fighters were powerless to 
blunt the devastating enemy attack. 
By the evening of 14 May, Timoshenko had opened broad gaps both north and south 
of Kharkov and had created the right conditions for introducing the bulk of his armour and 
mobile formations. During the previous two days he had deployed his armoured formations, 
for the first time in the war, according to Heinz Guderian's maxim: "not in dribbles, but 
in mass!".12 His use of tanks in the German manner had doubtless contributed to his 
recent successes. Even so, the Soviet Marshal had not yet deployed more than 20 per 
cent of his available armour. He had been holding back his powerful Twenty-First Tank 
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Corps in order to use it, when he saw the right moment, to maximum effect. Now, after 
two days of unchecked progress, Timoshenko had the opportunity to throw the Corps 
effectively into the battle in order to complete the encirclement of German forces around 
Kharkov. However, he failed to seize the moment. According to the official postwar Soviet 
history, he was misled by false intelligence reports stating that von Bock was concentrating 
a large Panzer force near Zmiev (25 kilometres south of Kharkov) and, as a result, he 
delayed introducing his mobile formations. The Marshal's failure to deploy his armour on 
14 or 15 May, the official history continues, "negatively affected the development of the 
operation. The advancing troops exhausted their strength and the pace of the advance 
dropped sharply. By this time the enemy had succeeded in pulling up reserves and in 
organizing the rear area defences."13 
Not only had von Bock regrouped his ground forces by 15 May, but by then most of 
the air units diverted from the Crimea had arrived. These included three groups of the 
77th Dive-Bomber Wing, which had distinguished itself in almost every major operation 
since the war started. One group arrived at Kharkov on 13 May, the others two days 
later.14 They were joined by two groups of the 27th Bomber Wing, which also reached 
Kharkov on 13 May, three groups of the 51st "Edelweiss" Bomber Wing, which came 
between 13 and 15 May, and three groups of the 55th Bomber Wing, which came on 14 
May. The last unit to make its way north, a group of the 76th Bomber Wing, arrived late 
on 15 May. Pflugbeil borrowed units not only from von Richthofen, but also from von 
Greim, whose recently-formed Luftwaffenkommando Ost operated in the central army 
zone before Moscow. Von Greim sent him a Stuka group, which flew south on 14 May, 
and a bomber group, which made the journey five days later. These transfers taxed the 
energy and resources of Pflugbeil's service and maintenance personnel, who worked 
ceaselessly to organize and equip airfields and prepare arriving aircraft for their new 
missions. They also gave beleaguered German ground forces what historians Ziemke 
and Bauer later called "an extraordinarily powerful concentration of air support".1S 
Including these additions, Fliegerkorps IV now commanded no fewer than 10 bomber, 
six fighter and four Stuka groups, as well as a close support group and a tactical 
reconnaissance Staffel.16 This gave Pflugbeil far more units than von Richthofen later 
had at Sevastopol, although, because of differences in operational readiness-54.5 per 
cent of Pflugbeil's aircraft were combat-ready on 20 lVIay, whereas 64.5 per cent of von 
Richthofen's were on 20 June17-the size of the strike forces were almost identical. 
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The reinforced Fliegerkorps IV immediately made its presence felt. Although the 
enemy continued advancing south of Kharkov, taking Krasnograd and Taranovka on 15 
May, German forces managed to slow its progress and contain the Soviet advance north 
of the city. The air corps was largely responsible for these achievements. Operating from 
airfields dangerously close to the front, it provided German ground forces with effective 
support by launching unremitting and devastating attacks on Soviet troops, vehicles and 
armour and pounding mobilization pOints and logistics systems in army rear areas. It 
attacked the Soviets not only with aircraft, but also with its 88-cm flak guns. Used as 
direct-fire anti-tank guns, these high-velocity weapons destroyed scores of Timoshenko's 
T-34s as they rolled westwards. The corp's outstanding work was recognized by all 
observers. Even Halder (who, as already noted, rarely paid attention to air activities) 
wrote in his diary on 15 May that "the force of the attack appears to have been broken 
by the efforts of our Luftwaffe".18 
Von Bock was greatly relieved that the Soviet attack was losing speed and strength, 
but also felt unsure of what to do next. Although Fridericus was due to start in a few 
days, powerful enemy forces still pinned down and threatened to destroy the bulk of 
Paulus' Sixth Army, his northern pincer. By 14 May, it had already lost 16 battalions.19 
With one pincer missing, the Field Marshal realized that Fridericus could no longer be 
carried out as originally planned. Should he cancel the offensive, therefore, and merely 
carry out a local counter-attack in order to stabilize the front, or should he attempt to 
conduct the offensive with only one pincer?20 He preferred the former option; Hitler, who 
promised to send additional aircraft from other combat zones, ordered the latter.19 Early 
on 17 May, Armee-Gruppe von Kleist would strike at the weak and unsuspecting Soviet 
Ninth Army, which was supposedly defending the southern shoulder of the Izyum salient. 
The Gruppe would also drive from Barvenkovo to Balakleya, thereby pinching off the 
entire salient and trapping Timoshenko's forces. 21 
With five Rumanian divisions protecting their left flank, von Kleist's strike force of eight 
infantry divisions, two Panzer divisions and a motorized infantry division attacked as 
planned on 17 May.22 They were supported by several fighter groups, which swept the 
skies of their Soviet counterparts and strafed exposed troops and supply and reinforcement 
convoys. Because these convoys possessd few anti-aircraft guns and had to travel 
unprotected more than 100 kilometres from their railheads to their forward units, they 
were little more than sitting ducks. 
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Hundreds of bombers and Stukas joined the battle, unloading streams of bombs on 
tank and supply columns, troops, field fortifications, strongpoints, bunkers and logistics 
networks. They also scattered loads of propaganda leaflets over enemy positions, calling 
on Soviet troops to throw down their arms in order to save themselves from inevitable 
destruction. In fact, during May they rained down an impressive 8,349,300 leaflets {two-
thirds released by KG. 55 alone).23 Additionally, bombers dropped 383 canisters of 
ammunition and rations to encircled German troops. KG. 55 conducted the bulk of these 
missions, dropping supplies on several occasions, for example, to German pockets of 
resistance in the small Ternovaya forest and repeatedly bombing enemy forces attempting 
to eradicate them.24 
Tactical reconnaissance planes also played their part, monitoring enemy movements, 
directing attack aircraft to their targets and checking and correcting the army's artillery 
fire. Von Kleist actually considered the role of these observation planes (whose work is 
still ignored by most historians) to be so important to his operation that he later singled 
them out for special praise. "The underlying reason for the Command's actions," he wrote 
in a letter of thanks to Fliegerkorps IV, "was the provision of tactical reconnaissance fliers. 
Their tireless missions, which demonstrated their outstanding personal bravery, gave the 
Command a clear picture of the enemy at all times." 25 
Many aircrew flew more than ten missions per day in this critical period, leaving them 
and their ground teams exhausted. Their efforts, however, brought great rewards; they 
shot down numerous enemy aircraft, knocked out scores of tanks and motor vehicles, 
killed hundreds of horses, destroyed countless artillery pieces and even wrecked several 
trains. After the war, Generalmajor Hans Doerr, Fifty-Second Army Corps' Chief of Staff, 
recalled Fliegerkorps IV's outstanding work in the first days of von Kleist's offensive: 
A decisive share of the success achieved during the first stages of the offensive 
was contributed by the IV. Fliegerkorps, whose units supported the infantry's 
struggle in such an exemplary manner that, for example, the strongly-defended 
heights south of Bogorodichnoye [on the Donets river, southeast of IzyumJ 
came under annihilating air attacks only 20 minutes after requests arrived 
from Infantry reglments. 26 
According to First Panzer Army's war diary, the new offensive was supported "most 
effectively by the Luftwaffe'?7 Strong air attacks In front of their advances helped Third 
Panzer Corps push forward 24 kilometres to Barvenkovo and Seventeenth Army 28 
kilometres, nearly to Izyum, on the first day alone. Fliegerkorps IV also assisted Paulus' 
army in the region southwest of Kharkov, where fighting intensified on 17 lVIay. Strong 
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Soviet armoured forces attempted to break through to Merefa, but were stopped in their 
tracks by a powerful combination of anti-tank guns and Stukas. Their attacks left burned-
out tanks strewn across the battlefield. "The divisions of the Eighth Army Corps," Hans 
Doerr wrote, "effectively supported by IV. Fliegerkorps, prevented the breakthrough and, 
with that, the envelopment of Kharkov." 28 
Taken by surprise, General Kharitonov's Ninth Army collapsed under the weight of von 
Kleist's attack. Its left wing began a fighting retreat towards the northern Donets, whilst 
its right wing fell back towards Barvenkovo and further to the southwest. This retreat, and 
the rapid German advance along the northern Donets, placed Soviet forces in great 
danger of being cut off. Realizing this, and that Timoshen ko's northern pincer had been 
stopped and his southern now swung into empty air, Marshal Vasilevskii, the Red Army's 
acting Chief of the General Staff, urgently requested Stalin twice on 18 May to cancel the 
offensive and redeploy all forces in defensive operations.29 Stalin refused, pOinting out 
that Timoshenko himself still believed the offensive should continue. Late on 19 May, 
however, he finally permitted Southwestern Front to switch to the defensive after 
Timoshenko, apparently realizing his enormous error, now insisted that a disaster appeared 
imminent. This decision came far too late. 
On 20 June, von Kleist's spearheads took Protopopovka, which reduced the mouth of 
the pocket to only twenty kilometres. "Continuation of this advance," concerned American 
intelligence officers noted in their brief to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, "would threaten 
encirclement of all Russian forces west of the Donets." The battle, they added, "has 
assumed large proportions and much depends on its outcome." 30 No-one realized this 
more than the encircled Soviets themselves. "Like fiery wasps trapped in a bottle," John 
Erickson wrote, "the trapped armies turned inwards and stabbed at the German pincers".31 
It did no good; after three more days of bitter fighting, German troop succeeded in closing 
the mouth of the pocket.32 
Fliegerkorps IV worked vigorously in that period to ensure that few Soviet troops 
escaped. To strengthen his already-powerful bomber fleet for these operations, Pflugbeil 
briefly borrowed an extra bomber group from Luftwaffenkommando Ost.33 His bombers 
struck Soviet forces still fighting inside the rapidly-closing ring as well as those trying to 
smash the ring open from the outside. They annihilated large numbers of men, tanks, 
armoured vehicles, trucks and guns. In order to prevent enemy formations fleeing through 
the narrowing gap, they also struck the main bridges across the Donets.34 They were 
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poorly suited to this work, and succeeded only in destroying one bridge and damaging 
five others. Stukas raced in to do the job properly, destroying seven bridges and damaging 
four more and a landing stage. 35 Fighters, with complete air superiority and no major 
concerns about enemy flak-most flak guns had been destroyed or left on the battlefield 
by retreating troops-attacked unprotected formations and soft-skinned vehicles both 
inside and outside the pocket. As a result, few enemy troops made it through the gap 
and those that did suffered fearful losses, running headlong into a hailstorm of anti-
personnel and high-explosive bombs. 
When the ring closed completely, Soviet troops fought like cornered cats. With 
extraordinary determination and ferocity, they launched themselves against the walls of 
the ever-tightening ring. Low on food, ammunition and fuel, but driven by the combination 
of courage and blind fanaticism that the Germans had come to expect, they made 
desperate and hopeless attacks. On many occasions, they stormed forward with arms 
linked, shouting "Urrayl". German machine-gunners hardly needed to aim; they just sprayed 
the lines with bullets, killing hundreds at a time. Only one breakout attempt came close 
to success. On 25 May, two divisions, supported by a number of T-34s, managed to 
bulldoze their way towards Petrovskoye before they were caught by Pflugbeil's Stukas. 
"In heavy individual actions, Hans Doerr recalled, describing these events, "Fliegerkorps 
/V's superb work caused the annihilation of the forces attempting to break out near 
Petrovskoye." 36 
By 28 May, Soviet resistance finally petered out. The Battle of Kharkov-in which the 
Soviets tried to encircle the Germans but were themselves surrounded-was over. For 
Stalin, it was an appalling defeat. 75,000 of his best troops had been killed and another 
239,000 staggered into captivity. Over 1,200 tanks, 2,000 artillery pieces and 542 aircraft 
were destroyed or captured. Many thousands of horses (vital for transport and towage) 
also fell into German hands, as did large stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment.37 
For Hitler, it was a grand victory. He had humiliated Stalin only a week earlier, when his 
forces crushed three armies, captured Kerch and took 170,000 prisoners. Now, by smashing 
another three armies, throwing back a major offensive and bringing the prisoner total for 
both campaigns to more than 400,000, he inflicted further humiliation. Referring to his 
coming campaign for the Caucasus, he triumphantly exclaimed to Goebbels that he was 
now ready "to strangle the Soviet system at its Adam's apple".38 
It was a classic battle of encirclement and annihilation and, as Hitler fully realized, one 
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of strategical importance. At a bearable cost, his troops had hacked off the Izyum salient, 
which had been a constant threat to Kharkov and an extra length of front for them to 
guard. By gaining important areas in the Donets Basin, they had created an excellent 
staging area for Operation B/au, the planned summer campaign. They had also significantly 
weakened opposition in the region and regained the strategic advantage. If they could get 
Blau rolling in the near future, they should make splendid progress. 
Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV had certainly contributed to the German victory. In less than 
three weeks of furious fighting, it had flown 15,648 sorties and dropped 7,700 tons of 
bombs, 8,359,300 leaflets and 383 canisters of supplies.39 The Ju 52s of its transport 
squadrons worked hard to keep airfields and army units supplied, flying in 1,545 tons of 
material. For the loss of only 49 aircraft (and 12 men killed and 98 missing), the air corp's 
reported kill total was astounding. If its claims can be trusted, and Soviet sources do 
admit very heavy losses to the Luftwaffe, the corps destroyed no fewer than 615 aircraft, 
19 of them on the ground. It claimed an impressive 227 tanks destroyed and 140 others 
damaged. Horizontal bombers, flying at low altitude over armoured columns caught in the 
open without flak protection, actually destroyed as many tanks as the Stukas. All units-
bombers, dive-bombers and fighters-perfomed equally well against supply convoys. 
According to their reports, they together wrecked 3,038 motor vehicles and 1,686 horse-
drawn wagons and damaged another 462 and 272 respectively. Railway convOYs fared 
no better: Pflugbeil's airmen knocked out 22 locomotives and six complete trains, and 
damaged another 22 trains. They demolished 24 artillery and two 'flak batteries, 49 
separate artillery pieces, 14 munitions camps, 10 supply camps and various other 
installations, and partially destroyed many more of each. They also killed large numbers 
of men and horses. 
Flak units also distinguished themselves during the Battle of Kharkov. The I. Flak-
Korps (First Anti-Aircraft Corps) claimed that between 12 and 28 May it shot down 33 
enemy aircraft and wrecked 124 tanks, including T-34s and the huge KV-1s and KV-2s.40 
Again, Soviet sources attest to the general reliability of these figures. Although most 
batteries performed well, some proved remarkably effective. For instance, one battery, 
commanded by Leutnant Reichwald, managed to shoot down six aircraft within the space 
of a few minutes on 18 May, bringing its total for the eastern campaign to 27. Reichwald's 
achievements did not pass un-noticed; in August he received the Knight's Cross. 
The air corps played a crucial role in the battle, as army commanders gratefully 
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acknowledged. "Our special thanks go to the air corps and its close-combat aircraft," von 
Kleist wrote to Pfugbeil, "which, in tireless operations, contributed decisively to our victory."41 
Paulus also sent his thanks: 
From the onset of the battle, fighters controlled the airpace and shot down 
numerous enemy aircraft. Assisting the struggle on the ground, dive-bombers 
and bombers attacked with bombs and other weapons, smashing enemy 
assembly points, attacking tanks, batteries and columns. The IV. Fliegerkorps 
thereby made an essential contribution to the successful defence, encirclement 
and destruction of the enemy. 
I proclaim to the corps and the elements it controlled my special gratitude for 
its frictionless co-operation and never-failing support.42 
Generaloberst Lohr, head of Luttf/otte IV and Pflugbeil's immediate superior, proudly 
passed on to the air corps a message from the delighted von Bock, whose armies had 
turned looming defeat into stunning victory.43 Von Bock, said the air fleet commander, 
"proclaims his special gratitude to Luttflotte IV for its decisive support of the army group". 
To this Lohr added his own expression of thanks for the corps' "outstanding performance 
and its again-demonstrated operational capabilities". 
Preparations for B/au 
As the intense battles around Kharkov drew to a close, Lohr hoped that his air fleet's 
next challenge, the assault on Sevastopol, would not be as demanding on ground and 
air crews. He wanted them fresh and ready for B/au, due to start in another month. His 
hopes were not entirely realized; even before fighting around Kharkov finished, and 
before he could think of rehabilitating many of his key units, he had to transfer them back 
to the Crimea. Von Richthofen, who had been pleading to the High Command for their 
urgent return, gave them no time to catch their breath. As soon as they arrived back at 
their Crimean airfields, he threw them into the battle. During the next month, he, and 
later von Wild, aggressively drove them to perform to the absolute limit of their capabilities. 
Then, when Sevastopol's fall became imminent in the final days of June, von Wild began 
sending them north again, this time to join von Richthofen's new headquarters in Kursk 
or to rejoin Pflugbeil's corps near Kharkov. 
While Fliegerkorps VIII pounded Sevastopol into rubble, Lohr's other corps, Fliegerkorps 
IV-minus the units von Richthofen borrowed and temporarily incorporated into his own 
corps-supported the army's two minor preliminary offensives in the Kharkov region. 
Operation Wilhelm was a small, two-pronged attack by Sixth Army, designed to trap 
elements of the Soviet Twenty-Eighth Army in what was left of the Volchansk salient 
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(slightly east of Kharkov) and to provide cover on the south for Sixth Army's main thrust 
during Blau's initial stages. Paulus brought Wilhelm to a successful conclusion only six 
days after its launch on 10 June. Although the bulk of the Twenty-Eighth Army withdrew 
eastwards, German forces took over 22,000 prisoners and secured excellent jump-off 
points east of the Donets river.44 
Operation Fridericus II was another small attack in this region. Its architects intended 
von Kleist's First Panzer Army to encircle the bulk of the enemy's Ninth and Thirty-Eighth 
Armies north and east of Izyum and to move itself forward fifty kilometres into its starting 
position for Blau. After several postponements due to heavy rain, Fridericus /I began on 
22 June.45 Again, Soviet formations fell back eastwards. As a result, von Kleist attained 
his territorial goals by 25 June, capturing 18,500 more prisoners: a haul considered 
disappointing in these favourable days for the Wehrmacht. 46 
During both Wilhelm and Fridericus II, Pflugbeil's air corps possessed relatively few 
ground-attack units. Most were still engaged in the Crimea. Accordingly, he concentrated 
the few he did have at the army's Schwerpunkte (points of maximum effort) and deployed 
his other units on interdiction and reconnaissance missions. They made strong attacks 
on road and rail traffic in enemy rear areas and constantly carried out surveillance 
missions over field pOSitions and supply and reinforcement routesY On the first day of 
Fridericus II, a He 111 of the 55th Bomber Wing even managed to destroy. the main 
Kupyansk bridge over the Oskol river with a 1,000-kg bomb, thereby severing the Soviets' 
main supply line, Despite temporarily losing his best close-support units, Pflugbeil strove 
to provide local armies with the maximum support available. He therefore exorted his 
men to work at an intense pace, to which they responded with great gusto. For instance, 
one group of the 51st Bomber Wing alone carried out 300 missions between 10 and 13 
June,48 
Throughout June, while Fliegerkorps IV participated in Wilhelm and Fridericus II and 
Fliegerkorps VIII took part in St6rfang, L6hr devoted 11is energies to preparing the entire 
air 'fleet for its contribution to the corning summer offensive. In recent months, Luftwaffe 
construction teams had built a large number of airfields in the Ukraine. The OKL ordered 
their creation so that L6hr's units could support B/au's opening operations from well-
equipped airfields right behind the front. As well as these new front-line airfields, engineers 
built a series stretching back throughout the Ukraine. Air supply units would need these 
to cope with their increasing workload as the front moved steadily eastwards and combat 
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units operated from new airfields, including hastily-built or captured ones away from rail 
or road supply routes. 49 
To ensure that his combat units would always be able to provide the army with the 
support it needed, L6hr built up large stocks of bombs, fuel, spare parts and other 
equipment. He also initiated a programme of regular exchanges and reliefs in order to 
bring his units back up to strength before the campaign commenced. Although interrupted 
by the battles in the Ukraine and the Crimea, this programme proved successful and by 
the time B/au started his fleet enjoyed a high state of operational readiness. 
For the summer offensive, the OKL sent fresh air reinforcements to the southern front, 
many of them transferred from the central and northern fronts. Several groups even 
arrived from the Mediterranean, following the abandonment of the assault on Malta.50 
Thus, by 20 June, the eastern air fleets possessed 2,644 aircraft, over 20 per cent more 
than they had only a month earlier and approximately the same number as during the 
previous summer. 51 Whereas in 1941 most fought on the central front, the majority 
(1,610 aircraft, or 61 per cent) now operated under L6hr on the southern front. The OKL 
left a relatively small holding force of nearly 600 aircraft on the central front, around 375 
on the Leningrad front, and the rest in northern Norway and Finland.52 For Lohr, controlling 
61 per cent of all aircraft on the eastern front was a sustantial improvement from only a 
month earlier, when he commanded only 46 per cent.53 His fleet was ready for the battle. 
It was a pity, he thought, that he was leaving for the Balkans. 
The army staff also worked hard to rehabilitate and strengthen its forces in time for 
B/au. It could no longer satisfy the manpower requirements of all three eastern army 
groups, which, despite having received 1,100,000 fresh troops up to 1 May 1942, were 
still 625,000 men short of establishment. 54 Realizing this, it began sending increasingly 
more of these replacements to Army Group South in order to insure that it was capable 
of carrying out Hitler's bold offensive. For example, 25 per cent went to Army Group 
South in February, 34 per cent in March and 39 per cent in April.55 Even they were not 
enough. On 1 May, according to a detalied report prepared by the OKW Operations Staff, 
Army Group South's infantry strength still stood at only 50 per cent of its 1941 level 
(whilst that of the other two groups stood at a mere 35 per cent).56 Although additional 
replacements arrived in l\IIay and June, the southern army group never reached more 
than three-quarters of its 1941 level. 
Despite the OKW's efforts to send enough new materiel to make good Army Group 
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South's losses in recent months, it only achieved this goal by stripping equipment from 
the other two army groups. It has already been noted, for example, how the OKW 
deprived them of most of their motor vehicles in order to ensure that von Bock's forces 
regained at least 85 per cent of their former mobility. The removal of so many vehicles 
and the lack of reinforcements of men and materiel naturally led to a significant reduction 
of the other army groups' combat effectiveness, a situation exacerbated by a drastic 
shortage of horses and fodder.57 
Army Group South also received the lion's share of all tanks and assault guns shipped 
to the east, including new models with guns capable of stopping the formidable T-34s. 
These tanks, coupled with some transferred from elsewhere on the eastern front, 
refurbished von Bock's tired armoured divisions. Many divisions were even given an extra 
tank battalion (that is, three instead of the usual two). Most of those in Army Groups 
Centre and North, on the other hand, were left with only one battalion each.56 
By the middle of June, Army Group South was as ready for battle as its supporting 
air fleet. Reinforcements from the Reich and other sections of the eastern front had 
raised its strength substantially to 68 well-equipped German combat divisions. They 
comprised 46 infantry, nine Panzer, four light infantry, five motorized infantry, two mountain 
and two elite SS divisions.59 The army group also included 25 allied divisions. Most were 
Rumanian, the rest Italian and Hungarian. 
Although von Bock had previously estimated that he would need eight divisions less 
than this combined total of 93, his own divisions were slightly understrength (but were far 
stronger than those elsewhere along the eastern front, which had now dropped from nine 
battalions each to six60 ) and his allied divisions were even weaker. The latter also tended 
to be inferior in equipment, training and, if past experience was any indication, fighting 
spirit. Still, von Bock realized that the million Germans and 300,000 allies under his 
command formed an extremely potent strike force. Supported by Lohr's powerful air fleet, 
it was certainly capable of carrying out Hitler's planned offensive. 
Blau was divided into three phases.61 In the opening phase (Blau I) a powerful force 
would make a direct thrust from the Kursk region whilst another made an enveloping 
thrust from around Belgorod, slightly north of Kharkov. They aimed to take Voronezh, an 
important rail junction and armaments and industrial centre, and destroy all Soviet forces 
west of the city in a pocket between the Oskol and Don rivers. 
After the successful completion of these operations, Army Group South would divide 
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into two new groups: A, under Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, and B, under von Bock. 
Then the offensive's second phase (Blau 1/) would commence. While some of the infantry 
divisions established a strong defensive line from Orel to Voronezh, motorized and 
armoured divisions would continue their south-eastward drive along the Don, carrying out 
another double envelopment in conjunction with forces thrusting directly eastwards from 
the Kharkov area. 
During the third phase (Blau /II), the forces following the course of the Don were to 
link up near Stalingrad with those advancing 'from the Taganrog area, thus completing a 
massive roundup of all Soviet formations in the bend of the Don river. After the successful 
completion of these operations, speci'fic orders for the Caucasus campaign proper would 
be given, according to which Axis forces would strike into the Caucasus and seize the 
valuable oil regions, including Baku and the shores of the Caspian Sea. 
Lohr planned to deploy both Fliegerkorps IV and VI/I in support of von Bock's armies 
when they rolled eastwards and to keep his smaller, specialist anti-shipping force (von 
Wild's FliegerfOhrer SOd) in the Crimea, protecting it from enemy ground, sea and air 
attacks. 62 To safeguard his airfields and the army's logistics networks, march routes, 'field 
installations and strongpoints from enemy air attacks, the OKL again assigned him the 
I. Flak-Korps. Under General der Flakartillerie Otto DeBloch's operational command, this 
recently-reinforced flak corps, comprising the strongly-armed 9th and 10th Flak Divisions, 
packed a mighty punch. 
Lohr would oversee his fleet's operations during Blau's opening days before departing 
for the Balkans, where he would take charge of all German forces. Von Richthofen would 
replace him as fleet commander, after first transferring command of his beloved Fliegerkorps 
V/II to Generalleutnant Martin Fiebig, a close air support specialist to whom he had taught 
his "trade". Before then, however, von Richthofen had to organize the corps' transfer 
from the Crimea to the Kursk region (which would be carried out immediately after 
Sevastopol fell). From there it would support the advance of Genera/oberst von Weich's 
Second Army and Fourth Panzer Army, beginning first with their attack towards Voronezh. 
Fliegerkorps IV would operate in the region south of Kharkov and, during the drive to 
Voronezh, support Sixth Army's thrust from Belgorod.63 
Von Richthofen arrived at Kursk in the morning of 24 June. He spent the early 
afternoon setting up his headquarters in a former commissar school, which he described 
as a "kind of castle-cum-hospital", and the rest of the day 'flying his Storch along the 
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front.64 German positions, he noted in his diary, appeared to have been carefully prepared, 
although there were surprising few signs of the enemy, who were "quite weak in the air 
as well as on the ground." The Soviets, he thought, were well aware of German intentions, 
having been tipped off by "German battle plans found on a General Staff officer whose 
plane was shot down". They were probably now regrouping and preparing to defend 
themselves in their present rear areas. 
Von Richthofen was clearly referring to the so-called "Reichel affair". On 19 June, 
Major Joachim Reichel, Operations Officer of the 23rd Panzer Division, crash-landed in 
a Storch four kilometres behind the Soviet Iines.55 Contrary to the Fuhrer's explicit orders 
in War Directive 41 about the need for absolute secrecy, Reichel carried in his briefcase 
the operational orders for General der Panzertruppe Georg Stumme's Fortieth Panzer 
Corps and the outlines of the entire first phase of Operation Blau.66 A German patrol 
found the plane several hours later, intact except for a bullet hole in the fuel tank. It did 
not, however, find any trace of Reichel, the pilot or the documents. Two days later, 
another patrol located what were presumed to be their bodies in shallow graves. Both 
Stumme's headquarters and the High Command were horrified, and bitterly disappointed 
to learn that the patrol found neither the briefcase nor the documents. 
Von Bock wanted to launch B/au immediately, before the Soviets could exploit the 
information. He feared it might be too late; they were already moving troops north from 
the Rostov sector and assembling a large armoured force opposite Sixth Army.67 On 21 
June he asked Halder to pass on his views to the Fuhrer, who was then at his mountain 
home in Berchtesgaden and had yet to be told of the Reichel incident.68 When finally 
informed, Hitler was furious about the officer's stupidity and, after returning to his 
headquarters and reading a detailed report on the matter, raged against his staff officers 
and sacked Stumme, Oberstleutnant Franz, his Chief of Staff, and General von Boineburg-
Lengsfeld, commander of the 23rd Panzer Division.69 
Stumme was an outstanding officer with an impressive record. He was well liked by 
his troops, who affectionately called him "lightning ball" because of his boundless energy 
and constantly red face (caused by blood pressure). Nonetheless, someone had to pay 
for Reichel's blunder. Stumme and Franz were promptly court-martialled, convicted of 
"issuing too-far-reaching orders", and sentenced to five and two years in prison respectively. 
GOring, who had presided over their trial, apparently admired their honest and courageous 
defence and promised to "report this to the Fuhrer". He kept his word and, after von Bock 
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also intervened on their behalf, Hitler struck down their sentences in view of their 
distinguished records. The OKW transferred Stumme to the western desert where he 
served as Rommel's deputy. Franz followed as the Afrikakorps' Chief of Staff. Tragically, 
the desert heat proved too much for the "lightning ball"; he died of a heart attack on 25 
October 1942, early in the EI Alamein offensive. 
Hitler now had a major decision to make. Should he cancel B/au on the assumption 
that the enemy knew all about its first phase and had probably redeployed their forces 
to counter it, or should he still go through with it on the off-chance that they had not? 
Believing after recent substantial victories in the Crimea and the Kharkov region that 
Soviet resistance was weaker than in the previous year, Hitler decided to trust his intuition 
and let B/au proceed as planned. 
As it happened, Hitler made the right choice. Soviet infantrymen had indeed found 
Reichel's aircraft and seized the papers. Sensing their importance, they sent them up 
through the channels to Timoshenko himself. The Marshal immediately transmitted their 
contents to the headquarters of the neighbouring Bryansk Front, which, along with his 
own South-Western Front, looked set to bear the brunt of the German attack. Timoshenko 
then sent the actual documents on to the General Staff in Moscow.70 
Colonel-General Golikov, commander of the Bryansk Front, took the documents seriously 
and began strengthening his left flank in order to withstand the German onslaught, likely 
to commence (according to his understanding of Reichel's papers) on 22 June.71 
Timoshenko, on the other hand, had apparently been convinced by Stalin that the papers 
were probably "fed to us deliberately in order to throw a veil over the true intentions of 
the German command". As a result, he did nothing to strengthen his own Front.72 This 
prompted Golikov to request a special commander for the "Voronezh Zone",13 Stalin, who 
still believed that the Germans intended to attack Moscow from the south and that they 
had planted phony papers in order to lure his capital's defenders out of position, turned 
him down flat. Then, when the offensive failed to materialize by 25 June (it had actually 
been postponed several days because of bad weather), Stalin summoned Golikov to 
Moscow. There he lectured him on the foolishness of believing such a "big trumped-up 
piece of work". Instead, he must prepare an operation to recapture Orel in co-operation 
with Western Front. Verbally battered into submission, Golikov agreed to draw up plans 
for the attack. He finished them in the early hours of 28 June, at almost the same time 
as Axis forces struck the first massive blows of the major offensive which Stalin said 
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would never come. 
B/au I: the Voronezh Offensive 
After only three hours sleep, von Richthofen climbed out of bed at 0145 hours on 28 
June, nervous but determined, as always, to watch his planes' first operations in a new 
campaign.74 He had spent the last few days hurriedly setting up Fliegerkorps VIII's new 
command staff-which "is willing but still has a great deal to learn" 7s-"and directing the 
overhauling and re-equipping of exhausted units arriving daily from the Crimea, where 
many of his groups, under von Wild's command, were still pounding Sevastopol. He was 
actually relieved, th~refore, that he was able that morning to throw a substantial number 
of aircraft into the battle. At 0300 he arrived in his Storch over the front, just in time to 
watch his Stukas and ground-attack aircraft make their first strikes. He was delighted by 
their performance and, uncharacteristically, by that of the army, which made good progress 
all that day. 
He was remarkably lucky to make this flight. While inspecting Axis positions three days 
earlier, troops of the German 387th Infantry Division mistakenly opened fire on his little 
aircraft, wounding his co-pilot, puncturing the fuel tank and filling his plane with holes. 
After making an emergency landing, he sent the commander of the division involved a 
letter ''thanking'' his men for their efforts.76 "Whilst it is a delight to see the fighting spirit 
of the German ground troops against aircraft," he sarcastically wrote, "may I request that 
these troops direct their fighting spirit against the Red Air Force." After pOinting out that 
visibilty was excellent and his aircraft was clearly marked, he added that "perhaps their 
gunfire was intended to be an ovation of greeting, in which case permit the Commander 
of the VIII. Fliegerkorps to express his gratitude for it and, at the same time, encourage 
them that similar greetings should in future be carried out witl, blank cartridges." His diary 
entry for that day is far more blunt. Well aware that he had escaped death by the closest 
shave, he angrily scrawled: "Damned dogs! They don't fire at the Russians, but at our 
Storch!" 
Watching his units carry out their initial attacks in front of von Weich's advancing 
armour-to return to the events of 28 June-von Richthofen also observed the German 
spearheads' rapid advance. After a heavy pre-dawn artillery and air bombardment, Forty-
Eighth Panzer Corps' armoured units roared forward, throwing up large clouds of dust 
into the stifling summer air. Their speed and power stunned Soviet troops, who seemed 
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unable to offer more than token resistance. Followed by motorized infantry, they penetrated 
enemy defences at the juncture of Golikov's Thirteenth and Fortieth Armies by mid-
morning, captured and crossed an undamaged bridge over the Tim river at noon, and 
reached the Kshen river by late afternoon. Its neighbouring formation on the left, Twenty-
Fourth Panzer Corps, made similar progress, also reaching the Kshen by dusk.77 Army 
Group South had previously calculated that von Weich's troops would take two days to 
make these gains. Watching the initial breakthroughs from his Storch, von Richthofen felt 
increasingly optimistic about B/au's outcome. "I have the impression," he recorded that 
evening, ''that things will go smoothlY." 
In the previous few days, von Richthofen and his staff had conducted regular meetings 
with army group, corps and division commanders to create joint Schwerpunkte and co-
ordinate inter-service co-operation. The battle tactics agreed on followed a basic pattern 
formed during the previous year of war in the east, a pattern Karl Koller, the Luftwaffe's 
last Chief of the General Staff, would later describe succinctly as "Tanks up front, artillery 
to the rear and planes above".78 The "planes above" certainly contributed substantially 
to the army's achievments during B/au, beginning with von Weich's successes that first 
day. 
Fighters worked furiously from before dawn to pin down enemy troops in front of 
advancing armour and wrestle air superiority from their Soviet counterparts, which they 
easily outclassed and, for once, outnumbered.79 Flying "without pause", Sf 109s shot 
down thirty enemy aircraft that first day alone. 80 However, unable to patrol the airspace 
above all Axis positions at any given time, they could not always prevent their rivals 
strafing German spearheads and the Second Hungarian Army, which protected a large 
section of the line. In response to these attacks and the loss of four He 111 s (apparently 
his only losses that day), von Richthofen subjected Soviet airfields to heavy attacks by 
his bombers, which wrecked one and inflicted substantial damage on several others. 
Direct battlefield support of advancing units also proved successful. Striking enemy 
positions in front of advancing armour, concentrated groups of Stukas and ground-attack 
aircraft destroyed countless field pOSitions, batteries, bunkers, tanks and guns. "Overall," 
the air commander penned that night, probably with only slight exaggeration, "where we 
are not, [the army's] results are very sparse."81 General Kazakov, the Bryansk Front's 
Chief of Staff, later recalled that "Enemy aviation continuously accompanied his tank and 
infantry offensive. [It] operated using powerful groups".82 As many as 100 aircraft at a 
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time were active against single Soviet divisions at the tip of German spearheads. Moreover, 
Kazakov added, "simultaneous with air strikes against our battlefield combat formations, 
enemy aviation delived strikes against concentration regions of army and Front reserves." 
Indeed, von Richthofen wrote in his diary that his bombers, striking into Bryansk Front's 
rear areas and deeper still, right back to the Don river, had annihilated two armoured 
trains and several supply columns. 
As already noted, co-ordinating air and ground operations was hard at the best of 
times, but during these battles of fast movement the task became extremely difficult. 
Because troops of the two opposing forces were almost indistinguishable from the air, 
Axis spearhead units sometimes fell victim to Luftwaffe "friendly fire", especially when 
they found themselves occupying positions that air observers and liaison staff still believed 
to be held by the enemy. One such case occurred that first day, when a company of the 
elite GroBdeutschland Division was spotted on a hill two kilometres east of the Tim river 
by Stukas. Although the soldiers "immediately spread out orange-coloured air identification 
panels as well as swastika flags and set off smoke signals", the pilots failed to recognize 
them as German and swooped down and scattered bombs amongst them.83 They killed 
sixteen men, wounded many others and destroyed numerous weapons and other 
equipment. Von Richthofen's diary reveals that he himself ordered the attack, believing 
the area still to be held by enemy troops. "It was my own fault," he lamented, "because 
I ordered it, and did not expect such a rapid [German] advance."84 
During the night of 28 June, Soviet aircraft showered bombs on several Axis positions, 
including von Richthofen's headquarters in Kursk. Poorly equipped for night missions and 
flying at high altitude to escape German flak, they inflicted little damage. Nature also 
bombarded the Germans that night, but with water instead of bombs. Torrential rain 
poured down on the combat zone, transforming airfields, supply roads and march routes 
into seas of mud. Troop and supply trucks sank axle deep and could only be moved by 
heavy tractors. Tanks and other tracked vehicles moved ahead fitfully, while the glue-like 
mud sucked at the boots of infantrymen. 
Swamped airfields and poor visibility forced von Richthofen to call off a series of pre-
dawn attacks he had planned. 85 His units finally got airborne at noon, the same time as 
armoured units began ploughing through the mud. The army advanced slowly but steadily 
that afternoon. Its unbroken progress was due in large part to the feeble resistance 
offered by Soviet troops-''the Russians are remarkably soft," the air leader wrote, "Their 
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tanks pull out and their artillery has come to a standstill"-as well as to the excellent 
support provided by Fliegerkorps VIII's Stukas and ground-attack aircraft. German tactics, 
General Kazakov recalled, were identical to those of the previous day: "strong artillery 
preparation and aviation pressure against our combat formations, and tank and infantry 
attacks with continuous aviation accompaniment in large groups of airplanes." 86 
Late on 29 June, forward units of the 40th Panzer Division closed in on what they 
believed to be the intact headquarters of the Fortieth Army. Receiving this news by radio, 
von Richthofen immediately pounded the village with everything available, hoping to 
destroy the headquarters before the commander and staff fled. 87 To his bitter 
disappointment, they managed to escape at the last minute, abandoning their command 
equipment and wireless vans. Their flight, however, left the entire army leaderless. sa 
The air leader did not mention how long it took the aircraft to strike the headquarters 
after he ordered the attack, but other comments in that day's diary entry allow us to 
conclude that the response time was far too long. "My [new] staff", he seethed, "is not 
functioning. I issued an order verbally at 1800, but it was only put into writing at 2330. 
Impossible!" 89 His communication system was hopeless, he added, and his air liaison 
officers-the F/ivos attatched to forward ground units-were "terrible", Their failings may 
partially account for the "friendly fire" attack of the previous day, if in fact von Richthofen's 
comments are accurate. 
For the next few days, nightly rainfalls slowed down von Weich's attack. "Intermittent 
thunderstorms made our routes as slippery as soap," wrote Genera/major Wolfgang 
Pickert, the newly-appointed commander of the 9th Flak Division. "These are strenuous, 
dirty days".90 Nonetheless, although the hostile weather retarded the Axis advance, it did 
not stop it. By late afternoon on 1 July, von Weich's northern pincer formations had 
survived a powerful but poorly-conceived armoured counterattack, occasionally freed its 
tanks from the quagmire and sent them churning slowly forward, overcome the stiffening 
resistance of enemy rifle divisions, and thrust several of its own drenched infantry regiments 
right to the headwaters of the Olym river, only seventy kilometres west of Voronezh. 
Fliegerkorps VIII contributed substantially to these gains. Its Stukas and ground-attack 
aircraft struck the three Soviet armoured corps rolling across the Steppes, destroying and 
damaging many tanks and forcing complete brigades to scatter and break off their attack. 
Its fighters worked at a frenzied pace (as did their ground crews), espeCially when air 
opposition stiffened briefly after the Soviet High Command hastily transferred seven 
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additional fighter and ground-attack regiments to Bryansk Front. 91 These reinforcements 
proved incapable, however, of regaining control of the skies, although their presence 
often forced German fighters to reduce their number of bomber escort and infantry attack 
missions. 
Stukas frequently joined the fighters as they roared down on exposed troops, although 
von Richthofen privately questioned the relative value of these missions.92 His air units 
would pound and strafe enemy infantry, he pointed out, thereby inflicting heavy losses. 
Yet, after an area was supposedly "cleared of the enemy", at least according to ground 
reconnaissance, Soviet troops would pop up again almost as soon as the aircraft left. 
The weather was far harsher to the northern pincer formations than to Sixth Army, the 
southern pincer, which finally launched its own thrust towards Voronezh on 30 June. This 
powerful army surged forward with remarkable speed, ripping a 35-kilometre-deep gap in 
the enemy's defences by nightfall. By late afternoon of the next day, when Fourth Panzer 
Army's spearheads passed the Olym river, Sixth Army's own forward units (fighting 100 
kilometres to the north) had shattered the right wing of Timoshenko's Southwestern Front 
and established bridgeheads on the east bank of the Oskol river. 
Although it possessed significantly fewer Stukas and ground attack aircraft than von 
Richthofen's corps, and was therefore unable to give the same level of direct battlefield 
support, P'fIugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV still provided Sixth Army with effective assistance. It 
smothered enemy defences in front of advancing troops with blankets of high explosive 
and anti-personnel bombs. It smashed command, communication and supply systems 
in rear areas. It also launched heavy bombing raids on more distant targets, including 
railway lines and junctions at Voronezh (joined by units of von Richthofen's corps, which 
also pounded the city itself, losing a Ju 88 to flak93), Michurinsk, Svoboda and Valuyki.94 
At midday on 1 July, the northern pincer released the 16th Motorized Infantry Division 
from its inner flank and sent it south towards Staryy Oskol, whilst its southern partner 
released the 100th Light Infantry Division from its own inner flank and sent it north along 
the Oskol river. Von Bock planned them to meet behind Staryy Oskol, forming a ring 
around the bulk of the Soviet Fortieth Army. Second Hungarian Army would then tighten 
the ring and destroy the trapped formations. 
Few operations go exactly to plan, and this one did not. The 16th Motorized Infantry 
Division crashed headlong into what it believed (according to the interrogation of a captured 
prisoner) to be a "remarkably strong and well-trained" Soviet motorized brigade. Unwilling 
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to engage this powerful enemy force without reinforcements, the division requested the 
assistance of ground~attack aircraft. Von Richthofen, angered by what he called its lack 
of courage, replied that the only troop concentrations in the region belonged to the 
division itself and that the supposedly-strong enemy brigade "had just departed in three 
lorries!!" 95 Later that afternoon, the air leader noticed that, whilst the northern division had 
finally reached Staryy Oskol, the southern division was still far from closing the pocket. 
To his disgust, Soviet troops were streaming eastwards through the open mouth. He 
immediately tried to seal the pocket with his Stukas and sent his bombers to pursue the 
columns streaming out. Although they left the ground strewn with large numbers of 
corpses, dead horses and wrecked vehicles, these air units failed to close the pocket or 
halt the retreat of Soviet formations. Army divisions finally closed the pocket the next 
day, by which time it was almost empty. The Soviets had even withdrawn most of their 
heavy weapons. 
The air leader blamed the army, claiming that its lack of fighting spirit allowed the 
enemy time to escape. It seems more likely, however, that Soviet troops escaped because 
their commanders had learned important lessons from their recent disasters, Kharkov 
being only one of several, and now employed new tactiCS; tactics successfully tested 
during both Wilhem and Fridericus II. Rather than defiantly holding ground at all cost, 
even at the risk of encirclement, as they usually had, they immediately asked for and 
received permission from the Stavka to withdraw eastwards the moment their encirclement 
looked Iikely.96 Strong rear-guard actions allowed the bulk of their formations to make an 
orderly withdrawal. 
Hitler now realized that he faced a major problem. Although he had previously suspected 
that Timoshenko's formations would conduct an elastic defence, he had intended to 
thwart this by moving his armour down the Don fast enough to trap them west of the river. 
Now, however, enemy formations were putting up no real defence but flowing back 
towards the Don with surprising speed. Would they escape across the river while his 
armoured units were still engaged in the battle for Voronezh? If they did, the entire first 
phase of B/au, now re-named Braunschweig (Brunswick), would end in failure. 
Thinking back to Dunkirk in 1940 and Leningrad the following year, the Fuhrer feared 
that tying up his precious armour in this damned city could throw his wider plans into 
jeopardy.97 Realizing that he had no iminediate need to capture Voronezh, but could 
destroy its railways and factories from the air and storm it later, he decided to fly to von 
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Bock's headquarters in Poltava and personally order the field marshal to leave the city 
alone. He made the three-hour journey on the morning of 3 July but (according to Keitel's 
description of these events), when confronted by the aloof and aristocratic Prussian field 
marshal, lost his nerve. He had always found it hard to discuss thorny matters with his 
older senior generals, and this time was no different. To Keitel's frustration, the Fuhrer 
became jovial and friendly.98 Far from flatly forbidding von Bock to take Voronezh, he 
"beat around the bush" and left the decision ultimately up to von Bock. Confused by his 
commander's vague instructions, the field marshal queried, "Am I right in understanding 
you as follows: I am to capture Voronezh if it can be done easily or without bloodshed. 
But I am not to get involved in heavy fighting for the city?" Hitler confirmed this with a 
silent nOd.99 
Von Bock vacillated all that day, unsure whether to attack the city or follow Hitler's 
"suggestion" to leave it alone. Early the next day, 4 July, he learned that a regiment of 
the 24th Panzer Division had captured a bridge across the Don and had established a 
bridgehead on the eastern bank. Later that day, forward units of GroBdeutschland-
which had alone destroyed 100 enemy tanks in the last week1OO-established their own 
bridgehead on the eastern bank. Voronezh was now tantalizingly close and apparently 
only weakly defended. Therefore, the Field Marshal decided to ignore his Fuhrer's advice 
and take the city. After carrying out this coup de main, he argued, he would still have 
time to send his tanks down the Don to block the flight of Timoshenko's shattered 
formations. 
On 5 July, Hitler heard reports that Soviet troops had flooded into Voronezh. He 
complained to his cohorts about the army group's recalcitrant and incompetent leadership 
and finally put his foot down; von Bock must halt the advance on the city and send his 
armour southwards. The following day, however, the army group reported that the city 
had actually been abandoned and that his spearheads had reached the suburbs. Enticed 
by this news, Hitler relented and let von Bock proceed. He did state, though, that an 
armoured corps must be sent down the Don without delay and further Panzer units freed 
up as soon as possible. The Field Marshal complied, dispatching the Fortieth Panzer 
Corps (belonging to Sixth Army) south-eastwards along the Don. 
The Fuhrer remained extremely agitated as the unwanted battle for Voronezh took 
place. His agitation turned to horror when he discovered that Army Group South's 
intelligence had failed to detect a major enemy build-up around the city. The Soviet 
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Command had assembled no fewer than nine ri'fle divisions, four rifle brigades, seven 
tank brigades and two anti-tank brigades, and these forces were now pinning down the 
valuable Panzer and motorized divisions of Forty-Eighth and Twenty-Fourth Panzer 
Corps.101 This was clearly Stalin's plan. Aware by now that Reichel's documents were 
authentic, he was desperate to tie down as many German forces as possible to give 
Timoshenko a chance to pull the bulk of his formations back from the Oskol and Donets 
and across the Don. Protected by tenacious rearguards, they had already begun to 
stream eastwards. 102 
Voronezh could not be held for long, as Stalin well knew. On 7 July, von Weichs threw 
more infantry into the battle, which tipped the scales and allowed him to disengage 
GroBdeutschland and the 24th Panzer Division and send them along behind the Fortieth 
Panzer Corps. They 'finally left at first light on 8 July. Still, the city's defenders fought 
bravely until they finally succumbed to the superior skill and forces of their assailants later 
that day. 
B/au I was over. Hitler was far from satisfied. Whilst his troops had captured a huge 
area, they bagged surprisingly few prisoners (around 70,000) and little booty. He was 
also extremely annoyed at the way his armoured units had been swallowed up for the 
last two days. This might yet have a profound impact on his campaign's next phase. His 
anger bubbled below the surface for another five days, finally erupting during a situation 
conference on 13 June.103 After giving Keitel, Jodi and Halder a savage verbal lashing, 
he ordered them to put von Bock on the "sick list" and replace him with von Weichs. 
He could hardly find fault with the Luftwaffe. It had performed extremely well so far, 
not only during the army's drive eastwards towards Voronezh but also during the storming 
of the city itself and attacks on the Soviet forces massed around it. On 5 July, for 
example, von Richthofen unleashed Fliegerkorps VIII's bomber and dive-bomber forces 
against the city, leaving its citizens battling numerous fires and choking on the dense 
clouds of smoke swirling through the broken buildings.104 The following day, he threw 
them into battle against the forces opposing the 24th Panzer Division. "The enemy was 
heavily smashed," he triumphantly wrote, "and fled in disarray towards the northeast." 
Pflugbeil's corps was apparently doing just as well. "Fliegerkorps IV hammers the Don 
bridges," von Richthofen noted, "destroying sections and inflicting terrible damage. 
Exploding, burning columns line the bridges, while three times as many line the roads." 
Von Richthofen's diary reveals that the Luftwaffe retained control of the skies. For an 
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average loss of four, it claimed forty enemy aircraft destroyed per day. 8 July was 
especially successful: Fliegerkorps VIII attacked enemy tanks, ammunition depots and 
airfields north and northeast of Voronezh. "Very good against trains," he commented, 
"and, above all, aircraft. 35 left burning, many others strafe-damaged .... 38 also shot 
down." Two days later, fighters in the Voronezh region practically wiped out a 20-strong 
VVS formation, allowing only one to limp back to base.105 
Flak units of various calibres guarded supply lines, rail-heads, troop concentrations 
and airfields. They also advanced with the army's spearheads, protecting both armour 
and infantry from the steadily-decreasing number of enemy ground-attack aircraft in the 
region. These were mainly the heavily-armoured Ilyushin 11-2 Shturmoviks. These excellent 
planes were impervious to small-arms fire, but not to the high-velocity fire of light and 
medium flak batteries. In his diary, Genera/major Pickert describes how he witnessed a 
low-level attack on German troops near the Oskol river on 3 July. Flak gunners brought 
down an enemy aircraft as they quickly beat off the attack, immediately receiving Iron 
Crosses for their efforts.106 The army certainly appreciated the efforts of the flak teams. 
A 1955 issue of Der Luftwaffenring, the Luftwaffe veterans' journal, proudly stated that 
"in this period, the flak artillery's existing glory received new lustre. Every infantry division, 
every regiment, wanted to have its 'own' flak battery."107 
Despite these aerial combat and flak successes, Fliegerkorps /V and VIII proved 
incapable of preventing increasingly-heavy VVS bombing raids most nights. "In the night 
were very dreadful red bombing raids on Kursk and the Voronezh bridges," von Richthofen 
complained on 6 July. The following night was even worse; raids on the 76th Bomber 
Wing's airfields caused "continuous aircraft losses."108 Spread out over a vast area and 
employed in a wide variety of tasks, mainly as extra artillery, flak batteries were also 
powerless to stop these raids. They still gave a good account of themselves. The 10th 
Flak Division alone reported shooting down 30 aircraft between 28 June and 6 July.109 
Its direct battlefield support was just as impressive; in the same period, it claimed 50 
tanks and numerous batteries and field fortifications destroyed. 
The offensive continues 
Following the capture of Voronezh, the OKW promptly disbanded Army Group South, 
replacing it with two separate commands: Army Groups A and B. Generalfe/dmarschall 
Wilhelm List took charge of Army Group A, the smaller of the two commands. It initially 
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comprised First Panzer Army (under von Kleist), Rumanian Third Army (Dumitrescu) and 
Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies (von Manstein and Ruoff).110 This force, operating 
south of the other, was to strike directly eastwards from the Taganrog area to the Don 
bend, where it was to link up with Army Group B's Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies, 
thereby netting a prize catch of fleeing enemy troops. Other formations were to thrust 
southwards, recapture Rostov and establish bridgeheads south of the Don. After 
accomplishing those missions, they would plunge into the Caucasus, Eleventh Army 
joining them by crossing the Kerch Straits. 
Following von Bock's "retirement" (from his point of view, premature; from Hitler's, long 
overdue), von Weichs assumed command of Army Group B, initially comprising Hungarian 
Second Army (Jany), Italian Eighth Army (Garibaldi), Fourth Panzer Army (Hath) and 
Second and Sixth Armies (von Salmuth and Paulus). T~lis powerful force was to cover 
Army Group A's northern flank, cut off the Volga shipping traffic, take over defence of the 
Don Bend, hold the front south of Stalingrad and, if possible, capture the city itself. 
The great offensive's second phase commenced on 9 July, two weeks ahead of its 
projected schedule. Despite the small number of prisoners bagged, the High Command 
felt optimistic. The enemy was broken, it claimed, and victory likely. Even commanders 
at the front felt things were going superbly. Genera/major Pickert, for example, wrote in 
his diary on 11 July that "we are about to inflict an annihilating defeat on the enemy here 
in the great Don bend. Great success is clearly indicated."111 However, the offensive's 
rapid progress (which continued for several more weeks). coupled with partisan attacks 
on railways, poor roads and recent rainstorms, threw the army's logistical system into 
chaos. The 23rd Panzer Division took longer than expected to reach Sixth Army, its 
progress hampered not by stiff resistance (or "lack of zesf', as von Richthofen claimed112) 
but by fuel shortages. It had to stop several times and wait for extra fuel to be brought 
up before it could continue its move south-eastwards towards Millerovo. Likewise, Pickert's 
diary reveals that fuel shortages often held up the advance of his flak units. "Our fuel 
supplies scarcely arrive," he complained on 11 July, "which reduces our freedom of 
movement." 113 Eight days later, his fuel situation was still "uncomfortable". He ordered 
his batteries forward to the Don to protect army spearheads attempting to cross the river. 
"The execution of my order looks doubtful," he cursed, "due to a lack of fueL" 
Similarly, back on 12 July, while units of First and Fourth Panzer Armies attempted to 
pinch off Soviet fomations around Millerovo-and once again, they locked the door after 
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the horse had bolted; the meeting pincers caught few Soviet troops, the rest having 
already withdrawn-GroBdeutschland and the 24th Panzer Division sat stranded halfway 
between Voronezh and Rossosh, waiting (as they already had for more than two days) 
to be refueled.114 Even when supplies arrived, wrote Helmuth Spaeter, GroBdeutschlands 
postwar chronicler, they proved woefully inadequate. The division continued advancing 
for the next few days, but only after "scraping together all fuel reserves, supplemented 
by air drops by Ju-S2 transports and recovery of fuel from abandoned vehicles, and 
leaving behind individual tanks and other heavy consumers of fuel-at some cost to the 
unit's fighting strength",115 
The Luftwaffe did all it could to alleviate the army's fuel problems, flying in up to 200 
tons of petrol each day during this period. It managed to carry out these vital supply 
missions even though its own constant transfers from region to region created major 
logistical problems, "We fly in 200 tons of fuel [for the army]," von Richthofen noted on 
13 July, "but are ourselves operating on a reduced scale because of breakdowns in our 
supplies." To keep up with rapidly-moving ground forces, air units had to move constantly 
to new airfields-mainly deserted Soviet air bases-close to the front. Finding new fields 
often proved difficult. Reconnaissance units sometimes searched all day for bases 
mentioned by ground troops. Then, before these new fields could be used, signals teams 
had to lay telephone wires or set up wireless equipment connecting them to the corps 
command. 
These frequent transfers to new airfields created hardships for both ground and air 
personnel. Their housing was usually primitive, often consisting of "tent cities" (to quote 
von Richthofen's colorful phrase), and their sanitation facilities were rudimentary. At 
many hastily-formed airfields-really only large stretches of flat grass-there was not 
even running water. Because new airfields were usually far from German railheads and 
established supply routes, and sometimes even from decent roads, Luftwaffe service and 
maintenance personnel had to move their equipment-and later all supplies and 
replacements-forward by air. 
Supply units struggled to carry out these missions, but really pushed themselves and 
their Ju-S2 work-horses to the limits of their endurance to satisfy the army's urgent 
requests for fuel. The Ju-S2 had already been in service for ten years and, although it 
was strong, reliable and had excellent short take-off and landing capabilities, its load 
capacity was no longer sufficient to satisfy the logistical requirements of both army and 
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air force. Still, the Luftwaffe had nothing to replace it with, even though the Air Ministry 
had requested a faster and larger transport plane back in 1939, when the J u-52 was 
already considered obsolete. 
Despite complaining of "having supply difficulties and operating at the limit of our 
range," and grumbling about what he called the army's lack of fighting spirit-"It makes 
me sick!" he scrawled two days later-the air leader remained happy with his corps' 
performance. He was also excited about the shattered state of the enemy's defences. 
To his 13 July entry, he added that "The Russians attempt to escape, broken and 
leaderless, leaving all their heavy weapons behind." And, only the day before, he had 
written with unmistakable glee: "the mass of the Russians march to their death", 
On 20 July, von Richthofen flew to Luftflotte /V's new headquarters at Mariupol (present-
day Zhdanov) on the Sea of Azov, 160 kilometres southwest of Rostov. He took charge 
of the fleet the following day, a week after blithely noting in his diary: 'IRead today of my 
appointment to Chief of Luftflotte IV, which took effect back on 3 July! It had been signed 
by the Fuhrer but stopped by the Reichsmarschall,"116 Von Richthofen briefly retained 
Generalmajor Korten, Lohr's outstanding Chief of Staff, but the OKL promoted him soon 
afterwards to head of his own corps (Fliegerkorps I, later renamed Air Command Don). 
Oberst Hans-Detlef Herhudt von Rohden-known to most airpower historians as the last 
head of the Luftwaffe's 8. Abteilung (Military Science Branch)-succeeded him late in 
August. 
The fleet's staff, used to Lohr's academic, understated but solid command style, was 
apparently not thrilled by the arrival of his harsh, arrogant and brilliant successor. "I must 
really have a dreadful reputation," von Richthofen wrote on 20 July. "Everyone here is 
scared stiff of me. Mind you, things are so slack here that I will not be able to rein in my 
temperament for too long." He had been expressing these sentiments in his diary for 
several weeks. The fleet was slack, he sharply wrote on several occasions, but he would 
soon see to that. On 7 July, for instance, he had insisted that that he would "command 
more tightly and from closer to the fronf' than his predecessor. 
Although it would take time to win over several members of his new team, he knew 
that he had already gained the respect and support of both his corps commanders. 
Martin Fiebig, whom he had commanded in the Balkans, arrived "for training" at his 
Fliegerkorps VIII headquarters (by then a mobile command centre 200 kilometres west 
of Kursk) on 6 JUly.117 The two old friends and army-support experts got on famously. 
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He was now delighted to pass Fliegerkorps VIII's reins to Fiebig, knowing that his beloved 
corps remained in good hands and would continue to live up to its reputation as the 
Luftwaffe's premier close-support force. 
He could also rely on Kurt Pflugbeil, Fliegerkorps IV's tall and skeletal commander. He 
had always liked and trusted Pflugbeil, an outstanding officer with a distinguished service 
record stretching back to the Great War, and when they met on 21 July, von Richthofen's 
first day as fleet commander, he again made a good impression: "Pflugbeil is composed, 
sensible and good." The new chief discussed his plan to reorganize Fliegerkorps IV, 
transforming it from a general-purpose corps into a well-equipped close support force 
with powerful dive-bomber and ground attack groups ("along the lines of Fliegerkorps 
VIII", he had jotted in his diary three days earlier118). They talked for so long-"united on 
everything"-that von Richthofen almost missed his appointment with GeneralfeldmarschalJ 
List, the army group commander. 
Fliegerkorps IV was not the only force to be reorganized during this period. After 
Voronezh fell and the Second Army began constructing a solid defensive front along a 
line from Livny to Voronezh and the Hungarians began building a front immediately to the 
south, Lohr had taken a few units from each of his corps and formed a new command, 
called Gefechtsverband Nord (Tactical Air Command North). He intended it to guard 
those vulnerable regions after von Richthofen moved Fliegerkorps VIII 200 kilometres 
south to the Rossosh sector in order to support the advance of Hoth's Fourth Panzer 
Army. Gefechtsverband Nord's leader, Oberst Alfred BOlowius, arrived at von Richthofen's 
headquarters east of Kursk on 10 July. His small command (similar in size to von Wild's 
Fliegerfuhrer Sud, still patrolling the Black Sea) operated alone in the Voronezh sector 
after Fliegerkorps VIII flew south the following day. 
Gefechtsverband Nord comprised the 76th Bomber Wing, the 10th Reconnaissance 
Group and a constantly-changing collection of temporarily-assigned fighter and dive-
bomber groups. Their mission, according to their operational order for 16 July, was simply 
to "support the fighting of the Second Army."119 Bombers (and Stukas after a separate 
order arrived by telephone) were sent that day to "fight in close harmony with the operations 
officer, Second Army, in the sector north of Voronezh." Fighters were to to attack Soviet 
airfields and, with reconnaissance planes, carry out "continuous surveillance of the combat 
zone northeast and east of Voronezh." Gefechtsverband Nord apparently did a good job 
in this vulnerable sector, even after fighting intensified in the following weeks. On 26 
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July, von Richthofen noted in his diary that "Around Voronezh, BOIowius is having some 
good defensive successes." 
Rostov and Beyond 
Von Richthofen took charge of Luftflotte IV just in time to oversee the assault on 
Rostov, gateway to the Caucasus. Aware that his planned encirclements in the central 
Don region had been only partially successful, Hitler had ordered his powerful armoured 
forces to sweep south to Rostov and prevent Lieutenant-General Malinovskii's Southern 
Front from escaping across the lower Don. These southward-driving forces included the 
Fourth Panzer Army, which he now transferred to Army Group A.120 In a move strikingly 
similar to that of the year before-when he sent Guderian's armoured forces down to 
Kiev, a diversion which produced a splendid local victory but probably cost him Moscow-
Hitler broke off Fourth Panzer Army's drive towards Stalingrad and turned it south. 
Deviating further from the original B/au plan, he sent Paulus' Sixth Army alone towards 
Staling rad , but not necessarily to take the city. Rather, it was to create a solid flank along 
the Don whilst its spearheads pushed eastwards to prevent the enemy establishing 
defences west of the Volga. It would have to accomplish these tasks without the bulk of 
its armour, which he also sent south towards Rostov as part of First Panzer Army. 
By 20 July, the day after the Fuhrer changed his mind and ordered Sixth Army (still 
alone and without its tanks) to attack Stalingrad121 , armoured spearheads of Fourth 
Panzer Army had established bridgeheads across the Don near Zymlyanskaya and 
Konstantinovka (150 and 110 kilometres northeast of Rostov). Meanwhile, First Panzer 
Army had crossed the Donets 130 kilometres to the north and was plunging down towards 
Rostov, whilst southern units of Seventeenth Army, driving due east from the Taganrog 
area, had wheeled south and reached the Don northeast and southwest of the city.122 
This ripe fruit was ready to be picked. 
Von Richthofen's units played a key role in the battle for Rostov. "The Russians," he 
wrote, describing the morning of 21 July, "had already evacuated their forward positions. 
Our troops were therefore able to advance without a struggle." In the afternoon, however, 
fighting intensified as ground troops encountered pockets of fierce resistance. He 
immediately threw the bulk of his ground-attack forces, from both corps (not just one, as 
Plocher suggested), into the battle.123 He also threw in Stukas from the 1 st Group, 77th 
Dive-Bomber Wing (until recently belonging to von Wild's small Fliegerfuhrer Sud), which 
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screamed down upon tanks, vehicles and troops. Hurling both high-explosive and splinter 
bombs, they inflicted heavy damage. This veteran wing, which had seen action in almost 
every campaign to date, had only the week before clocked up its thirty-thousandth mission 
on the eastern front. 124 (If its claims are accurate, it had inflicted far more damage to the 
enemy on the battlefield than any other wing.125) Gtlring immediately sent the wing his 
heartiest congratulations on reaching this milestone.12s 
Determined to prevent the enemy slipping away across the Don, von Richthofen 
deployed his "bombers against the city, bridges and fleeing masses". These included 
medium bombers from not only his two corps, but also von Wild's command. The latter 
pounded road and rail traffic flowing out of Rostov. These Crimea-based planes had 
actually been attacking the city and surrounding targets most days for several weeks.127 
Although they packed a relatively weak punch (the entire command released only 23.6 
tons of bombs on 21 JUly128), these aircraft still managed to make their presence felt. A 
He 111 of IIJK.G. 26, for instance, dropped a huge 1,aOO-kg bomb on a railway 
embankment, destroying two freight trains. Other aircraft inflicted various levels of damage 
on bridges, supply depots and vehicles. 
The following day (a "good day at the front") the German drive on Rostov progressed 
well. 129 With Stukas paving their way, army spearheads-including battalions from the 
SS Wiking (Viking) and 13th Panzer Divisions-pushed through the maze of anti-tank 
ditches, barbed-wire entanglements and mine-fields right up to within three kilometres of 
the city itself. "The Russians flee across the Don, the delighted air leader added, "without 
their equipment and weapons." Pflugbeil's aircraft pursued them, smashing troops caught 
in the open and vehicles jammed on the roads. They provided "outstanding support for 
the attack the entire day," wrote Wilhelm Tieke, author of a 'classic' work on the Caucasus 
campaign. 130 "Scarcely any targets were overlooked .... The co-operation between the 
ground troops and Luftwaffe, guided by the Flivo [air liaison officer] .. , was exceptional." 
While these attacks occurred, Fiebig's aircraft (joined by a small number of von Wild's 
bombers131) supported Sixth Army's steady advance in the direction of Stalingrad. 
Encountering little opposition, the army ambled eastwards with no sense of urgency. 
The Luftwaffe retained air superiority but did not have things all its own way. The 
VVS-now deploying scores of British lend-lease fighters, including Hurricanes132-put up 
a good fight, destroying several German aircraft each day and constantly harassing 
ground troops. VVS fighters almost killed Fiebig on 23 July, when they sprayed his Storch 
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with bullets and set it on fire. lVIiraculously, neither he nor his pilot received serious 
injury.133 Oberstleutnant Ihlefeld, the commander of the S2nd Fighter Wing, had not been 
as lucky the day before. Caught in ~Iis own Storch by enemy fighters, he was very badly 
wounded. Still, these incidents and the loss of a few aircraft each day pale when constrasted 
to the VVS's own losses. For example, 26 June was an especially good day for von 
Richthofen's units: they reported destroying 113 enemy aircraft, Fliegerkorps VIII alone 
claiming 88 of them in Sixth Army's combat zone.134 
On 23 July-to return to Rostov-Fliegerkorps IV unleashed on Rostov around-the-
clock raids of blistering intensity. Suffering intensely under these streams of bombs and 
squeezed by powerful German ground formations, which quickly carved their way through 
the wildly-burning suburbs as resistance weakened, the city's courageous defenders 
could not hold on. With the exception of several isolated groups (including tough NKVD 
troops), finally eliminated in bitter and costly house-to-house fighting, the city's defenders 
capitulated later that day. 
The way to the Caucasus was not yet open. Generalfeldmarschall List still had to 
capture the main bridge across the Don and the subsequent six-kilometre-Iong bridge 
embankment across the Don delta between Rostov and Bataisk before his waiting armies 
could lunge southwards into the Caucasus. He ordered forward the 2nd Battalion of the 
"Brandenburg" Special Purpose Training Regiment, which had been training for this task 
(and other similar actions in the Caucasus) since April. 135 On 24 July, Stukas of /.ISt.G. 
77 launched heavy "softening up" raids on the Soviet troops, guns and flak batteries 
defending the bridges. Even so, deadly machine-gun fire met the "Brandenburgers" when 
they tried to storm the bridges, pinning them down and inflicting heavy casualties. After 
trying unsuccessfully for over 24 hours to reinforce the "Brandenburgers", and at one 
point to withdraw them with bearable losses, the army called back Pflugbeil's Stukas in 
the morning of 26 July. They arived "in the nick of time", according to Hermann Plocher, 
and repeatedly pounded enemy positions.136 Their attacks allowed ground troops, including 
the remnants of the mauled battalion, to finish the job they started. 137 They promptly 
seized the bridges, across which the first spearheads of Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps 
rolled the following day. 
Aside from small "mopping up" actions, Hitler's Rostov operation was over. The Fuhrer, 
now commanding the war from new headquarters (code-named "Werewolf") at Vinnitsa 
in the Ukraine, was delighted; his courageous troops had smashed open the gateway to 
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the Caucasus, which lay before them bare and, to all appearances, only lightly defended. 
He could not help noticing, on the other hand, that once again his net contained a 
surprisingly small catch: only 83,000 more prisoners. 
Hitler considered his disappointing prisoner haul to be evidence, not that his grand 
encircling operations had failed, but that Soviet resistance had been truly shattered and 
any panic-stricken forces managing to escape were on their last legs anyway. This 
mistaken notion may seem absurd in hindsight-although at the time it was shared by 
American intelligence officers, who noted in their brief to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
that the "speed with which Germans seized bridgeheads over lower Don indicates serious 
decrease in Russian power of resistance"138-but plentiful evidence supported it at the 
time. Axis troops had, after all, delivered heavy blows and gained a fantastic amount of 
territory in recent weeks. The Soviet command had apparently lost control. Sixth Army, 
still ambling across the steppes towards Stalingrad, met little opposition. Enemy forces, 
it said, were in full flight. Von Kleist's First Panzer Army reported weak resistance and 
mass enemy desertions. Also, as David Irving pOints out, even if Hitler personally misread 
the situation, "there is no evidence whatsoever that General Halder advised him differently 
until August, and by then it was too late to undo the damage already done." 139 
On 23 July, while his forces stormed Rostov, Hitler's mistaken assessment of his 
enemy's present state prompted him to issue a war directive deviating substantially from 
Bfau's original conception. "The broad objectives I had set for the southern wing of the 
Eastern front," he trumpeted in War Directive 45, "have been largely achieved. Only weak 
forces from Timoshenko's armies succeeded in avoiding encirclement and reaching the 
southern bank of the Don." 140 Now, he continued, it was time to finish the task. 
No longer deeming it necessary to secure the northern flank and take Stalingrad and 
then head south into the Caucasus, he stipulated that both operations be undertaken at 
the same time. In Operation Fischreiher (heron), Army Group B would construct a solid 
front along the Don. Then, by thrusting forward to Stalingrad, it would smash the enemy 
forces concentrated there, occupy the city and block the land bridge between the Don 
and the Volga. Meanwhile, fast-moving troops were to advance south-eastwards along 
the Volga to Astrakhan, thereby cutting off this valuable waterway. Reflecting his growing 
infatuation with Stalingrad, formerly not even a main target, he ordered the transfer of a 
Panzer corps composed of two armoured divisions from Fourth Panzer to Sixth Army 
(and thus from the Caucasus to the Stalingrad operation). 
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In Operation Edelweiss, Army Group A was to encircle and destroy the enemy formations 
that fled across the Don into the northern Caucasus. It was then to carry out its most 
important task: the occupation of the entire Black Sea coastline, including its naval bases. 
This would effectively put an end to the Red Fleet. At the same time, mountain and light 
infantry divisions (including some brought across the Kerch Straits from Eleventh Army) 
were to take the high ground around Maikop and Armavir and close the passes in the 
western Caucasus. Finally, a mobile force was to strike south and east to close the 
military road between Ossetia and Grozny, and strike along the Caspian coast to the 
great oil metropolis of Baku. 
Hitler apparently considered these tasks to be well within his army groups' capabilities. 
Victory was so close, he maintained, that Army Group South could even afford to shed 
a number of unnecessary divisions. In the last few days he had authorized the transfer 
of two Panzer divisions to Army Group Centre, where a Soviet attack looked increasingly 
likely. Now, in his directive, he stated that the elite GroBdeutschland division was soon 
going to western Europe (to allay his growing fears of an Allied invasion-fears based 
neither on intelligence information nor specific Allied activities, but on his own "intuition'). 
Further, contrary to his last war directive, issued twelve days earlier141 , Manstein's powerful 
Eleventh Army was no longer going to advance across the Kerch Straits into the Caucasus. 
Rather, a small holding force would remain in the Crimea, whilst the army's command 
staff and the bulk of divisions travelled 1,800 kilometres north to do to Leningrad what 
they had done to Sevastopol. Only von Manstein's Rumanian mountain troops would 
cross the Kerch Straits. 
The Luftwaffe, Hitler continued, was to continue providing close and strong support 
to both army groups. "The early destruction of Stalingrad is especially important," he said. 
As opportunities present themselves, attacks sl10uld be made on Astrakhan and mines 
layed in the Lower Volga. In view of the Caucasus oil fields' critical importance to the 
prosecution of the war, he stressed, air raids should immediately be launched against 
railways and pipelines being used by the enemy. However, attacks on refineries, storage 
tanks and ports used for oil shipments should only be carried out if circumstances on the 
ground make them absolutely necessary. 
Hitler's new instructions flew in the face of traditional military doctrine. First, they did 
not involve a reorganization of the army groups in keeping with their allotted tasks. The 
specialist Italian Alpine Corps, for example, was not sent to the Caucasus. It remained 
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under the command of Paulus' Sixth Army, still rolling eastwards across 'flat steppes. 
Frittered away as infantrymen, these excellent alpine troops should have been transferred 
to List's Army Group A, where they were sorely needed. Hitler assigned List the task of 
conquering the Caucasus but allocated him only three mountain divisions and several 
infantry divisions totally unsuited in both training and equipment to the task. 
Second, rather than work towards a single Schwerpunkt-as espoused by traditional 
German strategists-Hitler's two groups would diverge at right angles, thus dissipating 
their strength. Their divergence would open a large and vulnerable gap between them 
and, even worse, necessitate separate logistics routes. Supply lines were already stretched 
to breaking point, with both army groups experiencing fuel and ammunition shortages. 
Now the War Lord wanted one group to push eastwards to Stalingrad, which was possible 
(but only just) at the present fuel consumption and supply rates. He wanted the other to 
plunge southwards to the distant oil-rich cities of the southern Caucasus, a highly 
improbable (if not impossible) task at the present rates. Even Maikop, the nearest oilfield, 
was-as the crow flles-335 kilometres away from Rostov, where List's armies stood 
ready for their drive south. Grozny was almost twice that distance, and Baku, Hitler's 
ultimate goal, was no less than 1,200 kilometres away. The latter, to illustrate the 
significance of these distances, was as far from Rostov as that city was from the Polish/ 
Soviet border. 
By the time List's troops stormed Rostov, established bridgeheads over the lower Don 
and set their gaze to the south, von Richthofen was beginning to find his feet as commander 
of Luft/lotte IV. On 27 July he flew to Goring's headquarters in Kalinovka, half an hour's 
drive from Hitler's new command centre in Vinnitsa. He spent an hour-and-a-half with his 
friend Jeschonnek, discussing organizational matters and his forces' future operations. 
As usual, they agreed on all important matters. Probably intentionally massaging von 
Richthofen's ego, the Air Force Chief of Staff mentioned that the former's recent promotion 
had been well-received in higher command circles. "As fleet commander, I am generally 
held in high esteem," he joyfully penned in his diary that evening, clearly writing for the 
memorial of his posterity.142 
The Reichsmarschall, who had apparently forgotten his anger at von Richthofen's 
private tete-lHete with the Fuhrer two months earlier, certainly acted pleased to see him. 
Goring was in a "very gracious and understanding" mood and seemed attentive and 
genuinely interested in events at the front. The bulky demagogue not only approved the 
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fleet commander's plans for the coming campaigns, but further rewarded him for his role 
in previous ones. "As the first member of the Luftwaffe," von Richthofen proudly wrote 
that night, "he awarded me the East Medal." Actually, he mused, it was only the ribbon; 
the medal itself had yet to be minted. He was still delighted, aware that the ribbon would 
sit nicely on his breast next to that of the "lVIichael", the Rumanian equivalent of the 
Knight's Cross. Marshal Antonescu had personally pinned it on him after the Kerch 
campaign. All the German generals considered the "Michael" a true honour, he had 
written on that occasion.143 After spending the evening listening to Goring drone on about 
almost anything that came into his head-followed by a late dinner with him, Jeschonnek 
and the Luftwaffe's personnel chief, starting at 10 in the evening-von Richthofen was 
doubtless relieved to be shown to his lUXUry compartment in Goring's marvellous command 
train. 
He flew back to his headquarters in Mariupol ("home," as he called it) next morning, 
28 July, then spent the afternoon attending to paperwork and talking to Korten, still 
serving as the fleet's Chief of Staff. They were both unhappy about Hitler's decision to 
split the main offensive into two simultaneous campaigns, realizing that the diverging 
directions of each expanded Luftflotte IV's operational zone to enormous proportions. 
That zone (already as large as pre-war Germany) now tripled in size overnight, stretching 
northeast to Voronezh, east to the Volga, southeast to the coast of the Caspian Sea and 
south to distant Baku. Its eastern front, therefore, measured over 1,600 kilometres. 
Carrying out the air operations Hitler outlined in his directive seemed impossible, especially 
as recent fighting and related missions had already taken a heavy toll on the fleet's 
strength. Its total complement had dropped from 1,610 aircraft to 1,359 in the last month, 
and its operational readiness had dropped from 71 per cent (which, although not as high 
as that of the air forces in western Europe, was excellent for the eastern front, where 
logistical, geographical and climatic problems proved difficult to overcome) to a mediocre 
56 per cent in the same period. 144 
The fleet would have to wage three separate campaigns (for the time being, at least). 
In the far north of his combat zone, Gefechtsstand Nord would continue to assist 
Genera/oberst von Salmuth's Second Army in its defensive battles in the Voronezh sector. 
This front had actually become so "hot" in recent weeks, with constant Soviet pressure, 
that he planned to dlssove BOlowius' small command and replace it with a complete air 
corps, Fliegerkorps I. Korten himself would take charge, the fleet chief noted in his diary 
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on 30 July.145 He actually wanted the experienced P'flugbeil to command the yet-to-be-
formed corps, feeling that Korten was still "too young". This was a silly complaint, 
considering that the 44-year-old Korten was already as old as von Richthofen was when 
he had taken over Fliegerkorps VIII in October 1939. It should not have worried the latter 
anyway; when the new corps arrived in another month or so, it would not be his 
responsibility. Back on 18 July, he had requested OKL to let him "get rid of that entire 
northern sector".146 It should set up an independent air command, he had argued, with 
its own Luftgau overseeing its sl.lpplies and maintenance. The OKL had apparently agreed; 
von Richthofen now noted that the new command would not be his concern. It would be 
under OKL direction and, based in Kiev, have its own organization, command and logistics 
systems. He also managed to get rid of the German Air Force Mission in Rumania, which 
had until now come under Luftflotte IV's command umbrella. Lohr, as Commander of all 
Wehrmacht forces in the Balkans, would take charge of Ploesti's air defence. 
Operating south of Gefechtsstand Nord, Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII would assist Sixth 
Army (and soon Fourth Panzer Army) in its drive towards Stalingrad. This corps was still 
better suited to army support than Pflugbeil's-although von Richthofen noted again on 
30 July that he was busily "making Fliegerkorps IV the same as Fliegerkorps VIII"-and 
the fleet commander had promised Paulus six days earlier that he would pay careful 
attention to Sixth Army's air support.147 
Plugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV would support List's drive to the oilfields, assisted by von 
Wild's small FliegerfOhrer Sad, still operating in the Crimea and over the vast expanses 
of the Black Sea. Von Wild was again annoyed to learn that his specialist anti-shipping 
and long-range reconnaissance force would be swallowed up by a larger command, as 
it had been during the assault on Sevastopol. His annoyance turned to anger when told 
that Fliegerkorps IV would command its Caucasus operations from Kerch, on "his" territory, 
and that his force would lose what little autonomy it had left.146 "He has no grounds [for 
these feelings]," von Richthofen wrote on 9 August, after meeting both von Wild and 
Plugbeil in Kerch, "because his own performance has hardly been convincing." 
Thus, two related but separate major Luftwaffe campaigns-excluding operations in 
the Voronezh sector, soon to disappear from this study anyway-commenced at the end 
of July. In order to avoid flitting from one campaign to the other, we will trace the 
progress of each in turn, beginning with what soon proved to be the least important of 
the two: Fliegerkorps IV's support of List's drive to the oilfields. 
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Chapter VI 
Stalemate in the Caucasus 
July-December 1942 
"We lacked aircraft, we lacked fuel, and ammunition was in short supply. 
We had to organize ourselves into the smal/est groups possible, 
therefore, in order even to be able to reconnoitre the front." 
-Major Gol/ob, on problems faced 
by Luftwaffe units in the Caucasus 
182. 
After taking Rostov, List's forces crossed the lower Don along a 200-kilometre front 
stretching from the Sea of Azov to Zymlianskaya. Armeegruppe Ruoff formed the right 
wing, crossing at Rostov and establishing a solid bridgehead at Bataisk. This Gruppe 
comprised Ruoff's Seventeenth Army and Dumitrescu's Rumanian Third Army. Von Kleist's. 
First Panzer Army stood on its left, with more than 400 tanks rolling forward from equally-
strong bridgeheads further east.1 On the left wing, the bulk of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army 
advanced steadily (although it would soon disappear from the Caucasus, because Hitler 
transferred it to the Stalingrad sector on 31 July). These Axis forces moved forward 
rapidly, opposed by remnants of half a dozen Soviet armies already smashed north of the 
Don. Whilst these shattered formations remained strong in manpower, they lacked 
competent leadership, cohesion, tanks, most of their heavy guns and air support.2 
Stalin feared not only a humiliating rout, but also the loss of rich industrial and agricultural 
regions in the Caucasus. Axis troops already looked set to take the Kuban, one of the 
Soviet Union's major food-producing areas. The Soviet people, Stalin knew, could ill 
afford to lose the Kuban's large harvests of wheat, sunflower seeds and sugar beets. 
Losing Baku's oilfields, however, would be calamitous. Accordingly, on 28 July he issued 
his now-famous Order No. 227, which stated, in terms unwittingly echoing Hitler's of 
December 1941: "ni shagu nazad!" (not a step backl).3 This order contained a rousing 
patriotic appeal to all Soviet soldiers and citizens in the name of the Motherland to 
increase their resistance to Axis forces and halt their advance. Perhaps to prevent the 
further disintegration of his forces before Stalingrad and in the northern Caucasus, it also 
warned that swift retribution would be meted out to "deserters" and "panic mongers". 
Operating from airfields in the Don bend as well as in the Rostov region itself (Stukas 
were even flying from the city's main airport by 29 July4), Fliegerkorps IV contributed 
substantially to the disorganization of Soviet forces in the northern Caucasus. 5 When 
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List's troops drove them back across the Don, Pflugbeil's air units continuously bombed 
and strafed them. As reported by British air intelligence officers, routinely reading the 
Luftwaffe's secret radio communications, these air attacks severely hampered the Soviets' 
ability to conduct effective rearguard actions, withdraw in an orderly fashion and construct 
defences in rear areas.6 Pflugbeil's airmen also achieved pleasing results against logistics 
systems and road and rail traffic, particularly along the main Baku-Rostov rail line. 
FliegerfOhrer SOd assisted them by constantly monitoring enemy movements and positions, 
attacking Black Sea ports and also carrying out light but relentless raids on enemy traffic 
in the northern Caucasus. 
After Sevastopol fell in the beginning of July, Lohr had stripped FliegerfOhrer SOd of 
most combat units, transferring them back to Fliegerkorps IV and VIII. By 15 July, for 
example, von Wild's force retained only t~lree bomber groups (IIUL. G. 1, UK. G. 100 and 
IUK. G. 26, the latter mainly used to launch torpedoes), a fighter group (IIUJ. G. 77), two 
reconnaissance squadrons (one longe-range), two flak regiments and a small sea-rescue 
team. It had only a handful of Stukas (E.lSt. G. 77) and no ground-attack planes.? 
FliegerfOhrer SOd's last major mission had been its massive attack on Novorossiisk 
harbour on 2 July, when its bombers and Stukas sank the flotilla-leader Tashkent and 
badly damaged the cruiser Komintern, a destroyer and several large freighters. Since 
then, the force routinely attacked that harbour and others along the Caucasus coastline, 
as well as Rostov and surrounding towns, but its attacks became increasingly weak as 
units left for combat elsewhere in the southern sector. With a few exceptions, these raids 
were of little more than nuisance value, inflicting only minor damage on harbour installations, 
storage facilities and supply systems. 
Von Wild simply lacked the means to do more. His remaining units were in a very poor 
state. On 20 July, for example, his three bomber groups had no more than 89 aircraft 
between them, only 30 (33 per cent) of wl"lich were operational.8 They had worked to 
the point of exhaustion during the assault on Sevastopol but, instead of being rehabilitated, 
now received meagre supplies of ammunition, fuel and spare parts and no replacement 
aircraft. This is understandable: Fliegerkorps IV and VIII worked furiously to support the 
army as it drove eastwards in pursuit of Hitler's strategic goals. They had their own 
substantial fuel and ammunition problems, and their operational capabilities were steadily 
falling. Luftflotte IV had to focus its attention urgently and constantly on their needs; it 
could hardly worry about von Wild's paltry force operating in the Crimea-now a "backwater" 
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of no immediate importance. With this in mind, von Richthofen's diary comment that von 
Wild's "own performance has hardly been convincing" seems most unfair. 
Dropping a miserable average of 40 tons of bombs per day throughtout July, von 
Wild's bombers sank no large warships, but only a motley collection of coastal patrol 
boats and freighters. 9 It was not for lack of trying. On 16 July, 24 bombers of UK.G. 100 
and /UK.G, 26 launched a joint raid on the bulk of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, berthed 
in distant Poti harbour and protected by several strong flak batteries and the ships' own 
flak guns. They hit several warships, including a heavy cruiser with a massive 1,400-kg 
bomb, but, despite inflicting a variety of light damage, failed to sink a single vessel. 10 
They lost two He 111s in the attempt, however. Throughout July, anti-shipping missions 
cost them another four destroyed and three damaged. 
FliegerfDhrer Suds two dozen operational fighters and two flak regiments proved 
hopelessly incapable of preventing bombing raids on German positions in the Crimean 
by VVS aircraft based in the Kuban. Early in July, these raids occurred intermittently and 
only at night. By the end of the month they came daily, and, with VVS commanders now 
realizing that they faced no real danger, often during the day. The heaviest raid took 
place on 30 July, when 24 medium bombers, protected by over a hundred fighters, which 
attacked with their own cannons and light bombs, rained destruction down on Kerch. l1 
Apparently aiming for the train station, they destroyed 22 railway wagons full of munitions, 
blew up a truck and killed a soldier. German flak teams only succeeded in bring down 
one Polikarpov 1-16 "Rata" fighter and one SB-2 bomber. This Soviet air activity promptly 
waned in the middle of AUgust after Fliegerkorps IV moved many combat units, 
accompanied by powerful flak batteries, to the Crimea. Until then, von Wild's few fighter 
pilots and flak teams did all they could to protect their region. Between 3 and 31 July, 
they managed to destroy 24 aircraft in aerial combat and another 10 with ground fire,12 
By the beginning of AUgust, von Wild's depleted force had little to offer List's troops 
in the northern Caucasus except for its unequalled knowledge of the terrain, which 
provided German commanders with a few extra pieces of the widely-scattered intelligence 
jigsaw. In particular, for the last six months its reconnaissance units had conducted daily 
surveillance missions over the Kuban and northwestern Caucasus. They had taken many 
thousands of photographs of important ports, cities, towns, roads, railways, rivers and 
bridges. German cartographers had already incorporated valuable information from these 
photographs and crew reports into the new maps now being spread before List and ~Iis 
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various corps and division commanders. 
FliegerfOhrer SOd had one other item of apparent value: experienced anti-shipping 
groups-particularly IIIKG. 26 and II.KG. 100-which were then active against both 
Oktyabrskii's Caucasus ports and those on the east coast of the Sea of Azov (still 
supplying Soviet troops in the northwestern Caucasus). In the last week of July, von 
Richthofen requested them to operate alonside bombers from Fliegerkorps VIII as they 
attacked Volga river shipping both north and southeast of Stalingrad. They dropped high 
explosive bombs as well as magnetic mines, but around 15 per cent of these detonated 
when they hit the water. 13 Von Wild's groups had a few minor successes. On 27 July, 
they bombed ships and released 31 mines in the Volga on both sides of Stalingrad.14 
They damaged two large transport barges being towed up river, and learned next day 
that their mines had sunk a floating crane and two other towed barges. 
According to a report presented to the OKW on 29 July by a Captain Massel, mines 
dropped by aircraft proved moderately effective in Caucasian ports, including Poti, where 
most of Oktyabrskii's fleet lay. Yet they had so far not proved as effective in the Volga, 
which was generally too shaJlow.15 They would be tried in narrower stretches, therefore, 
where the water was presumably deeper. Von Wild's units dropped far more bombs than 
mines anyway. but, although they continued intermittently bombing river traffic, they 
apparently gave up mining on 4 August. They dropped 28 mines on that last day, six 
of which exploded prematurely when they hit the water. 16 
Volga shipping was probably far from Generalfeldmarschal List's mind as his forces 
continued rolling southwards; he was worried more about his own supplies than his 
enemy's. Only airlifts of fuel by Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV kept his armies moving. By 
28 July, Seventeenth Army had crossed Kagalnik river, 32 kilometres south of Rostov, 
and was pushing forward on a wide front towards the Kuban. On the other flank, Fourth 
Panzer Army had captured Proletarskaya and advance units troops had reached the 600-
kilometre-long Manych river, which marked the boundary between Europe and Asia. 
Before the war, Soviet engineers had actually transformed the river into a canal. It now 
consisted of a chain of dammed lakes, some more than a kilometre wide, with several 
hydro-electrical dams providing electricity for local oil-producing centres. 
Crossing this continental divide proved less difficult than Soviet defenders (dug in on 
the other side) hoped, even after they opened floodgates and flooded the river. While 
German artillery pinned down those Soviets on 31 July, assault troops of the 3rd Panzer 
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Division shot across the swollen riven in 19 boats, bailing furiously with their mess-tins 
to overcome leaks, and established the first German bridgehead in Asia. They then 
launched a successful surprise attack on one of the enemy-held dams, allowing Panzers 
to roll across its narrow crown. Pflugbeil's airmen had played a key part in this action, 
attacking Soviet troops preventing German reinforcements crossing the river. Paul Carell 
writes: "at about 0600 the German close-support aircraft came roaring in .... The bombers 
silenced the Soviet artillery positions and maChine-gun nests. Under cover of the hail of 
bombs and strafing attacks, the third wave finally succeeded in crossing".i7 
Few of the tanks advancing into Asia under FJiegerkorps IV's protective umbrella 
belonged to Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army. After that army severed the railway between 
Stalingrad and the Caucasus, Hitler proclaimed that, whilst enemy forces south of the 
Don would continue trying to hold back List's advance, they could now get few' 
reinforcements from the rest of the Soviet Union.is Stalingrad, on the other hand, would 
be defended fanatically and reinforced steadily. On 31 July, he therefore transferred 
Hoth's Army-minus Fortieth Panzer Corps, which remained in the Caucasus-to Army 
Group B. It turned around and headed back the way it came, consuming huge amounts 
of fuel and needing constant airlifts in the process. Its destination: Stalin's city on the 
Volga. 
List's forces continued their southward drive, sweeping the enemy before them. By 
3 August, Seventeenth Army's spearheads had covered half the distance to Krasnodar. 
Vanguard units of the Third and Fortieth Panzer Corps, belonging to First Panzer Army, 
had made similar progress. They were well on their way to Armavir and Voroshilovsk 
respectively. However impressive these advances sound, though, they involved only light 
mobile forces. Despite the valiant efforts of Pfll.Jgbeil's transport groups, which worked 
around-the-clock to carry fuel for the army, most tanks sat stranded far to the rear, 
desperately waiting for supplies. i9 
Pflugbeil's transport units were not the only Luftwaffe formations supporting List's swift 
and seemingly-unstoppable advance. Units of the 10th Flak Division-including some 
with Flakpanzer, anti-aircraft guns mounted on half-tacks and tank chassis-accompanied 
all Panzer formations to protect the tanks and following infantry from deadly Ilyushin 11-
2 Shturmoviks and other enemy ground-attack aircraft. Especially in the few first days 
after Rostov fell, they also had to drive off enemy bombers attempting to destroy bridges 
across the Don and major north Caucasian rivers. Helmuth Spaeter, GroBdeutschlands 
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postwar chronicler, noted several occasions when enemy bombers endeavoured to halt 
that division's advance, but "were effectively prevented from doing so by the efforts of the 
flak artillery".20 As it was, the VVS had far fewer aircraft in the Don bend and northern 
Caucasus than the Luftwaffe. On 29 July, Luftf/otte /V reported to the OKW that "the 
Russian air force facing Army Group South's right flank demonstrates its weakness. 
Stukas even carry out their attacks without fighter escort, and don't get attacked by 
Russian fighters."21 
List and von Richthofen deployed most flak regiments in support of Seventeenth Army, 
which had very few tanks and, as a result, needed extra firepower.22 Flak units again 
proved devastatingly effective, not in the role for which they were intended, although they 
notched up pleasing aircraft "kill" totals, but against ground targets, including tanks, field 
fortifications and gun positions. They were, of course, equipped for both roles, carrying 
time-fuse anti-aircraft ammunition as well as armour-piercing and percussion shells. 
Pflugbeil's ground-attack and reconnaissance aircraft also supported Axis forces on 
the battlefield. They provided ground forces with outstanding tactical intelligence information. 
Wilhelm Tieke remembers how aircraft "released smoke signals showing ground troops 
the way, reported enemy concentrations and pointed out the best march routes if the 
ground reconnaissance could not keep pace." 23 Co-operation between ground and air 
forces remained excellent, he added. In many cases, pilots communicated directly with 
army units, thus bypassing the usual FJivo liaison system. As Tieke noted: "[Pilots1 talked 
with us over the radio or dropped messages and requested that we find them suitable 
landing areas" 24 After landing, squadron leaders met their army counterparts to co-
ordinate their operations. Naturally, he added, Pflugbeil's airmen not only reported the 
location of enemy forces, but also attacked them aggressively: "With their on-board 
weapons and fragmentation bombs they joined in the ground battle or suppressed enemy 
forces. In all, the cooperation was ideaL" 
Fliegerkorps IV had fewer dive-bomber and ground-attack aircraft than Fliegerkorps 
VIJI, so it could not support all German spearhead units at once or even individual units 
for long. Still, no-one on the ground doubted the air force's ability to wreak havoc on the 
Soviet forces they encountered. For example, when advance detachments of the 3rd 
Panzer Division reached Voroshilovsk on 3 August, they were delighted to learn that the 
Luftwaffe had already stamped its imprint on the region: "There were traces of German 
air attacks everywhere. On the roads overturned vehicles and heavy weapons lay strewn. 
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Freight trains were still burning on open stretches of track. The German Fliegerkorps IV 
had done a good job there." 25 
Escorted by fighters, which also chased away Soviet aircraft, Pflugbeil's bombers 
worked as energetically as the ground-attack planes. During the last days of July and the 
first of August, bomber units mainly directed their efforts against enemy shipping on the 
lower Volga, ground forces in the Kuban region and road and rail logistical routes throughout 
the entire nothern Caucasus. 26 When they had time and resources (which was not often), 
they also mounted raids, joined by von Wild's bombers, against Oktyabrskii's ports along 
the Caucasus coast. The latter's fleet had not yet recovered from the mauling it received 
during the Axis assault on Sevastopol, and now ventured outside its ports only rarely. 
Fliegerfuhrer Sud closely monitored the ports, looking for-but rarely finding-evidence 
of imminent naval activity. Small warships of Gorshkov's Azov Flotilla had been supporting 
their beleaguered army comrades by firing on Ruoff's Seventeenth Army as it advanced 
along the coast towards the Kuban.27 Their gunfire had little effect, however, and soon 
died out when Fliegerfuhrer Sud stepped up its torpedo and bombing attacks. Individual 
warships of Oktyabrskii's main fleet also carried out a few artillery attacks at night on 
German pOSitions, but they proved ineffective-as did Fliegerfuhrer's Sud's attempts to 
sink the ships28-and the fleet attempted no large-scale naval missions. By early August, 
only merchant vessels, submarines and small warships regularly plied the waters of the 
eastern Black Sea. Medium-sized warships still made occasional gunfire attacks on 
Crimean centres, but only at night and with little effect. The Soviet naval command, which 
still possessed a substantial force despite its major losses, preferred to keep its large 
warships in the relative safety of flak-defended ports and prepare its land approaches and 
harbour defences for the inevitable attacks by List's armies.29 
On 2 August, von Richthofen noted in his diary that advance units of von Kleist's First 
Panzer Army (and Ruoff's Seventeenth Army, although the air chief only mentioned the 
former) were now within 15 kilometres of the Kuban. "Stronger enemy forces remain 
behind the Kuban river and around Krasnodar", he wrote with concern.30 His following 
comments reveal his frustration at not being able to create a single Schwerpunkt there 
for his two corps: "Unfortunately, I have to split up my forces. Fliegerkorps VIII must help 
Sixth Army near Stalingrad, and carry out attacks on railways in that area and shipping 
on the Volga." That corps, he added with annoyance, also had to carry forward Sixth 
Army's supplies. Meanwhile, Fliegerkorps IV must attack the enemy in the Kuban and 
189. 
railways throughout the northern Caucasus. This, he concluded, must be his Schwerpunkt 
for now, "whilst later: Stalingrad." 
As in previous campaigns, von Richthofen and his two corps commanders worked in 
close co-operation with their army counterparts to co-ordinate joint Schwerpunkte. On 4 
August, the fleet chief invited Generalfeldmarschal List to his headquarters in Mariupol, 
where the two commanders discussed fresh air reconnaissance information and planned 
their operations for the coming days.31 They were both worried about the fuel situation 
(so was Halder, who had recently noted in his diary that "the fuel situation in Army Group 
A remains tight" 32), but still optimistic about the campaign's chances of success. If fuel 
supplies held out, they claimed, the oilfields were theirs for the taking. That same day, 
List submitted to the OKW an optimistic situation assessment. The Soviet command 
apparently intended to make a stand south of the Kuban river to protect Maikop and the 
main Black Sea naval bases. Yet enemy forces were "dispensing with any sort of unified 
command" and "a fast thrust to the southwest with sufficient mobile forces will not encounter 
serious enemy resistance anywhere forward of Baku." 33 
The following days seemed to support his bold claim. By 9 August, vanguard units 
of Seventeenth Army had reached their first major objective: Krasnodar, the oil refining 
city on the Kuban river's north bank. Four infantry divisions moved up and took the city, 
strongly supported by Fliegerkorps IV. "Bombers," von Richthofen noted, "performed 
extremely well against thick enemy columns there".34 The infantry footsloggers had made 
impressive progress. In blazing heat, they had covered thirty miles per day as they 
marched past seemingly endless fields of sunflowers.35 On the opposite flank, Panzer 
and mobile units of Fortieth Panzer Corps had swept through Voroshilovsk and on to 
Pyatigorsk, 425 kilometres southeast of Rostov. They captured the city the following day 
and rumbled into the Caucasus foothills. Between these two groups, the Third Panzer 
Corps crossed the Kuban river, took Armavir and bore down upon Maikop, the first of 
Hitler's great "oil objectives".36 In the evening of 9 August, the 13th Panzer Division 
stormed the city, took around a thousand prisoners and captured 50 undamaged aircraft. 
The Filhrer's initial joy at Maikop's seizure was shared by many of his cohorts. According 
to Ciano's diary, Mussolini "attributes a great deal of importance" to its capture. It will 
have the effect, the Italian Foreign Minister wrote, "of relieving the Axis, but not immediately, 
and not altogether, of the pressing oil problem."37 However, their delight soon turned to 
bitter disappointment when they learned that Soviet rearguards had already destroyed 
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hundreds of wells, wrecked oil storage facilities and crippled the refineries by removing 
vital components.38 Although this was always a likely result, the damage was far more 
extensive than the Axis leaders had naTvely hoped. Twelve days after the city fell, the 
Inspector of Air Defences reported that only two oil wells were "capable of being developed 
for use. One well is still burning, although it may soon be possible to extinguish the fire. 
The other wells have been rendered useless by having cement poured down the bores."39 
The Soviets had also destroyed the large refinery in Krasnodar, he added. 
Bringing Maikop back into production would be difficult and time-consuming. At the 
end of August, Georg Thomas, head of the War Economy and Armaments Office, noted 
in his monthly situation report that "only insignificant amounts of mineral oil were found" 
when Maikop fell. 40 The extensive damage inflicted on extraction and processing 
installations and the sporadic fighting still taking place in the region made it impossible 
at the moment to conduct a thorough investigation of the oilfield. Yet only after specialists 
conducted such an investigation, Thomas pointed out, could they determine how soon 
and to what degree the field could be exploited. 
On 8 September-that is, a month after German troops first entered the Maikop 
oilfield, choking on thick smoke billowing from burning storage tanks-Dr. Schlicht of the 
Mineral61 Brigade reported to Thomas on progress at Maikop. 41 Difficult terrain-"extremely 
suitable for partisan warfare"-prevented the transportation of cumbersome drilling 
equipment, at least until new transportation routes could be created. In the meantime, 
Schlicht said, German specialists had to determine which wells would be easiest to 
unblock. This would not be easy; the Soviets had inflicted massive damage, even to 
pipelines. "Until now," he emphasized, "only 4,000 cubic metres of oil stocks have been 
IJncovered. It will take at least another six months until regular production can resume." 
Accordingly, "it is essential we give the Reichsmarschall [Goring, still Plenipotentiary of 
the Four Year Plan and, in effect, Germany's economics dictator] a completely accurate 
picture of lVIaikop". Goring's understanding of the situation, he added, was grossly over-
optimistic: "questions are already being raised about whether the southern army groups 
can now be supplied with fuel directly from Maikop." 
Schlicht was right: Goring's grasp of matters relating to oil production was extremely 
weak. For instance, two months later, on 21 l\Jovember, he presided over an 011 conference 
in Berlin. Maikop, which had yet to produce oil for Axis troops (and never would, except 
a few dribbles), remained at the forefront of his mind. "I'm fed up!", he exclaimed. 
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"Months have passed since we captured the first oil wells, yet we still aren't getting any 
benefit." 42 He astounded his audience of technical experts when, referring to the concrete 
plugs dropped down the bores, he na'(vely demanded to know: "Can't you just drill them 
out with something like a gigantic corkscrew?" 
After Krasnodar and Maikop fell, von Richthofen believed that Soviet forces in the 
Caucasus were finished. On 11 August, he noted in his diary: "My impression is still this: 
the Russian southern army is destroyed. Parts of it are in rout along the Grusinian Army 
Road [that is, beyond the Caucasus mountains]". On the other hand, Sixth Army now 
faced stiff resistance, both in the air and on the ground, as it closed in on Stalingrad. 
Accordingly, the air commander decided that Stalingrad must now be his fleet's new 
Schwerpunkt,43 This decision was doubtless influenced by his meeting with Jeschonnek 
on 10 August, when the Luftwaffe Chief of the General Staff emphasized Hitler's growing 
infatuation with Stalin's "own" city. 
To create this new point of maximum effort, Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII would direct all 
its efforts against Stalingrad and Soviet forces fanatically defending its approaches. 
Moreover, Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV would also send most of its bomber and dive-
bomber groups north from the Caucasus, where they were no longer needed. "I'm ordering 
unusual things," von Richthofen stated, "and mixing up all the units! All the main forces 
of the fleet are going there". He was not exaggerating. As well as transferring many of 
P'I'Iugbeil's combat units to Fiebig's corps, he ordered the !'Ieet's signals and logistics 
teams to organize a Stalingrad "transport region", handling a massive 3,000 tons of 
supplies per day. This tonnage included not only bombs, ammunition, spares and provisions 
for the Luftwaffe's own substantial consumption, but the same items for the army's even-
greater consumption. To carry this large tonnage, he also stripped Pflugbeil of most of 
his transport planes. Aircraft alone could not carry these supplies, of course, so he 
ordered all the fleet's road transport companies, including those in the Caucasus, to the 
Stalingrad region. 
On 15 August, von Richthofen held a conference in Rostov, attended by the senior 
staff of Air District Rostov, which organized his fleet's supply and maintenance matters.44 
He promptly ordered General Vierling to the Stalingrad region to run the new "transport 
region", and demanded much greater effort by all technicians and transport personnel. 
That evening he outlined in his diary the main topics discussed during the conference: 
[I asked] how things stand with my previous orders for the movement of all 
transports to the Stalingrad region, in order to ensure that our bomber 
formations (and, of course, the rest of the fleet) can operate there. Because 
the railway running east from Stalino [where the last rail-head was situated] 
is no longer usable, we shall have to transport our supplies and equipment 
a further 350 kilometres ourselves. [Its] a really difficult problem, and a new 
one, since the rule was always that bomber formations can only be supplied 
by rail.. .. These folk seemed mildly astonished by what I said. I actually felt 
quite sorry for them, because apparently no-one has ever spoken to them like 
this before. 
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Von Richthofen made one other major change to the 'fleet's command and operational 
structure at this time. After successfully seeking OKL permission, he disbanded FliegerfOhrer 
SOd on 9 August. It was no longer necessary to have a separate air command in the 
Crimea, he reasoned, especially now that Fliegerkorps IV was moving its headquarters 
and bomber units there (they arrived at Kerch the same day he dissolved von Wild's 
command). Accordingly, he ordered Plugbeil simply to take over von Wild's units and 
incorporate them into his corps. 
Von Wild's command had existed for only six months, and never had the resources 
necessary to carry out successfully the wide range of tasks the fleet assigned it. Still, 
his units had every reason to be proud of their achievements. They had conducted 3,481 
air operations, involving 16,626 individual sorties.45 Their attacks on Soviet shipping 
achieved good results, considering their limited strength and the difficulty of destroying 
vessels from the air. They sank-if their kill claims are accurate-68 freighters (together 
weighing 131,500 tons), a 'flotilla-leader, two destroyers, a submarine-chaser, three 
submarines and a variety of smaller warships and merchantmen. They damaged even 
more vessels than they sank. Their army support missions were as successful as their 
anti-naval operations. They reported destroying 510 trucks, 280 motor vehicles, 65 tanks, 
30 artillery pieces, 11 artillery batteries, 11 fortified gun implacements, eight trains, four 
locomotives and a variety of bunkers, installations, buildings, bridges and railway lines. 
Perhaps more importantly, they continuously and systematically reconnoitred the entire 
Crimea-Caucasus-Black Sea region, clocking up 462 long-range operations alone. 
FliegerfOhrer SOd's impact on local fighting far outweighed the material damage it 
inflicted on the enemy. It contributed substantially to Axis defensive battles, when Soviet 
forces attempted to break out of Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula, and then to Axis 
offensive battles, when Axis troops attempted to break into those areas. First, by bombing 
and strafing exposed troops, tanks, motor vehicles and field fortifications, FliegerfOhrer 
Slid provided the army with reasonable air support on the battlefield. Second, its small-
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scale but systematic interdiction operations disrupted enemy land and sea supply efforts. 
Third, by carrying out constant surveillance of Crimean and Black Sea coasts and attacking 
enemy forces at likely embarkation pOints, it gathered valuable information on Soviet 
strengths and movements and prevented further enemy amphibious landings. Finally, its 
small but frequent and aggressive attacks on enemy warships at sea as well as in port 
persuaded the Soviet naval command into not attempting major operations. 
Oberst Wolfgang von Wild, prominent in all recent air activities in the Crimea and 
Black Sea, leaves our study at this point. Although he had performed extremely well in 
recent months, he failed to win von Richthofen's confidence. His career was far from 
over, however. The OKL soon transferred him to Athens, where he served as Air 
Transport Commander I (Southeast). He held various other important Luftwaffe posts 
and, finally promoted to Generalmajor on 1 March 1945, ended the war as Air Attache 
in Tokyo. The present writer has no knowledge of von Wild's post-war career. 
Even before Fliegerkorps IV set up its headquarters in Kerch-and before it sent most 
of its combat groups to the Stalin grad theatre-it launched its last ever major air campaign 
in the Caucasus: a series of heavy bombing raids on Soviet ports along the Caucasus 
coast, especially those in which Oktyabrskii's fleet lay berthed. These raids commenced 
on 6 August and continued daily until 19 August, the day British Air Ministry intelligence 
officers (closely following events from Enigma decrypts) reported in their secret Weekly 
Intelligence Summary that: 
Air operations have increased somewhat in the I\lorth Caucasus, where attacks 
have been made on shipping, including naval vessels, and on harbour 
installations at the Black Sea ports, while support has been given to the 
German army in its thrust towards the ports and to the south along the line 
Krasnodar-Maikop-Piatigorsk."46 
According to the Luftwaffe's historical branch, Pflugbeil's units "carried out attacks in 
front of our own Panzer spearheads, against marching columns as well as transport 
movements and embarkations along the Black Sea coast." 47 These "transport movements" 
and "embarkations" were actually large-scale Soviet evacuations from positions along the 
eastern shore of the Sea of Azov and on the Taman Peninsula. When Dumitrescu's 
Rumanian Third Army-led by its outstanding 5th Cavalry Division-drove swiftly south 
along the shore towards the ports of Jeisk and Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, Rear-Admiral 
Gorshkov's Azov Flotilla hastily evacuated 4,000 men and much valuable equipment. 
Suffering from both German minefields and air attack, small boats carried them through 
the Straits of Kerch to Tuapse and other "safe" ports along the Caucasus coast. 48 Similarly, 
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when the German Fifth Army Corps swung west towards I\lovorossiisk, warships, transport 
vessels and small freighters began evacuating personnel and equipment to ports further 
south.49 Marshal Budenny, Soviet commander in the northern Caucasus, evacuated 
these ports not only by sea, but also by land. Trains, trucks and wagons carrying troops 
and equipment jammed all railways and roads leading south. Like the naval convoys, 
they made perfect targets for German aircraft. 
Pl'Iugbeil threw every available bomber into battle against the evacuation fleets and rail 
and road convoys. Fighters provided protection not only by escorting them in flight but, 
joined by Stukas and ground-attack aircraft, by hitting enemy airfields and flak batteries. 
VVS forces in the north-western Caucasus were outclassed and vastly outnumbered and, 
as a result, lost many aircraft in the air and on the ground. However, most units still 
managed to withdraw the majority of their aircraft to airfields in the central and southern 
Caucasus. From those airfields, they would later gain revenge. 
Fliegerkorps IV's bombing attacks-the Luftwaffe's last substantial operations in the 
Caucasus-produced pleasing results. Every day between 7 and 19 August, air units 
destroyed several vessels and hundreds of vehicles and killed numerous troops caught 
in the open. On 9 August, for example, FliegerfOhrer SOd (joined by two further bomber 
groups on its final day of operations) alone reported destroying 108 trucks, heavily damaging 
many others, smashing seven trains, wrecking much railway equipment, sinking a 4,000-
ton freighter and badly damaging three others.50 
AlthOUgh Pflugbeil's airmen achieved their greatest successes against rail and road 
targets, which they destroyed in heavy raids, they still performed well against Soviet 
evacuation convoys at sea. On 10 August, they reported sinking 11 transport vessels, 
together weighing 12,700 tons, and damaging nine others.51 The following day, they sank 
two transport vessels, two coastal traders and a patrol boat, and damaged another seven 
vessels. Two days later, they sank more ships and gutted a 45-strong Soviet air formation, 
allowing only ten to return to base. 
Despite this excellent kill rate, which caused Oktyabrskii intense concern about his 
fleet's safety, von Richthofen could not allow Pflugbeil to continue these anti-shipping 
operations for long. He needed urgently to transfer Fliegerkorps IV's bombers and most 
other aircraft north to the Stalingrad sector. Accordingly, the operations came to a halt 
on 19 AUgust, after several equally-successful days (only the previous day, for instance, 
Pflugbeil's airmen had sunk a destroyer and four coastal traders and badly damaged six 
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transport vessels and eight other coastal traders).52 Everything must now be focused on 
Stalingrad, von Richthofen stated in his diary that evening.53 "The enemy there is 
increasingly stronger and fights with more determination." In the Caucasus, he added, 
"the enemy is completely trapped. That's why we [that is, most of Fliegerkorps /V's 
combat units] are departing from there for a while." 
On 20 August, the fleet chief actually told List that he regretted having to transfer the 
bulk of PJlugbeil's air corps, "except for very small remnants," to Stalingrad. The decision 
came from Hitler, he explained, so he had no choice. Trying to reassure the army group 
commander, he added that he might be able to begin transferring units back to the 
Caucasus "in six to ten days".54 Although he made a similar promise to von Kleist 11 
days later ("we'll be returning as quickly and strongly as possible" 55), no units would ever 
permanently return to the Caucasus from Stalingrad. They would be swallowed up by 
the airlift to support the doomed Sixth Army. 
Units began flying north~east to the Stalingrad region as soon as their supply and 
maintenance staff prepared them for the long flight and the fleet's command staff found 
bases for them. The 51st Bomber Wing flew north on 16 August, even before attacks 
on Black Sea ports and shipping ceased, whilst most others left on 19, 20 and 21 
August. 56 Reduced to two bomber and a few Stuka, ground-attack, fighter and 
reconnaissance units, Fliegerkorps /V no longer possessed the ability to affect decisively 
the outcome of battles in the Caucasus or even conduct systematic interdiction in the 
enemy's rear areas. 
The oilfields: so close but yet so far 
By the time most of Fliegerkorps IV's combat units departed for Stalingrad, List's 21 
divisions in the Caucasus were advancing along a front of more than 500 kilometres. The 
Field Marshal had shuffled his forces, shifting a Panzer corps (the Fifty-Seventh) from 
First Panzer Army to help Seventeenth Army, and then sent them on diverging paths. On 
the left flank, von Kleist's First Panzer Army was proceeding southeast. It aimed to cross 
the Terek river, seize the Grozny oil'fields, breach the mountains, and finally take Baku, 
Hitler's oil "Mecca". Armeegruppe Ruoff, on the right flank, was now advancing in three 
separate columns, each with its own objective. The Fifth Corps aimed for Novorossiisk, 
a major naval base situated slightly south of the Taman Peninsula. Mountain troops stili 
in the Crimea were preparing to advance across the Kerch Straits and join the attack. The 
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Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps was on its way past lVIaikop towards Tuapse, another naval 
base on the Black Sea. The two divisions of the Forty-Ninth Mountain Corps were pushing 
past Armavir, hoping to cross passes through the main mountain range and descend 
upon Sukhumi, a naval base south of Tuapse. 
By the last week of August, the pace of Army Group A's advances had dropped 
dramatically. Not only had the terrain become more difficult, but Soviet resistance had 
stiffened. Even more importantly, supplies, especially of oil and gasoline, had become 
alarmingly inadequate. The Wehrmacht's logistical route in southern Russia consisted of 
a Single railway running eastwards across the Ukraine to Stalino. From there aircraft and 
trucks carried supplies to Army Group B in the Stalingrad region, 350 kilometres to the 
eastY However, after von Richthofen's recent reorganization of the air fleet, Pflugbeil 
had no aircraft and very few Luftwaffe trucks available to carry supplies to Army Group 
A in the Caucasus, which had units dispersed along a front over 750 kilometres away. 
The cessation of airlifts to those units had a sudden and profound impact on List's 
advance. The army had its own trucks, but nowhere near enough to transport sufficient 
fuel, ammunition and provisions for spearhead units to advance at the speed the Fuhrer 
demanded. Also, the distance between the last railhead and those vanguards, each with 
its own supply line, had become so great that the army's truck columns themselves 
consumed a large portion of the fuel allotted to the forces at the front. Supply personnel 
attempted to ship supplies forward on Soviet railways, but had very little rolling stock. 
German wagons were in short supply and, in any event, could not be used because of 
different rail gauges. They also had few undamaged or repaired stretches of line on which 
to operate. With no aircraft and not enough trucks, they became even more reliant than 
usual on their horses and mules. Although they had tens of thousands of each, they 
were slow and consumed vast quantities of fodder, which was scarce in the desert-like 
steppes of the northern Caucasus.58 
By the end of August, Army Group A's spearheads were advancing at a snail's pace: 
three or four kilometres per day if they were lucky. To Hitler's disgust, List began arguing 
that, unless his forces received reinforcements, fuel and air support, they would soon 
have to take up winter positions.59 Von Richthofen felt powerless to help, at least until 
Stalingrad fell, when he could probably shift his fleet's Schwerpunkt back to the Caucasus. 
Until then, List's forces could expect no airlifts of fuel or supplies. Moreover, their wide 
dispersion across the width of the Caucasus prevented Pflugbeil's air corps-now weaker 
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than von Wild's Fliegerfuhrer Sud had been in May-offering more than token combat 
assistance. "The armies are so widely stretched out," he penned on the last day of the 
month, "that we cannot create a single point of maximum effort .... Because we now have 
only extremely weak forces there, we're no longer able to have significant influence." 60 
The only units making satisfactory progress in this period were the 1st and 4th Mountain 
Divisions, which fought tl1eir way through heavy snow and icy winds and seized several 
3,OOO-metre-high passes through the supposedly-impregnable Caucasus range. 61 On 21 
August, one detatchment even scaled majestic, glacier-clad Mount Elbrus, the highest 
mountain in the Caucasus, and planted the swastika-emblazoned Reich War Flag 
(Reichskriegsflagge) on its 5,633-metre-high summit.62 However, after clambering along 
almost two hundred kilometres of precipitous mountain paths and finally reaching the 
foothills on the other side of the range, the mountain troops' advance petered out only 
twenty kilometres from Sukhumi, their coastal objective. They had expected ammunition 
and provisions to be dropped from aircraft, but Pflugbeil had none to spare. They had 
also expected units of the Italian Alpine Corps to follow them, bringing supplies by pack 
animal, but that corps was not behind them; it was 1,OOO-kilometres away, advancing 
towards Stalingrad. They had also hoped to encounter little resistance as they descended 
into the foothills, but found instead that strong Soviet forces guarded the exits from the 
mountains. Thus, worn out by weeks of exhausting marching and climbing at high altitudes, 
and desperately needing ammunition and provisions, they lacked the strength to descend 
from the foothills onto the coastal plain. 
The activities of these mountain troops were carefully monitored at Hitler's headquarters. 
The Fuhrer had repeatedly demanded that they strike through the Caucasus to the Black 
Sea port of Sukhumi as quickly as possible. The seizure of this port-coupled with the 
capture of Novorossiisk and Tuapse, which Seventeenth Army looked set to take from the 
north-would cripple Oktyabrskii's fleet, enabling Admiral Schwarzes Meer to ferry troops 
and much-needed supplies across the Kerch Straits.63 Accordingly, the War Lord exploded 
when told that his troops had scaled Elbrus (an act with absolutely no military worth and 
only slight propaganda value), but had failed to reach the coast. As Albert Speer recalled: 
I often saw Hitler furious but seldom did his anger erupt from him as it did 
when this report came in. For hours he raged as if his entire plan of the 
campaign had been ruined by this bit of sport. Days later he went on railing 
to all and sundry about "those crazy mountain climbers" who "belong before 
a court-martial." They were pursuing their idiotic hobbies in the midst of a war, 
he exclaimed indignantly, occupying an idiotic peak even though he had 
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commanded that all efforts must be concentrated upon Sukhumi.64 
Logistical breakdowns, not the time wasted climbing Elbrus, prevented the mountain 
troops taking the Black Sea ports, as Hitler probably realized once he cooled down. It 
made no difference; his troops failed to accomplish the task he set them. His other forces 
in the Caucasus fared no better. Hampered by acute fuel and ammunition shortages, 
Generalleutnant Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg's Fortieth Panzer Corps (of First Panzer 
Army) made slow progress as it pushed on towards Grozny, which it was supposed to 
secure before rolling south to Baku. The swift and deep Terek River, with its high and 
rocky southern bank, superbly protected Grozny's otherwise-vulnerable oilfields. 
Determined to keep those fields out of German clutches, local Soviet forces-the Ninth 
and Forty-fourth Armies of the North Group, Transcaucasian Front-carefully dug 
themselves in behind the Terek.65 They also requested and received additional VVS air 
units, which began operating from airfields around Grozny in the last week of August. 
Pflugbeil dispatched the 3rd Group of the 52nd Fighter Wing to support the Fortieth 
Panzer Corps as it attempted to capture Mosdok, cross the Terek and push southwards 
to Grozny. On 20 August, the group had a total complement of 43 Bf 109s, of which 28 
(65 per cent) were serviceable. 66 Considering that von Richthofen's fleet as a whole had 
only 58 per cent of its aircraft serviceable-virtually the same amount as the previous 
month-this fighter group remained in good shape (at least by the standards of the 
eastern front).67 However, its operations were severely curtailed most days by fuel and 
ammunition shortages. Accordingly, it proved incapable of preventing strong Soviet air 
attacks on von Schweppenburg's troops. Enemy air superiority in this region, Wilhelm 
Tieke recalled, "was crushing".68 
At the time, Tieke fumed over the Luftwaffe's poor showing. German fighters rarely 
appeared over the Terek front, and usually only after Soviet aircraft had done their 
damage and departed. After the war he sought reasons for this, and received a letter 
from Major Gordon Gollob, the fighter group's commander, who stated: "It might interest 
you to know that on the T erek front sector there were no more than four aircraft operational 
at anyone time .... We lacked aircraft, we lacked fuel, and ammunition was in short 
supply. We had to organize ourselves into the smallest groups possible, therefore, in 
order even to be able to reconnoitre the front." Tieke was apparently pacified: "The 
German Luftwaffe did all it could", he concluded. Indeed, Gollob's group achieved 
acceptable results, considering the paltry number of aircraft it. managed to get airborne 
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each day. Between 14 and 29 August, during which time army spearheads captured 
Mosdok and advanced to the Terek, I/I./J.G. 52 claimed 32 enemy aircraft destroyed.69 
With bearable losses, Soviet air units continously attacked pontoon bridges erected 
across the Terek, sometimes inflicting considerable damage. Despite the VVS's 
increasingly-stiff resistance, matched by that of the I\linth and Forty-Fourth Armies-the 
latter led, incidentally, by General Petrov, the former Sevastopol garrison commander-
von Schweppenburg's troops succeeded in crossing the river on 2 September, and began 
inching forward towards Grozny. However, their progress throughout the first half of 
September remained extremely slow and their losses high, largely due to virtually-
unopposed VVS forces. Vladimir Karpov recalled that "Convergent Soviet ground and air 
strikes prevented their breakthrough",1° Aside from a few aerial victories each day (Gollob, 
an ace of considerable renown, scored his 150th in this period), IIUJ. G. 52 could do little 
to help them. 
On the western flank, meanwhile, Dumitrescu's Rumanian Third Army advanced south-
westwards along the eastern shore of the Sea of Azov towards the Taman Peninsula. 
Seventeenth Army pushed south-westwards from Krasnodar and Maikop, across the 
northwestern Caucasus foothills, towards Novorossiisk and Tuapse. Marshal Budenny, 
commander of the Soviet I\lorthern Caucasus Front, was determined to prevent Dumitrescu 
taking the strategically-important Taman Peninsula, knowing that without it the Germans 
would be unable to move reinforcements and supplies across the Kerch Straits. Budenny 
was also determined to stop Ruoff seizing the Black Sea naval bases further south. On 
17 August, therefore, he established the Novorossiisk Defence Region, comprising Forty-
Seventh Army, Gorshkov's Azov Flotilla, the Temryuk, Kerch and Novorossiisk Naval 
Bases and a composite VVS force. 71 These forces, he prayed, would be able to do what 
no others had so far since B/au began: withstand a major Axis offensive without abandoning 
ground. 
Budenny's hopes were realized, but not for several weeks. In the meantime, the 
Rumanian Cavalry Corps humiliated the Soviet Forty-Seventh Army in the Taman region.72 
It stormed Slavyanskaya, where the Soviets had attempted to make a stand, repulsed a 
counter-offensive across the Kuban river, and captured the small port of Temryuk. It then 
crossed the Kuban and made a rapid thrust to the heights of Nassurovo on the Black Sea 
coast. There it captured two batteries of Soviet 15-cm heavy guns, which it turned on the 
port of Anapa, shattering its defences. To von Richthofen's delight, the Cavalry Corps 
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captured Anapa on 31 August. The air leader immediately telephoned Dumitrescu to offer 
his heartiest congratulations.73 
Dumitrescu had achieved these tasks without Luftwaffe assistance, his only air support 
coming from his own very small, inadequately-trained and poorly-equipped Escadrilas (air 
sqadrons). Although they belonged nominally to Pflugbeil's emaciated Fliegerkorps IV 
and relied on its support services, they operated as an independent group (Grup Aerian 
de Lupta), supporting only Rumanian ground forces. The few Escadrilas in the Caucasus 
employed obsolete aircraft, which could take to the skies only in areas with little or no 
VVS opposition. Escadrilas 21 112 and 114 attempted to meet the Rumanian army's 
reconnaissance and communication needs with eight early-model German Dornier 17 
"Flying Pencil" bombers and 24 even older Rumanian-made U.S. Fleet 10G trainer 
biplanes.14 Escadrila 17, with six under-powered Rumanian IAR 39 tactical reconnaissance 
biplanes, supported its divisions on the battlefield by monitoring enemy movements, 
directing artillery fire and dropping small bombs. 
By capturing the Taman Peninsula (except for one isolated pocket of resistance), the 
Rumanians had finally closed the Sea of Azov to Soviet shipping and driven out Gorshkov's 
flotilla. In the last days of August and the first of September, that flotilla mined Azovian 
ports to prevent their exploitation by Axis forces and broke through the Kerch Straits, 
evacuating as many weapons and pieces of equipment as possible.75 It also evacuated 
army and navy infantry units on the southern coast of the Taman Peninsula to Novorossiisk. 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer1s small Italian and German flotillas in the Crimea attempted 
to stop those operations. 76 However, these forces still possessed few serviceable MTBs, 
the weather was poor and, most importantly, Pflugbeil had very few aircraft available to 
provide cover and carry out supporting raids. Under the circumstances, their attacks on 
Soviet vessels and embarkations points inflicted satisfactory damage-they sank almost 
20,000 tons of shipping between 30 August and 2 September-but they failed to prevent 
the successful completion of most evacuation operations. 77 
News of the Taman Peninsula's capture was welcomed at Hitler's headquarters. It 
cleared the way for Admiral Schwarzes Meer to begin Operation Bliicher II, the 
transportation of the urgently-needed Rumanian 3rd Mountain and German 46th Infantry 
Divisions across the Kerch Straits. For the last week or so, Hitler had constantly complained 
about delays in transporting them from the Crimea, delays his advisers blamed on rough 
seas and lack of air support. Sick of what he wrongly called "excuses", on 29 August 
201. 
the FDhrer ordered the forces to travel by land around the Sea of Azov to the Caucasus.78 
He changed his mind the following day, demanding that they cross the Straits immediately, 
"regardless of the weather and, if necessary, without support by the air force."79 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer's assault craft and transport barges ferried the divisions 
across the Straits during the night of 1 and 2 September. so MTBs, minesweepers and 
the small Luftwaffe force Pflugbeil hastily threw together for the task (apparently including 
aircraft temporarily diverted from the Stalingrad sectors1) provided protection against enemy 
attacks. They were hardly needed; Soviet warships and aircraft kept away. For the next 
few months Axis naval vessels and a few of Pflugbeil's fighters routinely patrolled the 
sealanes and airspace around the Kerch Straits, protecting Admiral Schwarzes Meer's 
supply squadrons as they transported fuel, ammunition and provisions across the Straits. 
In the first two weeks alone (easily the busiest period), they ferried 30,605 men, 13,254 
horses and 6,265 motor vehicles to the Caucasus.82 
Reinforced and possessing excellent jump-off positions, Armeegruppe Ruoff looked 
set to take Novorossiisk, then advance down the Black Sea coast, knocking off one naval 
base after another. However, to Marshal Budenny's relief, Ruoff's Seventeenth Army 
made much slower progress than the Rumanians recently had. After Plugbeil's bombers 
and the bulk of his Stukas and ground-attack aircraft departed for Stalingrad, Ruoff's 
army received only weak air support. Budenny, who pulled the bulk of Forty-Seventh 
Army back to Novorossiisk, where it dug in and prepared to hold the port at all costs, 
noticed the absence of strong Luftwaffe forces and called VVS units back to the region. 
Although these units were unable to gain air superiority, at least initially, they made life 
difficult for Plugbeil's aircrew, whose operations they frequently interrupted, and for Ruoff's 
troops, whose anti-aircraft guns and batteries were too dispersed to offer concentrated 
firepower. 
Budenny also brought back tens of thousands of troops previously withdrawn to the 
south. o ktyabrskii , whose courage steadily waxed as Fliegerkorps /V's strength waned, 
organized the troop transfers from his headquarters in PotL His warships, including 
destroyers, cruisers and a flotilla-leader, carried reinforcements and equipment from Poti 
to Tuapse and Gelenyik, a small port 35 kilometres south of Novorossiisk. Pflugbeil's 
reconnaissance units, still carefully monitoring all enemy movements and photographing 
the Caucasian ports each day, immediately detected the troop transfers. His few bombers 
and dive-bombers carried out nightly attacks on the harbour facilities at Gelenyik, 
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desperately hoping to stop or at least significantly hamper them. 83 Lacking adequate 
bomber forces, they failed miserably. The Soviet reinforcements from Poti, as well as 
those evacuated from ports on the Sea of Azov and the Taman Peninsula, arrived safely 
and immediately dug themselves in behind Novorossiisk. Budenny was determined to 
hold the coastal road to Tuapse, Sukhumi and Batumi. Even if Novorossiisk fell, and he 
hoped it would not, he would stop the Axis advance along the Black Sea coast. 
General der Infanterie Wetzel's Fifth Army Corps fOUght fanatically and suffered terrible 
losses as it crossed the wooded north-western Caucasus foothills and reached the outskirts 
of l\Iovorossiisk, stubbornly defended by its naval garrison and the Soviet Forty-Seventh 
Army. Vanguards broke into the port on 6 September84 , but it took four days of furious 
and costly house-to-house fighting before Wetzel could announce the city's capture.as 
This was List's final victory in the Caucasus and, even then, it was not a total victory: 
strong Soviet forces still held the heights behind the port and the strategically-important 
coastal road. Wetzel's repeated attempts to push out of l\Jovorossiisk's southern suburbs 
and drive southwards failed. They resulted in heavy casualties, especially to the Rumanian 
3rd Mountain Division, which was almost wiped out in a Soviet counter-attack on 25 and 
26 September. 86 Although Axis forces managed to contain that attack, they could do little 
more than stabilize the front. They clearly lacked the strength to dislodge enemy forces 
stubbornly holding the coastal plain between Novorossiisk and Tuapse. 
Those Soviet forces also thwarted repeated attempts by elements of Fifty-Seventh 
Panzer Corps and Forty-Fourth Jager (Light Infantry) Corps to break through the thickly-
forested hills protecting Tuapse. List wanted to reinforce them with the bulk of Forty-
Ninth Mountain Corps. Some of that corps' units were still fighting their way through high 
mountain passes in the main Caucasus range whilst others were struggling unsuccessfully 
to descend from the foothills to Sukhurni, their tantalizingly-close goa\. Believing that 
these mountain units were too weak to achieve their allotted tasks, the Field Marshal 
wanted to withdraw them all, except for enough troops to keep the passes in German 
hands, and deploy them more usefully against Tuapse. 
On 7 September, he requested a visit to his Stalino headquarters by Jodi, the OKW's 
operations chief, so that he could describe the situation and outline his plans. The latter 
immediately flew east, talked and length with List, and returned to Hitler's headquaerters 
in the evening. Jodi had often given unpopular advice but seldom stood up to his 
domineering boss. Explaining this, he once told Halder that he always remembered what 
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his grandmother had told his mother on her wedding day: "In matrimony the husband is 
always right! And if he says, 'The water's running uphill today', my answer is, 'Yuh, Yuh, 
its up there already!"'87 Yet Jodi was also an honourable man, unwilling to abandon a 
colleague to unfair attack. He gathered his courage and informed Hitler that List's 
assessment was correct: the mountain troops were incapable of completing their assigned 
missions so they should instead be deployed against Tuapse. He bravely added that 
List's costly and unsuccessful recent actions had been faithfully carried out according to 
Hitler's own orders and directives. The Field Marshal could not, therefore, be blamed for 
their failure. The Fuhrer exploded. He accused Jodi of disloyalty, dismissed List and 
announced to his stunned entourage that he would take personal charge of Army Group 
A. 
Jodi, Hitler's most trusted paladin, clearly hurt the War Lord's feelings by siding with 
List. For several months, the Fuhrer refused to shake his hand, and he never again ate 
with his generals. Also, to ensure that no-one accused him for issuing orders he never 
gave, he brought in a team of stenographers to take down every word at military briefings 
and conferences. Tormented by the heat and a growing realization that his Caucasus 
campaign was almost over, and filled with disappointment, mistrust and anger at his 
general staff, he directed his hostility towards Halder, whom he repeatedly accused of 
lacking National Socialist ardour and finally sacked two weeks later. He replaced him 
with Kurt Zeitzler, the 47-year-old chief of staff of a western army group. Zeitzler was 
not only a fervent Nazi but a dynamic leader with exceptional organizational abilities, an 
assertive manner and boundless energy that earned him the nickname "Thunderball" 
(KugelbJitz) . 
Neither Zeitzler's "thunder" nor Hitler's long-distance command of exhausted Army 
Group South compensated for the group's acute shortages of supplies, reinforcements 
and air support. As autumn wind and rain replaced summer sun, the Caucasus campaign 
streadily petered out, with only very minor changes in the line occurring after the middle 
of September. By early October, Axis forces were barely moving-and barely surviving, 
in many cases, due to fierce resistance and shortages of fuel and provisions. Yet, although 
they almost had Grozny, they were still nowhere near achieving Hitler's major campaign 
goals. On the left flank, First Panzer Army had managed to push across the Terek river 
and inch forward towards Grozny before determined Soviet divisions, supported by 
squadrons of the Fourth Air Army's deadly Shturmoviks, blunted their advance. On the 
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right flank, Seventeenth Army's infantry had held Novorossiisk, despite several small 
Soviet counter-attacks, but failed to break through to Tuapse and the other ports in the 
south. The army's mountain troops, meanwhile, had abandoned their advance against 
Sukhumi when snow and rain cut their logistics route through the high mountain passes. 
The Luftwaffe in the Caucasus, mid-August to late-November 
P'I:lugbeil's stripped-to-the-bones air corps had supported the army as often and strongly 
as it could, but its efforts after late-August made little impact on the ground war. "Field 
Marshal" Hitler's divisions were too dispersed and Pflugbeil's air units too weak for the 
latter to create a single Schwerpunkt. Instead, he did the only thing he could under the 
circumstances: split his quarter-strength "corps" into separate formations, each assigned 
to a particular army corps or operational group. 
The air corps commander deployed a very small air formation in support of the 16th 
Motorized Infantry Division as it advanced alone across the Kalmuck Steppe towards 
Astrakhan in order to close the exposed gap between Army Groups A and B and protect 
First Panzer Army's vulnerable flank. The small Luftwaffe combat force supporting this 
division, which advanced in fits and spurts due to frequent fuel shortages, seldom 
participated in combat missions but provided a fair amount of reconnaissance information. 
It lacked the strength to do more, possessing at the end of September only one Me 110, 
four Bf 109s, a few FW 189 twin-fuselage surveillance planes and a few DFS 230 
transport gliders.88 The latter, towed by Hs 126s, supplied both air and army troops. 
Fearing a large-scale amphibious operation by Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii's Black Sea 
Fleet now that he had few forces to throw against one, P'flugbeil deployed most of his 
long-range reconnaissance aircraft on the same missions they had carried out when part 
of FliegerfOhrer Sad: constant surveillance of shipping movements and Black Sea ports. 89 
These aircraft (mostly Ju 88s) carried out "armed reconnaissance" (bewaffnete 
Seeaufklarung) , which means that, where possible, they attacked the objects under 
surveillance. They frequently hit ports and occasionally vessels, although they rarely 
inflicted substantial damage on either.90 When conditions permitted and sufficient aircraft 
could be gathered together, which was not often, Pflugbeil ordered heavier attacks on the 
ports and ships. 
Fliegerkorps IV's attacks on Oktyabrskii's fleet were far too few and weak to satisfy 
either Admiral Schwarzes Meer or Marine-Gruppenkommando Sad, its parent command. 
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They had been constantly nagging Luftflotte IV to destroy the enemy fleet in massive 
bombing raids, a task it no longer had the means to accomplish. On 11 September, for 
example, they requested Luftflotte IV and Army Group A-which would have to do without 
air support during the proposed raids on the fleet-to "paralyze the enemy by air attacks".91 
Two days later, the German naval command received a disappointing reply: Army Group 
A was so desperate for air support on and behind the battlefield that it could not spare 
aircraft for large-scale attacks against the enemy fleet. "The time to concentrate on the 
Russian fleet," the army's communique bluntly stated, "will come only when weather 
conditions deteriorate." 92 As it happened, that time never came; a month later, in early 
October, the naval command was still asking for "concentrated air attacks 011 the principal 
bases of the Russian Fleet," but already realized that there was "little hope of this until 
the German Air Force is free of other tasks"-unlikely in the near future. 93 In early 
November, Admiral Schwarzes Meer pointed out to Luftflotte IV's Crimean staff that 
recent reconnaissance revealed "a heavy concentration of shipping in Poti and Satum. 
The entire Russian Fleet is concentrated in those two ports, offering an unusually good 
target to the Air Force." The Navy received the reply it expected: "Air Force Staff, Crimea 
stated that at present no planes were available for this task".94 Strangely, even after the 
Soviets launched their massive Stalin grad counter-offensive later in November, causing 
von Richthofen to transfer Fliegerkorps IV's remaining bombers north to that sector 
(leaving none in the Crimea and Caucasus), the Navy continued asking for air attacks on 
Slack Sea ports. 
Before the Stalingrad counter-offensive, Pflugbeil usually committed his two bomber 
groups, together with his dive-bomber and ground-attack groups, alternately (as need 
arose) in the combat zone of First Panzer Army in the eastern Caucasus and in that of 
Seventeenth Army in the western Caucasus. Fighters escorted these bombers and dive-
bombers in both sectors. They also operated against VVS forces constantly pounding 
Axis airfields, naval bases and army installations in the Crimea. Despite the best efforts 
of the few fighter groups stationed in and around the peninsula, enemy raids sometimes 
caused substantial damage.95 These were not the fighters' only security missions; since 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer began transporting men and materiel across the Kerch Straits 
on 1 September, a small number also patrolled the airspace over those sea-lanes, searching 
for enemy air units attempting to disrupt this vital logistics route. The naval command 
pleaded for extra fighters and flak batteries, pointing out its recent losses of transport 
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vessels to air attack. Yet Pflugbeil had no extra fighters or flak guns to give it. In the 
middle of September, he even took fighters away from those missions to help Ruoff's and 
von Kleist's armies. Marine-Gruppenkommando SOd protested, arguing that "fighter 
protection in the Crimea [was] the minimum requirement" and stressing "the grave 
consequences for the conduct of the war of further losses of shipping space and escort 
duties".96 Its protests achieved little; Pflugbeil returned only a handful of fighters to naval 
escort duties. He could spare no others. The exhausted and hard-pressed armies needed 
them far more than the navy. 
In the middle of September, Pflugbeil's twin-engined bombers helped First Panzer 
Army stem a Soviet attack against its eastern flank and launch a small stabilizing attack 
of its own.97 Their operations were seldom hampered by enemy aircraft, although the 
army suffered constant and costly Shturmovik attacks. Soviet air superiority in the Terek 
bend remained oppressive, despite I/UJ. G. 52's valiant efforts to keep enemy ground-
attack aircraft off von Kleist's tanks and troops.98 
Late in October, Pflugbeil directed all available bomber, dive-bomber and ground-
attack aircraft, which now needed constant fighter protection from enemy air attacks, to 
support a new offensive by First Panzer Army.99 On 18 October, von Kleist's Fifty-
Second Corps detected a weak spot in Soviet defences at the western end of the Terek 
bend and, in a probing attack, made such good progress that the Panzer commander 
decided to launch an all-out attack in that sector. Von Richthofen was determined to 
support the attack and temporarily made available to Pflugbeil several air groups from the 
Stalingrad area, including the 2nd Group of the 51st Bomber Wing".10o The attack began 
on 25 October, with strong air and flak support, and initially made splendid gains.101 
German bombers contributed substantially to the battle on the first day, as the postwar 
official Soviet history attested: "In the morning of 25 October more than 100 enemy 
bombers attacked the 37th Army's formations. Simultaneously, German aviation subjected 
the Army's headquarters to a bombing which severed its communications with the units." 102 
Spearheads of Third Panzer Corps quickly breached Soviet defences and swept forward, 
to the relief and mounting excitement of von Richthofen and von Kleist. Joined for a while 
by Eberhard von Mackensen, the Panzer corps' capable commander, they watched the 
action from what the air leader called a "really primitive" command post near the front. 
The three commanders came under heavy Soviet artillery fire at one point, and were 
in considerable danger until Luftwaffe bombers silenced the guns.103 Then, when von 
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Richthofen returned to his sleeping quarters in Baksan, he found that bombers of the 
Soviet Fourth Air Army had totally gutted it and destroyed several planes sitting on 
airfields. In coming weeks, Soviet air attacks increased in both regularity and strength, 
and occasionally caused substantial damage. Wolfgang Dierich, the 51st Bomber Wing's 
post-war chronicler, described one particularly destructive raid on the Second Group's 
make-shift base at Armavir. Enemy aircraft, he lamented, scored a direct hit on the fuel 
dump, causing massive damage: 
There was a flash, and the flames spread to the fuelled and bombed-up 
aircraft. Since the field had several units on it, and was packed with more than 
a hundred Ju 88s and He 111s, there was no lack of combustible material. 
Only one of the II Gruppe aircraft survived without damage. The unit was 
forced to move back to Bagerovo on the Kerch Peninsula, to get a new set 
of aircraft.104 
Despite occasional successes like this and "rolling attacks" on German infantry and 
Panzer spearheads, VVS units proved incapable of stemming Third Panzer Corps' advance. 
On 28 October, the 13th Panzer and Rumanian 2nd Mountain Divisions took the city of 
Nalchik, smashed several enemy divisions and added another 7,000 prisoners to the 
4,000 captured the previous day.105 Luftwaffe forces, under von Richthofen's personal 
command, were unable to operate in this sector on 28 and 29 October because of dense 
ground fog, so they carried out heavy raids on Tuapse instead.106 They also conducted 
nightly raids on convoys in the Caspian Sea, sinking between 10,000 and 12,000 tons 
of merchant shipping each night,107 
Even with minimal air support, von Mackensen's divisions continued pushing forward 
towards their goal: Ordzhonikidze, the city guarding the entrance to the Grusinian Military 
Road. That road ran south through the main mountain range to Tbilisi, capital of Georgia. 
Its capture would make possible a rapid drive through the mountains to the oil-rich Baku 
region. On 30 October, the 23rd Panzer Division overcame tenacious resistance and 
captured the town of Chikola. The following day, the 13th and 23rd Panzer Divisions 
launched a joint attack through Digora towards Alagir, the city guarding the entrance to 
the Ossetian Military Road. This road ran south-west through the main mountain range 
to the Black Sea coast. Its capture would enable a rapid drive to the important Poti and 
Baturni naval bases. On 1 November, Digora fell. The Panzer armies swept forward, the 
13th Panzer Division towards Ardon, which it captured that night, and on towards 
Ordzhonikidze; the 23rd towards Alagir, which it took that day, before swinging west to 
join its sister division.108 
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As these forces approached Ordzhonikidze (and by late on 2 November vanguards 
were within four kilometres of its western suburbs), Soviet resistance increased significantly. 
The North Group, Transcaucasian Front bolstered its battered Thirty-Seventh Army with 
fresh reinforcements, including a guards rifle corps, two tank brigades and five anti-tank 
artillery regiments. 109 The weather also took a dramatic turn for the worse, which not only 
sapped Axis troop morale but hampered air operations. Pflugbeil's bombers and dive-
bombers were able to attack Tuapse on 3 November, sinking around 14,000 tons of 
merchant shipping (a feat they repeated the following day).11o Yet the weather in the 
central Caucasus prevented them supporting Third Panzer Corps, which suffered high 
losses in men and equipment as it advanced a single kilometre through torrents of icy 
rain towards strongly-defended Ordzhonikidze. That same day, von Kleist, worried about 
his army's flagging strength and over-extended supply lines, asked the OKH when he 
would get reinforcements. 111 He received no immediate answer. He drove his weary 
troops forward the following day, again without air support. They made small gains for 
heavy losses, as they did on 5 November and the following morning. If they could only 
muster their energy for one last push, the city would be theirs. 
On 6 November, the weather improved, allowing von Richthofen to throw all available 
air units into the fray. They conducted three massive raids against Ordzhonikidze and 
its stubborn defenders but, to the air chief's dismay, German armoured units failed to 
follow up the attack.112 He quickly learned why: the North Group, Transcaucasian Front 
had launched a well-timed and carefully-aimed counter-offensive which swept in behind 
the 13th Panzer Division, trapping it and severing its supply route. Enemy forces also 
battered the 23rd Panzer Division, inflicting high losses and preventing it relieving the 
13th. Extremely bitter fighting took place over the next few days as Soviet forces attempted 
to tighten their strangle-hold and German troops attempted to break it. Snowed in, the 
Luftwaffe was unable to help its encircled comrades. On 9 November, von Richthofen 
complained in his diary: "No flying is possible here .... We can't even make telephone 
calls because the wires are iced up. There's not much to do. It's boring. We sleep a lat." 
That same day, a wide-awake and far-from-bored von Mackensen finally ordered his 
trapped division to break 01Jt.113 He sent forward strong forces, including the elite SS 
Wiking Division, to relieve the 13th Panzer Division. In the night of 11 and 12 November, 
the trapped division, including all its wounded but few of its vehicles and heavy guns, 
managed to break out and withdraw to safer positions behind a line formed by Wiking and 
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the 23rd Panzer Division. 
Von Kleist knew that his forces had taken a heavy beating (Third Panzer Corps alone 
lost 1,275 killed, 273 missing and 5,008 wounded114) and were unable, at least immediately, 
to attack again. He called for reinforcements, which the OKH duly dispatched. In mid-
November, however, the reinforcements had not yet arrived when a sudden drop in 
temperature brought a permanent end to all attempts to revive the operation. The Axis 
offensive towards Ordzhonikidze-the Filhrer's last attempt to capture Grozny and a 
route through the mountains to Baku-had failed dismally. Once again, Soviet forces had 
snatched a major prize from Hitler's grasping fingers before he could tighten his grip. 
Ruoff's Seventeenth Army, meanwhile, had fared no better in its attempt to capture 
Tuapse and the coastal road to Batumi, despite receiving much better air support than 
von Kleist's troops. Throughout the first three weeks of September, Pflugbeil directed 
around half his combat units to bomb and strafe Black Sea ports, shipping and the enemy 
forces opposing Seventeenth Army, whose attack had stalled after capturing I\lovorossiisk 
on 10 September. They conducted these tasks to a satisfactory level, considering their 
numerical weakness. He sent his other units to von Kleist's aid in the Terek bend, where 
they conducted the operations already described. 
Seventeenth Army commenced Operation Attika (a new offensive aimed at Tuapse) 
on 23 September, but only after its commander had successfully demanded improved air 
support.115 Pflugbeil concentrated virtually his entire fleet in the Tuapse region, in order 
to support, both directly and indirectly, attacks by the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps, which 
lurched forward on 23 September, and the Thirty-Fourth Army Corps, which started two 
days later. Von Richthofen temporarily reinforced Pflugbeil's units with a few groups from 
the Stalingrad sector. This combined force attacked Tuapse (the city and its harbour 
installations), its road and rail logistics routes and the enemy troops resisting repeated 
Axis attempts to push through the thickly-forested hills and mountains east of the port. 
The latter operations were by far the hardest. "It's extremely difficult terrain for an 
attack," von Richthofen had noted in his diary after inspecting tl1e combat zone several 
days before Attika began. 116 Indeed, despite detailed radio directions sent by Flivos and 
coloured smoke shells lobbed into enemy pockets by mortar and artillery teams, Luftwaffe 
units found it hard to locate those well-camouflaged troops in the dense oak forests.117 
Even when they did find them, they seldom inflicted substantial damage upon them. 
They simply lacked the aircraft, fuel and bombs to conduct large-scale "carpet bombing" 
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of even limited stretches of forest. They also lacked Vietnam-style napalm or wide-
coverage incendiary bombs, which are far more effective against forest targets than high-
explosives. Even if they had possessed these, they could not have used them because 
of the close proximity of Soviet and Axis troops. As it was, air units had difficulty 
distinguishing friend from foe. "Only by seeing the coloured cloths or light signals that 
were raised out of the thickets," one Stuka pilot recalled, "could we recognize the friendly 
lines. We had to change the colour of the recognition signals constantly because the 
Russians would use them to their own benefit"118 
Despite the Luftwaffe's efforts-sometimes effective, most times not-Seventeenth 
Army's offensive failed as miserably as First Panzer Army's. The terrain was too difficult 
and the enemy far too strong for Ruoff's worn-out troops. Against these obstacles, and 
handicapped by frequent rainstorms, they found momentum remarkably hard to generate 
and extremely easy to lose. Throughout October and November, they made minor gains 
for high losses, but failed to break through to Tuapse or any other major naval base. 
Ruoff's troops would never reach those goals; for the rest of the year they maintained 
their positions in the mountains and foothills around Tuapse, throwing back repeated 
enemy attacks and waiting for substantial reinforcements that never arrived and major 
enemy blunders that never occurred. Early in 1943, a powerful Soviet offensive finally 
forced a dejected Ruoff to withdraw his army from the western Caucasus. 
On several occasions-to return to the months of October and November 1942-when 
fighting at Stalingrad diminished in intensity and von Richthofen considered it safe to pull 
aircraft away, he diverted Fliegerkorps VII/'s powerful bomber forces south to join 
Fliegerkorps /V's weak forces in raids on Tuapse.119 These raids, often involving a 
hundred bombers, caused substantial damage to both the city and port.120 They were 
few in number, however, and far less destructive than the cumulative effect of the VVS's 
constant attacks on key Axis centres, airfields and naval bases in the Crimea and the 
Taman Peninsula.121 By early October, the Luftwaffe was so stretched out by of ten-
unrealistic and constantly-taxing demands placed upon it by its commanders that it was 
powerless to hamper, let alone stop, those raids. Flak batteries on the Crimea were just 
as restricted as air units. They possessed only light guns, incapable of hitting the high-
flying Soviet bombers.122 The Luftwaffe deployed all its heavy flak guns in the Stalingrad 
and Caucasus sectors. Accordingly, Crimean flak gunners-including a few Rumanian 
flak batteries, which belonged to the Rumanian army and, therefore, functioned 
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independently of the I. Flakkorps123-seldom managed to bring down enemy planes.124 
The Luftwaffe also lacked the ability to prevent the ever-stronger enemy air force's 
mining of Crimean sea-lanes and torpedo attacks on Axis vessels, which now occurred 
more frequently but with a success rate no better than that of the German groups.125 
These mining and torpedoing missions resulted in the sinking of few Axis vessels, although 
the former did cause minor interruptions to Axis traffic. When Admiral Schwarzes Meer 
detected mines in certain stretches of water, it suspended all maritime operations in those 
waters until its mine-sweepers (or a special Junkers aircraft fitted with mine-sweeping 
equipment126) cleared them. On 12 October, for instance, the naval command cancelled 
its vital supply missions across the Kerch Straits for 24 hours after surveillance teams 
spotted enemy aircraft dropping mines.127 
The Luftwaffe-like the Axis flotilla-was unable even to discourage artillery attacks on 
important Axis installations, bases and ports by Soviet warships now confidently plying 
the sea-lanes around the Crimea and Taman Peninsula. Small warships with light weapons, 
and sometimes destroyers and cruisers with heavy guns, hit Axis targets on an almost-
daily basis. Apparently no longer fearful of destruction by the Luftwaffe, they carried out 
their attacks both at night and during the day. They usually inflicted only minor damage, 
due to their inaccurate gunfire (seldom corrected during barrages) and the low calibre of 
most weapons. On occasions, however, they achieved better results. On 2 October, for 
instance, three destroyers lobbed 60 to 80 shells at Yalta, cutting its communications, 
inflicting damage on harbour facilities and killing and wounding several seamen. German 
coastal batteries returned fire, but their gunners soon broke off fire when they realized 
they lacked range.128 Soviet warships sometimes directed their attacks against the coastal 
batteries, hoping to knock out the only guns capable of thwarting their efforts.129 With no 
Luftwaffe forces to worry about, and showing no fear of the German and Italian MTS 
squadrons, they also attacked Axis shipping in Crimean sea-lanes and in the Kerch 
Straits. These actions greatly concerned Admiral Schwarzes Meer, which complained to 
Naval Group South as early as 6 October that "the persistent shelling of ports, minelaying 
operations and attacks on our convoys by the Russian fleet in cooperation with the 
Russian Air Force is beginning to interfere with vital supplies transported by sea for the 
Army". The Air Force, it added, was now too busy with other tasks to mount regular anti-
shipping attacks. 
The situation soon deteriorated further. After the Soviets launched their massive 
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counter-offensive in November, Luftflotte IV had to send to Stalingrad most of its 
reconnaissance planes in the Crimea and north-western Caucasus, leaving Admiral 
Schwarzes Meer and the Crimean air staff with no effective way of monitoring the enemy 
fleet, let alone attacking it. Admiral Schwarzes Meer requested the air fleet to reconsider, 
pointing out that its vessels were in constant danger from Soviet warships and only 
systematic air reconnaissance could provide adequate surveillance of enemy naval 
movements. The Luftwaffe replied that a few longe-range reconnaissance aircraft would 
keep patrolling the sea-lanes, but "increased reconnaissance during the present critical 
situation is out of the question".130 In response to the Navy's constant pleading for 
offensive action against Oktyabrskii's fleet-based on its intense fear that the fleet would 
launch an amphibious landing on the Crimea, as it had the previous winter131-the Luftwaffe 
repeatedly emphasized throughout November and December that even occasional, small-
scale bombing attacks on the enemy fleet could not possibly resume until the terrible 
situation at Stalingrad improved. 
This almost brings the discussion of Luftwaffe operations in the Caucasus during 1942 
to a close. However, it is fitting to describe and explain one noteworthy operation: the 
Luftwaffe's bombing raids on the very oilfields Hitler set out to capture. Early in October, 
the Fuhrer realized that his forces would probably not reach the main oilfields before rain, 
ice and snow forced them to take up winter positions. He therefore ordered the Luftwaffe 
to damage the oil fields as severely as possible, believing that if he couldn't have the 
oilfields (at present, anyway), he should at least deny Stalin's agriculture, industry and 
armies their vast outpUt. 132 
On 10 October, von Richthofen hurled his entire bomber fleet against the Grozny 
refineries.133 That fleet, like those of the other aircraft types, was now in poor shape. He 
had started Operation Blau with an impressive force of 480 bornbers, of wl'lich 323 (a 
reasonable 67 per cent) were servlceable.134 Now he had only 232 bombers, of which 
a mere 129 (55 per cent) were serviceable. They could stili deliver heavy blows to single 
targets, however. The damage they inflicted on Grozny reminded the air chief of attacks 
on Sevastopol; huge flames leapt from shattered fuel tanks and burst pipes, and dense 
clouds of smoke rose high into the air.135 He was delighted, joyfully noting in his diary 
the following evening that smoke clouds were still 5,500 metres high. He repeated the 
attacks two days later, with equally-pleasing results. These raids on oil refineries, though, 
marked the sum total of Luftflotte IV's "strategic" attacks on enemy industry in the Caucasus. 
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Von Richthofen simply could not spare aircraft from the Stalingrad sector to carry out 
further such raids (against the major oil'fields at Baku, for instance, which Hitler ordered 
a month later136). It is remarkable that the Wehrmacht High Command did not order the 
temporary release of all, or at least most, bombers 'from Stalingrad for these attacks on 
oilfields. Their extensive damage (particularly Baku's) would have dealt the Soviet Union 
a far heavier blow than the loss of Stalin grad's remaining suburbs. When von Richthofen 
managed to send squadrons south-not often, due to the intensity of combat in Stalingrad 
and the perceived importance of continued bombing raids on that already-destroyed 
city-they carried out a small number of interdiction raids on Soviet road, rail and sea 
traffic, but mainly supported the two German armies by attacking the enemy on the 
battlefield and in his rear areas. 
When Stalin launched his massive offensive on 19 l'Jovember, von Richthofen 
immediately ordered tile witlldrawal of all remaining combat units in the Caucasus and 
their transfer north to the Stalingrad sector, where they were now sorely needed. "I am 
transferring all Fliegerkorps IV's forces to the penetration region," he jotted in his diary 
that night, "so that nothing will remain in the Caucasus except for two fighter groups and 
some reconnaissance units." 137 The transfers would take place, he added, as soon as 
the dreadful weather eased up. Pflugbeil wasted no time. Despite the weather, which 
remained bad for several more days, he moved Fliegerkorps IV's headquarters to Salsk, 
from where he could better assist Axis relief efforts. In accordance with his chief's 
instuctions, he stripped Admiral Schwarzes Meer's forces in the Crimea and First Panzer 
and Seventeenth Armies in the Caucasus of virtually all their air support. For the protection 
of Axis support and combat forces and the surveillance of enemy ground, air and naval 
formations, he'left only two fighter groups (and their staff), a longe-range reconnaissance 
squadron and a few tactical reconnaissance aircraft in the south.138 He left no bombers, 
dive-bombers or ground-attack aircraft. 
The few weak units now remaining in the Caucasus and responsible for that vast 
region and the eastern reaches of the Black Sea comprised: the 3rd Squadron of the 
122nd Long-Range Reconnaissance Wing, with only six working Ju 88s (out of its total 
complement of nine); the 1 st and 9th tactical reconnaissance Squadron, whose operational 
strength varied from six to twelve Bf 110s and Fw 189s each; the Staff and 3rd Group 
of the 52nd Fighter Wing, with 31 of its 46 Bf 109s operational; and the 13th Squadron 
of the same fighter wing, with six of its eight Bf 109s operational.139 Slovakian pilots, 
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flying German machines, composed the latter. With only around 18 surveillance planes 
and 37 fighters to guard a region the size of Great Britain, these weak units proved 
incapable of offering protection to army and navy forces from attacks by VVS fighters and 
bombers, which now struck with merciless fury. 
Von Richthofen placed these units under the authority of General der Flakartillerie 
DeBloch's I. Flak-Korps, which still possessed strong flak forces in the Caucasus. 
Redesignating DeBloch's command Luftwaffengruppe Kaukasus (Air Force Group, 
Caucasus), he instructed the general to direct the operations of all air and flak units 
supporting Seventeenth and First Panzer Armies. For the rest of 1942, Luftwaffengruppe 
Kaukasus provided those two armies, stuck in a stalemate with their opponents until early 
1943, with excellent flak support. However, because of inclement weather and few 
available aircraft, their air support remained ineffective. The Fw 189s and Bf 11 Os of the 
two tactical reconnaissance squadrons constantly monitored enemy movements at and 
behind the front, but they were too few in number-usually only nine or ten serviceable 
aircraft supported each entire 200,000-man army-and had very limited offensive 
capabilities. The long-range reconnaissance squadron continued as it had all year, although 
on a smaller scale: whereas previously five or more aircraft reconnoitred the eastern 
Black Sea, the enemy naval bases along the Caucasus coast and roal and rail traffic in 
the western Caucasus, by mid-December only one or two planes were able to undertake 
those missions each day. As a result, they had to abandon surveillance of the western 
Caucasus and their coverage of the ports and sea-lanes became far less thoro~gh. To 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer's disappointment, "the increased allocation of reconnaissance 
planes was still out of the question. The shortage of fuel and lubricating oil had repeatedly 
forced them to restrict air reconnaissance." 140 
Von Ric~lthofen soon realized that DeB loch needed air reinforcements if he was to 
monitor enemy movements and provide even occasional protection from VVS attacks. 
Between mid-December 1942 and mid-January 1943, he steadily increased 
Luftwaffengruppe Kaukasus' surveillance capabilities by adding the following forces: the 
Staff and 3rd Group of the 125th Sea Reconnaissance Wing (flying from bases in Bulgaria, 
Rumanian and the Ukraine and mainly covering the western Black Sea); the Coastal 
Squadron, Crimea (operating from Kerch); and the 20th Rumanian Reconnaissance 
Squadron (Eupatoria).141 He assigned the command a few sea rescue aircraft, and also 
added the following combat forces: the 43rd Rumanian Fighter Squadron (Kerch); the 3rd 
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Night-Flying Training Squadron; and the "Sattler" Stuka Operational Squadron, Crimea 
(based in Bagerovo and flying obsolete Stuka models). Because most squadrons had 
fewer than five operational aircraft-due to lack of fuel and spares and freezing winter 
weather-these reinforcements made almost no impact on combat in the Crimea, the 
eastern Black Sea and the Caucasus.142 Aside from its strong and effective flak component, 
Luftwaffengruppe Kaukasus remained a motley collection of weak units, capable of nothing 
more than harassing the enemy. The two armies received a little help from reconnaissance 
units, but hardly ever saw combat aircraft overhead. The group's only noteworthy offensive 
successes were against enemy aircraft; up to 6 February 1943, it reported shooting down 
113 planes and destroying 11 others on the ground, for only six losses.143 
Luftwaffengruppe Kaukasus possessed no transport groups. Therefore, in periods of 
crisis, Seventeenth Army occasionally requested Fliegerkorps VIII to airlift supplies to 
isolated groups in the Caucasus. The air corps always obliged, despite the fact that its 
transport fleets already worked tirelessly to keep Sixth Army alive in Stalingrad. On 7 
December, for example, Fliegerkorps VIII airlifted 17.5 tons of provisions, 6.5 tons of 
horse fodder and 3.5 tons of engineering equipment to cut-off troops of the Forty-Fourth 
Jager and Forty-Ninth Mountain Corps, stuck in the mountains behind Tuapse. 144 The 
following day, only eight tons could be dropped because of appalling weather. These 
tonnages, it should be noted, represent the amount dropped, not the amount received by 
Axis troops. Usually troops recovered only around two-thirds, the rest either falling into 
enemy territory, getting lost or breaking up on impact. As it was, airlifts to Army Group 
A occurred seldomly in December and not at all in January, when biting winter conditions 
and strong enemy opposition wreaked havoc on the Luftwaffe's attempts to sustain the 
strangled Sixth Army. The two German armies dispersed throughout the northern Caucasus, 
some 450,000 men, would survive the rest of winter with almost no more assistance from 
the air force. 
This brings the analysis of German air operations in the Caucasus during 1942 to a 
close. It is necessary to return at a later point to that vast oil-rich region, to see how 
Ruoff's and von Kleist's armies managed to survive the winter and how the Luftwaffe, in 
early 1943, helped them make a hasty but successful retreat in the face of imminent 
destruction. At this pOint, however, we will shift our focus onto Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII, 
which we left back in late-July, when Hitler directed Sixth Army-and von Richthofen sent 
Fiebig's air corps-to take Stalin's mighty city on the Volga. 
20, 21. The command staff of Luftflotte IV in 1941. Although the air fleet's composition 
changed considerably during the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, several 
senior officers remained to oversee operations during Operation B/au, the preceding 
Crimean offensives and the following Stalingrad airlift. The fleet commander, Alexander 
Lohr, is fourth from the right (in a white tunic). Because of his diminutive stature, high 
cheek bones and small and narrow eyes, von Richthofen privately called Lohr "the little 
Japanese emperor". The other officer in a white tunic is GOnther Korten, who served 
as Lohr's Chief of Staff during the first half of 1942 and later succeeded Hans Jeschonnek 
as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. The tall, thin officer second from the right (and 
pictured below, late in 1942) is Kurt Pflugbell, FJiegerkorps IV's capable commander. 
22. Hitler admired von Richthofen, a committed National Socialist, aggressive 
commander, inspiring leader, forthright adviser and loyal follower. The Fuhrer shakes 
the air leader's hand at an airfield in southern Russia (date unknown). 
23. In July 1942, von Richthofen assumed command of Luftflotte IV. Generalleutnant 
Martin Fiebig, a close-support expert to whom he had taught his "trade", replaced him 
as head of Fliegerkorps VIII. Fiebig, pictured below in conversation with Oberst Stahel 
(with cap), proved an effective air corps commander, displaying energy, courage and 
sound judgement during even the worst of circumstances. 
24. The Ilyushin 11-2 Shturmovik was probably the most famous Soviet aircraft of the 
war-and deservedly sol Well armed and armoured, it proved an effective ground-
attack and close-support machine. Shturmoviks inflicted heavy losses on German 
army units, particularly in regions where Luftwaffe fighter protection was scarce. 
25. Women composed the maintenance team servicing this Shturmovik (the same 
plane as above). The Red Army and Air Force used women as labourers, technicians, 
flak gunners and even soldiers. The memoirs of Soviet generals, including Marshal 
Chuikov, defender of Stalingrad, prominently praise them for their outstanding efforts. 
26. Major Gordon Gollob, commander of the 3rd Group of the 52nd Fighter Wing 
(flying Bf 109Gs), shot down this Shturmovik over the central Caucasus in July 1942. 
It was his 114th verified aerial victory. Within a month, he would reach his 150th, 
making him the Luftvvaffe's top ace of the 1942 eastern campaign. 
27. Luftwaffe flak weapons, especially the superb high-velocity 88-mm gun, proved 
deadly to Soviet tanks, bunl<ers and field installations. This photograph shows an "88" 
in action during the advance to Stalingrad. 
28. Except for those guarding airfields, logistics centres and other key installations 
from air attacl<, Luftwaffe flak batteries accompanied army units into combat. The crew 
of this light gun point to incoming aircraft on the outskirts of Stalingrad. 
29. A cautious commander with little tactical imagination, Friedrich Paulus (seated) 
lacked the strength of character and decisiveness needed to capture Stalingrad or save 
his army from destruction after its encirclement. Bending over the table is General 
Rodenburg, commander of the 76th Infantry Division. 
30. Whenever possible, von Richthofen (with binoculars) carefully co-ordinated his air 
units' operations with those of the army, creating joint Schwerpunkte (points of maximum 
effort). Here he watches a Stuka attack with General der Panzertruppen Hans Hube 
(above, wearing glasses), the highly-decorated commander of the Fourteenth Panzer 
Corps. 
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Chapter VII 
Towards Destruction 
August-November 1942 
"The fate of the Caucasus will be decided at Stalingrad." 
-General Jodi, 30 July 1942 
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August began poorly for the powerful Sixth Army, heading across flat steppes in 
scorching heat towards Stalingrad. On the first of the month, Generaloberst Halder 
bitterly complained in his diary (as he had several times in the last two weeks): "Our 
attack can't proceed because of fuel and ammunition shortages".1 The following day, von 
Richthofen, whose air transport units relieved some of those shortages, noted in his own 
diary that Sixth Army sat "bogged down" in front of Stalingrad, partly because of stiff 
opposition but mainly because of acute logistical problems. 2 Unlike the ever-pessimistic 
army chief, the latter remained confident, adding light-heartedly that "the enemy attempts 
to fling troops from every point of the compass into the Stalingrad sector. He's hell-bent 
on holding the city. This means that, when the city falls, Stalin will have to sue for peace. 
Well, well!" He was not the only senior commander to believe that the fali of the city was 
the key to German success in the east. Three days earlier, Jodi had trumpeted (with a 
prophetic resonance that would later haunt him): "the fate of the Caucasus will be decided 
at Stalingrad".3 
During the first weeks of August, Sixth Army advanced fitfully, frequently crippled by 
fuel and ammunition shortages. As noted earlier, von Richthofen did everything possible 
to improve the army's supply situation. He requested the OKL to send additional Ju 52 
groups, transferred north most of Pflugbeil's (and his road transport companies), created 
a special Stalingrad "transport region", and ordered immediate increases in transportation 
levels through intensified effort and improved procedures. The army undertook its own 
measures to improve its supply situation. The efforts of both service branches bore fruit, 
particularly those of the Luftwaffe, which continued flying forward large amounts of 
ammunition and provisions and smaller amounts of fuel (dangerous and difficult to airlift 
because of its flammability and huge volume). By the third week of August, Sixth Army 
began receiving sufficient supplies for it to carry out most of its missions without hardship. 
Generalleutnant Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII, meanwhile, provided the army with effective 
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air support. It struck enemy troops, vehicles, guns and fortified positions on the battlefield, 
as well as logistics and mobilization centres and road, rail and river traffic behind the 
front. The guns of Genera/major Pickert's 9th Flak Division smashed field fortifications 
and enemy vehicles and generally kept the airspace above Sixth Army free of the enemy 
fighters and Shturmoviks that frequently eluded Fiebig's own fighters. The division's 
actions did not pass unnoticed. On 8 August Pickert personally received Paulus' "praise 
... for the close co-operation between the army and the flak teams".4 
On 6 August, Hitler ordered von Richthofen to support Sixth Army's renewed attack 
across the Don at Kalach, due to start the following day.5 The air crlief immediately flew 
to Paulus' command post, where he found the army commander "confident", and then to 
Army Group B's headquarters, where he found an equally-optmistic von Weichs furiously 
raging about the lethargic efforts of his Italian and Hungarian components. They discussed 
their plans for the coming weeks and carefully co-ordinated a joint Schwerpunkt at Kalach, 
which, the air leader noted in his diary, "we're going to hit tomorrow with all our forces", 
Schwerpunktbildung-the creation of individual points of maximum effort-had not 
been possible throughout most of July, when widely-dispersed army formations advanced 
at different rates in different directions with different objectives. Moreover, von Richthofen 
lacked sufficient aircraft to concentrate substantial numbers in support of all those 
formations. Instead, he had to dissipate his forces by deploying smaller numbers alternately 
in support of various army efforts, sometimes in two or three separate regions at a time. 
Things were now different. His fleet was still divided-one air corps supported the drive 
to Stalingrad, the other the drive to the Caucasus ollfields-but at least he could create 
a single Schwerpunkt at the Kalach bridgehead for Fiebig's entire close-support force. 
Early on 7 August, Paulus' Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Panzer Corps sliced into 
that bridgehead from north and south, their armoured vanguards receiving massive support 
from Fiebig's air corps and elements of Pflugbeil's, Late in the afternoon, the pincers 
clamped tight near the west bank of the Don, opposite Kalach, trapping the main body 
of the Soviet Sixty-Second Army. Joined by the Fifty-First Army Corps, the Panzer corps 
began methodically cleaning out the pocket. Hitler was ecstatic; he had envisaged a 
series of classic double envelopments like this when planning B/au, but this was the first 
encirclement of any significance actually accomplished so far. His booty was impressive, 
as von Richthofen privately noted on 10 August: "Fliegerkorps VIII finally clears out the 
Kalach pocket in conjunction with Sixth Army, capturing 50,000 prisoners and 1,100 
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tanks."6 
Throughout this period, Fiebig's dive"bombers and ground"attack units encountered 
steady, but rarely powerful, VVS opposition as they smashed troops, vehicles and field 
positions in the pocket. Bombers, escorted by fighters, also encountered little air oppostition 
as they pounded trains and railway installations south of Stalingrad and airfields south" 
west of the city (claiming the destruction of 20 enemy aircraft on the ground on 10 August 
alone).7 General T. T. Khriukin's Eighth Air Army had done all it could in recent weeks 
to stem the German advance, but its strength had been drastically reduced in savage air 
combat and its valiant efforts against Fiebig's technically and numerically superior force 
achieved nothing.s The Stavka dispatched a constant stream of reinforcements to Khriukin's 
force-447 aircraft between 20 July and 17 August9-but the vastly"outclassed and still" 
outnumbered Eighth Air Army failed to prevent a steady deterioration of the situation 
around beleaguered Stalingrad. In fact, the air army's attrition rate ran almost as high as 
the reinforcement rate, so little improvement in strength occurred. 
On 5 August, the Stavka substantially bolstered the VVS's local strength when it split 
the Stalingrad Front into two separate commands: the Southeastern Front, supported by 
Eighth Air Army, and a new Stalingrad Front, supported by General P. S. Stepanov's 
hastily"formed Sixteenth Air Army. Both air armies received a steady flow of reinforcements, 
including Yak-1s, Yak 7"bs, 1I"2s, Pe"2s and other newer models. However, most units 
arrived at the front well below strength. The 228th Shturmovik Air Division, for example, 
commenced combat operations with only one-third of its prescribed complement. 1o Most 
units also arrived with inexperienced aircrew-no match for their German counterparts-
as well as poor logistical networks and dismal army-air communication and liaison systems. 
Prematurely assigned to frontline airfields, these units began reconnaissance and combat 
operations immediately. As a result, they suffered severe losses and failed to rob the 
Luftwaffe of its overwhelming air supremacy. For instance, if its daily reports are accurate, 
F/iegerkorps VIII suffered no losses as it destroyed 25 of the 26 Soviet aircraft that 
attacked German airfields on 12 August It destroyed 35 out of 45 the following day, 
again for no losses.11 
With much of the Soviet Sixty-Second Army now marching westwards into captivity, 
Paulus struck for Stalingrad. He did not choose the most direct route, due east from 
Kalach. That route was criss-crossed by deep gullies that would provide the enemy 
splendid defensive opportunities and frequently force tanks to make lenghthy detours.12 
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Instead, the army commander decided to send his two Panzer corps to the "northeast 
corner" of the great Don bend, where they would establish bridgeheads for the advance 
on Stalingrad. 
The loss of 50,000 troops and a thousand tanks, coupled with the collapse of the 
Kalach bulwark, which he prayed would hold back the rising Axis tide, threw Stalin into 
panic. He cast more reserves into the region and, on 13 August, placed both the Stalingrad 
and the Southeastern Fronts under the authority of one of his most trusted field 
commanders, Colonel-General YeremenkoY Directing the actions of two Fronts was, the 
latter once remarked, "an extremely heavy burden", especially as it involved conducting 
operations through two deputies, two chiefs of staff and two staffs.14 
Hath's Fourth Panzer Army, meanwhile, had made excellent progress in the last two 
weeks. Its drive northwards from the Caucasus brought its right-flank vanguards up to 
Abganerovo Station on the railway 70 kilometres south of Stalingrad. The VVS had 
unsuccessfully tried to blunt its advance by diverting the bulk of its combat forces south, 
but 'frantically had to rush it back to the Don bend when Sixth Army began its attack 
across the Kletskaya-Peskovatka line on 15 August. 15 In two days, Fourteenth and 
Twenty-Fourth Panzer Corps cleared the entire Don bend and Eighth Army Corps captured 
two small bridgeheads near Trekhostrovskaya, at the bend's easternmost point. 
Unfortunately for Paulus, the marshy terrain in this sector proved unsuitable for tanks and 
Yeremenko threw First Guards Army into the battle. By 18 August, it had pushed divisions 
westwards across the Don and re-established a 35-kilometre-long bridgehead from 
Kremenskaya to Sirotinskaya. 
Unwilling to waste time and suffer unnecessary losses in a prolonged contest for the 
Don bend, an uncharacteristically-daring Paulus thrust Fifty-First Army Corps across the 
Don towards Vertyachiy on 21 August. Although this attack left his left flank dangerously 
exposed, it succeeded brilliantly. Surprised by their enemy's daring, the Soviet defenders 
fell back helplessly. By next morning, Fourteenth Panzer Corps' tanks were rolling over 
two massive bridges thrown across the Don by German engineers. 
These were favourable days for Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII. It deployed most of its 
bombers against Black Sea ports and shipping and its powerful ground attack and dive-
bomber groups against the Soviet formations resisting both Paulus' advance across the 
Don and Hath's drive on Stalingrad from the south. The air corps notched up excellent 
tallies of enemy aircraft: it claimed 139 victims in 3 days.16 It also inflicted heavy damage 
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on enemy troops and armour contesting the battlefield. On 21 August, for instance, von 
Richthofen flew over the Don bend north of Kalach and found himself staring down at 
"extraordinarily many knocked-out tanks and dead [Russians]"Y Later that day, Ju 88s 
of K.G. 76 massacred two reserve divisions caught in the open 150 kilometres east of 
Stalingrad, prompting the delighted air fleet commander to scrawl excitedly in his diary: 
"Blood flowed!" (Von Richthofen's original text says "Blut gerilhltf', not "beautiful bloodbath!" 
(toiles Blutbad) as both Williamson Murray and Richard Muller assert, basing their 
statements on the few subjectively-edited and frequentlly-inaccurate diary extracts found 
in the "Karlsruhe Collection".18) Two days later-while Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army barely 
moved in the south because of acute shortages of fuel and ammunition19-General der 
Panzeltruppen von Wietersheim's Fourteenth Panzer Corps surged across the land bridge 
between the Don and Volga rivers, reaching the latter in Stalingrad's northern suburbs 
at 1600 hours. Generalleutnant Hans Hube's 16th Panzer Division, the corps' mailed fist, 
smashed more than thirty artillery batteries in those suburbs. The enemy gunfire was 
woefully inaccurate. After the one-armed Hube's men closed in on the wrecked batteries, 
they learned why: the guns had been "manned" by hastily-deployed and totally-untrained 
civilians, mostly women, now lying dead in their blood-stained cotton dresses. 
Von Wietersheim's corps accomplished its remarkable advance (which deeply shocked 
the Soviet leadership) by moving up closely berlind a deluge of shrapnel and high explosives 
rained down on enemy pOSitions by Fliegerkorps VIII, now permanently reinforced by 
units stripped from Fliegerkorps IV. "Since early morning we were constantly over the 
Panzer Spearheads, helping them forward wth our bombs and machine-guns," recalled 
Hauptmann Herbert Pabst, commander of a Stuka squadron. "We landed, refuelled, 
received bombs and ammunition, and immediately took off again. It was 'all go' and 
splendid advances. As we took off, others landed. And so it went."20 During 1 ,600 non-
stop sorties, Fiebig's units dropped 1 ,000 tons of bombs on the enemy troops and 
defensive positions in the corps' advance path, destroying all opposition (as von Richthofen 
wrote, "totally paralyzing the Russians").21 Apparently suffering only three losses the 
entire day (certainly not 90, as several post-war Soviet accounts absurdly maintain22), 
they also ravaged VVS forces desperately trying to destroy Don crossings and halt von 
Wietersheim's advance. They claimed 91 aircraft destroyed in what even the Soviets 
acknowledged were "fierce battles".23 
221. 
Stalingrad bludgeoned, then "slowly strangled" 
Von Richthofen was delighted (as Hitler was, when informed that day), but did not stop 
there. Late in the afternoon, Fiebig's corps carried out what the fleet chief called his 
"second great attack of the day": an immense raid on Stalingrad itself. Bombers smashed 
buildings to rubble with high explosives and torched various residential areas with 
incendiaries, leaving houses, schools and factories wildly burning. In some suburbs, the 
only structures left standing were the blackened brick chimneys of incinerated wooden 
houses. "Never before in the entire war had the enemy attacked in such strength from 
the air", wrote Lieutenant-General Vasili Chuikov with pardonable exaggeration, not having 
witnessed the even-heavier annihilation raids on Sevastopol.24 The abrasive but talented 
commander of the Sixty-Second Army was not exaggerating at all, however, when he 
added tllat "the huge city, stretching for nearly thirty-five miles along the Volga, was 
enveloped in flames. Everything was blazing, collapsing. Death and disaster descended 
on thousands of families." 
Estimating fatalities is difficult because of a paucity of reliable statistical data. Yet this 
hellish attack caused at least as many deaths as similar-sized Allied raids on German 
cities. For example, it certainly claimed as many victims as the Allied attack on Darmstadt 
during the night of 11 and 12 September 1944, when the Royal Air Force unloaded 
almost 900 tons of bombs and killed over 12,300 citizens. The Stalingrad death total may, 
in fact, have been twice that of Darmstadt, due to tile fact that the Russian city was poorly 
provided with air-raid shelters. Recent popular accounts have advanced a figure of around 
40,00025, although this seems extravagant when compared to the death tolls in German 
cities hit by similar bomb tonnages. The post-war official Soviet history merely states: "In 
one day, scores of thousands of families lost a member, and thousands of children, their 
mothers and fathers." 26 
Raids continued almost without pause for another two days, although with steadily-
decreasing intensity.27 Von Richthofen flew over Stalingrad on the morning of 25 August, 
in order to watch that day's "great fire-attack". The city, he later noted in his diary, was 
"destroyed, and without any further worthwhile targets". He then landed at the forward 
airfield of one of his bomber units, 25 kilometres from the ruined metropolis. The sky was 
full of "thick, black fire-clouds reaching all the way from the city."28 After another heavy 
bombing attack in the afternoon, he added, the dense volcano-like clouds climbed 3,500 
metres into the sky. The level of distruction was impressive (except, of course, to the 
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tormented souls who tied the holocaust and now huddled in deep ravines outside the 
city). Flames leapt from huge oil storage containers and fuel tankers on the Volga, 
across the surface of which spilled oil burned.29 That evening, Genera/major Pickert, 
head of the 9th Flak Division, recorded his own impressions in his diary: "At dusk I went 
on another 14 kilometres, then spent the night in the open ... against a backdrop of 
magnificent smoke and flames, with Stalingrad burning and Russian searclllights blazing. 
A fantastic picture in the moonlight."30 
Aside from these massive raids, the Axis advance on Stalingrad stalled for several 
days. Hube's troops encountered stiff resistance from the Soviet Sixty-Second Army and 
the citizens' militia. Their morale intact despite Fliegerkorps VIII's best efforts, these 
courageous defenders refused to allow Germans to bulldoze through the rubble-strewn 
streets of Rynok, Stalingrad's northern-most suburb, into the Spartakovka industrial region. 
Powerful Soviet attacks inflicted punishing blows on Hube's division. It had raced to the 
Volga with such speed that it now found itself stranded at the river, separated from other 
German divisions by over 20 kilometres and surrounded by enraged enemy forces seeking 
revenge for the destruction of their city. On 26 August, a particularly strong attack sliced 
a chunk off Fourteenth Panzer Corp's northern flank in the Kremenskaya region. This, 
and Hube's constant panicky requests for supplies and reinforcements, prompted von 
Wietersheim to request that his corps withdraw from the Volga. 31 Paulus refused, but 
frantically directed Fifty-First and Eighth Army Corps to close the gap between themselves 
and von Wietersheim's corps, bolster the vulnerable northern flank and push supplies 
forward to Hube's encircled division, still suffering heavy losses as it clung to the Volga. 
Fliegerkorps V/IJ effectively supported these endeavours, pinning down enemy troops 
assailing Hube's division and repelling repeated Soviet attempts to stab into Fourteenth 
Panzer Corps' exposed northern flank from the Kremenskaya bridgehead. In its brief daily 
report on air operations, the German Naval Staff's war diary for 28 August was unusually 
generous in its praise of Fiebig's units: "The supply road for our forces which reached the 
Volga River was freed and attacks against it were repulsed, thanks to the splendid 
support of the Air Force. Tank attacks south of Kremen[skaya] were repulsed with 
particularly severe losses." 32 
Von Richthofen, always aggressive and prepared to take risks-unlike Paulus, whom 
the air chief accurately described two weeks later as "worthy but uninspiring" 33-insisted 
that the army could take Stalingrad even now if it launched an all-out assault. Losses 
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would be ~Iigh, but, in the present circumstances, acceptable. He was disgusted by what 
he called the army's lack of fighting spirit and its unwillingness to suffer losses to obtain 
major goals. He had made similar complaints during the assault on Sevastopol. On 22 
June, he had grumbled in his diary: "I wish that everyone would just push a little more 
energetically. The view that advancing cautiously avoids losses is simply not correct, 
because small losses each day SOOI1 mount up the longer it takes." History, he now 
believed, was clearly repeating itself. Therefore, on 27 August, he sent his operations 
officer, Oberst Karl-Heinz Schulz, to express in no uncertain terms to Goring and 
Jeschonnek his intense frustration "at the army's weakness in nerves and leadership".34 
Schulz returned the next day, informing von Richthofen that Goring had responded 
sympathetically to his views. In fact, both the Reichsmarschall and the Fuhrer had 
expressed anger at the army's slow progress and granted von Richthofen permission, as 
a "morale booster', expressly to "request" it to act more aggressively. 
The following day, this "morale booster" flew to Hoth's command post to pass on the 
Fuhrer's sentiments and, hopefully, to spur him on in a friendly manner. Hoth, meanwhile, 
had heard from the army group that even he had been included in von Richthofen's self-
righteous accusations to the High Command. 35 The Panzer commander was outraged 
that he, of all people, whose army frequently sat idle for want of fuel, not courage, should 
be accused of lacking fighting spirit. He confronted von Richthofen immediately. Shocked 
by the Panzer leader's anger, the airman emphatically denied that he had mentioned him 
to the High Command. (This should be taken with a large measure of salt, given that the 
previous month he had privately described Hoth as "ageing and doubtless weary" and 
only a few days earlier had commented harshly that Fourth Panzer Army had "worn-out 
leadership and feeble troops" 36). Highly embarressed, he blamed Goring for "twisting" his 
complaints about army leadership and even unfairly bawled out Jeschonnek on the 
telephone. Hoth was apparently satisfied; at least von Richthofen believed so. This was 
the first open clash between the arrogant airman and his army colleagues; it would not 
be the last. 
As it happened, Hoth's army surged forward that very day, in an operation that clearly 
demonstrated his courage and ability. For the last week or so, his army had been stuck 
halfway between Tinguta and Kransarmeysk, unable to advance past a line of heavily-
fortified hills guarding Stalingrad's southern approaches.37 His Panzers and guns hammered 
away at those positions and the Soviet Sixty-Fourth Army's constantly-attacking troops 
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and armour. The loss of thousands of men and scores of tanks for only minor gains 
proved to Hoth that he could not advance on Stalingrad from his present position. He had 
to regroup and strike towards the city from a sector held less tightly by the enemy.as 
Under cover of darkness and light but steady attacks by Fiebig's Stukas and ground-
attack aircraft, he slowly pulled the bulk of his tanks and other mobile units from the front, 
replacing them with infantry formations (including numerous elements of the Rumanian 
Sixth Army Corps) to camouflage his actions. Regrouping his armoured units behind 
Tinguta, almost fifty kilometres behind their earlier positions, he prepared them for their 
new drive to Stalingrad. Assisted by a strong concentration of aircraft39 , they raced 
forward on 29 August, sweeping northwest for 20 kilometres before wheeling northeast 
towards the city with considerable momentum. Flanking the strongly-defended hills that 
had cost them dear in lives and time, they smashed through the surprised enemy forces 
vainly trying to block their path. Late that day they reached the Karpovka river. The next 
day-as von Wietersheim finally opened the pocket in which Hube's division lay trapped 
and pushed forward supplies-they crossed the Karpovka and took a bridgehead at 
GavriI ovka, less than thirty kilometres southwest of Stalingrad. The Soviet Sixty-Second 
and Sixty-Fourth Armies, rightly fearing encirclement, withdrew to the suburbs and hastily 
erected new positions amongst surviving buildings and piles of rubble. 40 The former 
prepared to defend the ruined metropolis from attack against its northern and northwestern 
suburbs, whilst the latter guarded its southern precincts. 
"Everything's gOing well," von Richthofen excitedly wrote on 30 August, momentarily 
forgetting his recent bout of bitter frustration. Believing Stalingrad's capture to be imminent, 
and determined to shatter the enemy's will to resist-an unrealistic goal, as his experiences 
at Sevastopol should have shown-he ordered fresh terror attacks on the city. Throughout 
that day and the next, Fiebig's corps struck the city with everything available, diverting 
aircraft only occasionally to smash enemy airfields east of the Volga. 41 
The army, meanwhile, made pleaSing progress. When Fourth Panzer Army pushed 
forward from the Karpovka river on 31 August, von Weichs ordered Hoth to meet Paulus' 
Sixth Army at Pitomnik (fifteen kilometres east of the city), having crushed the enemy 
forces currently between them. From Pitomnik, they would together drive into the centre 
of Stalingrad, roughly following the line of the Tsaritsa river. However, Hath reported on 
2 September that virtually no enemy forces lay between his army and Voroponovo Station 
(only ten kilometres from Stalingrad), prompting von Weichs to instruct the Panzer 
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commander to swing east into the city without waiting for Paulus. Determined to provide 
them with maximum support, von Richthofen had Fiebig pound enemy positions in and 
arol.lnd Stalingrad with his entire corps. The latter responded with characteristic gusto, 
launching a 24-hour, relentless raid against the already-ruined city on 3 September 
(which Hermann Plocher wrongly claimed was the "first heavy air raid on the city" 42). This 
crushing attack, similar in scale to that of 23 August, destroyed Sixty-Second Army's 
command centre and almost killed Chuikov, its commander. As he vividly recalled: 
The enemy's air reconnaissance must have detected our command post and 
promptly sent in bombers .... After sitting like this [in a tiny earth bunker] under 
bombardment for several hours, we began to grow accustomed to it and took 
no notice of the roar of engines and the explosive of bombs. Suddenly our 
dug-out seemed to be thrown into the air. There was a deafening explosion. 
Abramov [the Member of the Military Council] and I found ourselves on the 
floor, together with the overturned desks and stools. Above us was the sky, 
choked with dust. Lumps of earth and stone were flying about, and around us 
people were crying out and groaning. When the dust had settled a little, we 
saw an enormous crater some six to ten yards from our dug-out. Round it lay 
a number of mutilated bodies, and scattered about were overturned trucks 
and our radio transmitter, now out of action. Our telephone communications 
had also been destroyed.43 
Behind the Luftwaffe's downpour of steel, which pinned the Soviets to the ground and 
temporarily ended their resistance, Fourth Panzer Army established contact with Sixth 
Army at Gonchary, near Voroponovo. Paulus and von Richthofen-the hatchet apparently 
buried after recent tension over the latter's accusations to the High Command-studied 
the burning ruins through field glasses from the relative safety of an infantry command 
post. Despite the fact that the Soviet SixtY-Second and Sixty-Fourth Armies had escaped 
capture and withdrawn into the city (where they would later offer tenacious resistance), 
both commanders concluded that victory at Stalingrad was only days away. Back in his 
Ukrainian headquarters, the Fuhrer, whose own concerns about progress evaporated as 
soon as his troops reached the city's outskirts, also claimed that Stalingrad was as good 
as won. The entire male population, he informed a disgusted Halder, would have to be 
"disposed of" as soon as pOSSible, because it constituted a dangerous, fanatical Communist 
element.44 
Stalin, meanwhile, also believed that the city would fall at any moment, unless he 
could organize an immediate counter-offensive. On 3 August, during the height of the 
Stalingrad blitz, he sent an urgent message to General Georgi Zhukov, who had arrived 
in the burning city only two days earlier to take over its seemingly-impossible defence. 
"The situation at Stalingrad has deteriorated further," he told Zhukov, recently promoted 
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to Soviet Deputy Supreme Commander. "The enemy stands two miles from the city. 
Stalingrad may fall today or tomorrow if the northern group of forces [First Guards, 
Twenty-Fourth and Sixty-Sixth Armies] does not give immediate assistance .... No delay 
can be tolerated. To delay now is tantamount to a crime. Throw all your airpower to the 
aid of Stalingrad." 45 Zhukov winced when he read his chief's order, knowing that ammunition 
had not yet reached the armies ear-marked for the counter-offensive. He immediately 
telephoned Stalin, stating that he would indeed attack, but could not do so until 5 
September, by which time sufficient ammunition should have arrived and effective inter-
service co-operation would be arranged. In the meantime, he added, he would order ~Iis 
air forces to pound the Axis troops with all their strength. Stalin reluctantly agreed, but 
insisted that "if the enemy begins a general offensive against the city, attack immediately. 
Do not wait for the troops to be completely ready. Your main job is to keep the Germans 
from taking Stalingrad and, if possible, to eliminate the German corridor separating the 
Stalingrad and Southeast fronts." 46 
After a day of small gains by Paulus' army, Zhukov's counter-offensive north of Stalingrad 
started at dawn on 5 September. First Guards, Twenty-Fourth and Sixty-Sixth Armies 
drove forward after a joint air and artillery barrage. The barrage was too weak to damage 
German forces substantially or even pin them down for long. Zhukov watched the action 
from an observation post at the front, and "could tell from the enemy's counterfire that 
our artillery bombardment had not been effective and that no deep penetration by our 
forces was to be expected".47 Indeed, within two hours the already-disappointed Soviet 
commander learned from combat reports that German troops had thrown back their 
advance and were themselves counter-attacking with infantry and armour. Zhukov's only 
consolation was that he had forced Paulus to cancel a major thrust into the city planned 
for that day and divert forces north to hold back the Soviet advance. Although still 
disappointed by his army's poor showing that day, Stalin was also consoled by this news. 
The diversion of German forces gave his armies time to strengthen the city's inner 
defensive positions.48 
Throughout 5 September, Fliegerkorps VIII's bombers and dive-bombers inflicted heavy 
losses on Soviet troops and armour. That night, Hauptmann Pabst described in his diary 
the operations of his Stuka squadron: "The Russians throw in everything. Always masses 
of huge tanks. Then we come, circle, search and dive. They camouflage their tanks 
fabulously, digging them in to protect them from blasts, sparing no effort. But we find and 
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smash most of them." 49 The Luftwaffe certainly contributed significantly to Axis defensive 
battles that day, as the German Naval Staff's war diary testifies: "Massed enemy attacks 
from the north, which were launched after an intensive artillery barrage, were dispersed 
with the assistance of strong air forces formations."5o Similarly, Zhukov informed Stalin 
that when his troops attacked, "the enemy was able to stop them with his fire and 
counter-attacks. In addition, enemy planes had superiority in the air and bombed our 
positions all day." That night, Soviet air units managed partially to restore their pride, 
bombing Axis positions along the front. Combat groups of the still-understrength Eighth 
and Sixteenth Air Armies carried out the bulk of these missions. They were joined on 
many attacks by bombers of Lieutenant-General Golovanov's long-range bombing force, 
divisions of which had been operating in the Stalingrad region since mid-August. 51 
For the next five days or so, intense fighting continued around Stalingrad, with both 
sides suffering heavy losses for slight Axis gains. Only on 10 September did Hoth's 
Panzers manage to drive a wedge between Sixty-Second and Sixty-Fourth Armies, tighten 
the noose around the city and isolate Sixty-Second Army inside the suburbs. Hoth 
immediately ordered General der Panzertruppen Werner Kempf, commander of the Forty-
Eighth Panzer Corps, to bulldoze into the southern suburbs the following day, taking them 
"piece by piece".52 Now disgusted again by the army's failure to exploit recent opportunities 
or quicken the offensive's tempo, the exasperate rated von Richthofen complained in his 
diary of the city's "slow strangulation".53 Even when German troops finally entered the 
city on 13 September and began clearing it street by street, the air chief remained 
unhappy. In the last days of August, he claimed (rightly so, in the present writer's 
opinion), Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies had blown their chance of encircling the Soviet 
Sixty-Second and Sixty-Fourth Armies in the city's outer defensive zones; instead, they 
permitted those enemy formations to withdraw into the ruined suburbs, where the former 
had since fought fanatically for every street (having been isolated from the latter, the 
reman ants of which fought south of the city). To capture Stalingrad was now going to take 
a great deal of time and cost many lives, and the inevitable close proximity of opposing 
forces was already making air attacks extremely difficult. 
This appalling situation resulted from weak and indecisive army leadership, von 
Richthofen ranted to anyone who would listen. On 13 September, he even phoned Goring 
to demand that one single army commander take over the Stalingrad sector, and he did 
not mean the "uninspiring" Paulus,54 Three days later, by which time only a few small 
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regions of the city had been cleared in bitter fighting for high losses, the fleet chief vented 
his anger in his diary: "The 'combing' of Stalingrad is progressingly very slowly, despite 
the fact that the enemy is weak and in no shape for hard fighting. This is because our 
own troops are few in number, lack fighting spirit and their commanders' thoughts are 
elsewhere." 55 Army leaders simply fail to drive their troops hard enough, even though 
the capture of a major objective is tantalizingly close. Doubtless comparing von Weichs', 
Hoth's and Paulus' bland and cautious leadership styles to his own-aggressive and 
daring to the point of recklessness-he added harshly: "From the highest levels down, 
attempts at motivation are only theoretical and, as a result, totally ineffective. The generals 
merely issue orders, but lead neither by example nor by any rousing actions whatsoever." 
Believing that he had to practice what he preached, von Richthofen also demanded 
more aggression from Fliegerkorps VIII, telling Fiebig that he had not deployed his corps 
"actively or flexibly enough" in recent weeks.56 Not only had operations "lacked focus and 
zeal", but the corps had yet to overcome several major supply difficulties." The fleet chief 
then issued what he called "some really sharp orders," and explained to Fiebig the reason 
for his unhappiness: the army's poor performance at Stalingrad, which naturally influenced 
the Luftwaffe's ability to make a decisive impact on the battle. "Because the army is a 
lame duck," he said, "we can do little ourselves." If everyone would only operate more 
aggressively, Stalingrad would fall in two days. 
Fiebig's corps-indeed, the entire fleet-had performed as well as could be expected 
in recent weeks, given its logistical difficulties, limited resources, mounting attrition rate, 
vast combat zone and wide range of tasks. Still, von Richthofen was right; the Luftwaffe's 
performance had dropped. Between 5 and 12 September, for instance, Luftf/otte /V 
conducted 7,507 sorties (an average of 938 per day}.57 When B/au had commenced 
almost three months earlier, the fleet was conducting around 10,750 in the same number 
of days (a daily average of 1,343). The main reasons for this substantial operational 
decrease were a quicker-than-expected consumption of reserves stocks of spare parts 
and equipment, supply difficulties and high attrition rates. When B/au began, the fleet 
possessed approximately 1,600 aircraft, of which over 1,150 were operational.58 After 11 
weeks of non-stop operations, with insufficient replacement aircraft and spare parts arriving 
at forward airfields, it now possessed about 950 planes, a mere 550 of them operational. 
That is, the fleet's total strength had decreased by 40 per cent and its operational rate 
by 14 per cent {from 71 to 57}. Its bomber fleet had been hardest hit, mainly due to VVS 
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fighter attacks and a lack of engine parts (naturally, twil1-engined aircraft need more 
spares than single-engined). Back in June, the air fleet had 480 bombers, 323 of which 
were operational. On 20 September, it had no more than 232, only 129 of them air-
worthy.59 
Despite Luftflotte IV's plummeting strength and Hitler's craving for victory at Stalingrad 
and in the Caucasus, the OKL made no large-scale aircraft transfers from the other, 
supposedly-"quiet" sectors of the eastern front (at least not before the Soviet counter-
offensive in November). When B/au began, Luftf/otte IV possessed 60 per cent of all 
German aircraft in the Soviet Union.60 On 20 September, after 11 weeks of combat, its 
dramatic drop in strength left it operating in the "decisive" sector with only 38 per cent 
of all aircraft in the east. The OKL was unable to transfer units south to adjust the ratio 
in Luftf/otte /V's favour because strong air forces were also sorely needed in the "quief' 
central and northern sectors of the front. Constant Soviet probing attacks and attempted 
offensives in those sectors kept local Luftwaffe forces extremely busy. When critical 
situations arose, groups-sometimes whole wings-were hastily shifted between the 
commands in those regions. For example, when a Soviet attack in the far north threatened 
to hack off the German "bottle-neck" south of Leningrad late in August, 
Luftwaffenkommando Ost (operating in Army Group Centre's combat zone) dispatched 
two bomber groups, a Stuka group and a fighter group to Luftflotte 1.61 Accordingly, 
although the only major Axis offensive operations in the Soviet Union took place at 
Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, the OKL could not draw reinforcements for the rapidly-
shrinking Luftf/otte /V from the other two combat sectors, where air commands were hard-
pressed to fulfil their defensive duties. 
Whereas the Luftwaffe's strenght in southern Russia was quickly decreasing, the 
VVS's strength increased at a slow but steady pace. The Soviet improvements resulted 
from greater numbers of aircraft and crew replacements and diminishing kill levels by 
German fighters. (On General Rudenko's wise instructions, Soviet fighter pilots avoided 
duelling with their German counterparts, attacking bombers and reconnaissance planes 
instead62 ). According to German records, the VVS air armies in LuftfJotte /V's immense 
combat zone carried out only 2,834 sorties between 5 and 12 September, or an average 
of 354 per day (compared to the German fleet's poor total of 7,507 and daily average of 
938).63 Between 16 and 25 September, though, those air armies carried out 4,589 
sorties, or 458 per day.54 This operational increase of 30 per cent did not, of course, 
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even remotely challenge the Luftwaffe's air superiority. In the same period, the German 
fleet carried out twice as many sorties (9,746 in total). Yet it was the start of an 
operational increase that would continue steadily for several more months until the VVS 
was, in fact, able to challenge the Luftwaffe for its command of the skies over Stalingrad. 
The city of rubble gasps for breath 
Throughout September, Fiebig's corps directed most of its attacks against Stalingrad 
itself, the main targets being the Lazur chemical factory inside the "tennis racket" (a huge 
rail loop), the Krasnyi Oktyabr (Red October) metallurgical works, the Barrikady (Barricade) 
gun factory and the Dzherzhinski tractor factory. The corps pounded those targets most 
days, except when aircraft were urgently needed to support an Axis advance or stem a 
Soviet counter-attack in the region north of the city. On 18 September, for example, 
Lieutenant-General Chuikov noticed that the German aircraft crowding the sky above 
Stalingrad suddenly departed, giving Sixty-Second Army a much-needed "breathing 
space".G5 Fiebig had hastily called them away, he realized, in order to deploy them in 
the region north of the city, where they were urgently needed to counter a surprise attack 
by the Stalingrad Front. Six hours later, Chuikov noted with disappointment, "it was clear 
that the [Soviet] attack was over: hundreds of Junkers had reappeared." 
Chuikov quickly noticed that the Luftwaffe carried out surprisingly few raids at night. 
He could not work out, therefore, why the Stalingrad Front attempted its attacks during 
the day, "when we had no way of neutralizing or compensating for the enemy's superiority 
in the air, and not at night (when the Luftwaffe did not operate with any strength)."66 The 
city's defenders did not make the same mistake, he added later in his memoirs: "The 
enemy could not fight at night, but we learned to do so out of bitter necessity; by day the 
enemy's planes hung over our troops, preventing them from raising their heads. At night 
we need have no fear of the Luftwaffe". This was certainly true: at Stalingrad, as at 
Sevastopol, the Luftwaffe conducted almost no night missions to speak of. Its aircraft 
lacked the specialized night navigation and bomb-aiming equipment necessary for situations 
like this, when opposing forces battled in close proximity. Also, its airfields, with a few 
exceptions, were poorly equipped for night operations. 
Fiebig's air corps also bombed and strafed any Soviet forces seen among the broken 
buildings and piles of rubble. Chuikov recalled that "the Luftwaffe literally hammered 
anything they saw in the streets into the ground".G7 In 11is detailed memoirs, he also 
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quotes the situation report of a young lieutenant, whose company came under severe air 
attacks on 18 September. "From morning till noon," Lieutenant A. Kuzmich Dragan wrote, 
clusters of German planes hung in the sky over the city. Some of them would 
break away from their formations, dive and riddle the streets and ruins of 
houses with bullets from ground level; others would fly over the city with 
sirens wailing, in an attempt to sow panic. They dropped high explosives and 
incendiaries. The city was in flames. 68 
Determined to support German troops now fighting for every house and building by 
stopping the steady trickle of Soviet reinforcements entering the city from the eastern 
bank of the kilometre-wide Volga river, Fiebig's corps also directed attacks against the 
river crossing facilities. Rear-Admiral Rogachev's Volga Fleet used numerous crossing 
points, but mainly "Crossing 62", its moorings at the Krasnyi Oktyabr and Barrikady 
factories. The small fleet ferried substantial numbers of men and large quantities of 
rations and ammunition across the river to the desperate Sixty-Second Army. These 
courageous sailors, Chuikov maintained, "rendered an incalculable service .... Every trip 
across the Volga involved a tremendous risk, but no boat or steamer ever lingered with 
its cargo on the other bank." 69 Had it not been for them, he concluded, the Sixty-Second 
Army would almost certainly have perished in September. 
Alan Clark, British author of a now-outdated popular account of the war in Russia, 
maintained that, if the Luftwaffe "had been employed with single-minded persistence in 
an "interdiction" role ... the Volga ferries might have been knocked out." 70 Clark was 
clearly unaware of Luftflotte IV's poor state when he wrote these words. Von Richthofen 
had no aircraft available for a proper interdiction campaign against the Volga crossings. 
As noted above, by 20 September his air fleet had already lost half its total strength and, 
because of a drop in serviceability levels, had a mere 516 air-worthy planes (when Blau 
began, it had 1,155).71 Moreover, 120 of those were reconnaissance and sea planes, 
leaving him with only 396 operational combat aircraft. With this small force, he was 
already extremely hard-pressed to fulfil his army-support obligations. Having stripped 
Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV to the bones in order to concentrate an acceptable number of 
aircraft at Stalingrad, he had left the two German armies in the Caucasus with very little 
air support and could only increase it during times of crisis by returning units temporarily 
from the Stalingrad region. Thus, he could spare no aircraft for a systematic interdiction 
campaign against Volga crossings. 
Fliegerkorps VIII did not ignore the crossings, of course. Both Fiebig and von Richthofen 
realized that, if Paulus' men were going to destroy the enemy troops fighting fanatically 
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in the ruined city, they had to sever their supply and reinforcement lines. Although they 
lacked aircraft for a proper interdiction campaign, they continually threw as many bombers 
and dive-bombers as they could spare each day against the railway lines carrying men 
and materiel to the eastern bank of the Volga, against the exposed and poorly-defended 
loading and landing platforms and against any barges and steamers seen crossing the 
river. Fiebig often managed to keep aircraft continuously above the crossing points. As 
Chuikov remembered: "From dawn till dusk enemy dive-bombers circled over the Volga"J2 
Likewise, Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimirov noted in 1943: 
The enemy bombers, operating in groups of 10 to 50, ceaselessly bombed 
our troops, the eastern part of the city and the crossings on the Volga .... The 
Germans relied on their aircraft to crush the fire system of our defence [that 
is, the artillery], paralyze our organization, prevent the arrival of reinforcements, 
and disrupt the movements of supplies.73 
German aircraft hunted down each boat and barge, but, as the discussion of air 
attacks on Black Sea s~lipping revealed, sinking ships from the air was extremely difficult. 
The relatively small size of Volga barges and ferries made them difficult targets. As a 
result, Fiebig's dive-bombers proved far more successful against rail-heads and ferry 
landing platforms than they did against the vessels themselves. 
German troops penetrated the city to the Volga in the middle of September and 
brought the central crossings under the sweep of their artillery guns and the weapons of 
Generalleutnant Pickert's flak teams.74 Their gunfire greatly added to the destructive 
power of Fiebig's Stukas. As a result, the Volga Flotilla had to decrease its daylight 
crossings substantially.75 Crossing at night was also risky, Chuikov explained, because 
"the enemy knew where our ferries crossed and throughout the night lit up the Volga by 
dropping 'flares suspended by parachutes."76 When most ferries began crossing at night, 
Fliegerkorps VII/lost the ability to inflict substantial damage on them. It continued its raids 
on the loading and landing platforms, however, often wrecking or damaging them or 
moored boats. 
In the first days of October, three 280-metre-long footbridges were constructed near 
the Krasnyi Oktyabr and 8arrikady factories in order to supplement the over-worked 
ferries.77 These wooden footbridges, mainly made of barrels and rafts lashed together by 
rope and linked by iron bars, joined the city with Zaitsevski Island across the Volga's 
Denezhnaya Volozhka branch. To the amazement of German observers, several thousand 
men crossed these flimsy bridges. Both the Luftwaffe and the army directed attacks 
against them, without causing more than minor damage to two. The third bridge lasted 
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only three days. A lucky dive-bomber broke its hawser with a well-placed bomb, allowing 
the swirling current to drag it away. 
Fiebig's units encountered weak opposition as they carried out these attacks on the 
Volga Flotilla and its loading and landing points. VVS fighters increased missions over the 
river and the road and rail routes from the Russian hinterland to the eastern bank, but 
they were few in number and generally no match for the German fighters escorting 
Stukas.18 Flak protection was especially weak, although it strengthened significantly in 
October. "The city's anti-aircraft defences had already been substantially weakened," 
Chuikov explained, referring to the situation in September. 79 "Part of the anti-aircraft 
artillery had been destroyed by the enemy, and what remained of it had been moved to 
the left bank of the Volga." From there, the remaining flak batteries could cover only "the 
river and a narrow strip along the right bank. From dawn to dusk, therefore, German 
planes were over the city, over our military units and over the Volga." 
German artillery gunners and dive-bomber pilots succeeded in making life difficult for 
the Volga Flotilla, causing it to switch to night crossings only. However, despite this 
achievement and the minor damage they inflicted on vessels and landing platforms, they 
failed to sever the city's vital life-line. The importance of the Volga Flotilla can be shown 
by mentioning a few remarkable statistics; between 13 and 16 September, around 10,000 
reinforcements from the 13th Guards Division, a crack Soviet unit, crossed the. river and 
entered the battle for the ruined city.so They were the forerunners of almost 60,000 
others who crossed the river during the next two weeks in a desperate attempt to deny 
Hitler the prize he now wanted most: the city bearing the name of their leader. The flotilla 
carried across not only these troops, but large quantities of small-arms ammunition, 
mortar bombs and rations (including thousands of bottles of Vodka, considered essential 
to the maintenance of troop morale). Serving as floating ambulances, the flotilla also 
evacuated hundreds of wounded soldiers each night. The failure of both Luftwaffe and 
army to stop these magnificant river crossing operations contributed substantially to their 
failure to capture the city completely before the Soviets launched their massive November 
counter -offensive. 
In the second half of September, Paulus' men made very slow progress as they fought 
their way street-by-street through the city from west to east. Noting on 22 September that 
the army "barely advanced," the self-righteous von Richthofen accused it of "constipation".81 
His criticism of the army's vaccilation and over-cautious deployment back in August may 
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have been justified, but his accusation that German divisions now in Stalingrad fought 
half-heartedly were certainly not. In bitter and bloody street fighting, usually in smashed 
houses, rubble-filled factory yards and even sewers, they attacked constantly and 
courageously, suffering shocking losses. In his study of the Stalingrad campaign, 
Genera/major Hans Doerr revealed the character of combat within the ruins: 
In the middle of September began the battle for Stalingrad's industrial area, 
which can be described as "trench" or "fortress" warfare. The time for conducting 
"operations" was over for good. From the wide expanses of the steppes, 
fighting had moved into the jagged gullies of the Volga bank, with its copses 
and ravines, into the city and factory areas of Stalingrad, spread out over 
uneven, pitted, rugged land, covered with iron, concrete and stone buildings. 
The kilometre was replaced as a measure of distance by the metre. GHQ's 
map was the map of the city. 
A bitter battle for every house, factory, water-tower, railway embankment, 
wall, cellar and every pile of rubble was waged, without equal even in the first 
world war .... The distance between the enemy's forces and ours was as small 
as it could possibly be. Despite the concentrated activity of aircraft and artillery, 
it was impossible to break out of the area of close fighting. The Russians 
surpassed the Germans in their use of the terrain and in camouflage and 
were more experienced in barricade warfare for individual buildings; they 
defended firmly.82 
The tenacity of the city's defenders, many units of which were reduced to one-tenth 
of strength and had no weapons heavier than tommy-guns, won them respect from many 
German observers still bent on their destruction. Hauptmann Pabst, for instance, pounded 
them every day with his Stuka squadron, yet noted in his journal with mild admiration that 
they "tenaciously defend every pile of rubble".83 "The Russians," he wrote in another 
entry, "remain in their burning city and won't budge. There's hardly a house left, just an 
atrocious chaos of ruins and fire, into which we drop our bombs .... But the Russians 
won't budge." 84 
Despite the Soviets' tenacity, however, the waves of German troops thrown in by 
Paulus, constantly supported by tanks and aircraft, gradually overpowered them. On 26 
September, the German commander was finally able to declare the city centre secured, 
after his men took the central landing area, the last government buildings and the large 
bunker that had been Chuikov's headquarters. "Since noon," Paulus reported, winning 
even von Richthofen's grudging approval for a change, "the German war flag has been 
flying over the party buildings."85 Half the city lay in German hands. Hoth's Panzers, now 
under Sixth's Army's operational control, held the suburbs south of the Tsaritsa river. 
Sixth Army's own troops occupied the central districts. Yet Paulus had suffered severe 
losses-7,700 dead and 31,000 wounded in the last six weeks-and still had to capture 
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the strongly-defended northern industrial district. 
Temporarily buoyed by the penetration of central Stalingrad, Hitler was apparently less 
concerned (or less well-informed) about the high losses and looming difficulties than his 
army commander. On 30 September, he opened his drive for the winter relief with a 
rousing speech to the German people from the Berlin Sportspa/ast.86 Referring to a string 
of dismal British failures, including Dunkirk and the hopeless Dieppe fiasco, he ridiculed 
something he privately admired: the way the British managed to turn humiliating defeats 
into propaganda victories. "Obviously we cannot even begin to compare our own modest 
successes with them!," he jeered, boldly adding: "If we advance to the Don, finally reach 
the Volga, overrun Stalingrad and capture it-and of that they can be certain-in their 
eyes this is all nothing." Stalingrad would soon fall, he emphasized to his audience, 
assuring them (in a manner he doubtless later came to regret) that "you can be certain 
no-one will get us away from there." 
Fliegerkorps VIII contributed significantly to the army's progress within the city, 
conducting massive attacks on Soviet pockets of resistance. The corps' strength fluctuated 
widely, dropping substantially when von Richthofen temporarily (but frequently, throughout 
September and October) diverted units to assist First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies in 
the Caucasus or to protect Axis troops in the Voronezh region. Usually, though, the corps 
operated two or three bomber wings from airfields at Morozovskaya and Tatsinskaya, as 
well as five or six Stuka groups, three or four fighter groups and a "destroyer" group from 
airfields closer to the target area. Despite their low serviceability levels, these units were 
still sufficient for attacks on Stalingrad, Volga shipping in the vicinity of the city as well 
as in the stretch between there and Astrakhan, and rail and road logistics routes east of 
the Volga. In keeping with von Richthofen's "proven" army support formula, attacks on 
the city itself took precedence. 
Stuka crews exhausted themselves flying multiple missions against Stalingrad each 
day. On 15 September, Hauptmann Pabst climbed down from his cockpit after seven 
hours, during which time he had carried out five missions against the city.87 That was 
probably a typical day for him. Major Paul-Werner Hozzel, commander of the /mmelmann 
Stuka Wing (St.G. 2) and one of the most successful and acclaimed Stuka pilots of the 
war, describes how his wing was able to carry out so many missions each day. His units 
operated from airfields within 40 kilometres from the city. "This meant," he explained, 
that we needed for each sortie a chock-to-chock time of not more than 45 
minutes, which included taxiing to the start, takeoff, approach flight, the climb 
to an altitude of 4,000 meters, target pickup, dive bombing attack, low level 
flight departure, landing, taxiing to the apron. Each turnaround-a new loading, 
a short technical overhaul, chackout-took us another 15 minutes. We were 
consistently able to fly with each plane about eight sorties from sunrise to 
sunset.88 
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Because of the close proximity of opposing forces, attacks on enemy pockets were 
always difficult. Detailed aerial photographic maps identified almost every building (those 
that still stood, anyway), so Flivos were able to direct Stuka pilots, who also carried aerial 
maps, to their targets.89 Desperate not to hit their own troops, often huddling in buildings 
or behind walls tens of metres from the targets, pilots were far more careful than usual 
to place their bombs precisely on their targets and always sought to ascertain the position 
of German troopS.90 Of course, not even the best Stuka pilots could consistently place 
their bombs precisely on targets. As a result, "Friendly fire" incidents occurred with 
disappointing (or, from the Soviet viewpoint, pleasing) frequency. 
Chuikov's memoirs clearly reveal the considerable impact of Fliegerkorps VII/'s 
"incessant attacks". Following a half-hour artillery barrage, the Soviet commander's 
worn-out troops launched a localized counter-attack before dawn on 14 September. 
However, although the attack initially made satisfactory progress, "as soon as day broke 
the enemy brought the Luftwaffe into action; groups of fifty to sixty aircraft flew in, 
bombing and machine-gunning our counter-attacking units, pinning them to the ground. 
The counterattack petered OUt."91 Events in Stalingrad followed this pattern on numerous 
occasions. Early on 27 September, for instance, Chuikov's forces launched another 
small counter-attack. "To begin with," he said, "we had some success, but at 8 a.m. 
hundreds of dive-bombers swooped on our formations. The attacking troops took cover."92 
Two German infantry divisions advanced with strong tank support behind the Luftwaffe's 
hail of bombs, intent on occupying the Krasnyi Oktyabr workers' settlement and Mamayev 
Kurgan (a hill-actually an ancient burial mound-dividing the city in two). "The Luftwaffe 
bombed and strafed our units from our forward positions right to the Volga," Chuikov 
stated. "The strongpoint organized by the troops of Gorishny's division at the Mamayev 
Kurgan was utterly destroyed by aircraft and artillery. The Army HQ command post was 
under attack from the air the whole time." 
The VVS did all it could to defend Chuikov's army and logistical routes from the 
German air onslaught. It launched nightly bombing raids against German flak positions 
and airfields, destroying a few aircraft and, just as importantly, depriving exhausted 
237. 
Luftwaffe personnel of precious sleep.93 Hauptmann Pabst described these attacks in his 
journal. "In the night," he wrote on 27 September, "the Ivans were very busy. The 
tremendous noise woke me up. Sand fell from the walls of my sleeping pit [a small dirt 
bunker]. Again and again, we heard the drone of incoming aircraft and pressed ourselves 
a little flatter against our straw mattresses, hoping to block out the noise of falling bombs." 94 
Pabst's rudimentary (and doubtless uncomfortable) sleeping arrangements may sound 
strange, but they were common amongst the Axis forces assailing Stalingrad. Even 
Genera/major Wolfgang Pickert, commander of the 9th Flak Division, moved out of his 
trailer and into a tent-covered hollow, hoping it afforded him better protection from bomb 
blasts.95 
VVS fighters and ground attack aircraft conducted defensive operations against German 
forces in and around Stalingrad, suffering high losses to more experienced and numerically 
superior Luftwaffe fighter units. A typical mid-September entry in the war diary of the 3rd 
Group of the Third Fighter Wing states: "During the entire day, the Russians undertook 
defensive air operations above Stalingrad. [There were also] Shturmovik attacks on the 
16th Panzer Division and German forces breaking into the city centre."96 The German 
group clearly outclassed its opponents, according to that entry: it claimed 11 Soviet 
aircraft destroyed (five of them Shturmoviks) for no losses. 
Soviet fighters also threw themselves wildly at German aircraft, especially the vulnerable 
Stukas and bombers, bringing down a small but steady number, yet losing far more 
themselves. Pabst described how Soviet fighter pilots aggressively attacked his squadron, 
occasionally shooting down Stukas or, when their ammunition ran out, trying to ram them. 
On 25 September, by way of illustration, his squadron was returning from missions 
against logistical targets east of the Volga when "Russian fighters suddenly turned up. 
For 20 minutes they attacked us, uninterrupted, from all sides, from above, from below."97 
His aircraft climbed, dove and weaved as they raced home, pursued by Soviet planes. 
"One can't express it on paper. It would take too long and lose its immediacy. Yet in 
practice, it took a high toll on our nerves." He was extremely lucky that day, suffering only 
seven damaged aircraft and one wounded pilot. Yet, although the VVS scored a few 
aerial victories each day (far fewer than the Luftwaffe, though, which claimed 22 destroyed 
for no reported losses on 27 September alone98), it proved incapable of clearing the skies 
above the city of German aircraft. It still lacked sufficient aircraft and suffered from the 
same logistical problems that plagued the Luftwaffe. On 26 September, von Richthofen 
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recorded in his diary: "Over Stalingrad there was not even a single Russian aircraft in the 
sky until late in the day, although around 900 [a huge exaggeration] sat on airfields. No 
fuel?" 
On 27 September, Chuikov urgently appealed to Nikita Khrushchev, Stalingrad Front's 
commissar, for increased VVS protection. "I make no complaint about our air force, which 
is fighting heroically," he said, "but the enemy has mastery in the air. His air force is his 
unbeatable trump card in attack. I therefore ask for increased help in this sphere-to give 
us cover from the air, if only for a few hours a day."99 Khrushchev replied that the Front 
was already giving Sixty-Second Army all the help it could, but agreed to pass on 
Chuikov's request and "press for increased air cover for the city." 
The "increased" air protection had not arrived, however, before the Luftwaffe launched 
fresh attacks next day, keeping up what Chuikov called "a constant, concentrated air 
attack on our troops, on the ferries and on the Army H.Q command post." German 
aircraft, he claimed, "dropped not only bombs, but also pieces of metal, ploughs, tractor 
wheels, harrows and empty casks, which whistled about the heads of our troops." However 
fascinating this story is, it is almost certainly apocryphal. Fiebig's units constantly suffered 
bomb shortages, but at no time in September were they so acute that bomber groups 
resorted to dropping ploughs, tractor wheels and the like. 
"Fumbling around" in Stalingrad 
October began satisfactorily for the depleted Sixth Army, divisions of which were either 
throwing back repeated attempts by Don Front to hack open its northern flank or 'fighting 
deep inside Stalingrad, battling for individual houses, workshops and sewers. Only the 
previous day, divisions holding the northern flank had managed to thwart a powerful 
attack by Don Front troops, led by 120 tanks. (On 28 September, the Stavka had changed 
Stalingrad Front's name to Don Front, and Southeastern Front's to Stalingrad Front, to 
reflect their geographical locations more accurately.) If their combat reports are accurate, 
Paulus' anti-tank gunners knocked-out around 60 tanks, whilst Pickert's flak troops, firing 
their "88s" with deadly precision, wrecked almost 40 more.100 On 1 October, while 
Fiebig's fighters claimed 18 enemy aircraft destroyed above Stalingrad for no reported 
losses, the tenacious Don Front pushed forward again in the region north of the city, only 
to be driven back once more with the loss of 60 tanks.101 One flak gunner, Wachmeister 
(Technical Sergeant) GemOd, destroyed 21 of those tanks single-handedly, despite being 
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wounded. He became an immediate celebrity. Pickert invited him to his headquarters in 
the evening of 2 October and von Richthofen, who called him "extremely courageous," 
nominated him for the Knight's Cross.102 
AltholJgh Sixth Army's pace of conquest had fallen to single houses or a few workshops 
per day, operations still seemed to be going relatively well for German air units over 
Stalingrad. Beginning at nightfall on 30 September, Fiebig's Stukas, Pickert's flak guns 
and Paulus' artillery guns savagely attacked barges and ferries attempting to carry Major~ 
General Guriev's 39th Guards Infantry Division across the Volga. "Day and night the 
enemy's artillery and aeroplanes directed withering attacks on our barges and ferries," 
Chuikov later complained.103 The Germans proved incapable of halting the transportation 
of Guriev's men across the river, but they slowed down the rate of reinforcement. "By 
morning on October 2," Chuikov added, "only two infantry regiments had been landed on 
the right [or west] bank". 
On 2 October-when "nothing special" happened, according to von Richthofen, except 
for "a tiny advance in Stalingrad"-Fiebig's bombers and Stukas launched heavy attacks, 
again in conjunction with artillery and flak fire, against the Kransnyi Oktyabr factory and 
Chuikov's crude, earthen command post near the Volga. The results were dramatic: near 
the factory sat huge oil tanks which Chuikov mistakenly took to be empty. Hit by bombs, 
they exploded with ground~shaking blasts. "Bombs dropped all over the bank," the Soviet 
commander recalled, "blowing up the oil~tanks full of oil, and a burning mass gushed 
across our dug-outs towards the Volga. The command post was in the middle of a sea 
of flames.''104 The situation was horrendous. Chuikov continued: 
The streams of flame burned everything in their path. Reaching the bank of 
the Volga, the burning oil poured on to the barges standing near the command 
post. The burning oil floated down with the current. The Volga itself seemed 
to be bursting into flame. Telephone lines also went up in flames. 
Communication could be maintained only by radio, which worked with 
interruptions. We were imprisoned by fire, descending on us from all 
directions.... Surrounded by fire, we stayed where we were and continued 
administering the Army. 
Despite occasional operational successes like this, Sixth Army advanced at a snail's 
pace through the northern industrial districts. Gains were so small and casualties so great 
that the army command sank into a mire of pessimism. Even on 2 October, the Chief 
of Staff informed the army group that, "in spite of the most intensive efforts by all forces, 
the low combat strengths of the infantry will prolong the taking of Stalingrad indefinitely 
if reinforcements cannot be supplied."105 Paulus, whose increasingly~obvious nervous 
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facial twitch betrayed gnawing doubts about his army's chances of success, had already 
pulled forward the last of his reserves from back at the Don. Yet, although he now had 
eleven divisions in and around the shattered city, giving him substantial numerical superiority 
over Chuikov, he knew his units were all in poor shape and his troops jaded. Next day, 
he echoed his subordinate's opinion, telling von Weichs: "At present even the breaking 
out of individual blocks of houses can only be accomplished after lengthy regroupings to 
bring together the few combat-worthy assault elements that can still be found." 106 
Accompanied by Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe Chief of the General Staff, von Richthofen 
flew to the Fifty-First Army Corps' command post, where they talked at length with Paulus 
and Generafmajor Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, the corps' commander. Surprisingly, the 
air fleet leader agreed with their assessment: "Success is assured," he told them 
sympathetically, "but only with an influx of reinforcements."107 Later that day, he had the 
opportunity to speak privately to Jeschonnek. "Above all, we lack clarity of purpose and 
a well-defined Schwerpunkt," he asserted. His own depleted air forces lacked the means 
to continue concentrating forces against Stalingrad, he explained, especially as he often 
had to dispatch air units south to help Seventeenth and First Panzer Armies, making poor 
progress in the Caucasus. "We simply can't go on fumbling around everywhere at once 
with what are, in any event, weak forces. Only when we establish a set of successive 
goals, and achieve them one at a time, will things go welL" "Of course," he added, "first 
of all we have to finish off what we started, especially at Stalingrad and Tuapse." 
Axis forces lacked the means to "finish off' Stalingrad in the 'first weeks of October. 
On the 6th, Paulus had to suspend offensive operations inside the city for "at least five 
days", because of what his army's war diary called "the exceptionally low infantry combat 
strengths."108 While he hastily regrouped his forces, holding a defensive "line" inside the 
city, he learned that Hitler had "reaffirmed the total occupation of Stalingrad as Army 
Group S's most important mission". 
Aware that he had virtually no reserves left to send either to Stalingrad or the Caucasus, 
where the drive to the highly-prized oilfields had petered out, the Fuhrer expressed his 
annoyance at the intolerably low combat strengths of fighting units in relation to their 
support units.109 On 8 October, he instructed all his army commanders to account 
immediately for their subordinate divisions' total ration strength versus combat strength. 
Nine days later, Sixth Army sent in its strength report. It made disappointing reading. The 
army had a total ration strength of 334,000 men, but only 66,549 were combat troops 
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(these figures did not include the Fourth Army troops then subordinated to Paulus).11o 
Zeitzler, Hitler's recently-appointed Army Chief of the General Staff, issued a companion 
directive to all German army commands, ordering an immediate ten per cent reduction 
in headquarters personnel, from army group down to divisions.111 The respective 
commands were to send the manpower thus freed to the front as combat troops. 
"Thunderball" Zeitzler also ordered that commands reduce their rear area support personnel 
in proportion to front-line combat losses and send those freed soldiers forward as 
replacements. His reasons were sound: support units sharing the hardships of front-line 
combat and suffering casualties would not only increase reinforcement levels, but also 
eliminate the traditional estrangement between "combat troops" and "rear echelons". 
These High Command directives could not, of course, immediately alleviate Paulus' 
manpower problems. His men needed a rest from offensive action and, between 6 and 
14 October, he gave them one. Chuikov's own troops were equally exhausted so, when 
German troops settled into temporary defensive positions amongst the ruins, a week-long 
lull occurred. Whilst Chuikov later claimed that "it was not, and could not be, a lull in the 
proper sense of the word, because our positions were only a grenade-throw from tl1e 
German positions," the intensity of fighting did drop dramatically.112 Most days between 
6 and 14 October, von Richthofen noted in his diary: Bei Stalingrad absolute Ruhe-
"Absolute quiet at Stalingrad." 
This temporary respite not only allowed Paulus to regroup his troops, but also permitted 
von Richthofen to concentrate virtually all Luftflotte IV's units, including the bulk of Fiebig's 
corps, in the Caucasus.113 Their operations against the Grozny oil refineries and in 
support of Seventeenth and First Panzer Armies have been analyzed above, so no 
description of their activities is needed at this pOint, sufflce to say that von Richthofen flew 
south in order to supervise the air operations personally. As always, he established joint 
Schwerpunkte-albeit small and frequently-changing ones-with army commanders during 
lengthy conferences. These included von Mackensen, whom the airman considered 
"dreadful and boring"114, and Ruoff and von Kleist, whom he liked, respected and, on at 
least one occasion, bravely defended against Goring's angry criticisms. 
This situation occurred on 15 October, when von Richthofen flew to Hitler's headquarters, 
armed with photographs of Stalingrad's ravaged suburbs. Hitler, he was amazed to learn, 
had recently ordered the Reichsmarschall to release to the army 200,000 troops from the 
manpower-swollen Luftwaffe. Goring considered his service branch insulted and pleaded 
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to retain the men under his leadership. He offered to set up twenty Luftwaffe "field 
divisions" instead. Against the advice of close advisers, the Fuhrer relented, allowing his 
soft spot for the Reichsmarschall to cloud his judgement. Von Richthofen privately called 
the decision "most alarming", maintaining that "those troops belong in the depleted army 
divisions."115 Hopefully, he added (over-optimistically, as it happened), "the whole thing 
won't prove a colossal blunder." Extant sources do not reveal whether he openly expressed 
these views. Although he seldom refrained from speaking his mind, the fact that he 
mentions no clash with Goring suggests that on this occasion he chose to keep his 
opinions to himself. 
Goring, whose working relationship with Hitler was still intact, although, as he probably 
knew, his ability to impress him as a military leader had long departed, became excited 
by von Richthofen's claims that the army was performing poorly at Stalingrad and in the 
Caucasus. He cursed von Kleist, Ruoff and the recently-sacked List-to the disgust of 
von Richthofen, who "strongly defended" the first two {but not List, whom he felt deserved 
what he got).116 Goring, the fleet commanded wrote, "then dragged me off with Jeschonnek 
to make an unannounced call on the Fuhrer. Once there, he gave a very spirited rendition 
[of the complaints against the army]." 
Hitler was clearly drawn to the charismatic von Richthofen, admiring his confidence, 
drive and aggression and wishing that all his operational commanders possessed those 
qualities. "He was especially affectionate to me," the airman proudly recorded in his diary 
that night. Indeed, the dictator listened attentively and approvingly to his operational plans 
and his assessment of "infantry weaknesses, combat leadership and, above all, the 
terrain." He was clearly angry about the Caucasus campaign's premature death and still 
upset about his recent clash with List, upon whose head he heaped hot coals. "The 
Fuhrer vehemently curses List," von Richthofen noted, adding: "justi'fiably." Later that 
day, Goring told him that Hitler planned to place him in charge of Army Group A in the 
Caucasus, believing that if anyone could get things going again, he COUld. (Nothing came 
of this; upon reflection, Hitler apparently considered the airman more valuable as his 
tactical airpower "trouble-shooter"). The Reichsmarschalf was delighted and, after von 
Richthofen flattered him about a recent speech, promised him a field marshal's baton as 
soon as Stalingrad fell. The latter laughed it off, replying: "I protest at having to lug a 
baton around." 
During this short lull in fighting at Stalingrad, von Richthofen spent most of his time 
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in the Caucasus, close to the bulk of his formations. Naturally, he left sufficient air units 
in the Stalingrad region to protect Paulus and Hoth's troops and prevent the VVS from 
temporarily seizing the initiative. Even in the absence of most German fighter groups, 
which flew south to escort bombers and dive-bombers attacking Tuapse and enemy 
troops opposing German armies, the VVS seemed unable to exploit the situation and 
press home their attacks with greater safety and consequent success. For example, the 
10 October entry in the war diary of the 3rd Group of the Luftwaffe's Third Fighter Wing 
states: "In the morning hours, weak Russian defensive air activity above Sixth Army's 
northern flank and Stalingrad. In the afternoon, very weak Russian air activity .... We 
dominate the airspace over Stalingrad." 117 
The German units remaining around Stalingrad did not operate by themselves, as von 
Richthofen's diary reveals. On 6 October, he welcomed to his headquarters two Rumanian 
air commanders, Generals Enescu and Ghiorghiu, "who should, after the 10th, 
independently direct [their own units] under our fleet command." 118 The first of their five 
combat groups, he learned, were already on their way. On 7 and 9 October, he held 
lengthy meetings with Gienescu, the Rumanian Air Minster, during which they discussed 
the role to be played by those groups. As "operationally-independent" formations of 
Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII, they were to provide air support to the Rumanian Third Army, 
which, with its eleven fresh divisions, was due to take over a section of the front north-
west of Stalingrad on 10 October. Von Richthofen found Gienescu friendly and co-
operative. "We are in agreement," he noted simply in his diary after their first meeting. 
"Conversations with Gerstenberg [the German Air Attache in Bucharest] and the Rumanian 
Air Minister were successful," he wrote after the second. "Marshal Antonescu approves 
all our proposals." 
Weak Rumanian units had already tasted combat as part of Fiebig's corps. Escadrila 
15, with a complement of only six under-powered Rumanian IAR 39A tactical 
reconnaissance biplanes, had accompanied the Rumanian Sixth Army Corps' advance 
since the summer campaign began.119 These aircraft monitored enemy movements, 
directed artillery fire, dropped small bombs and, on rare occasions, engaged enemy 
aircraft. Units of Corpul Aerian, the Rumanian Air Force's most powerful combat formation, 
began arriving at airfields in the Don bend early in September.120 On 16 September, 
Grup 7 Vanatori-comprising Escadrilas 56, 57 and 58, each witl, 12 Bf 109Es-began 
its operations from Karpovka with ten days of fighter operations in support of German 
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assaults on Stalingrad. A week or so later, the 15 He 111s of Grup 5 Bombardament 
began bombing missions, followed shortly after by the 15 Rumanian-made J RS 79B and 
JIS 79B bombers of Grup 1 Bombardament. In the first days of October, another fighter 
group, Grup 8 Vanatori, with 36 Rumanian-made IAR 80As, arrived in the Stalingrad 
sector. The IAR 80As were no match for the latest Soviet fighters, but were capable, 
nonetheless, of duelling the older-vintage fighters still possessed by many VVS units. 
All these Rumanian groups operated under Major-General Ghiorghiu as the 
RDmanischen I. Fliegerkorps (Rumanian First Air Corps).121 They mainly attacked Soviet 
road and rail traffic northwest of Stalingrad, enemy ground pOSitions facing Rumanian 
army units, and VVS units in the airspace above those units. Yet reconstructing a clear 
picture of their achievements or contribution to the Axis efforts in the region is almost 
impossible, at least with sources available outside Rumania. Like the single Croatian unit 
active in the Stalingrad area-the tiny 15./J.G.52, usually operating with less than a 
dozen Bf 109s122-they are scarcely mentioned in surviving German reports and war 
diaries. Von Richthofen, for example, totally ignored them in his own detailed diary. 
Even Mark Axworthy, author of an excellent study of the Rumanian armed forces during 
the Second World War, devoted little space to their operations. The regretably-slim 
treatment of Rumanian air operations in the present work reflects this scarcity of material, 
not the low importance of those operations. 
One fact is clear: Rumanian units certainly strengthened Luftflotte IV, which, despite 
receiving a trickle of replacements (mainly bombers), was no stronger in October than it 
had been the previous month. On 20 October, the fleet possessed 974 aircraft, excluding 
the "independent" Rumanian planes. 594 (61 per cent) of these were operational.123 The 
fleet's bomber force, in very bad shape in September, when it had only 129 air-worthy 
aircraft, had recovered significantly, now numbering 186. Yet this was still a major drop 
from the 323 bombers operational when Blau began back in June. 
The Final Axis Offensive Operations 
Von Richthofen's bombers and Stukas still packed a solid punch, despite their marked 
decrease in strength since June and July and the intense strain on ground personnel 
caused by the groups' recent transfers back and forth over enormous distances. On 12 
and 13 October, the bulk of Fiebig's units returned from the Caucasus to their bases 
around Stalingrad. On the 14th, they launched a heavy attack on the city in support of 
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Paulus' troops, who returned to offensive operations with an all-out attack after a week 
of regrouping, minor reinforcement and defensive battles. With what von Richthofen 
called "hardly any" VVS opposition, "the strongest magic of Fliegerkorps VIII" fell upon the 
northern suburbs of Stalin's city.124 Hans Doerr described the scale of this joint air force 
and army offensive: 
On October 14, the largest operation [against Stalingrad] to date commenced: 
an attack by numerous divisions, including the 14th Panzer, 305th and 389th 
Infantry Divisions [the first two "borrowed" from Hoth's depleted army], against 
the Dzherzhinski tractor factory, the eastern part of which was occupied by 
the Russian Sixty-Second Army. Although they were needed just as much 
where they were brought from, reinforcements, engineers and anti-tank units 
had arrived from all sectors of the front, including the Army's flanks on the 
Don and the Kalmyck Steppe. The Luftwaffe transported 'five engineer battalions 
from the Reich. The entire Fliegerkorps VIII supported the attack.125 
Paulus thrust three infantry divisions and almost two hundred Panzers into the three-
kilometre-long industrial complex, which had produced T-34s and other killer tanks until 
Fiebig's aircraft helped Pickert's flak guns and Paulus' artillery demolish its workshops 
and assembly lines. Chuikov's men, exhausted from their own unsuccessful counter-
attack the previous day, were shocked by the attack's "unprecedented ferocity". The 
general himself noted that "Those of us who had already been through a great deal will 
remember this enemy attack all our lives."126 German guns, rocket launchers and mortars 
bombarded Soviet pOSitions the entire day, whilst tanks and Panzer grenadiers forced 
their way through the blocks of workers' houses, ruined workshops and debris-strewn 
factory yards. 
The Luftwaffe played a key role in the attack, unloading over 600 tons of bombs on 
the tractor factory and Chuikov's strongpoints. Major (later General) Hozzel, commander 
of the Immelmann Stuka Wing, recalled that von Ricthofen "made us understand that our 
Geschwader had to do precision bombing so as to avoid danger to our troops entrenched 
close to the target area. He wanted to watch our sorties, judge the accuracy of our pilots, 
from his command post at the western outskirts of the city."127 Hozzel explained why "this 
was indeed a very delicate order": 
We could not risk making a dive-bombing attack from 4,000 meters altitude 
because of the wide area of [bomb] dispersion. We had to fly a slant range 
attack, releasing the bombs directly over the roofs. We had to push the 
bombs into the target like loaves of bread into an oven, with one plane 
succeeding the other.128 
When free of enemy air opposition, Stukas were effective attack aircraft, capable of 
flying all day with little maintenance, carrying relatively heavy bomb loads, placing their 
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deadly projectiles witll unparalleled precision and withstanding flak 1"lits tllat would disable 
or destroy many other aircraft. For the raids on the tractor factory, ground personnel 
fitted them with special payloads. As Hozzel pointed out: "We loaded each plane with 
one 500-kilo bomb with a tank-busting head and delayed action fuse for piercing the 
[factory] roofs. Each plane also carried two 250-kilo bombs under the wings, so each 
carried a load of 1,000 kilos." 
Soviet flak guns now operated on both banks of the Volga, most "manned" by women. 
After the war, Chuikov repeatedly extolled the bravery and tenacity of those women, who 
were "models of courage". "They would stick to their guns and go on firing," he explained, 
"when bombs were exploding all round tllem, when it seemed impossible not merely to 
fire accurately, but even to stay with the guns. In the fire and smoke, amid bursting 
bombs, seemingly unaware of tile columns of earth exploding into the air all about them, 
they stood their ground to the last."129 They were not only courageous, he added; they 
were also relatively successful: "The Luftwaffe's raids on the city, therefore, in spite of 
heavy losses among the anti-aircraft personnel, were always met by concentrated fire, 
which as a rule took a heavy toll among the attacking aircraft. Our women anti-aircraft 
gunners shot down dozens of enemy planes over the blazing city." He was exaggerating, 
but not grossly. Major Hozzel noted that the city's flak teams "fired at us with all calibers 
at their disposal, inflicting heavy casualties on US."130 In fact, his wing "suffered its most 
severe losses by anti-aircraft fire and hardly [any] by Soviet fighter planes". Hozzel's 
losses, it Sllould be noted, were never severe by the standards of Soviet units. In the four 
months that his 200-strong wing operated in the Stalingrad region, it lost a daily average 
of only one Stuka, even though the wing-which included, incidentally, a dozen or so 
Italian Macchi fighters-often carried out more than 500 sorties per day. As Hozzel put 
it: "Four months, 120 days, 120 losses." 
Despite stiff flak opposition, the factory and its surrounding houses, workshops and 
courtyards made good targets for the constantly circling and diving Stukas. "As on a 
string of pearls," Hozzel remembered, "one plane followed the others within an interval 
of a few seconds, throwing the bombs on the oblong target area divided among us. Not 
one single bomb missed its target. This brought our crews high praises by the infantry."131 
Devastating the factory and killing many hundreds of its defenders, the Stukas attacked 
without pause the entire day. "We recorded some 3,000 sorties by enemy aircraft," 
Chuikov later wrote, wildly exaggerating or miscalculating (the true figure was probably 
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closer to 1,250).132 "German aeroplanes bombed and machine-gunned our troops without 
stop .... It was a sunny day, but the smoke and dust cut visibility down to a hundred yards. 
Our dug-outs shook and caved in like houses of cards".133 Yet the morale of Chuikov's 
troops did not crack. Like Sevastopol's defenders, they dug themselves deep into the 
rubble and, despite incessant bomb and cannon explosions, which threw torn-apart corpses 
everywhere, they defended their positions with extraordinary courage and blind fanaticism. 
Hozzel was shocked: although his wing had repeatedly smashed the factory district with 
intense ferocity, German infantry units encountered "fierce counterattacks as though 
nothing had happened; as if the Geschwader had dropped toy torpedoes instead of 
bombs."134 
Still, the day went as well for the attackers as it did poorly for the defenders. "The 
advances at Stalingrad were good," von Richthofen commented that night. "The dreaded 
tractor factory has been taken. The Russians were apparently taken by surprise. We've 
reached the Volga on a front of three kilometres." Indeed, although their casualties were 
very high (perhaps 2,000 killed and wounded), German forces did capture most of the 
factory, surround the remaing sections, split the Sixty-Second Army in two, and inflict 
equally-high losses on Chuikov's troops and armed factory workers. As John Erickson 
wrote: 
The approaches to the tractor plant were littered with the dead and dying, 
hundreds of Soviet wounded crawled to the Volga or waited in the night to be 
ferried on one of those ghastly journeys across the Volga; that night 3,500 
wounded men were ferried to the eastern bank, the largest single tally in the 
whole of the defensive battle.135 
Hitler was delighted, believing that Stalingrad would be his within days (which doubtless 
explains why, as mentioned, he was so pleased to see von Richthofen when the airman 
arrived at his Ukrainian headquarts next day.) The Fuhrer craved news of this nature, 
especially as he had recently instructed the Luftwaffe to wreck the Caucasus oilfields, the 
principal objectives of his now-lifeless summer campaign. Also, that very morning, 14 
October, he had ordered all forces in the east, except those battling inside Stalingrad and 
pushing (hopelessly, as it happened) towards Tuapse and Grozny, to prepare for winter 
in the lines they held. "This year's summer and fall campaigns," he wrote, "excepting 
those operations underway and several local offensives still contemplated [a reference to 
a planned operation at Leningrad], have been concluded."136 With this order, Hitler 
brought his offensive to a more timely close than he had a year earlier, but he also raised 
to the level of doctrine the fanatical defensive formula that had saved 11is armies during 
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the previous winter. "Every leader," he stated, "down to squad leader must be convinced 
of his sacred duty to stand fast, come what may, even if the enemy outflanks him on the 
right and left, even if his part of the line is cut off, encircled, overrun by tanks, enveloped 
in smoke or gassed." 
On 15 October, Paulus' troops entirely cleared the tractor factory and brickworks 
before turning south the following day, behind Fliegerkorps VII/'s curtain of falling bombs, 
towards their next objectives: the Barrikady gun factory, the bread bakeries and the 
Krasnyi Oktyabr metallurgical works. By the afternoon of 16 October, they had taken half 
the gun factory and encircled several pockets of resistance a few kilometres northwest 
of the city. 
As usual in tl1is period, the army received effective Luftwaffe support, both from air and 
flak units. "Hundreds of dive-bombers and assault aircraft bombed and machine-gunned 
our sector," Chuikov later wrote, "[especia.lly] where tanks of the 84th Brigade were dug 
in. Buildings were burning, the earth was burning and the tanks were burning. Our anti-
aircraft artillery was unable to give our troops any real cover." 137 Genera/major Pickert's 
diary reveals what he called (with understandable pride and only slight exaggeration) the 
"key role" played by his flak teams. Their guns punched massive holes through the 
concrete and brick walls providing cover but little protection to the fiercely-defending 
troops and factory workers. "Its a fantastic sight," he wrote on 17 October. "Absolutely 
nothing in the suburbs has escaped destruction. We fired several thousand rounds there, 
including a lot of anti-tank shells, used against the most solid buildings." 138 
Despite these strong attacks (which killed and wounded 13,000 Soviets in the first 
three days) and the steady gains they produced, Stalingrad's tenacious defenders were 
not yet willing to let Hitler trumpet the fall of their ruined metropolis. They resisted bitterly, 
especially inside the gun factory, where twisted machinery, stacks of iron, and metal 
debris made superb gun nests. To Paulus' intense frustration, his troop strength was 
fading rapidly while the Soviets received a small but steady flow of reinforcements from 
the eastern shore of the Volga. Even more importantly, he realized that Chuikov had kept 
his nerve under the most difficult and dangerous circumstances and, valiantly leading 
from the front (where his men could see his own suffering), he had prevented a rout and 
forged his shattered regiments into makeshift combat groups. 
By 19 October, Paulus' units had destroyed several pockets of resistance in the gun 
factory, captured a few more blocks of houses and brought their guns, mortars and 
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rockets to bear on the bread factories and the Krasnyi Oktyabr metallurgical works. Yet 
this was certainly not the pace of conquest the general had expected when he launched 
his major attack five days earlier. Von Richthofen was again disgusted. His airmen had 
thrown everything they had at the enemy, he self-righteously claimed, yet the army failed 
to concentrate forces against single targets and advance with a sense of purpose. "In 
Stalingrad there's only chaos," he fumed in his diary that evening. "It seems that divisions 
reported too optimistically. No-one knows what's going on. Every division and every corps 
reports something different." He was not the only one to feel this frustration. "Fiebig is 
furious," he wrote, "because the infantry don't exploit the chances his attacks provide."139 
The airmen were most unreasonable in their criticisms. In battles of movement and 
manoeuvre, the German army vastly outclassed its Soviet counterpart. Yet successful 
days no longer consisted of armoured pincer movements and ten-thousand-strong prisoner 
hauls, but of the capture of broken buildings and the destruction of single battalions. 
Now, in this bloody battle of attrition, German infantry units proved inferior to their Red 
Army opponents. Armed with tommy-guns, hand-grenades and molotov cocktails, Chuikov's 
men fought with imagination, determination and courage. German numerical superiority 
and the Luftwaffe's strong air attacks ensured that progress continued, but Soviet skill 
and tenacity kept it slow. 
By the beginning of November, Paulus' troops had pushed through the bread factories, 
cleared the region between them and the Krasnyi Oktyabr metallurgical works-with the 
help of Fliegerkorps Vllf 40, which continuously bombed the enemy position in the infantry's 
advance path-and occupied half those works. The offensive had already lasted 15 days, 
not the two or three Paulus originally hoped for, and the city was not yet his. Although 
he controlled almost 90 per cent, he could not yet proclaim the city free of the enemy. 
Chuikov's men-now fewer than 20,000-clung to two small patches of ground. They 
held a fragile bridgehead in parts of the northern suburbs of Rynok and Spartakovka, and 
another in the Lazur chemical works and parts of the Krasnyi Oktyabr metallurgical 
works. The exhausted but still-defiant Chuikov, so badly afflicted with stress-induced 
eczema that he had to wrap bandages around his hands to cover open sores, commanded 
his "formations" from a sandstone tunnel overlooking the river behind the Krasnyi Oktyabr 
plant. It was his fifth command post in seven weeks. 
Von Richthofen's frustration mounted as the temperature dropped, heavy autumn 
rains began, and Paulus' troops inched forward at a steadily-decreasing pace. He could 
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do nothing about the weather, he reasoned on the last day of October, but perhaps he 
could do something about the attack's pathetic pace. He flew to Stalingrad on 1 November 
to confront Paulus and von Seydlitz. The deployment of the Luftwaffe was pointless, he 
hissed, "because the artillery don't fire and the infantry don't exploit our air attacks. We 
drop our bombs on enemy positions less than a hand grenade's throw from the infantry, 
but they do nothing."141 Naturally, the army commanders attempted to explain their poor 
performance, but the hot-tempered airman was far from satisfied with their answers. 
"They trotted out all the same old and stupid excuses," he harshly wrote in his diary, 
"which are only partly true: numerical weaknesses, lack of training in this type of [close-
quarters] combat, and shortages of ammunition." He would place additional air transport 
at their disposal, he told them, and use his influence with the High Command to see that 
properly-trained reinforcements were forthcoming. (That evening he did, in fact, ring 
Jeschonnek and demand the immediate despatch of four pioneer assault battalions. The 
"request" arrived at the Fuhrer's desk next day.) Von Richthofen did not mince his words. 
"The real reasons [for the slackening pace]," he boldly stated, "lie in the weariness of both 
command and troops and in that rigid army formalism, which tolerates only 1,000 men 
in the front line out of a division ration strength of 12,000." lVIoreover, "generals are 
content merely to issue orders, without going into any detail or making sure that preparations 
are properly made." Paulus was naturally unimpressed, he added, "but he couldn't refute 
the truth of it." 
At least his own forces were still performing satisfactorily, von Richthofen concluded. 
Throughout the day, he had thrown all his Stuka wings against the factories and his 
bombers against artillery positions and mobilization points. His flak general noted in his 
own diary that "it was very quiet at the front, with no disturbances by flak or enemy 
aircraft."142 The result, the fleet chief wrote with undisguised pride, reminded him of the 
annihilation raids on Sevastopol. Only the army's disappointing efforts spoiled his pleasure: 
"Following the raids by all Stuka wings, the army struck with a force of only 37 men, and 
they promptly stopped again after initial losses!!!"143 
The Calm Before the Storm 
For the first two and a half weeks of November, von Richthofen's thoughts were 
usually on two matters: Paulus' dreadfully-slow progress in taking the final ten per cent 
of Stalingrad, and the ominous build-up of Soviet forces northwest of the city, in the 
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section of front held by the Rumanian Third Army. Hitler had the same concerns. 
Although capturing the remaining ten per cent of the desolate ruins provided no strategic 
advantage, it had substantial propaganda value and, for Hitler personally, great 
psychological significance. Stalingrad represented what he hated (and admired) most 
about the Soviet spirit: its intense fanaticism and unparalleled tenacity. Now that his 
southern army group had come to a halt without taking the main Caucasus oilfields and 
his northern army group had failed to break into Leningrad, he craved a victory over that 
accursed spirit. 
On 8 November, he delivered his annual speech to the Party's "Old Guard" at Munich's 
Lowenbraukeller. It was an inspiring speech, according to Goebbels, who noted in his 
diary that ''the Fuhrer spoke with excellent strength and certainty. It is constantly astonishing 
that he somehow manages to find the physical and spiritual strength to give such 
performances."144 Although Hitler was still reeling from Rommel's humiliating withdrawal 
from EI Alamein four days earlier and Operation "Torch", which had begun that very day, 
he was careful to keep his disappointments and fears well hidden. Those events in North 
Africa were nothing to worry about, he told his devoted audience. Africa was of no major 
importance anyway. The real war was being waged in the east, and Germany was clearly 
winning. Giving himself a verbal pat on the back (w~lich he doubtless later cursed 1"limself 
for doing), Hitler also announced that he was now master of Stalingrad: 
I wanted to reach the Volga, at a particular spot, at a particular city. By 
coincidence, it is blessed with the name of Stalin himself, but don't think we 
marched there for that reason-it could be called anytl"ling. We're there because 
it's a vitally-important city. There you can cut off thirty million tons of river 
transport, including nine million tons of oil. It is there that the grain of the 
mighty Ukrainian and Kuban regions 'flows in for transportation to the north; 
there the manganese ore is processed. It is a huge shipment complex. That 
was what I wanted to capture and, you know, modest as we are-we've got 
it too. There are only a few more tiny pockets! Now some may say, "Then why 
don't you fight faster?" Because I don't want a second Verdun, that's why. I 
would rather do it with small assault squads. Time is of no importance. Not 
a single ship comes up the Volga any more, and that's the main thing.145 
Hitler's superb oratory doubtless convinced most members of his audience, including 
millions of listeners glued to radios across Germany, that things were still going well in 
the east. Throughout the last decade, he had produced political and military victories so 
impressive that even many of his staunchest opponents conceded his genius. But this 
time he clearly failed to impress the gods of war, who showed the "master of Stalingrad" 
only two weeks later-when powerful Soviet forces ripped gaping holes in the line both 
north and south of the city-that he was merely a piece on their chessboard. 
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Despite ~Iis rousing speech, the Fuhrer held grave fears for his troops at Stalingrad. 
As early as mid-August, he had suspected that the Red Army was planning something 
northwest of the city, but, because of poor intelligence advice, wasn't quite sure what. On 
16 August, he expressed his fears to his top military advisers, telling them that Stalin 
might repeat the tactics that gave the Bolsheviks an excellent victory over General Pyotr 
Wrangel's White Army in 1920; that is, he could thrust powerful forces across the Don 
near Serafimovich, a town on the Don 160 kilometres northwest of Stalingrad, in the 
direction of Rostov.146 As a result, the OKW war diary states, "the Fuhrer urgently requested 
the speedy transfer of the 22nd Panzer Division into the area behind the Italian Eighth 
Army to bolster its defences." 147 
Hitler's fears were premature, but his predictions surprising accurate. Two months 
later, on 13 October, the Fremde Heere Ost (FHa-Foreign Armies East), the army 
department responsible for evaluating all military intelligence about the Soviet Union, 
actually did detect and report to the High Command what appeared to be the early stages 
of a Soviet build-up around Serafimovich. The FHa was not especially concerned, however, 
believing the small scale of the build-up meant that no offensive would be attempted in 
the near future. Even if one were attempted, it would probably be against Army Group 
Centre.148 Hitler clearly felt more concerned than his intelligence people and on 26 
October, after studying daily reconnaissance reports, which revealed a steady reinforcement 
of the Serafimovich bridgehead, ordered several of Goring's new Luftwaffe Field Divisions 
to stiffen the Italian, Hungarian and Rumanian front on the Don. He told von Manstein 
that same day that "an especial danger" existed in the front between Stalingrad and 
Voronezh. 
On 31 October, the FHa reported that the build-up was limited to the Serafimovich 
bridgehead and Kletskaya, 35 kilometres closer to Stalingrad, in the Rumanian Third 
Army sector. It repeated its previous assessment: the dense night traffic towards 
Serafimovich did not presage a major attack. In fact, it would probably not result in more 
than a local effort of some kind.149 Hitler remained unpersuaded, especially after learning 
that Stalin's formations had thrown several new bridges across the Don to the Serafimovich 
bridgehead. According to the 2 November entry in the OKW war diary: 
Reconnaissance photographs submitted by the Luftwaffe show that the number 
of new bridges across the Don in the Rumanian Third Army's sector has 
grown. Therefore, the Fuhrer anticipates (as before) a major Russian attack 
across the Don towards Rostov. He orders powerful air attacks against the 
bridge sites and mobilization areas in the forests on the northern bank of the 
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Don.15o 
Goring's Luftwaffe Field Divisions would count for little in heavy combat, Hitler stressed 
that day, adding that they should "only be used in defensive fighting until such time as 
they have gained cohesion and combat experience." 151 He did not want a repitition of 
events in Flanders during the Great War, when "volunteer units were prematurely committed 
in offensive actions and, because of their inadequate training, suffered dreadful losses." 
As a result, he cancelled the Field Divisions' transfer to the Third Rumanian Army's 
sector, instead ordering (two days later) the "transfer of the 6th Panzer Division and two 
infantry divisions, including the 306th Infantry Division, from the western theatre to Army 
Group B in the east, to serve as tactical reserves behind the Rumanian Third Army and 
the Italian Eighth Army." 152 These forces would leave as soon as possible, but, because 
of organization and transportation delays, they would take a month or so to arrive at their 
new destinations. 
On 6 November, the FHO repeated its previous assessments: the Soviet offensive would 
fall against Army Group Centre and, if an attack were to be launched against Army Group 
B, it would come later. The intelligence organization also began monitoring a similar 
build-up opposite Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army, south of Stalingrad. A week later, that 
army began expressing its growing fears of a major enemy offensive, complementing the 
concerns expressed by both Paulus' army and Army Group B's command staff. Soviet 
troops and equipment were observed leaving the line at various pOints and reappearing 
soon after in the suspected jump-off points northwest and south of the city. The FHO still 
felt unable to predict with certainty that a major offensive against Army Group Bloomed, 
but, on 12 November, it did at least advise that "an attack in the near future against 
Rumanian Third Army with the objective of cutting the railroad to Stalingrad and thereby 
threatening the German forces farther east and compelling a withdrawal from Stalingrad 
must be taken into consideration." 153 
Fearing a major attack but knowing that the OKW had no substantial reserves available, 
Army Group B transferred the Headquarters, Forty-Eighth Panzer Corps into the vulnerable 
Rumanian zone on 10 November. It also alerted the 29th Motorized Infantry Division that 
it might have to swing in behind the Rumanians "on the shortest notice."154 Two days 
later, the worried army group instructed Paulus, still struggling in Stalingrad, to squeeze 
10,000 men out of his much-needed engineer and artillery units to man a support line 
behind the Rumanians.155 
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Despite these movements within Army Group B, Hitler remained convinced that the 
best means of preventing a Soviet breakthrough would be the rapid capture of Stalingrad, 
which would release the bulk of Paulus' formations for defensive duties in and behind the 
vulnerable sections of the front. 156 Therefore, he repeatedly ordered Paulus to capture 
the remaining districts as quickly as possible, 
Sixth Army's exhausted commander prepared his men and steeled his nerves for a 
final push, aimed not at the two enemy bridgeheads on the Volga, but at the forces 
holding the Lazur chemical plant. On 5 November, however, he learned that Hitler, 
desperate to secure the entire west bank of the Volga to cut off Chuikov's reinforcements, 
had "expressed the opinion" that the ground east of the Barrikady gun factory and Krasnyi 
Oktyabr metallurgical works ought to be taken first 157 "Before resuming the attack to 
capture the Lazur Chemical Plant," Hitler ordered more explicitly the following day, "the 
two sections of the city the enemy still holds east of the gun factory and east of the 
metallurgical plant are to be taken, Only after the bank of the Volga is entirely in our 
hands in those places is the assault on the chemical plant to be begun,"158 
Both Army Group B's and Sixth Army's leaders considered this unreasonable, 
complaining (but apparently not to the Fuhrer himself) that the stipulated attack would 
consume too much strength and probably rule out a subsequent assault on the chemical 
factory, Still, they grudgingly complied with their commander-in-chief's wishes, commencing 
an artillery attack on the Soviets' own artillery positions on the Volga's far bank, and 
organizing two ground assaults, one from the gun factory, to begin on 11 November, and 
the other from the metallurgical plant, to start four days later. The first two specialist 
engineer assault battalions transferred by Hitler from divisions on the Don (apparently in 
response to von Richthofen's recent requests159) had arrived on 4 November, carried 
forward by Fliegerkorps VII/,160 By the jump-off dates, the commanders knew, the other 
three battalions would have arrived. 
In the meantime, rapidly-deteriorating weather in southern Russia began to interfere 
with Luftflotte IV's ability to support ground operations. Blinding rain and heavy snowfalls 
hampered the work of supply, maintenance and airfield personnel, made take-off and 
landing difficult, and reduced the visibility and, therefore, the effectiveness, of aircrew. 
Nonetheless, the air fleet worked vigorously, devoting most of its energy in the first week 
of November to operations against the Soviet build-up around Serafimovich and Kletskaya, 
against railway lines and installations east of the Volga and south of Astrakhan, and 
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against enemy forces opposite First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies in the Caucasus. 
"Absolute calm" reigned at Stalingrad, von Richthofen noted in his diary on 5 November, 
explaining why his forces no longer conducted heavy raids on the ruined city. 
The air fleet commander had a lot to contend with in southern Russia. Yet on 8 
November, the very day that Hitler boldly proclaimed himself master of Stalingrad, he 
realized that his colleagues in North Africa and the Mediterranean faced far greater 
problems. Not only had Rommel been pushed away from EI Alamein four days earlier, 
pursued by Montgomery's Eighth Army, but powerful British and American forces were 
now landing in French North Africa, looking set to destroy the desert fox's retreating 
forces. On the 2nd, Goring's staff had frantically diverted bomber squadrons from Norway 
to the Mediterranean, and, in the following days, it had grabbed units from all fronts to 
hurl against the Allied attackers.161 Now, on the day the "Torch" troops disembarked near 
Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, von Richthofen offered the OKL a number of his own 
units, although he could ill afford to lose them, for deployment in that purportedly-critical 
theatre. "Extremely dreadful news from the Mediterranean and Africa," he wrote that 
night. "I offer three bomber groupS".162 As it happened, he dispatched the 1st Group, as 
well as parts of the 2nd and 3rd Groups, of the 76th Bomber Wing.163 Because their 
usual commander fell sick, Major von Friedeburg of the 51st Bomber Wing led the the 
units to their new combat zone.164 
With remarkably bad timing, they left for the Mediterranean only a few days before 
Stalin's metal fists smashed into the Axis lines north and south of Stalingrad and quickly 
locked Sixth Army in a strangle hold. The departure of those valuable units, coupled with 
high attrition rates (caused by supply difficulties and over-commitment) greatly weakened 
Luttf/otte /V's already-inadequate bomber force, leaving it without the means to interrupt 
Soviet preparations or, even more importantly, to resist the massive attacks when they 
came. On 20 October, the fleet had possessed 341 bombers, of which 186 were 
operational. By the time the Soviets struck a month later, it possessed only 139, of which 
a mere 64 were operational. 165 
Bad weather rendered von Richthofen's units powerless to help Paulus' regiments 
when they commenced their final assault on the two main enemy pockets within Stalingrad 
on 11 November, although the following day they launched a powerful attack against 
Chuikov's defiant but barely surviving troops. Even so, German troops made very slight 
gains for heavy losses. That evening, the air fleet commander complained in his diary 
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that the army's attacks were "dreadful and only reluctantly carried out." He also noted 
glumly that the spectre of destruction loomed over the vulnerable Don front: 
Opposite the Rumanians on the Don, the Russians are resolutely carrying on 
with their preparations for an attack. Available elements of Fliegerkorps VIII 
[the rest of which were supporting ground operations in the Caucasus], other 
fleet units and the Rumanian air forces continually hit them. Their reserves 
have now been concentrated. When will the Russians attack? They have 
apparently been experiencing ammunition shortages. Artillery installations, 
however, are now starting to be equipped. I only hope that the Russians don't 
tear too many large holes in the IineP66 
Von Richthofen was painfully aware that his air fleet could not conduct a systematic, 
large-scale interdiction campaign against the Soviet bridgeheads on the Don and the rail, 
road and march routes leading to them. In mid-November, the fleet possessed only 732 
aircraft, of which 402 were operational.167 This was less than the usual complement of 
a single Fliegerkorps. His greatly-depleted bomber, dive-bomber and ground-attack groups 
were already forced to perform a wide variety of demanding tasks in combat regions 
stretching over 700 kilometres north to south (,from Kletskaya, northwest of Stalingrad, to 
Ordzhonikidze, in the central Caucasus) and 800 kilometres from west to east (from 
I\lovorossiisk and Tuapse to Astrakhan). At various times, and often simultaneously, they 
supported Seventeenth and First Panzer Armies in the Caucasus, and Sixth and Fourth 
Panzer Armies in the Stalingrad sector. They carried out interdiction operations against 
Volga shipping between Stalingrad and Astrakhan and roads and railways east of the 
Volga. A small number also performed reconnaissance duties over the Black Sea and the 
western Caucasus. 
Still, von Richthofen threw every available squadron against Stalin's bridgeheads on 
the Don, which were swollen to bursting pOint with armour, artillery and fresh formations. 
"At regular intervals we attack the northern bridges over the Don," recalled Hans-Ulrich 
Rudel, the famous Stuka pilOt.168 "The biggest of these is near the village of Kletskaya 
and this bridgehead on the west bank of the Don is most vigilantly defended by flak .... 
The bridgehead is constantly being extended and every day the Soviets pour in more 
men and material." Air attacks on the bridges were often successful, Rudel explained, 
but had little permanent effect: "Our destruction of these bridges delays these 
reinforcements, but they are able to replace them relatively quickly with pontoons so that 
the maximum traffic across the river is soon fully restored." Knowing that the Rumanians 
possessed almost no anti-tank guns, and would therefore be unable to hold back even 
a light armoured thrust across the Don, on 14 November von Richthofen also sent two 
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flak battalions to reinforce their endangered section of front. 169 
By 16 November, the army had made minor gains in Stalingrad, having captured 
several blocks of houses, beaten off an attack by Chuikov's forces, and narrowed the 
bridgehead east of the gun factory. But it had not yet destroyed the two main pockets 
of resistance. Von Richthofen was so 'frustrated by the army's poor progress, and fearful 
of the iminent attack in the northwest, that he rang Zeitzler that day to plead for "really 
energetic combat leadership at Stalingrad, or for the attack to be called Off."170 "If we 
can't clear up the situation now," he stressed during his typically-unfair attack on the 
army, "when the Volga is blocked with ice 1'Ioes and the Russians are in real difficulties, 
we shall never be able to. As it is, the days are getting shorter and the weather worse." 
The Chief of the General Staff agreed and promised to inform the Fuhrer of von Richthofen's 
views. "While talking to Zeitzler," the latter noted in his diary, "I emphasized that the 
commanders and combat troops in Stalingrad are so apathetic that only the injection of 
a new spirit can get us anywhere. I suggested that the present commanders, who are 
otherwise trustworthy enough, should be sent on leave for a while to let very different 
types take their place." Unfortunately, he angrily scrawled in his journal, "those at the top 
lack the guts to do it." 
Next day, he was so worried about the Soviet offensive that he pulled Gefechtsverband 
Hitschold out of the Caucasus, where it had been supporting von Kleist's army for more 
than a month, and dispatched it to the threatened Rumanian front. This small close air 
support command, comprising a Stuka group and a destroyer group, lacked the strength 
and arrived too late to make any impact on the Soviet preparations. Only two days later, 
during a swirling snowfall in the early hours of 19 November, 3,500 Soviet guns and 
mortars opened up with a deafening roar on Rumanian Third Army. An hour later, tanks 
crashed through the forward Rumanian lines, followed by waves of well-equipped infantry, 
all but invisible in their white winter clothing. Stalin's onslaught had begun. 
31, 32. Ju 87 Stukas were slow and vulnerable to attack, especially when pulling out 
of dives. When free of enemy air opposition, however, they proved very effective. They 
could fly all day with little maintenance, carry relatively heavy bomb loads, place their 
bombs with a high degree of accuracy, and withstand flak hits that would disable or 
destroy many other aircraft. These Stukas fly over Stalingrad, which they and horizontal 
bombers turned to ruins between August and November 1942. The picture below 
shows bomb damage to the central train station, with the Grain Elevator, scene of bitter 
fighting, in the background. 
33, 34. The Luftwaffe turned Stalingrad's industrial districts into piles of rubble, buckled 
steel and twisted girders. 
35. A Luftwaffe "88" flak gun used in direct fire against buildings in Stalingrad. Von 
Richthofen refused to allow the army's artillery generals to control his flak batteries, 
even though most operated alongside the army's guns throughout the entire campaign. 
He preferred to keep all flak guns under his own direction, believing that he and his 
senior flak officers used them more effectively than army artillery leaders, who "still 
deployed their guns as though they were in the First World War". 
36. German flak guns of the 9th Flak Division, capably commanded by Genera/major 
Pickert, contributed substantially to German offensive successes within Stalingrad. 
"Absolutely nothing in the suburbs has escaped destruction," Pickert noted in his diary 
on 17 October 1942. "We fired several thousand rounds there [today], including a lot 
of anti-tank shells, used against the most solid buildings." His medium guns actually 
proved more effective against buildings than his large, high-velocity weapons, which 
punched holes clean through them but inflicted less structural damage. 
37, 38. Luftwaffe bombers, dive-bombers and flak guns, joined by the army's artillery 
guns, totally destroyed most of Stalingrad, leaving very few buildings standing and 
none undamaged. The bottom photograph shows the Lazur chemical works' railway 
siding, a popular target referred to by German aircrews as the "tennis racket." 
39. This Luftwaffe reconnaissance photograph (date unknown) shows fires burning 
throughout the Lazur chemical works, inside the "tennis racket", and burnt-out buildings 
(with solid lines drawn around them) and fuel installations (with broken lines drawn 
around them). 
40. The VVS (Red Air Force) proved incapable of preventing or curtailing the Luftwaffe's 
constant raids on Stalingrad, but did have occasional offensive successes against 
German airfields, mobilization points and logistics centres. Here several Ju 52s burn 
after a Shturmovik raid on their airfield in the Don-Donets sector. 
41, 42. Von Richthofen-shown above escorting King Boris of Bulgaria (in overcoat) 
on an inspection tour of a German airfield in Southern Russia-directed his bombers 
to smash Stalingrad's oil installations, including the large 011 depot of the Dzherzhinski 
tractor factory. The photograph below shows that oil depot burning wildly, prompting 
von Richthofen to write excitedly in his diary that the "thick, black fire-clouds" climbed 
3,500 metres into the sky and stretched for 25 kilometres. 
43, 44. Several of Fliegerkorps VIII's Stuka squadrons attacked shipping on the Volga 
river, both north and south of Stalingrad. They sank numerous tankers and transport 
barges-including the two ships (circled) above, which were left burning at Saratov, 
north of Stalingrad-but tlley failed to sever this major north-south supply artery. They 
also conducted several raids against Astrakhan, near the mouth of the Volga, directing 
their attacks against its oil refineries and storage tanks (shown burning below). They 
inflicted little damage to the city, but did manage to cripple its oil facilities temporarily. 
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Map 6: Stalingrad:the Prize that eluded Hitler 
Chapter VIII 
Disaster and Decisions 
November 1942 
"Supply an entire army from the air?-absolutely impossible! It simply 
cannot be done, especially in this weather. 1J 
258. 
-Generalmajor Pickert to Generals Paulus and Schmidt, 22 November 1942 
Stalin's counteroffensive had been under preparation for more than two months before 
it finally smashed through weakly-held Rumanian lines with great momentum on 19 
November. It had grown out of a military briefing in the Kremlin on 12 September, 
attended by Stalin, Zhukov and their Chief of the General Staff, Aleksandr Vasilevskii. 
The latter spoke first, reporting on the battles raging in Stalingrad, the Kuban and the 
region around Grozny. Stalin listened calmly and attentively to Vasilevskii's description 
of constant German successes, humiliating though they were. Turning to Zhukov, his 
deputy Supreme Commander, who had flown north from the front only hours before, the 
sixty-two-year-old dictator then said: "Well, now let's see what Zhukov has to say about 
Stalingrad."1 
Not yet plagued by the intense jealousy that soured his relationship with Zhukov in the 
immediate aftermath of war in 1945, when the Marshal's reputation as the "real" saviour 
of the Soviet people soared, Stalin valued and trusted his deputy's lucid and logical 
thinking and unparalleled (on the Soviet side, at least) strategic intuition. The stocky, 
broad-featured general, born forty-five years earlier into a poor peasant family, had first 
come to his attention in August 1939. Using imaginative and daring tactics, he had 
inflicted a major defeat on the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol, Mongolia, at a time when the 
Red Army needed such a victory to restore its flagging morale and prestige. Although he 
had failed to stem the German advance on Smolensk in August 1941, Zhukov's firm hand 
and sound defensive command had prevented Hitler's northern armies from taking 
Leningrad, their coveted prize, the following month. He had then taken over the defence 
of Moscow-the trophy Hitler's generals wanted most-forcing back their exhausted troops 
within miles of the city's western suburbs before unleashing a powerful counteroffensive 
that regained some territory and inflicted heavy ·Iosses on the Germans. The situation at 
Stalingrad was now as critical as it had been at Moscow the previous year. Could Zhukov 
perform another miracle, Stalin wondered, and save the city he had named as a monument 
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to his own greatness? 
Zhukov repeated what he had told his boss two days earlier by telephone: his Stalingrad 
Front lacked the strength to break through the enemy corridor and join up with the 
Southeastern Front.2 Stalin asked what his front would require to accomplish this. With 
Vasilevskii nodding assent, he replied that he would need a full-strength field army, an 
armoured corps, three armoured brigades and 400 howitzers, plus nothing short of a 
complete air army. Stalin then bent over his maps showing the location of Stavka 
reserves, studying them at length while his subordinates discussed in whispers the 
possibility of saving Stalingrad by other means than a fight-to-the-Iast-man defence. They 
had not meant their commander to hear, but Stalin had sharp ears. Looking up suddenly, 
he asked: "What other way out?" Caught thinking aloud, his generals had no ready 
answers. "Look," he said, his appetite for a counteroffensive whetted, ''you better get back 
to the General Staff and give some thought to what can be done at Stalingrad and how 
many reserves, and from where, we will need to reinforce the Stalingrad group. And don't 
forget about the Caucasus Front. We will meet again tomorrow evening at nine."3 
Zhukov and Vasilevskii spent all next day studying alternative possibilities before 
settling on a single major operation which would, in Zhukov's words, "avoid using up our 
reserves in a large number of isolated operations." The plan they submitted to Stalin that 
night involved far more than an attack to break von Paulus' grip on Stalingrad. They 
proposed a major pincer movement "of such magnitude '" as to shift the strategic 
situation in the south decidedly in our favor." This offensive, they explained, could not 
be launched before the middle of November, because it would take that long to organize 
the operation and for the Stavka to obtain sufficient mechanized and armoured forces. 
In the meantime, they would continue feeding troops into Stalingrad, but only enough to 
keep Chiukov barely holding on and Paulus thinking victory was imminent. While Chuikov 
served as their "live bait", drawing Paulus' attention and reserves away from his exposed 
flanks, they would build up their forces opposite the sections of line held by the Rumanian, 
Hungarian and Italian troops. 
"The satellite forces," Zhukov later explained, "were found to be less well armed, less 
experienced, and less capable, even in defense, than the German units. And, most 
important, their soldiers and even many of their officers had no desire to die for others 
on the distant fields of Russia".4 The enemy position was further complicated, he continued, 
by the fact that the Axis "had few troops in his operational reserve in the Volga-Don 
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sector. They amounted to no more than six divisions and were scattered over a broad 
front." When the time came, he said, powerful Soviet forces would smash through 
Rumanian Third and Fourth Armies, north and south of Stalingrad respectively, and swing 
towards a junction near Kalach, 75 kilometres west of the city, thereby trapping Paulus' 
army. Stalin had reservations, but was clearly interested. He instructed the two generals 
to work out the plan in full. Perhaps with the Reichel affair in mind, he dismissed them 
that night with a sombre warning: "No-one, beyond the three of us, is to know about it 
for the time being." 
Zhukov and the General Staff faithfully obeyed their leader's demands for secrecy, 
prohibiting even the drafting of all but the most essential written orders for Operation 
Uranus, the code-name given to the final draft plan for the counteroffensive, approved by 
Stalin in mid-October.5 Only at that stage did they even discuss Uranus with the Front 
commanders involved, who were forbidden to initiate any planning of their own before the 
I 
first week in November. Mainly by verbal instructions, commanders and logistics officers 
began massing men and materiel for the operation.6 In huge vehicle convoys and more 
than 1,300 railway cars per day, they pulled resources from all parts of Stalin's empire: 
troops and foodstuffs from Siberia and the central Asian republics, vehicles, weapons and 
other military freight from the Urals.7 They ordered these movements to be conducted 
as stealthily as possible. Accordingly, railway officers broke troop and supply trains into 
small sections in order to disguise the size and scope of their movements from the 
reconnaissance aircraft that von Richthofen kept constantly overhead and the bombers 
he managed to dispatch when circumstances at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus permitted. 
Vehicle convoys moved at night with their headlights out or dimmed, taking cover during 
daylight in forests, ravines or beneath camouflage nets. Reserves, usually brought close 
to the front before offensives, travelled only as far forward as mobilization pOints around 
Saratov, 350 kilometres north on the Volga. They marched or rode on trucks in small 
groups, at night, with strong air cover, and under strict radio silence. As a result of these 
deception efforts, German intelligence sections failed to deduce the scope and significance 
of Soviet movements, although they were carefully monitoring them. Zeitzler, German 
Chief of the General Staff, acknowledged this soon after the offensive began. In a directive 
dated 28 November, he wrote: "Among the distinctive characteristics of Russian 
preparations for the offensive one must include the excellent concealment of all units 
participating in the attack, especially the tank formations".8 
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According to the official Soviet post-war history, 1,005,000 men, 13,540 artillery pieces 
and mortars and 894 tanks took up their assigned positions in the staging areas, supported 
by 1,115 combat aircraft. 9 They opposed an equal number of Axis troops-1,011,000-
but, because of the latter's spread-out deployment, were far stronger at the points of main 
effort. The Soviet Twenty-First Army, for instance, opposed elements of Third Rumanian 
Army with a strength ratio of only 1 :1.4 along its entire attack frontage, but achieved a 
3:1 superiority at its points of main effort. Soviet troops were also in much better 
condition than their opponents and possessed a substantial superiority in artillery and 
armour. Von Weichs' Army Group B had only 10,300 guns and mortars and 675 tanks, 
most deployed within Stalingrad or spread out thinly along the flanks. The Rumanians 
themselves possessed no tanks to speak of and no anti-tank guns heavier than 47-mm. 
The official history added that, despite the Stavka's efforts to increase the strength of 
Soviet air armies in the Stalingrad sector, von Richthofen's Luftflotte IV retained numerical 
superiority with its 1,216 German and Rumanian aircraft. 
These statistics for ground forces and equipment are apparently accurate, although 
they downplay the depleted nature of all Axis formations, which gave the Soviets a 
greater superiority in manpower than suggested. The statistics for aircraft are misleading, 
however. Von Hardesty points out that the Soviets had several hundred more aircraft 
than advanced in their official post-war history. He places the strength of VVS air armies 
in the Stalingrad sector at 1,350 combat aircraft by one estimate, and at 1,414 by 
another.10 This gave the air armies attempting to liberate Stalingrad almost three times 
as many aircraft as they had to defend it with back in July. The Luftwaffe, Hardesty 
claims, had around 1,200 planes. 
If Hardesty's figures for the VVS are correct-which is probable, based as they are on 
those of Rudenko, commander of the 16th Air Army-then von Richthofen's air fleet was 
greatly outnumbered. As noted in the previous chapter, the depleted Luftflotte IV did not 
possess anywhere near the 1,200 aircraft attributed to it by both the authors of the official 
history and Hardesty. On 20 November, a day after the offensive began, it possessed 
only 732 combat aircraft, of which a mere 402 were operational. 11 
VVS aircraft composed four major formations for the offensive: the 2nd (also engaged 
in the region of Voronezh) and 17th Air Armies, operating in the breakthrough zone 
northwest of Stalingrad, and the 8th and 17th Air Armies, operating in the breakthrough 
zone south of the city. Elements of the Air Defence and Long-Range Bombing fleets 
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operated independently. Colonel-General Aleksandr Novikov, the VVS's capable 
Commander in Chief (and one of the few Soviet senior officers to have distinguished 
himself during the Winter War against Finland), personally supervised and co-ordinated 
the preparations of all these formations. Working closely with Zhukov, he worked tirelessly 
to develop effective inter-service liaison and co-operation and improve the strength and 
state of readiness of his air armies. He displayed flair and imagination, constructing 
dozens of decoy airfields, for example, to disguise the purpose and scope of his air units' 
build-up and protect them from German air attack. 
Not only was the VVS numerically superior to the Luftwaffe by the time of the 
counteroffensive, but, due to the growing productivity of the aviation industry and Novikov's 
repeated insistence that units involved in the offensive receive the most modern aircraft, 
it was also qualitatively capable of matching von Richthofen's fleet. By mid-November, 
three-quarters of all planes and 97 per cent of all fighters in the Stalingrad sector were 
newer models.12 Among the 125 fighters of the 16th Air Army, for instance, only nine 
were obsolete models, and almost all its 103 Shturmoviks were the new 11-2s. 
Despite l\lovikov's efforts, VVS formations encountered problems when they moved 
forward to improvised airfields near the offensive's jump-off points. Runways were often 
only large stretches of flat grass, quarters were usually primitive (tents or covered sleeping 
trenches) and sanitation facilities were rudimentary. Logistical systems functioned poorly, 
not least because trucks and transport aircraft were in short supply. InadeqlJate quatities 
of fuel, ammunition, replacement engines, spare parts and rations reached these forward 
airfields, and only after considerable effort. Despite these difficulties, operational rates 
were good by previous VVS (and Luftwaffe) standards. For example, on 19 November, 
250 (73 per cent) of the 16th Air Army's 343 aircraft were air-worthy, an operational rate 
shared by the other air armies involved and equal to that enjoyed by Luftf/otte /V when 
it had commenced Operation B/au five months earlier.13 (The latter's operational rate, by 
comparison, had since fallen to 55 per cent.14) For the Stalingrad counteroffensive, then, 
tl1e VVS was far stronger and better prepared than it had been for any previous campaign. 
Stalin argued that airpower would playa key part in achieving deep penetrations north 
and south of Stalingrad. As he stated to Zhukov on 12 November: "The experience of 
war ... indicates that we can achieve a victory over the Germans only if we gain air 
supremacy." 15 Explaining air tactics strikingly similar to those repeatedly used by the 
Luftwaffe to great effect, he said that the VVS's first task would be to gain air superiority 
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by striking German airfields in a series of heavy raids beginning on 16 l\Jovember.16 The 
air force would then concentrate its actions in the breakthrough zones, clearing the skies 
of Axis aircraft and providing Soviet ground forces with effective air support. While fighters 
and Shturmoviks continued attacking airfields and any planes managing to get airborne, 
bombers and other ground-attack aircraft would bomb and strafe enemy forces and 
defensive positions in front of advancing Red Army formations. Once those formations 
shattered the Axis defences, VVS units would pursue retreating troops in a sustained 
fashion to prevent any enemy efforts to re-establish a stable defensive line. 
As it happened, frequent snow storms and constant low cloud and fog impeded Soviet 
air reconnaissance missions and Shturmovik raids on German rear areas. iVlore importantly, 
these adverse weather conditions prevented the attacks on Luftwaffe airfields planned for 
the three days before the counteroffensive began. The only consolation to Soviet air 
commanders was that the bad weather also prevented von Richthofen's units conducting 
effective attacks on their own airfields and ground forces. On the other hand, Paulus, 
still hoping to present the desolate ruins of Stalingrad to his expectant Fuhrer, considered 
the plummeting temperature to be a powerful ally in his battle against Chuikov's remaining 
forces within the city. Packs of ice were now building up in the Volga, preventing the 
small vessels of the Soviet flotilla from ferrying reinforcements, rations, ammunition and 
equipment to the west bank. If ever Paulus had a chance to destroy the remaining 
pockets of resistance, it was now, in the few weeks left before the river iced over solidly, 
allowing men and vehicles to cross again. During the night of 18 and 19 l\Jovember, the 
temperature once more dropped below freezing, and Chuikov's depleted groups of cold, 
hungry and poorly-equipped soldiers spent their fourth straight night without the arrival of 
reinforcements and supplies. Their defeat looked imminent. What neither Paulus nor 
Chuikov (informed by Zhukov only at the last moment) knew, though, was that within a 
few hours strong Soviet formations would begin ripping through the flanks of Army Group 
B in an offensive that would soon trap the former's army in the very city it had spent three 
months trying to take. 
Uranus Begins 
Stalin's onslaught began at dawn on 19 November, set in motion late the previous 
evening by the Stavka's coded message to Don and Southwestern Fronts: "Send a 
messenger to pick up the fur gloves"Y At 0730, the artillery regiments of Fifth Tank Army 
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and Twenty-First Army, in the Serafimovich bridgehead and around Kletskaya respectively, 
prepared their guns after receiving a coded alert message. Ten minutes later, the command 
"ogon" (fire!) arrived, and their 3,500 guns and mortars erupted in a mighty barrage 
against Rumanian Third Army. They fired their last salvoes at 0848, two minutes before 
the first infantry echelon streamed forward through snow and thick fog, many troops 
running behind or riding on top of the hundreds of tanks churning through the Rumanian 
forward defences. 
Most Rumanian units defended bravely at first, some even managing to hold their 
positions despite savage attacks by vastly superior forces. Others cracked immediately 
and began retreating, creating a sense of panic that quickly spread to all but the most 
courageous battalions (and certain units surprised the Soviets with their tenacity and 
fighting spirit18). When scores of T-34 lumbered through their lines, picking off artillery 
installations and the few anti-tank batteries available, thousands of Rumanians succumbed 
to what Panzer commander Heinz Guderian had once called "tank fright", Terrified, they 
abandoned their positions and eqUipment, threw down their arms and ran, screaming 
"Enemy tan ks in the rear!" 19 
Genera/major Ferdinand Helm's Forty-Eighth Panzer Corps did all it could to stem the 
tide, but unusual circumstances had left it weakened. The crew of the 22nd Panzer 
Division, which formed the corps' nucleus, had dug its tanks into pits and covered them 
with straw to protect them from the cold. Now, when they hurriedly tried to start the 
engines and race forward to the Rumanians' aid, they found less than half their tanks 
operational.20 Mice nesting in the straw had chewed away the insulation of the electrical 
wiring, causing short circuits. Only 42 of the division's 104 Panzers rolled forward to 
meet the enemy. Even so, when those Panzers and their accompanying anti-tank battalions 
engaged their Soviet counterparts, they performed well, destroying 26 T-34s. Had Heim 
possessed additional armoured units to cover the 22nd's flanks, they may have blunted 
the enemy attack. As it was, the Rumanian 1st Armoured Division, equipped with a few 
German tanks and numerous anti-tank guns, had been sent off in another direction and 
was unable to offer assistance. Rumanian infantry on either side of the Panzer division 
proved incapable of throwing back the Soviet advance or even holding ground. They 
broke and fled, allowing the Red Army to sweep through the gaps. 
By evening, whole Rumanian formations, including the 9th, 13th and 14th Infantry 
Divisions, had been stricken with the "tank fright" epidemic or disintegrated under the 
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crushing weight of superior enemy forces. They streamed to the rear in disorganized 
columns. By nightfall, Soviet armoured spearheads had ripped open an 80-kilometre-wide 
hole in the Rumanian front and were over half-way to Kalach. At 2200, von Weichs sent 
Paulus the following message: "The development of the situation at Rumanian Third 
Army compels radical measures to secure forces to protect the deep flank of Sixth 
Army .... All offensive operations in Stalingrad are to be halted at once."21 Sixth Army, he 
added, must pull three Panzer divisions and an infantry division out of the city and deploy 
them to meet the attack on the army's left flank. Chuikov, who launched his own small 
counterattack within the destroyed city at the same time as the massive Soviet effort 
against Rumanian Third Army, was ecstatic to learn that the Rumanian line had collapsed 
and to see German units leaving the city at last for defensive fighting on the Don. Under 
the most demanding circumstances, the remains of his Sixty-Second Army had clung to 
a few isolated sections of city, preventing it falling completely to the hated invaders. "All 
of us," he later wrote, "from the private to the general-felt proud to be the sons of the 
Soviet people, felt the pride of the unconquered."22 
That night, von Richthofen bitterly cursed the Rumanian army for "scattering because 
of tank terror". Realizing that Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies faced a grave threat, he 
immediately ordered his last air units in the Caucasus to fly north as soon as weather 
conditions permitted, leaving the two German armies in that vast region with a small 
"holding" force of only two fighter groups and a few reconnaissance squadrons.23 He also 
ordered the immediate evacuation of numerous command posts and airfields situated 
between the Chir and Don rivers back to Morozovskaya, Tatsinskaya and other airfields 
behind the Chir. He could not risk losing them to the Soviet forces advancing through 
Rumanian Third Army's shattered front. Although he called these evacuations "urgent", 
he knew that they too could only be carried out as weather conditions allowed. 
Because of the bad weather, German air units played only a minor part in defensive 
fighting that first day of the Soviet attack; Rumanian air units, whose surveillence of the 
build-up opposite their Third Army had recently proved helpful in piecing together miSSing 
sections of the intelligence jigsaw, played no part at al1.24 "The weather was dreadful," 
von Richthofen explained, "Feezing fog, snow and biting rain. We were unable to carry 
out any air operatons at all. That's why we COUldn't even get a clear picture of the 
situation from the air."25 He was most concerned, adding: "I only hope the Russians 
won't get as far our main supply railway, which is a very real possibility." The significance 
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of the situation was obvious: German forces would again have to spend a dreadful winter 
fending off destruction. "Now we're back in the digusting mess of last year," he glumly 
wrote. 
Von Richthofen exaggerated his air fleet's inactivity. Bad weather and poor visibilty 
grounded most units throughout 19 November, preventing effective reconnaissance, 
systematic interdiction or formation attacks on particular targets. Still, from Fliegerkorps 
VII/'s headquarters in Oblivskaya, Generalleutnant Fiebig ordered several small groups 
of Stukas and ground-attack aircraft to take to the skies. Flying from airfields around 
Karpovka, 20 kilometres west of Stalingrad, elements of the 1 st Group of the 2nd Dive-
Bomber Wing conducted the bulk of Luftwaffe's 120 sorties. Operating individually, in 
pairs or in squadrons, its Stukas bombed and strafed Soviet troops, vehicles and, in 
particular, tanks and cavalry formations. Hans-Ulrich Rudel, who ended the war as 
Germany's most highly-decorated soldier and the only holder of the Knight's Cross with 
Golden Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds, led his Stuka squadron into battle that day. 
Although frequently quoted, his account of those operations is so exceptional it is worth 
repeating here: 
One morning after the receipt of an urgent report our Wing takes off in the 
direction of the bridgehead at Kletskaya. The weather is bad: low lying clouds, 
a light fall of snow, the temperature probably 20 degrees below zero; we fly 
low. What troops are those coming towards us? We have not gone more than 
half way. Masses in brown uniforms-are they Russians? No. Rumanians. 
Some of them are even throwing away their rifles in order to be able to run 
the faster: a shocking Sight, we are prepared for the worst. We fly the length 
of the column emplacements. The guns are abandoned, not destroyed. Their 
ammunition lies beside them. We have passed some distance beyond them 
before we sight the first Soviet troops. 
They find all the Rumanian positions in front of them deserted. We attack with 
bombs and gun-fire-but how much use is that when there is no resistance 
on the ground? 
We are seized with a blind fury-horrid premonitions rise in our minds: how 
can this catastrophe be averted? Relentlessly I drop my bombs on the enemy 
and spray bursts of M.G. fire into these shoreless yellow-green waves of 
oncoming troops ... I haven't a bullet left, not even to protect myself against 
the contingency of a pursuit attack. Now quickly back to remunition and refuel. 
With these hordes our attacks are merely a drop in the bucket, but I am 
reluctant to think of that now. 
On the return flight we again observe the fleeing Rumanians; it is a good thing 
for them that I have run out of ammunition to stop this cowardly roUt,26 
Next morning, Paulus' Fourteenth Panzer Corps and the four divisions he withdrew 
from Stalingrad shifted to the west bank of the Don. Together with the three divisions 
already there, they withstood repeated attempts by Soviet Twenty-First and Sixty-Fifth 
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Armies to create a secondary pocket west of the river. Greatly outnumbered and lacking 
mobility because of fuel shortages, however, they were unable to stop the major 
envelopment. 
Throughout the 20th, "very dreadful weather" again hindered Fiebig's efforts to halt the 
advancing Soviet spearheads. 27 His units once more conducted around 120 sorties, but 
they had no more effect than during the previous day. The weather also hampered 
Fiebig's efforts to evacuate the airfields in the Soviet advance path. Only a third of his 
units had managed to move back behind the Chir the previous day, and progress on the 
20th was just as difficult. Soviet forces advancing rapidly out of the Serafimovich 
bridgehead reached Kachalinskaya and linked up with the forces driving southeastwards 
from Kletskaya. Elements of the former then thrust out towards the Chir, threatening 
Fiebig's command post in Oblivskaya and the remaining airfields in the immediate vicirlity.28 
At some of the airfields further east, the last planes were leaving when Soviet tanks rolled 
into view and began firing. Because of the speed of the enemy advance, Fiebig's units 
were not always able to remove or destroy all materiel. Morozovskaya, Tatsinskaya and 
the other German airfields west of the Chir suffered greatly 'from the loss of essential 
supplies and equipment. The booty captured by the Red Army included vehicles, fuel, 
replacement engines, spares, maintenance machinery, and a variety of other valuable 
items, such as aerial photographic development and interpretation devices. 
The Luftwaffe prepared to defend a number of headquarters and airfields that it could 
not evacuate quickly or needed to keep functioning temporarily because of their important 
communications systems. AlthOUgh Oblivskaya lay east of the Chir river and was, therefore, 
at risk of being overrun, Fiebig chose to command Fliegerkorps VIII from that town whilst 
signals teams linked his airfields behind the river with proper wire communications. He 
would stay until he learned from von Richthofen whether the High Command planned to 
launch counteroffensive or relief operations. He especially wanted to hold the rail bridge 
over the Chir at Oblivskaya, across which Sixth Army's supplies had passed. He argued 
that, regardless of which option Hitler took, the bridge "has to be held so that it can be 
used as a starting point for future operations." 29 
Luftwaffe flak units fighting east of the Chir as part of ground formations also prepared 
to defend themselves from being overrun. For example, Genera/major Pickert, commander 
of the 9th Flak Division, noted in his diary on the 20th that the situation was "far more 
serious" than he had thought the day before and that, as a result, he had arranged "all 
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kinds of counter-measures, including the security of our own headquarters"?O As it 
happened, continued Soviet advances forced Pickert to move his headquarters back to 
Novocherkassk, in the Donets Basin, only the following day. Finding most of his battalions 
cut off from the west two days later, he pased command of the few that had escaped 
encirclement to one of his senior officers, then flew into the pocket itself to direct the 
operations of his trapped troops.31 
Von Richthofen's fleet participated not only in the defence of its own installations, but 
also in the establishment and protection of a new line on the Chir river. Oberst Stahel, 
commander of Flak Regiment 99, formed Kampf-Gruppe Stahel (Combat Group Stahel), 
a makeshift defence force initially comprising only flak, field police, kitchen, supply, 
maintenance and signals battalions. Establishing at Oblivskaya a sole bridgehead on the 
eastern bank of the Chir, Kampf-Gruppe Stahel took up defensive positions on the west 
bank for more than 50 kilometres along the river's great bend.32 "Encouraged by this 
example" (according to one historian), other army and Luftwaffe forces did the same.33 
South of Stalingrad, meanwhile, the second great Soviet pincer thrust out towards 
Kalach on the morning of 20 November. Stalin grad Front's Fifty-First and Fifty Seventh 
Armies broke through the section of front held by Rumanian Sixth Corps, which collapsed 
even quicker than Rumanian Third Army formations had the previous day, and swept in 
behind Fourth Panzer Army' right flank. Hoth was disgusted by the performance of the 
Rumanians, complaining that all his army's work over the last weeks had been "ruined 
in a day".34 In places, they had offered no resistance at all. They had, he fumed, fallen 
victim to "an indescribable tank panic." For the defenders, the situation looked grim. The 
bulk of Fourth Panzer Army and all of Sixth Army faced imminent encirclement. The 
seriousness of the situation was not lost on Pickert, who noted in his diary that night: "It 
became apparent by evening that the enemy has broken through in the south, without 
meeting any real resistance, and looks set to penetrate further. In the north, meanwhile, 
the deep breach appears to have stopped for now, but further penetrations look certain 
there tOO."35 
Three days later, shortly before dusk on 23 November, the two Soviet pincers met 
near the town of Sovietskii, twenty kilometres southeast of Kalach. Vasilevskii's and 
Zhukov's great armoured trap had exceeded all Stalin's expectations. It clamped shut 
around what the Soviet General Staff first thought were 85,000 to 95,000 German troops.36 
In fact, as they soon learned, it enveloped three times that number of men-well over 
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250,000, along with 100 tanks, nearly 2,000 guns and 10,000 trucks-in a pocket measuring 
only fifty kilometres from west to east and forty from north to south. Encircled formations 
included Paulus' entire Sixth Army, numerous elements of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army, 
the remains of two Rumanian divisions, plus a variety of specialist and auxiliary units 
(ranging from signals and logistics personnel to Todt Organisation construction teams).37 
On Hitler's instructions, Paulus had flown into the rapidly-closing pocket the previous day 
in order to assume command of the encircled forces. 
Over 12,000 Luftwaffe troops also found themselves trapped, including most of 
Genera/major Pickert's 9th Flak Division (with 11 heavy and 19 light batteries and numerous 
supply units), several signals teams, the ground organisations of two airfields, elements 
of the Third Fighter Wing, and the 12th, 14th and 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Groups.3S 
Von Richthofen immediately placed Pickert, the senior Luftwaffe officer in the pocket, in 
charge of all these air force units.39 He could not have known at that stage that he would 
soon be placed in charge of providing ground support services inside the pocket for a 
massive airlift operation about to be launched. He would be responsible for the 
administration and operation of airfields, the daily unloading of transport planes and the 
distribution of supplies, and the flak protection of airfields, the pocket's outer defenses, 
and the quarter of a million men trapped inside. 
Before analyzing the airlift itself, Luftwaffe operations during the final three days before 
the Soviet trap closed on 23 l\Jovember should be described. On the 21st, one historian 
claims, "a full day of operations was possible, and considerable damage was done to 
Soviet cavalry formations by the [Rumanian] Corpul Aerian and Luftwaffe".40 Contemporary 
sources, however, reveal a different picture. For instance, von Richthofen complained of 
"dreadful weather everywhere, which prevented us flying in any sector."41 The 3rd Group 
of the 3rd Fighter Wing recorded in its own diary that day: "Still no operational possibilities 
because of foul weather."42 Several squadrons from that group did take to the sky, along 
with elements of other groups, but only because advancing Soviet spearheads forced 
them hastily to relocate to airfields in the Oblivskaya bridgehead, back on the Chir, or to 
fields west of the river. Despite poor visibilty during their flights, pilots observed the 
severity of ground fighting as the Soviet pincers closed in on Kalach. According to their 
group's war diary, "The front is a sea of flames and smoke and explosions of snow 
caused by artillery fire." Many army and air force units attempting to escape westward 
through the rapidly-shrinking gap shared the fate of that fighter group's supply and 
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maintenance teams. "Elements of the ground personnel," the diary states, "which are 
supposed to transfer in vehicle formations, can no longer cross the Don bridge at Kalach 
and must, therefore, return to Pitomnik, within the closing pocket." 
Next day, bad weather again curtailed air operations. "Fliegerkorps VIII and the 
Rumanian [squadrons] only operated to a small extent," the air fleet commander noted 
in his journal. "In total, only 150 sorties. Actually, it was only an attempt at operations. 
How miserable it is that we don't have good weather to hunt the Russian tanks and pick 
them off at close range."43 Fortunately, he added, "we were able to carry out relatively 
good supply missions for the cut-off Rumanians." Indeed, several German squadrons and 
a Rumanian squadron carried or dropped fuel, ammunitions and rations to several isolated 
Rumanian formations, including the combat group headed by General Mihail Lascar. 
Lascar's men certainly needed these supplies; few had eaten properly since "Uranus" 
began on the 19th and all were short of ammunition. Refusing to let his men retreat or 
accept repeated Soviet calls to surrender, Lascar fought defiantly until his group was 
finally overwhelmed and he was taken prisoner on the 23rd. He probably only learned 
that Hitler had rewarded his courage with the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, the first 
awarded to a non-German, when he returned from captivity in April 1945 to command a 
Communist division fighting for the Soviets. 
"Tolerable weather" on the 23rd permitted Fliegerkorps VIII to increase its operations.44 
Attacks against Soviets armoured and cavalry formations formed the bulk of its work, 
carried out by fighters and Stukas now based at crowded airfields in the Oblivskaya 
bridgehead and at very congested fields around Morozovskaya and Tatsinskaya, west of 
the Chir. For the last six weeks or so, Rumanian air units operating from the latter fields 
had outnumbered German units. Whilst Fiebig's bombers had flown from those fields, all 
his other aircraft-fighters, dive-bombers and ground-attack planes-had flown from fields 
east of the Chir. Now, with the exception of Oblivskaya, the fields around Morozovskaya 
and Tatsinskaya became the most advanced airfields safe from the Red Army. The influx 
of German combat aircraft falling back to them from the overrun airfields east of the Chir 
created major overcrowding problems, leaving many Rumanian squadrons (to quote one 
writer) "marginalised on their own airfields".45 These problems would increase in the 
coming two weeks, when a second influx of aircraft occurred, this time transport planes 
arriving from the Reich and other sectors of the eastern front to supply Sixth Army by air. 
On the 23rd, Fliegerkorps VIJI also carried out reconnaissance missions, "which failed 
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to yield a clear picture of the situation", and "a little [air] supply".46 It dropped equipment, 
ammunition and rations to beleaguered Panzer forces around Bokovskaya, on the Chir 
100 kilometres northwest of Oblivskaya, and, for the first time, carried supplies into the 
Stalingrad pocket. For the next nine weeks, the air corps would do little else than fly food 
and materiel into that pocket in an increasingly-hopeless attempt to save Paulus' trapped 
army. 
The Decision to Airlift 
Since the war, almost all writers on the Battle of Stalingrad have blamed Goring for 
the airlift, claiming that when Hitler asked him what the air force could do, he made rash 
promises of an airlift, hoping its success would restore his flagging prestige. As von 
Manstein wrote, typifying this line of argument: "I am unsure whether Goring's frivolous 
assurances to Hitler were due to a false appreciation of existing capabilities, or of a 
desperate need for admiration. Whatever the cause, Goring was responsible."47 Many 
early writers on Stalingrad, it should be noted, were participants in the events, whose 
biases and preconceptions are evident in their self-serving, blame-shifting accounts. 
However, their works were influential in shaping scholarly opinion, and their descriptions 
and explanations have been, with a few exceptions48, accepted uncritically to the present 
day. In a recent work on Stalingrad, for example, Franz Kurowski repeats many errors 
and concludes: "What had moved Hitler to give this death order to Sixth Army? During 
a telephone conversation on 23 November 1942, he asked Goring directly whether the 
supply of Stalingrad by air was possible. Goring replied: 'The thing appears feasible."'49 
Likewise, Samuel Mitcham writes in his own book on the Luftwaffe: "The only way the 
Reichsmarschall could redeem himself in the Fuehrer's eyes was to score a spectacular 
military victory. Stalingrad seemed to be his ticket. He promised Hitler that the Luftwaffe 
would resupply Stalingrad by air .... It was the major turning point of the war."50 Goring 
was certainly among those responsible for one of the war's most ill-considered decisions, 
but he does not deserve sole blame, as this study will attempt to demonstrate. 
When Uranus began on 19 November, Hitler was enjoying a brief holiday at the 
Berghof, his mountain retreat in Berchtesgaden, southern Bavaria. His relaxation came 
to an abrupt end that afternoon, when he took a telephone call from his headquarters in 
East Prussia. A clearly-agitated Zeitzler shouted down the line that hundreds of Soviet 
tanks had shattered the Rumanian front exactly where the Fuhrer had predicted and 'that 
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the Rumanians were in full flight. 51 Repeated "updates" throughout the afternoon convinced 
Hitler that the situation was serious, although he still felt that Heim's Forty-Eighth Panzer 
Corps could, if properly deployed, contain the enemy break-through. He promptly ordered 
von Weichs to abandon all further offensive operations within Stalingrad and transfer 
forces from the city to the broken flan k. 
When Southwestern Front breached the Axis flank south of Stalingrad next day, Hitler 
realized immediately that his Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies were in grave danger of 
encirclement. He ordered Field Marshal von Manstein to abandon the planned attack at 
Velikiye Luki in the far north and take charge of a newly-created command, Army Group 
Don, in the Stalingrad sector.52 Von Manstein was ideal for the job because of his fine 
strategic mind and unparalleled experience with Rumanian units. Although delighted by 
Hitler's trust, the Field Marshal was initially discouraged to learn the composition of his 
new "army group": Rumanian Third Army, which had crumbled wherever struck, Fourth 
Panzer Army, a large portion of which (including most of its tanks) lay trapped between 
the quickly-closing pincers, and Sixth Army, completely bottled up. The latter was also 
worn down after months of constant action, with all battalions far below strength. Hitler 
did tell the Field Marshal to expect reinforcements totalling six infantry and four panzer 
divisions, a Luftwaffe field division and some flak units. Of these formations, however, 
only two infantry divisions were at hand. The others would not arrive until early in December. 
Hans Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe's Chief of the General Staff, arrived at the Berghof 
that same day. Hitler had summoned him from his headquarters in East Prussia to 
discuss the air force's role in any attempted break-out or relief operations.53 Goring was 
too "busy" to attend; he was presiding over an oil conference at Karinhall, his country 
estate in Berlin. No verbatim records of Hitler's conversation with Jeschonnek have 
surfaced, but the basic facts are known: the FDhrer explained that Sixth Army would 
probably be totally cut off within days, that he had organized a new army group under 
von Manstein, and that it would launch a relief effort as soon as possible. He hoped not 
only to free Sixth Army within a short time, but also to regain lost territory and rebuild a 
strong defensive line. Apparently understanding Sixth Army's encirclement to be temporary, 
Jeschonnek assured Hitler that, if both transport planes and bombers were used, and if 
adequate airfields inside and outside the pocket could be maintained, the Luftwaffe could 
airlift sufficient supplies to the army. After all, he pointed out, the air force had successfully 
sustained 100,000 men in the Demyansk pocket for several months during the previous 
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winter. 
The comparison with Demyansk was specious, as Jeschonnek himself probably realized 
as soon as he had time to think through the issues (which was seldom possible when 
dealing with Hitler, who always wanted immediate answers to his questions). The 100,000 
men of the Second Army Corps trapped at Demyansk had required no less than 300 tons 
of supplies per day. 54 Because of low operational rates caused by winter conditions, the 
Luftwaffe had been forced to commit almost 500 Ju 52s to the airlift in order to ensure 
that suf'fient planes-around 150-could carry that tonnage each day.55 Further, the VVS 
presence at Demyansk had been negligible, allowing almost uninterrupted German air 
operations with low 10sses.56 The situation at Stalingrad was very different. First, almost 
three times as many men were encircled there than had been at Demyansk. If 100,000 
men had needed 300 tons of supplies per day, then, logically, 250,000 men would need 
around 750 tons, an almost-impossible tonnage to deliver (as calculations made at Hitler's 
headquarters a few days later confirmed57). Second, the Luftwaffe did not possess 
anywhere near enough transport aircraft and available bombers to deliver such tonnages. 
Third, VVS forces at Stalingrad were now far stronger than they had been at Demyansk. 
They would greatly hamper air-lift operations and inflict high losses. 
Jeschonnek's spontaneous and ill-considered assurance that the air force could sustain 
Sixth Army at Stalingrad pleased the FDhrer. He could hardly allow the army to abandon 
that city after he had proclaimed to the entire German nation in September that "you can 
be certain no-one will get us away from there!" and, only two weeks ago, had trumpeted 
in the Munich Lowenbraukeller that his forces had taken that "vitally-important city ... with 
Stalin's name", where the "real" war was being fought. Unable to eat his words, Hitler 
now found himself committed to holding Stalingrad. On the afternoon of the 21st, therefore, 
he sent a message directly to Paulus, ordering him to stand firm "despite the danger of 
temporary encirclement." He was to hold open the rail link as long as possible. "As to 
airlift," he added, "orders will follow".58 
Hitler did not envisage an airlift of the Demyansk scale or duration. He still thought that 
von Manstein would soon break the encirclement and restore the southern front. Sixth 
Army would only need to be supplied by air in the meantime. That is not the way 
commanders in the field, faced with the grim realities of their predicament, interpreted 
Hitler's references to an airlift. To the horror of local air commanders, Sixth Army's senior 
officers felt that, unless they broke out immediately (which they unsuccessfully advocated), 
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their army would have to be supplied by air for weeks, if not months. It would need 750 
tons of supplies per day, they stated (reducing this figure to 500 tons within a few days). 
Later that day (21 November), Fiebig telephoned Genera/major Schmidt, Sixth Army's 
Chief of Staff, to discuss the army's intentions. Paulus listened on another phone. 
Fiebig's report on this conversation reveals the tension that quickly developed between 
army and air force commanders when the former readily embraced Hitler's suggestion 
that the air force would keep alive the trapped army: 
In response to my questions about Sixth Army's intentions, Genera/ Schmidt 
replied that the army commander proposed to deploy his army in a hedgehog 
[that is, all-around] defence of Stalingrad .... Regarding the possibilities of this 
hedgehog defence, I asked how they planned to keep Sixth Army supplied, 
especially when the supply line from the rear looked certain to be cut very 
soon. Genera/ Schmidt replied that supplies would have to carried in by air. 
I replied that supplying an entire army by air was impossible, particularly when 
our transport aircraft were already heavily committed in North Africa. I warned 
him against exaggerated expectations. Genera/oberst von Paulus entered the 
conversation occasionally on his other telephone line. Next morning, at 0700, 
I telephoned General Schmidt again, telling him tl1at he was counting too 
strongly on air supply. I stressed to him again that, after long deliberations, 
based on my experience and knowledge of the [limited] means available, 
supplying Sixth Army by air was simply not feasible. Further, the weather and 
enemy situations were completely unpredictable factors. 59 
Von Richthofen agreed with Fiebig: it was madness for Paulus and his staff to plan 
an all-around defence at Stalingrad and pin its hopes on the Luftwaffe to sustain their 
army. The air force simply lacked the ability to keep it supplied. "Sixth Army believes that 
it will be supplied by the air fleet in its hedgehog positions," he complained in his diary 
on the 21st.GO "I make every effort to convince it that this cannot be accomplished, 
because the necessary transport resources are not available." During "dreadfully many 
telephone calls ... until late in the night," he frantically warned everyone who would 
listen-including Goring in Berlin, Zeitzler in East Prussia, Jeschonnek at Berchtesgaden 
and von Weichs at Army Group B headquarters-that he lacked the means to supply 
Paulus' army. It should immediately attempt to break OUt. 61 
The following day, Pickert echoed these sentiments to Paulus and Schmidt during a 
conference in Nizhne-Chirskaya (outside the pocket), attended by these generals and 
Hoth, Fourth Panzer Army's commander. According to Pickert's subsequent version of 
what transpired (the only surviving account), Schmidt asked him at one point what he 
thought should be done. 62 "I would gather together all the forces I could and break out 
to the southwest," the flak general replied. Schmidt explained that Hitler had expressly 
ordered Sixth Army to stand fast at Stalingrad, that the army lacked sufficient fuel for a 
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proper break-out attempt and that the terrain itself complicated matters. The Soviets held 
higher ground to the west, meaning that Sixth Army would be exposed to their guns if 
they attempted to break out. Such an attempt would have to be made without heavy 
weapons, in any event, because of the fuel shortages. Moreover, it would be necessary 
to leave 15,000 sick and wounded soldiers to their fate. For these reasons, Schmidt 
added, a break-out would probably turn into a "Napoleonic catastrophe". 
Pickert insisted that a break-out was still the only solution, adding that his flak forces 
could help considerably. He had numerous heavy batteries for covering 'fire, and his men 
could carry his 160 20-mm flak guns and their ammunition across the steppes. "No," 
Scrlmidt concluded, "the army has been ordered to stand fast at Stalingrad. As a result, 
we shall form hedgehog defences and expect supplies from the air." The flak commander, 
who apparently had no knowledge of Fiebig's previous debate with the army on the 
matter, was flabbergasted. "Supply an entire army from the air?-absolutely impossiblel 
It simply cannot be done, especially in this weather." Despite repeatedly urging the Army 
to break out, and explaining at length the reasons why the Luftwaffe could not supply the 
army, Pickert was unable to persuade the army. Paulus had remained silent throughout 
the discussion, but finally told the airman the two most important things in his mind: that 
Hitler had ordered him to stand fast, and that a break-out attempt with the means available 
would probably only end in disaster. Schmidt remained adamant about the airlift. "It 
simply has to be done," he stated, adding that his men would do their bit to cut down the 
supply level by eating the thousands of horses within the pocket. 
Thus, Luftwaffe commanders in the field were unanimous both in their belief that the 
air force could not supply the entire Sixth Army and in their condemnation of the idea to 
local army commanders and the High Command itself. They made several converts, most 
notably Zeitzler (as will soon be shown) and Genera/oberst von Weichs, commander of 
Army Group 8. The latter had listened carefully to von Richthofen's arguments. Persuaded, 
he sent a teletyped message to the High Command on 22 November. 63 The prompt 
withdrawl of Sixth Army was essential, he said, especially because "the supply by air of 
the twenty divisions that constitute this army is not possible. With the air transport available, 
and in favourable weather conditions, it is possible to carry in only one-tenth of their 
essential daily requirements." Von Weichs added that although a break-out would "entail 
heavy losses, especially in materie/," it was the only viable option and would, if successful, 
"result in favourable developments in the sitation as a whole." 
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Several of the army corps commanders bottled up in Stalingrad also agreed that the 
war was over for them if the High Command refused a break-out and ordered an air-lift. 
On 22 November, while Pickert was battling Paulus and Schmidt in Nizhne-Chirskaya, a 
meeting between corps commanders took place at Gumrak, within the pocket.64 Acting 
on his own initiative, von Seydlitz, commander of the Fifty-First Army Corps, summoned 
the other corps commanders-Generals Jaenicke of the Fourth Army Corps, Heitz of the 
Eighth, Strecker of the Eleventh, and Hube of the Fourteenth Panzer Corps-to discuss 
the situation. They all agreed that they must gather all their strength for an attempt to 
break through the encirclement. They scheduled their attack for the 25th and, in agreement 
with von Weichs (but not with Paulus, who had no knowledge of their plans at that stage), 
began regrouping for the operation. 
However, Paulus-like his Chief of Staff-was apparently not persuaded by the airmen's 
warnings. He vaccilated throughout the 22nd and 23rd, afraid to contradict Hitler's order 
to stand fast even though he knew his opportunities for a successful break-out were 
disappearing with every passing hour. On the 22nd, he did request "freedom of decision 
in the event of failure to construct southern defensive positions". Yet, totally ignoring von 
Richthofen's, Fiebig's and Pickert's logical arguments against an airlift, he stated that, as 
long as he could close his exposed southern front "and receive ample airborne supplies", 
he intended to hold the area still in his possession.65 Next evening, in response to Hitler's 
fresh order to construct all-around defensive positions and await relief from outside, the 
general replied with another teletype message. This time he did allude to mounting 
opposition to the proposed airlift, but said only that "timely and adequate supply has been 
ru led out".66 H is army must break through the encirclement to the southwest, he stated, 
because it was now suffering acute fuel and ammunition shortages and increasing enemy 
attacks against certain sectors. As the army could not hold out for long, he again requested 
"freedom of decision." His five corps commanders, he added, shared his views on the 
situation. 
Hitler's ears were now deaf to such pleas. His mind was firmly made up. After arriving 
back at his East Prussian headquarters on the 23rd, he replied to Paulus by radio in the 
early hours of the 24th. Sixth Army (which he now designated "Fortress Stalingrad") 
would stay and defend itself vigorously. "Air supply by a hundred more Junkers is getting 
underway," he said, trying to reassure the frantic army commander.67 By now, the 
Fuhrer's notion of an airlift operation had changed considerably since Jeschonnek had 
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first assured him that Sixth Army could be supplied by air. He had then described the 
army's encirclement as temporary, and Jeschonnek had made his rash assurance with 
that in mind. Now he clearly envisaged a Demyansk-style airlift, only even larger and 
longer-lasting. "Sixth Army will stay where it is," he yelled at Zeitzler in the evening of 
the 23rd, according to the latter's postwar account. 68 "It is the garrison of a fortress, and 
the duty of fortress troops is to withstand sieges. If necessary they will hold out all winter, 
and I shall relieve them by a spring offensive." 
The 'firmness of Hitler's conviction that the "fortress" should stand fast and that the 
Luftwaffe could keep it adequately supplied had grown considerably in the two days since 
Jeschonnek had first mentioned it. One of the main reasons for his increased conviction 
was the almost-unanimous support for the decision expressed by those around him. At 
Berchtesgaden, and during his long train journey to East Prussia on the 23rd, the Fuhrer 
had no contact-personal or telegraphic-with the army and air force commanders at the 
front. During that critical decision-making period, he did not speak to von Richthofen, 
Fiebig or Pickert, whose air forces would have to carry out the massive supply operation 
and who were now frantically warning almost everyone else that they lacked the means 
to sustain Sixth Army. Nor did he communicate with von Weichs, who shared their view 
and advocated an immediate break-out. Hitler learned of their views from Zeitzler, who 
defended their assessment. Yet, because their warning were not delivered personally, 
but only passed on by the army's "over-anxious" Chief of Staff, they carried little weight. 
Hitler merely accused Zeitzler of being too pessimistic and advised him to stop paying 
heed to "defeatist" commanders who couldn't see the forest for the trees. 
The military advisers accompanying the Fuhrer-his faithful paladins, Keitel and Jodi, 
and their skeleton staffs-were in no position to make detailed assessments or offer 
informed advice. The sycophantic Keitel, who seldom expressed views contrary to the 
Fuhrer's, acted true to form throughout this crucial period. "The Volga must be held!... 
Sixth Army must hold out!", he repeatedly told Hitler. Although Jodi was no lackey, 
despite the efforts of many post-war writers to paint him as one, he was still smarting from 
the rough treatment Hitler had dished out to him when he supported Field Marshal List 
in September. He was not yet ready to receive more. He therefore gave Hitler far more 
cautious but still agreeable advice: although Sixth Army was certainly in a predicament, 
he argued, and its destruction looked certain if relief was not forthcoming, the vast 
territorial gains made during the summer campaign should not be abandoned before von 
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Manstein's relief operation is attempted. In the meantime, the Luftwaffe should keep the 
army supplied. 
Aside from Zeitzler's, the only dissenting voice Hitler heard during his last two days 
in Berchtesgaden and his long journey north to East Prussia belonged to Jeschonnek, 
who had abandoned his earlier position and now meekly suggested that Sixth Army 
should break out.69 The Luftwaffe Chief of Staff regretted his earlier assurances to Hitler. 
Almost as soon as the words were out of his mouth, he wished he could swallow them 
again. After having his staff check his figlJres and after talking with von Richthofen 
several times by telephone, he quickly realized that nothing close to adequate logistical 
support of Sixth Army by air would be possible, even with consistently favourable weather 
and taking no account of VVS action. He and von Richthofen were close friends, but the 
latter clearly dominated their relationship and, when they disagreed on matters, usually 
managed to win Jeschonnek over. This was clearly one such case. However, although 
Jeschonnek notified Hitler that he might have been too hasty when he made his earlier 
assessment, his retraction carried no weight. Not only did Keitel and Jodi believe Sixth 
Army should stay, Hitler retorted, but Jeschonnek's own superior, Reichsmarschall Goring, 
had now given his personal assurance that the air force could fully meet the army's 
supply needs. 
Determining when Goring first specifically assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe could supply 
the army is difficult because of the paucity of reliable and detailed sources. However, 
David Irving, who has reconstructed the Reichsmarschal/'s movements in this period, 
believes that Hitler first phoned him on 21 November, a full day after Jeschonnek had 
made his rash promise and shortly after Hitler had first mentioned the airlift to Paulus.1° 
This view gains support from von Richthofen's diary description of a discussion he had 
with Hitler at the "Wolf's Lair" on 11 February 1943, almost two weeks after Paulus 
surrendered and his surviving troops staggered into Soviet captivity. Hitler admitted to 
von Richthofen that Goring was not entirely to blame for the failed airlift; he had himself 
promised Sixth Army that it would be supplied by air, "without the Reichsmarschal/'s 
knowledge." 71 
At that stage, Goring, who lacked up-to-the-minute information on Sixth Army's 
encirclement and statistical data with which to make air supply calculations, gave no 
speci'fic assurances about his force's airlift tonnage capabilities, insisting instead that 
Sixth Army should stand fast and that, as Jeschonnek had said, the Luftwaffe would do 
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all in its power to meet the army's needs. As soon as he got off the phone, he summoned 
his quartermaster staff and ordered every available transport plane-including his own 
courier flight-to be mobilized for the operation. The Reichsmarschall's actions are 
remarkable, considering that he had not yet studied detailed data or consulted air supply 
experts. He later told von Richthofen that, "at the very beginning of the Stalingrad 
episode, he had played the optimist and supported the Fuhrer in his decision to stand fast 
there."72 At that point, von Richthofen added, Goring had still believed Sixth Army's 
encirclement to be temporary. 
Goring's assurances became much stronger on the following day (22 November), 
when he arrived in Berchtesgaden. Hitler asked his bulky deputy whether he still supported 
the air-supply proposal. Goring replied confidently, "Ja, it can be done." He could give 
no other answer, he later told Genera/oberst Bruno Lorzer, his close friend, because the 
Nazi leader used the worst kind of emotional blackmail: 
Hitler said to me: "Listen here, Goring. If the Luftwaffe cannot carry this 
through, then Sixth Army is lost!" He had me firmly by the sword-knot. I could 
do nothing but agree, otherwise the air force and I would be left with the 
blame for the loss of the army. So I had to reply: "Mein Fuhrer, we'll do the 
job!" 73 
He could hardly have rejected the airlift proposal anyway, he lamely explained afterwards 
to Paul Korner (Undersecretary of State for the Four Year Plan), because his own Chief 
of Staff had already convinced the Fuhrer that the air force could supply the encircled 
forces. "Hitler already had Jeschonnek's papers before I set eyes on them," he told 
Korner, doubtless trying to shift some blame to his Chief of Staff. "I could only say, 'Mein 
Fuhrer, you have all the figures. If they are correct, then I place myself at your disposal.'''74 
Jeschonnek's original figures were not accurate, however, as the ReichsmarschaJl 
learned just hours later. Oberst Eschenauer, Jeschonnek's supply officer, informed his 
boss that the standard "250-kg" and "1 ODD-kg" air-supply containers on which he based 
his calculations actually carried only around two-thirds of those loads.15 Their names 
derived solely from the size of the bombs they replaced on bomb racks. Jeschonnek, an 
honest man who admitted his mistakes, immediately told Goring, and asked him to warn 
the Fuhrer that their calculations were based on incorrect data. Goring winced when his 
young Chief of Staff confessed to this error, but, believing it was "too late now", expressly 
forbade him to tell Hitler. Instead, he phoned the Fuhrer, repeating his unconditional 
assurances that the Luftwaffe could do the job and inviting him to phone 
GeneralfeJdmarscha/l Erhard Milch, his deputy and Air Inspector-General, if he still felt 
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unsure. When Milch finally learned of this in 1946, he angrily scrawled in his diary: 
"Deceit plus incompetence equals one Reichsmarschall! I guessed it already, but now 
I get proof of it, it makes me want to throw up all over again."76 
According to Zeitzler's post-war claims, after Hitler arrived back in East Prussia late 
next evening-23 November-he vigorously tried to persuade Hitler that GOring's promises 
were impossible to keep. After explaining at length the tonnages required and the lack 
of aircraft to carry them, Zeitzler told Hitler that, "Having examined the facts in detail, the 
conclusion is inescapable: it is not possible to keep the Sixth Army supplied by air."77 
Hitler remained outwardly calm, but, with annoyance evident in his voice, stated: "The 
Reichsmarschall has assured me that it is possible." When Zeitzler stood his ground, 
Hitler sent for the air force chief. "GOring," he asked, "can you keep the Sixth Army 
supplied by air?" The airman raised his right arm and said: "Mein Fuhrer, I assure you 
that the Luftwaffe can keep the Sixth Army supplied." Hitler cast Zeitzler a triumphant 
glance, but the general refused to back down. "The Luftwaffe certainly cannot", he insisted, 
to which GOring angrily retorted: ''You are not in an opinion to give an opinion on that." 
Hitler was surprised by the undisguised hostility between his commanders, but granted 
Zeitzler permission to challenge GOring's promises. "Herr Reichsmarschall," he said. "Do 
you know what tonnage has to be flown in every day?" Caught off-guard, the embarrassed 
air leader spat back: "I don't, but my staff officers do." Zeitzler had come armed. His 
own staff had made detailed calculations, which he immediately summarized: 
Allowing for all the stocks at present with Sixth Army, allowing for absolute 
minimum needs and the taking of all possible emergency measures, the Sixth 
Army will require delivery of three hundred tons per day. But since not every 
day is suitable for flying, as I myself learned at the front last winter, this 
means that about five hundred tons will have to be carried to Sixth Army on 
each and every flying day if the irreducable minimum average is to be 
maintained. 
"I can do that," GOring shot back. Losing his temper, Zeitzler shouted: "Mein Fuhrer! 
That is a lie!" Hitler thought for a minute before replying: "The Reichsmarscha/l has made 
his report to me, which I have no choice but to believe. I therefore abide by my original 
decision [to supply the army by air]." 
Zeitzler's frequently-cited description of this argument with GOring should not be treated 
as a verbatim record because it is based on his subjective recollection of the exchange 
and was apparently not written down until the following day. However, the account is 
almost certainly an honest attempt at reconstructing the event. Zeitzler's open opposition 
to the airlift is mentioned in several reliable sources, including von Richthofen's diary, as 
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is his courage to express opinions contrary to the Fuhrer's. But placing this account 
chronologically within this crucial decision-making period poses problems. Zeitzler himself 
could not remember the date, noting only that it took place "between 22 and 26 
l\Jovernber",18 Most writers place the argument in the early hours of November 24-that 
is, shortly after Hitler arrived from Berchtesgaden and shortly before he issued his fateful 
order to Paulus that his army must stand fast, that a relief operation was being launched, 
and that the Luftwaffe, bolstered by "a hundred more Junkers," would keep the army 
supplied.79 If the argument did occur at that point, then it represents the last major appeal 
to Hitler to change his mind and the most weighty challenge to Goring's unconditional 
assurances that his air force would meet the trapped army's supply needs. It shows not 
only that Hitler had already firmly made up his mind before he arrived back in East 
Prussia, but that his deputy's embarrassing unfamiliarity with the tonnages he had promised 
to supply should have raised grave doubts in his mind about the reliability of those 
promises. Before it was too late, Hitler should have re-examined the tables and graphs 
drawn up by Jeschonnek, Zeitzler and the Army Quartermaster-General and have spoken 
to von Richthofen, whose air 'fleet was to carry out the air supply operation. 
However, the argument between Zeitzler did not take place on the 24th, before the 
airlift began. It could not have; after Goring had visited Hitler at the Berghof on the 22nd, 
he departed for Paris in Asia, his luxurious command train. He spent the next four days-
when he should have been organizing the airlift-visiting Parisian art dealers and galleries.80 
Von Richthofen was appalled. "I urge Jeschonnek and Zeitzler to report my views to the 
Fuhrer," he wrote in his diary on the 25th, "and to harness the Reichsmarschall, but he's 
in Paris!"81 Goring arrived back at Hitler's headquarters in Rastenburg on the 27th, and 
his heated exchange with Zeitzler probably took place at that point; that is, three days 
after Hitler had given the final go-ahead for the airlift. Despite the claims of numerous 
writers, therefore, the argument played no part in the decision-making process. The die 
had already been cast. 
Hitler's decision to keep Sixth Army at Stalingrad and support it from the air until a 
relief operation could break its encirclement was poorly received by the commanders in 
the field. Von Richthofen again tried desperately to convince everyone who would listen 
that Hitler must be given an honest appraisal of the facts. He phoned Jeschonnek (three 
times), von Weichs and Zeitzler, once more pleading with them to have his views made 
known to Hitler (which they did, to no avail).82 He was disappointed by what he correctly 
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perceived to be Jeschonnek's lack of courage in Hitler's presence, noting that "Weichs 
and Zeitzler share my view. Jeschonnek has no view at aiL" He was most upset next 
day (25 November) to learn that the airlift would proceed, despite their warnings: 
The Fuhrer heard everything we had to say, but decides against it because 
he believes the army can hold on and he does not think we could reach 
Stalingrad again. I stand by my own opinion. Still, orders are orders and 
everything will be done pursuant to the orders received. It is tragic that none 
of the locally-responsible commanders, although purportedly possessing [the 
Fuhrer's] confidence, has any influence at all now .... As things are at present, 
operationally-speaking, we are nothing more than highly-paid non-
commissioned officers.83 
Von Richthofen was stunned that the High Command expected him to fly in at least 
300 tons per day. "We supply [the pocket today] with all our Ju 52s, but we only have 
30 available for that", he added in his diary. "Of yesterday's 47 Ju 52s, 22 made sorties 
[into the pocket]; of today's 30, 9 made sorties. We flew in 75 tons today, instead of the 
300 tons ordered by the High Command, which is not possible with the few Ju 52s 
available. I report this to the Reichsmarschall." Von Seydlitz, commander of the Fifty-
First Army Corps, also complained that Hitler's order was impossible to fulfil. He sent 
Paulus a lengthy report, which warned that there could be no question of standing firm: 
"The army has a clear choice: it must break throught to the southwest in the general 
direction of Kotelnikovo or face destruction within days."84 The army's supply Situation, 
he insisted, would decide the matter. To believe the Luftwaffe could keep the army 
supplied was grasping at straws, especially since only 30 Ju 52s were at hand and, even 
if the other hundred aircraft Hitler promised actually materialized, they could still not meet 
the army's needs in full. Unfortunately, von Seydlitz's report contained several careless 
inaccuracies which robbed it of its persuasiveness. He stated, for example, that even 
1,000 tons of supplies per day would not be sufficient, whereas Sixth Army's own 
quartermaster had just reported that the army could survive if the Luftwaffe carried in 500 
tons each day (300 cubic metres of fuel and 200 tons of ammunition).85 Schmidt and 
Paulus still sent the report to von Manstein, adding that, although they disagreed with 
many of von Seydlitz's reasons, they shared his view that the army should break out 
im mediately. 
Unfortunately for all those opposed to Hitler's "stand fast" and airlift decisions, von 
Manstein made his own thorough assessment of the situation and sent the High Command 
a more optimistic appraisal.86 His position was similar to Jodi's: whilst he agreed that a 
breakout was the safest course, and that the army remained in danger if it stayed in its 
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present positions, he was not convinced by Army GrolJp B's insistence on an immediate 
breakout. If a relief operation could start in early December, he argued, and if the 
promised reinforcements arrived in time, it was still possible to save the army. Of course, 
he cautioned, if it proved impossible to launch the relief operation or meet the army's 
supply needs by air, then it should break out. Hitler felt vindicated. He highly valued von 
Manstein's opinions (as did most of his senior officers), and proudly informed Zeitzler and 
his other advisers that the field marshal's assessment was far more in keeping with his 
own views than those of his "defeatist" generals. The debate was over; he had won-
for now. 
Thus, responsibilty for the decision to supply Sixth Army-one of the most fateful 
decisions of the war-rests with three individuals: Jeschonnek, Hitler and Goring. 
Jeschonnek rashly made the first assurances that the Luftwaffe was capable of meeting 
the army's logistical needs before he had consulted air transport experts, made detailed 
calculations of his own or sought the views of von Richthofen and the other air force and 
army commanders at the front. Their evaluations of the situation and the capabilities of 
their respective forces would have been far more detailed and reliable than the situation 
assessments made by the Fuhrer and his entourage, thousands of kilometres away in 
Hitler's alpine retreat in southern Bavaria, whose main source of information was Zeitzler's 
telephone "updates". Jeschonnek should have requested a little time to do homework 
before presenting an opinion on the matter. 
When Jeschonnek gave his initial assurances to Hitler, however, he believed that the 
army's encirclement would be temporary and, therefore, that its long-term survival did not 
depend on the air force's ability to keep it supplied. Had he known then that Sixth Army 
would need supplying for several weeks, if not several months, he certainly would not 
have promised Hitler anything without extensive research. To his credit, when he did 
learn that Sixth Army's encirclement would last longer than originally claimed, that von 
Richthofen and Fiebig forcefully opposed the air-lift, and that his own hasty calculations 
were inaccurate, he immediately admitted his mistakes and tried to dissuade Hitler and 
Goring. He lacked both a forceful personality and the respect of his bosses, so, as a 
result, they simply ignored his warnings. Jeschonnek's culpability, then, stems from 
rashness, a faulty original assessment of the situation, and an inability to stand up to 
stronger personalities. It does not stem from dishonesty or incompetence. 
When considering Hitler's responsibility for the decision to supply Sixth Army by air, 
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one should note that he was unable to focus solely on that matter. He had to divide his 
attention between events at Stalingrad and what he mistakenly perceived to be the 
equally-critical situation in North Africa. Only a fortnight after Montgomery launched his 
offensive against Rommel's positions at EI Alamein and four days after his army captured 
them (which threw the Fuhrer into a fit of rage), major Anglo-American landings took 
place in Morocco and Algeria on 8 November. French resistance quickly collapsed, and 
subsequent events forced Hitler to launch Operation "Anton", the occupation of Vichy 
France, on the 11th. To make matters worse, he felt he needed to pour scores of 
thousands of troops into Tunisia to counter the advance of Anglo-American forces pushing 
eastward towards Rommel's Afrika Korps, still falling back westward before Montgomery's 
Eighth Army. "Anton" quickly reached its successful conclusion. Yet, when Stalin launched 
"Uranus" on 19 November, events were still going very poorly for German troops in North 
Africa and Hitler's mind was foclJsed on their survival and, he hoped, operations to 
restore the situation. Thus, distracted by events in the Mediterranean, Hitler was unable 
to focus his attention solely on the grave situation in the east. Had he chosen to 
concentrate on Stalingrad and the security of the Don-Donets region, strategically more 
important than Tunisia, he may have made different choices than the ones that eventually 
led to the loss of an entire army. 
Deciding to supply Sixth Army by air was not Hitler's only mistake. His decision to 
pour men and equipment into Tunisia during this critical period rates as one of the worst 
he ever made. As Vincent Orange noted, "the campaign, however prolonged, could have 
only one result: an Axis defeat."87 The Allies, he explained, "enjoyed command of the 
sea, the air and an enormous advantage on land in numbers of troops, tanks, guns and 
supplies of all kind (especially fuel)." Thus, the 81,000 German troops landed in Tunisia 
between November 1942 and January 194388, plus the 250 Ju 52s used to transport 
them, were wasted in a campaign with little strategic value and no chance of success. 
Those men and aircraft could have made a crucial difference to German fortunes in the 
far more important Don-Donets region had they been sent to von Manstein and von 
Richthofen instead. 
Hitler's responsibility for the airlift outweighs Jeschonnek's. First, his own initial 
perceptions about the developing encirclement and the fate of Sixth Army were not based 
on rationality, but egotism. His "iron will" alone had saved his eastern armies during the 
previous winter, he believed. It would do so again. This explains his comment to Zeitzler 
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on the first night after he returned to East Prussia. "We must show firmness of character 
in misfortune," he lectured. "We must remember Frederick the Great."89 Second, he also 
considered it essential to stand fast at Stalingrad because he could not withdraw, without 
losing face, from the "strategically-important" city that he had publically vowed several 
times to keep. Third, because Jeschonnek's assurances supported his own preconceptions, 
he uncritically accepted them, although the airman had clearly not reflected or conducted 
research before making them. Fourth, from the moment he received those assurances, 
which suited his own views so well, Hitler closed his mind to alternative strategies. Fifth, 
he totally ignored the repeated appeals and warnings of his front-line army and air force 
commanders, unfairly calling them "defeatists" because they challenged the inflexible 
"stand fast" formula that he had elevated to the status of doctrine. Sixth, he accepted 
Goring's promises and reassurances as uncritically as he had accepted Jeschonnek's, 
despite the fact that the Reichsmarschall had a poor track record, had exercised only 
nominal command of the Luftwaffe during the last year, instead delegating the force's 
day-to-day running to his subordinates, and, despite the crucial nature of the present 
situation at Stalingrad, had evidently made no real effort to familiarize himself with the 
issues involved. Lastly, he did not sack Goring and replace him with someone competent, 
or even demand that he act responsibly in this critical period. He should at least have 
forbidden him (in von Richthofen's words) "to swan off to Paris to plunder art galleries" 
and ordered him to stay in Rastenburg to organize and oversee the Stalingrad airlift, the 
largest in military history, upon which hung the lives of a quarter of a million men. 
Goring's responsibility for the airlift decision equals Hitler's. When the Nazi leader first 
asked him whether the Luftwaffe could, as Jeschonnek had promised, fully meet Sixth 
Army's logistical needs, he should not have given an immediate answer. He should first 
have consulted his air transport experts, studied all available information on the situation 
at Stalin grad (enemy strengths and activities, the size and state of trapped forces, the 
condition and capabilities of Luftflotte IV, weather patterns and projections, and so on) 
and sought the opinions of von Richthofen and the Fliegerkorps commanders involved. 
Remarkably, Goring failed to do this, not only before making his first assurances, but also 
before making his final promises prior to leaving for Paris. 
The Reichsmarschall aggressively dominated his own staff, driving two of his senior 
officers to suicide (Udet in November 1941 and Jeschonnek in August 1943). Yet he 
proved incapable of standing up to Hitler. He rarely even expressed views contrary to 
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the Fuhrer's (at least in the latter's presence), especially after his obvious failure to defeat 
Britain from the air and to defend Germany's cities from ever-increasing Allied air attacks. 
These failures had steadily reduced his standing in Hitler's eyes throughout 1941 and 
1942. Instead, he lapsed into subservience, hoping his slavish loyalty would repair their 
relationship. It is probable, then, that Goring's unconditional assurances that his air force 
could maintain Sixth Army stem from his inability to resist the Fuhrer or challenge his 
views ("I gained the impression that he was afraid of Hitler", Milch once wrote90) and from 
his intense desire to restore his tattered prestige. 
Hermann Plocher argued that Goring "may also have sincerely believed that he could 
accomplish the airlift operation to satisfaction, just as he had done in some instances in 
the past, by combining the influences of his several offices and adding his own brutal 
energy." Plocher is wrong. The Reichsmarschall did not "sincerely" believe that he could 
do the job, otherwise no sense can be made from his comments to Lorzer that Hitler had 
him "firmly by the sword-knot" and that he could "do nothing but agree" because he did 
not want to "be left with the blame". Also, his refusal to inform Hitler that Jeschonnek's 
original caluculations were based on false premises and information removes any 
suggestion of "sincerity", He deliberately withheld embarrassing but important information 
from the Fuhrer. Additionally, at no point during the course of the airlift did he throw his 
"brutal energy" into making sure it succeeded. On the contrary, rather than stay and 
organize and oversee the crucial operation himself, he disappeared to Paris on a shopping 
trip and then, on his return, only rarely attempted to involve himself in its progress. 
Initial Organization 
When Stalin launched Uranus on 19 November 1942, von Richthofen's Luftf/otte /V 
possessed enough transport planes to keep its own airfields and air units operating 
adequately and to carry out limited air supply missions in support of the armies-particularly 
Paulus' Sixth-in its vast combat zone. Von Richthofen's transport fleet comprised the 
1st (Staff), 5th, 50th, 102nd, 172nd and 900th Special Purposes Bomber Wings, equipped 
with Ju 52s, and the Fifth Special Purposes Bomber Wing, equipped with He 111s.91 
These transport groups had performed well since B/au began back in June. Between 
August and October alone, for example, they had transported 20,173 tons of aviation fuel, 
9,492 tons of ammunition, 3,731 tons of equipment and 2,764 tons of supplies to Luftwaffe 
airfields at the front. They also provided the army with good support, carrying forward 
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27,044 troops, 4,614 tons of fuel, 1,787 tons of ammunition and 73 tons of supplies, as 
well as evacuating 51,619 wounded soldiers.92 
Von Richthofen was not able to deploy all these transport units in support of Sixth 
Army after the Soviet pincers closed around it, because most still had to carry out vital 
supply operations for the various Luftwaffe commands they served. The 1 st (Staff), 5th, 
50th and 102nd wings all supplied Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VII/, while the 172nd served 
Luftgau Rostov (Air District Rostov, which organized the fleet's supply, maintenance and 
ground service matters), and the 900th directly served the fleet command itself.93 By this 
time, Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV, which had almost ceased to exist since its combat units 
were transferred to Fliegerkorps VIII, had no air transport units. 
Most of von Richthofen's transport units had been in action without a break since Blau 
began, and the rehabilitation and refitting of combat units always took precedence over 
their own. As a result, their average operational rate, at around 40 per cent, was ten per 
cent lower than that of the combat units. 94 The operational rate of certain units-particularly 
those attempting to meet both the army's and the air force's needs-were as low as 30 
per cent. On 9 l\Iovember, for instance, the 900th Special Purposes Bomber Wing 
possessed 41 Ju 52s, but only 12 were air-worthy, whilst the 50th had 35 Ju 52s, only 
13 air-worthy.95 
The fact that these units still had vital supply tasks to perform for their respective 
commands (although the decrease in Fliegerkorps VII/'s combat missions after Uranus 
began freed up several dozen transport aircraft for other duties), and the fact that all 
these units were in poor shape, explains why von Richthofen was only able to commit 
30 of his 295 transport planes to supplying Sixth Army on 25 November. 96 The OKL 
would clearly need to send the fleet chief many hundred more aircraft if they expected 
him to fufil Goring's promises to Hitler. 
To supply Sixth Army with 300 tons a day-the absolute minimum amount demanded 
by the army (which really needed 500 tons)-would necessitate an average of 150 fully-
laden Ju 52s landing in the pocket each day. Of course, because weather would prevent 
that tonnage being airlifted on many days, far more than 300 tons would have to be 
carried in during good weather. Loading and unloading supplies was time-consuming, so 
each plane could only fly one, or perhaps two, missions a day. Therefore, because an 
operational rate of only 30 to 40 per cent could be counted on, von Richthofen needed 
at least 800 Ju 52s to fulfill Goring's promises and meet Sixth Army barest needs.97 At 
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that time, however, the entire Luftwaffe possessed only around 750 Ju 52s. Over half 
of them operated in the Mediterranean theatre. They supplied General der Panzertruppen 
Nehring's forces in Tunisia while they tried in vain to stop the Anglo-American forces that 
had landed in French North Africa, as well as Rommel's Afrika Korps, still retreating 
across Libya after its defeat at EI Alamein. 98 
Because of the importance of transport aircraft to the North African campaign, the 
Luftwaffe's Quartermaster-General had to look elsewhere for planes to send to Stalingrad. 
Although he took few aircraft from the Mediterranean and North Africa (at least initially), 
his measures were still a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. He stripped the Chief of 
Training of several hundred aircraft, plus its best instructor pilots and crewmen, thereby 
dealing a heavy blow to the training programme (which never fully recovered from the 
loss of many multi-engine training aircraft and pilots at Stalingrad). He robbed Lufthansa 
and numerous government agencies and departments of their transport and courier planes, 
which had a negative effect on communications and postal services. He also pulled 
scores of bombers and long-range reconnaissance planes from groups on all fronts, had 
them converted into emergency air transporters, and rushed them to southern Russia. 
Their very high attrition rate during the airlift later prompted Goring to moan to his 
American captors (with typical exaggeration): "I always believed in the strategic use of air 
power. ... My beautiful bomber fleet was exhausted in transporting munitions and supplies 
to the army at Stalingrad."99 
Naturally, it took time for these reinforcements to arrive at Luftflotte IV's airfields 
around Stalingrad. Those arriving from the Reich had to fly almost 2,000 kilometres; 
those from other fronts had to fly far further. On the way to their forward operating bases, 
they all had to pass through intermediate bases at Kirovograd and Zaporozhye in the 
Ukraine, where service and maintenance personnel converted bombers into transporters 
and prepared all aircraft for winter conditions.10o The influx of aircraft was so great at 
times, however, that ground staff were not always able to cope with the amount of work 
to be done. As a result, many aircraft left for their forward bases poorly equipped for the 
harsh winter or intensive airlift operations. 
By the first week of December most of the units the OKL assigned to von Richthofen 
had arrived and commenced air supply operations. They formed a large transport fleet, 
comprising almost nine Ju 52 wings; a strong He 111 force of two wings already in a 
transport role plus two full wings and two other groups hastily converted for the airlift; two 
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wings of converted Ju 86s; a converted He 177 wing and even a long~range formation 
equipped with FW 200 Condors, Ju 90s and Ju 290s.101 
On paper this transport fleet appears sufficient for the task, but, because most groups 
were well under strength, it contained only around 500 aircraft, far below the number 
actually needed to carry a daily average of 300 tons of supplies to Sixth Army. Also, 
many of the aircraft-especially the He 177s-were unsuitable for this transport role and 
soon became liabilities. Although the OKL would transfer additional units to von Richthofen 
as the airlift progressed, he would never have anywhere near enough suitable aircraft to 
keep Sixth Army adequately supplied. 
On 26 November, von Richthofen completely reorganized Luftf/otte 1V.102 Its main 
focus would no longer be combat operations in support of ground forces in offensive 
fighting, as it had been since B/au began, but supply operations in support of ground 
forces encircled by a powerful enemy and struggling for their survival. He appointed 
Genera/major Victor Carganico (former commander of the Tatsinskaya airfields) as the 
new "LuftversongungsfDhref (Air Supply Leader), directly subordinate to the fleet command 
(as opposed to an air or flak corps). "He has the task," von Richthofen stated in his 
reorganization instructions, "of securing the air supply of Sixth Army-through the strongest 
concentration and exploitation of all air supply resources-to a level that keeps it alive 
and its fighting capability intact."103 Carganico was not only responsible for organizing 
and overseeing all airlift matters outside the pocket, but also, through liaison with Sixth 
Army and Genera/major Pickert (the senior Luftwaffe officer trapped at Stalingrad), all air 
supply matters inside the pocket. 
Von Richthofen assigned air units to bases according to aircraft type, aware that this 
would reduce the supply and maintenance problems involved in deploying various types 
of planes from the same airfields. He ordered all Ju 52 groups to operate from Tatsinskaya, 
under the command of Oberst Hans Forster, Commodore of the 1st Special Purposes 
Bomber Wing. He would now assume the title "LufttransportfOhrer" (Air Transport 
Leader).104 Von Richthofen placed all He 111 units at Morozovskaya under the command 
of the 51st Bomber Wing, led by Oberst KOhl, its experienced commander. He placed all 
long-range bomber and reconnaissance aircraft-pressed into air transport service despite 
their unsuitability-at Stalino (near the Sea of Azov), under Major Willers, its air transport 
officer. Luftgau Rostov continued to function essentially as it had since B/au began, 
although the new types of aircraft and the specialized equipment needed for air supply 
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operations caused a variety of new problems. Its greatest difficulty, however, was keeping 
the airfields inside the pocket operable despite the bombing attacks of VVS forces. 
Carganico and his staff were competent in all air supply matters, but lacked command 
experience of major operations involving many hundreds of aircraft. They also lacked 
familiarity with combat aircraft and operations, a great weakness considering that fighter 
escorts were essential due to frequent and strong VVS attacks on the lumbering supply 
planes. Their inexperience and inability to get the air-lift up and running disappointed von 
Richthofen, who complained in his diary on 28 November: "Air Supply Leader Carganico 
is not working out, despite constant and detailed exhortations. I wrestle mentally with 
command and supply organization [problems], but, after much [debating] to and fro, I 
arrive at the following solution: Fliegerkorps VIII will take over the Stalingrad airlift"105 
The following day, he made Fiebig the new Air Supply Leader and placed his corps 
command in charge of the complete air supply operation. Fiebig was pleased by von 
Richthofen's trust, but also aware of the huge responsibility involved. He wrote in his 
diary that evening: 
Fliegerkorps VIII is relieved of its combat duties and will, from tomorrow, take 
over the air supply of Sixth Army. This is an honourable but difficult assignment! 
It must be accomplished, despite Soviet efforts to stop it. Finesse and skill 
must be used both day and night to carry out this task. It will cost a great deal 
of blood; of that I am certain.106 
Fiebig and his staff were already situated in Tatsinskaya, having been forced to abandon 
Fliegerkorps VII/'s command post in the Oblivskaya bridgehead three days earlier. The 
corps commander had not wanted to leave, hoping to keep at least some airfields east 
of the Chir. When Soviet tanks and cavalry formations closed in on those airfields on the 
25th, he threw every available fighter, Stuka and ground-attack aircraft against them. "All 
units are participating in raids to destroy them," he penned in his diary. "Ground-attack 
planes and Stukas from Oblivskaya carry out between 10 and 12 sorties each. Reports 
speak of an outright slaughter of horses and riders. But enemy elements are now getting 
very close to the Oblivskaya airfields."107 The situation on the Chir looked grim, he noted, 
and the Oblivskaya bridgehead was in grave danger of collapse. "Reinforcements, including 
two armoured platoons, eight flak batteries, and one-and-a-half Luftwaffe field divisions 
have been promised," he added, "but the ring around Oblivskaya tightens." 
The following day (26 November), Soviet tanks attacked the bridgehead and, joined 
by long-range artillery, opened fire on Fiebig's airfields. They destroyed numerous ground-
291. 
attack planes unable to take off in time and left the runways pockmarked with deep 
craters. Although some of the German reinforcements arrived in time to prevent the 
Soviet forces bulldozing through their defences, it was clear that Fiebig could no longer 
command Fliegerkorps VIII from within the bridgehead. Von Richthofen himself flew into 
Oblivskaya to assess the situation and asked Fiebig to shift his headquarters back to 
Tatsinskaya. The corps leader, who believed in commanding from the front, even if it 
meant risking capture, would not go willingly. Von Richthofen-doubtless inwardly 
impressed-had to order him out. 10S By the 30th, when Fiebig received command of the 
entire airlift operation, he had established his new command centre in Tatsinskaya, safely 
behind the Chir, and briefed his staff on their impossible new task: the maintenance by 
air of the quarter of a million men trapped within "der Kessef', the Stalingrad pocket. 
Grimly they set about it. 
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Chapter IX 
Failure 
November-December 1942 
"Everyone-ground and air personnel-is doing his utmost. 
But who can fight the forces of nature?" 
-Generalleutnant Fiebig's diary, 4 December 1942 
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Right from the start, adverse weather conditions obstructed Fiebig's airlift to a far 
greater degree than the VVS or any other factor save the glaring shortage of planes. 
Well informed about local conditions by their weather experts, both von Richthofen and 
Fiebig had warned the High Command (in vain) that this would be the case. Air operations 
would be extremely difficult, they argued, even without a repeat of the previous year's 
unusually cold winter. Even if the winter proved no worse than "normal", conditions in 
the Donets basin and the Stalingrad sector would create major problems for the air fleet. 
They were not being unduly pessimistic. Stalingrad experienced extremely cold winters. 
American air force meteorologists, who noted that German operations "will be hindered 
by intense cold", explained in a December 1942 intelligence bulletin that "Stalingrad has 
a colder winter than any other city in the area. The mean winter temperature at Stalingrad 
is 17.9 degrees F., colder than Leningrad, where the mean winter temperature is 19.5 
degrees F."1 Indeed, the entire Stalingrad region usually experienced warm summers, 
short and mild springs and autumns, and long and very cold winters.2 British Air Ministry 
meteorologists reported in 1942 that "the period during which the average temperature 
is below freezing point is apprOXimately 15th November to 21st March at Stalingrad and 
30th November to 7th April at Rostov."3 Throughout that period, heavy snowfalls occurred 
so frequently that snow coverage seldom disappeared. "Over the open treeless steppe 
country of the region the winter winds carry the snow with extraordinary force," the 
meteorologists added. "Violent blizzards sometimes occur which pile the snow into large 
drifts," Particularly in the southern Ukraine and the Donets basin-where Luftflotte IV's 
main bases lay-the snow coverage was usually so thick that roads could not be kept 
open except by constantly running motorized snowploughs over them. 
Air activity would certainly suffer, the American and British weather experts reported. 
Low cloud prevailed, "in general, on two days out of every three", These low ceilings 
(under 650 metres), combined with frequent ground fog, would make take-off and landing 
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difficult and greatly reduce visibility once airborne. Also, "the danger of icing in winter is 
likely to be great when flight is made in low cloud." 
The winter of 1942-1943 was not unusually severe, but when the temperature began 
plunging below zero in mid-November (almost exactly on the dates mentioned above), its 
"typical" conditions were still so harsh that Luftf/otte IV's operational capability suffered 
markedly. By 26 November, von Richthofen was grumbling in his diary that it was 
"bloody cold".4 He noted that evening that he had summoned von Rohden, his Chief of 
Staff, and Schulz, his quartermaster, to his headquarters at Kamensk on the Don, but 
"dreadful weather" prevented them arriving. Even making telephone calls proved difficult 
during snowstorms. "Nothing works in this bloody outfit," he complained. His entry for the 
following day reveals the frustration he felt: "Very dreadful weather. Fog. Icing over. 
Snowstorm. N? air operations, no supply possible." Fiebig's diary contains similar 
complaints. On 27 November, for instance, he lamented that the weather was "the worst 
we have ever experienced" and that, as a result of a heavy hailstorm, "communications 
with rear areas have disappeared .... We have one blizzard after another at Tatsinskaya; 
a desolate situation."5 
When fighter, ground-attack, and Stuka groups had hastily withdrawn from their airfields 
east of the Chir to escape being overrun by advancing Soviet armour, they had abandoned 
numerous purpose-built heating devices and much equipment used for thawing frozen 
engines by other means. They had also left behind a number of snowploughs, essential 
for keeping runways free of snow. The arrival of dozens of transport aircraft each day 
throughout the first two weeks of the airlift only exacerbated the situation, forcing already-
overtaxed ground personnel to work feverishly to keep airfields and aircraft operational. 
Genera/major Pickert later recalled that: 
The cold caused unimaginable difficulties in starting aircraft engines, as well 
as engine maintenance, in spite of the well-known and already proven 'cold 
starting' procedures. Without any protection against the cold and the 
snowstorms, ground support personnel worked unceasingly to the point where 
their hands became frozen. Fog, icing and snowstorms caused increasing 
difficulties, which were compounded at night.6 
Air leaders, like their troops, soon became depressed by the sight of Ju 52s churning 
up snow as they atttempted to take off with poor visibility from runways only partly cleared 
of snow by ground personnel armed only with shovels. As early as 2 December, Fiebig 
noted in his diary that, "after yesterday's snowfall, everything is still frozen. We can get 
He 111 s airborne, but not the Ju 52s before 1130 hours .... We lack heating equipment. 
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We did not receive enough to cope with the large influx of aircraft. Transport planes 
simply have no business here. Thawing takes too much time and a great deal of effort."7 
Two days later, he wrote: "During the night there was an urgent de-icing at Pitomnik [the 
principal airfield inside ther pocket], but still no opportunities for take-off because of the 
thick fog. Everyone is stressed, standing by for a chance to get airborne. Everyone-
ground and air personnel-is doing his utmost. But who can fight the forces of nature?"8 
Few of the new pilots were accustomed to flying in temperatures so cold that their 
planes iced up as they entered low-lying cloud formations. For the first weeks of the 
airlift, however, poor visibility caused by snowstorms, fog and low cloud hampered Luftwaffe 
operations more than the cold. Taking off was dangerous and difficult, but even experienced 
pilots hated having to land their fully-laden planes inside the ''fortress'' during the frequent 
periods of poor visibility. Thick fog shrouding Pitomnik and Basargino (the main airfields 
within the pocket) often forced even the most courageous pilots to turn back without 
attempting to land, despite the presence of radio beacons at each field.9 
Of the six airfields inside the pockets, only Pitomnik was properly equipped to handle 
large-scale operations. It even had lights, flare paths and signals equipment for night 
operations. The others-with the exception of Basargino, which Genera/major Pickert 
quickly fitted out with the minimum requirements-were no more than bare grass landing 
strips, lacking all necessary communications and air traffic control equipment. Several of 
those fields had been used in previous months to supply Sixth Army as it advanced into 
Stalingrad, but the quantities of supplies carried were never large and the weather had 
been satisfactory. Now, those soggy, snow-covered fields were virtually worthless to the 
Luftwaffe. 
Pickert worked tirelessly to ensure that his two main airfields functioned as efficiently 
as possible and that the off-loading and transfer of supplies was always handled smoothly 
and quickly. He took his job seriously, realizing that the lives of an entire army depended 
on the Luftwaffe's ability to keep it supplied and fed. "The [Pitomnik] airfield has become 
my main sphere of activity", he wrote in his journal on 26 November. "All momentum here 
is focused on the air supply operation, evacuation of the wounded, and their accomodation 
until they can be flown OUt."10 The plight of the wounded moved him deeply. When he 
had first arrived at Pitomnik two days earlier, he saw "tragic scenes of freezing wounded, 
waiting with their nurses for evacuation."11 For the next two months, he would frequently 
refer to the hundreds of wounded soldiers waiting each day to be placed in transport 
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planes and carried out of the pocket for medical attention. Many died besides the 
runways, especially on days when weather conditions curtailed air operations. 
Pickert stationed a heavy flak battery at the main airfield12, and ordered all the light 
batteries that Sixth Army had not already positioned along the pocket's outer perimeter 
to dig themselves in around the main airfields. "This is no easy task in the steppe," he 
noted, "because there is almost no wood and the ground is frozen solid."13 The flak 
teams must protect transport aircraft from VVS attack at all costs, he insisted, especially 
when they were most vulnerable during take~off and landing. The flak commander had 
good reasons to fear attacks by VVS units. By the end of November, Soviet fighters, 
ground-attack planes and bombers were singling out Pitomnik for heavy attacks, clearly 
aware of its importance to the airlift operation. 
The Soviet air force had actually played only a minor role in the opening days of 
Uranus. Recently~formed VVS units contained many aircrew fresh from training schools, 
who had no experience of flying during snowfalls or thick fog. As a result, they sat on 
their airstrips until brief periods of clear weather allowed them to engage in combat 
against the Axis forces. Even experienced aircrew were handicapped by the weather. 
Thick fog and low cloud prevented pilots and gunners from distinguishing between Russian 
and German or Rumanian troops in the chaotic conditions on the ground, espeCially after 
the Rumanian lines collapsed and Russian tanks and troops streamed through the gaps. 
With the situation changing constantly and opposing forces fighting in close proximity, the 
VVS was unable to throw the full weight of its combat units against the enemy. As a 
result, it carried out only 1,000 sorties during the first four days of the offensiveY Of 
course, Luftwaffe units suffered the same weather-related problems, and carried out a 
mere 361 sorties during the same period.15 
Once the Soviet pincers had closed near Kalach on 23 November, trapping Six Army 
and other formations, the situation on the ground became far less fluid. VVS air armies 
now had clearly-defined, stationary targets, which they could find and hit without difficulty, 
even during bad weather. VVS air activity increased substantially during the following 
weeks. Between 24 and 30 November, for instance, Soviet air units carried out 5,760 
sorties.16 Sixty per cent of those sorties were conducted against German troops, positions 
and airfields within the pocket.17 After regular German air-lift operations began on 25 
November, transport planes became popular targets for the Soviet "Okhotnikt' (free 
hunters), fighters and ground-attack aircraft which roamed the skies looking for combat. 
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Official Soviet claims of very high kill rates seem reasonable at first glance, owing to 
the obvious superiority of VVS fighters to the slow and mostly-unarmed German transport 
planes and the supposed vulnerability of the airfields within the pocket. Yet those kill 
rates should be treated with greater caution than they have been by the scholars who 
frequently repeat them in their accounts of the battle. Uncritically accepting the verity of 
General Rudenko's memoirs, for example, Von Hardesty is one of many writers on Soviet 
airpower who repeat claims that fail to stand up to closer scrutiny. According to one of 
Hardesty's statements, fighters of the 283rd Fighter Air Division intercepted 17 Ju 52s, 
escorted by four Bf 109s, over the pocket on 29 November. "They destroyed five Ju 52s 
and one Bf 109," he writes.18 Von Richthofen, Fiebig and Pickert, who routinely mention 
losses in their diaries, do not mention the loss of any aircraft on that day (or the day on 
each side of it). In fact, Pickert wrote that it was a quiet day for the VVS: "The weather 
cleared up, but the enemy failed to seize the opportunity. Only a single aircraft appeared 
[over the pocket] and it was attacked."19 Similarly, Hardesty's claim that VVS fighters 
destroyed 17 transport planes on the ground within the pocket on 2 December is also 
refuted by the German sources.20 Von Richthofen's diary states: "We flew 150 tons [of 
supplies] into Stalingrad, without losses." 21 Pickert even noted in his own diary that 
Soviet air activity had dropped off perceptibly that day. 
Even a cursory reading of surviving German sources-including the war diary of the 
3rd Group of the 3rd Fighter Wing, operating in the Stalingrad sector-reveals that Soviet 
fighters did not destroy anywhere near as many German transport aircraft as most writers 
maintain. Rather, they succeeded in destroying a relatively small but steady number. 
Although their loss proved costly to the airlift, it actually hampered the operation far less 
than the weather. However, VVS activity did have one other important effect: its constant 
pressure on the air-lift operation and on the troops within the pocket forced Fiebig to 
deploy fighters, although they were sorely needed elsewhere (especially on the Chir 
front), on convoy escort and airfield protection duties. 
Fiebig had relatively few fighters at his disposal during the air-lift. When B/au began 
back in June, Luftflotte IV possessed a total of 325 Bf 109s, of which 236 (73 per cent) 
had been operational. These fighters had operated without rest or rehabilitation for five 
months, during which time normal combat attrition took its toll. The OKL had also transferred 
several groups to other sectors of the front during times of crisis. As a result, when the 
Stalingrad air-lift began on 25 November, Luftflotte IV's two fighter wings, the 3rd and 
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52nd, together possessed only 203 planes.22 125 (61 per cent) were operational, whilst 
the others sat on airfields waiting for repair, maintenance, or the arrival of replacement 
engines. Not all these fighters even operated under Fiebig's command in the Stalingrad 
region and Donets basin. Von Richthofen had left a small fighter force in the Caucasus 
to serve Ruoff's and von Kleist's armies after he robbed them of Stuka and ground-attack 
support when Uranus began. 54 fighters, 37 of them air-worthy, patrolled the skies above 
those armies.23 Thus, when the air-lift commenced, Fiebig possessed fewer than 90 
operational fighters in the Stalin grad region. 
He could not deploy all these fighters on tranport escort duties, despite needing to 
protect the slow and unarmed Ju 52s, and even the armed He 111s, from VVS attacks. 
He had to commit numerous squadrons to combat against Soviet forces attacking the 
weakly-held Chir front in their effort to widen the gap between the new German line and 
the forces trapped within the pocket. According to received opinion (following Hermann 
Plocher's account24), those squadrons did not operate under Fiebig's direct command. 
Instead, they functioned as part of GeneraJleutnant Mahnke's Fliegerdivision Donez (Air 
Division Donets). This was purportedly a new operational command that von Richthofen 
had hastily formed in late-November to direct combat operations in the region after 
committing Fiebig's air corps solely to organizing and overseeing the airlift. Plocher was 
mistaken, however, and writers who have accepted his account have merely repeated his 
error. Von Richthofen did not form Fliegerdivision Donez until 2 January 1943, almost 
five weeks after Fliegerkorps VIII took over the airlift. 25 Until then, Fiebig retained command 
of his fighters, directing their operations on the Chir front through his corps staff. 
He did not ignore escort duties, though. He was gravely aware that Tatsinskaya and 
Morozovskaya, the main bases for the transport fleet, were 230 and 200 kilometres from 
the pocket repectively and that his transport planes were highly vulnerable along their 
entire 50-minute flight path to interception by VVS fighters and Shturmoviks waiting for 
them each day. The ten or twelve fighters that had been stationed at Pitomnik when the 
pincers had first closed-a squadron of the 1st Group, 3rd Fighter Wing, under Hauptmann 
Germeroth-were able to provide fair protection for the incoming transports and the two 
main airfields. They shot down dozens of Soviet aircraft (130, according to Pickert's 
postwar claim) during the airlift.26 These German fighters were powerless, however, to 
protect transport planes further afield. Not only were they numerically weak, but they 
lacked the range to escort transporters far on their return flights and they had to guard 
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the airspace over the pocket at all times. As von Richthofen commented in his diary: 
The air supply of Stalingrad suffers under the influence of Russian 'fighters. 
We are forced to leave fighters inside the pocket, therefore, although they 
themselves consume part of the supplies needed by Sixth Army. They are not 
yet able to guarantee the security of the supply operation and the Russians 
can still sweep over our forward airfield in the pocket at any time.27 
As a result, Fiebig deployed several fighter squadrons-with around 40 Bf 109Gs-solely 
on escort duties. The 3rd Group of the 3rd Fighter Wing, which he transferred to 
Morozovskaya-West on 28 November, formed the nucleus of this small escort force.28 An 
entry in that group's war diary explains its activities and reveals the difficulties involved: 
The main task of the wing's 1 st and 3rd groups is convoy protection for the 
Stalingrad air-lift. Because the range for escorting the slow-flying transport 
units on their in-coming and return flights is not sufficient, it is necessary for 
us to stop over and refuel at Pitomnik. During the return flights we protect the 
transports evacuating the wounded. Because the Russians have erected a 
"flak avenue" and deployed strong fighter forces, we must change our 
rendezvous points, approach paths and altitudes each day. 
Aside from these convoy escort duties, which remain the highest priority, the 
group must also defend its own airfields and the main supply bases of 
Morozovskaya and Tatsinskaya from enemy air attack. It must also conduct 
low-altitude attacks on the Russian ground forces which are now situated only 
a few kilometres north of our airfields.29 
Fiebig also intermittently deployed a few Bf 110 squadrons from the 1 st Destroyer 
Wing on escort and freijagd (free hunt) duties. These twin-engined "destroyers"-originally 
designed as fighters-proved less effective as escorts than Bf 109s, mainly because the 
weight of their guns, armour and engines, plus the extra fuel carried in drop-tanks to 
extend their range, substantially restricted their manoeuvrability. The Bf 109s, then, 
performed the lion's share of the convoy escort work. 
The First Weeks of the Airlift 
The airlift began on 25 November, before most of the additional Ju 52s and converted 
bombers had arrived at Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya. It was not an auspicious start. 
Thirty Ju 52s managed to carry in only 75 tons that day, well below the 300 tons the 
Luftwaffe promised and the 500 tons the army still wanted. Because the army had agreed 
to consume its remaining rations and then eat its 10,000 horses before asking for provisions 
to be air-lifted, the Junkers carried in no food. Fuel composed the greater part of their 
load. Pickert's ground personnel unloaded 36 cubic metres, a small drop in the army's 
almost-empty bucket. They also unloaded 28 tons of ammunition, sorely needed by 
Paulus' troops, who expended six time that amount per day.so They were then able to 
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place 330 wounded soldiers onto the Junkers, which ferried them back to makeshift field 
hospitals in Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya, from where the survivors were steadily 
transferred (mainly by motor vehicles) to military hospitals in the Reich or Rumania. 
The remaining days of November followed the same pattern. A small but steadily-
growing number of available Ju 52s left the airfields behind the Chir each day, some 
making completely blind take-offs in bad weather, to carry into the pocket only a fraction 
of the tonnage required. During the five days between the 26th and 30th, they managed 
to carry in only as much as Goring had promised for a single day: 191 cubic metres of 
fuel, 108 tons of ammunition, and four tons of other freight; that is, around 300 tons in 
total.31 The best day was the 30th, when Ju 52s and He 111 s carried 129 tons of 
supplies into the "fortress", including 69 cubic metres of fuel and 35 tons of ammunition. 
The worst was the 27th when, because of extremely bad weather, aircraft carrying a 
mere 28 tons of fuel (but no ammunition or rations) landed in the pocket. 
The weather was consistently unfavourable, with clear periods occurring rarely and 
briefly. The radio beacon at Pitomnik helped the pilots home in through fog and snowstorms, 
although landing with poor visibility proved disastrous to many. In fact, crashes during 
take-off and landing, especially during the latter, destroyed more transport planes than 
the VVS fighters and Shturmoviks attempting to create an "air blockade" of the pocket. 
Pickert often marvelled at the courage and superb flying skills displayed by the pilots who 
landed successfully in bad weather, sometimes even in total ''white outs". On 29 l\Jovember, 
for instance, he jotted in his diary: "In the most dreadful weather, with a ceiling of only 
80 metres ... He 111 supply planes appeared on the scene, a splendid accomplishment. 
I praised them all profusely!"32 
The courage and skill of the aircrew were matched by the energy and growing efficiency 
of Pickert's ground personnel. Using virtually no machinery, large teams constantly cleared 
runways of snow and the wrecks of aircraft that failed to land safely. They salvaged 
whatever cargo and aircraft parts they could from the wrecks before pushing them off the 
edge of the runways. They processed incoming planes quickly, unloading their cargo and 
dispatching them again, full of wounded soldiers, usually within two hours. They even 
drained from the planes all fuel not needed for the return flights, adding it to Sixth Army's 
meagre and constantly-shrinking reserves. It should be noted, however, that these teams 
were not able to sustain this high performance level for long. The extreme cold and 
constant enemy harassment gradually destroyed their strength and morale. By late-
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January, the aircraft turn-around time had risen to over four hours.33 
Pickert's flak teams performed well against marauding VVS aircraft, shooting down 
several and diverting others each day. However, they possessed too few batteries to 
prevent Soviet fighters and ground-attack aircraft streaking in at low altitude, bombing 
and strafing the airfields and the transport planes being unloaded. Pickert's diary entry 
for 30 November describes a typical attack: 
Weather clear. We [therefore] expect much enemy air activity, as well as 
increased activity by our transport planes. Both expectations were met. Over 
20 Ju 52s arrived almost at once, as well as numerous He 111s. The enemy 
appeared often with six to ten aircraft, dropping bombs and strafing. It was at 
times rather awe-inspiring, and, although there was little damage, there were 
unfortunately a few losses. Two Ju 52s were also shot down, fully laden with 
fuel. They went up in flames. A terrible sight. Still, during the attack the enemy 
lost around 20 planes in the attack. 34 
Thus, the situation at the beginning of December looked unpromising. Fiebig had 
nowhere near enough aircraft, the weather severely handicapped operations, VVS air 
activity hampered it still further, and, as a result of these factors, Sixth Army was receiving 
each day less than 20 per cent of the minimum amount considered essential for its 
survival. This placed tremendous stress on the operational air commanders-on Paulus 
and his staff too, of course-and, even at this early stage of the airlift, caused friction 
between them. On 2 December, for instance, von Richthofen and Fiebig clashed over 
what was really a trivial matter: the deployment of the small number of weak Rumanian 
air units left in the area. The former had a soft spot for the Rumanian airmen (but not 
for the soldiers) and wanted to reorganize their command to give them better access to 
resources as well as greater opportunities to prove their worth in combat. Fiebig was 
furious, especially when he learned that they would be taking over a number of airfields 
on the lower Don presently occupied by Fliegerkorps VII/'s own units. He angrily wrote 
in his diary that night that von Richthofen had been duped by the "bleatings and prattle" 
of Rumanian commanders claiming that "Fliegerkorps VIII thinks it owns the Don region."36 
The following day he even wrote that "Von Richthofen lacks the courage of his convictions. 
It's a terrible situation.... I try to call him, unsuccessfully. He is indisposed."36 Von 
Richthofen was just at angry over the situation. He noted in his own diary that "Fiebig 
behaves towards the Rumanians with ignorant and abnormal stupidity. I have to make 
myself abnormally clear to him!"37 The disagreement came to nothing, however, when 
both commanders realized that they had a far more important matter to worry about: the 
survival of the quarter of a million men in Stalingrad. They could not allow a rift in their 
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relationship to develop at this critical time. As Fiebig wrote on 6 December: "Conversation 
with von Richthofen. Loyalty on both sides. He tells me that he trusts me. Although our 
personalities seem to clash, in the end we are both pursuing the same objective-so we 
must be reconciled." 
Pickert did not involve himself in the squabble. Isolated within the pocket, unable to 
sleep properly at night because of the relentless thunder of artillery fire and sporadic 
crashing of bombs, he reacted to the intense stress he felt with composed resignation, 
not anger. "I pray each night to our God," he penned on 5 December, "not for myself, but 
for our people and the Fatherland, for the salvation of the Sixth Army and for final victory! 
I feel deeply compelled to do this. But for myself and my insignificant fate I can find no 
words. Everything for everyone. For our beloved land, which we must fight to protect."38 
He knew the airlift was doomed, but was not yet prepared to abandon Sixth Army. Von 
Manstein's powerful relief effort would start within weeks, he told himself. He and his men 
must do all they could to ensure its success. 
Operation "Winter Storm" 
During his long journey south from the Leningrad region to his new headquarters at 
Novocherkassk, 35 kilometres northeast of Rostov, Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein 
discussed the Stalingrad situation with several local commanders. Most importantly, he 
conferred with von Weichs and his staff at the Starobyelsk headquarters of Army Group 
B. They briefed him at length on Soviet actions and strengths and the state of Sixth 
Army.39 He also sought the advice of General Hauffe, the head of the German Military 
Mission to Rumania, "who painted a most disagreeable picture of the state of the two 
Rumanian armies on the Stalingrad front."4o Of their 22 original divisions, Hauffe said, 
"nine had been completely destroyed, nine had run away and could not be sent into 
action for the time being, and only four were stili 'fit for combat." Although he hoped to 
form "a few additional formations from the wreckage," he added that von Manstein would 
not be able to count on them for any relief operations attempted in the immediate future. 
In a series of telephone calis, von Manstein also discussed the situation with von 
Richthofen, who firmly insisted that his air fleet could not provide Sixth Army with anywhere 
the amount considered essential for its survival. Paulus must break out immediately, the 
airman emphatically stated several times, and the field marshal must abandon his unrealistic 
hope of breaking in and relieving him. Contrary to received opinion, von Manstein shared 
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this view and, because he doubted he would have sufficient forces, dispaired at Hitler's 
order that he should relieve Sixth Army as soon as possible. "Manstein is desperate 
about the decisions made at the top," von Richthofen noted in his diary after a long 
discussion with the field marshal at his new headquarters on 27 November.41 He added 
that von Manstein was also in a poor mental state, having lost his eldest son (Leutnant 
Gero von l\IIanstein) in combat only a month earlier. In his own memoirs, von Manstein 
referred to the loss of his son as "the hardest blow that could have befallen my beloved 
wife, myself and our children" and devoted several pages to a eulogy.42 
Still, von Manstein was a professional soldier. He would perform his duty to the best 
of his abilities. Despite his frustration with the High Command, his mounting belief that 
Army Group Don lacked sufficient forces to mount an attack strong enough to break into 
the pocket, and his grief at the death of his son, he responded to Hitler's instructions with 
the iron determination and boundless energy that had first won the FOhrer's admiration 
early in the war. He conceived a bold plan, code-named Operation Wintergewitter (Winter 
Storm), to send a powerful column slicing through the cordon around Sixth Army to break 
its strangulation. Fuel and ammunition would be rushed through the corridor to improve 
the army's mobility and strength.43 Then, if all went according to plan, he would send 
Sixth Army the radio signal Donnerschlag (thunderclap), its cue to break out through the 
same corridor. 
The Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps (from Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army) would make the 
main thrust towards Stalingrad. Strengthened by two fresh Panzer divisions still to arrive, 
it would strike from the vicinity of Kotelnikovo, 110 kilometres from Pau Ius' encircled 
army. Although von Manstein's forces at Nizhne-Chirskaya were 45 kilometres closer, he 
chose to strike from Kotelnikovo because it would not involve crossing the Don and he 
believed the Soviets would least expect an attack from that direction. A Rumanian corps 
would guard each of the column's flanks, whilst the Forty-Eighth Panzer Corps, with five 
divisions by then, would make a diversionary thrust from the Chir towards Kalach. 
Von Manstein soon realized, however, that many of his promised reinforcements would 
arrive late or not all all, because they were sent to other crisis points along the eastern 
front. He concluded that "relieving Sixth Army from two different directions ... from the 
Kotelnikovo area east of the Don ... and from the middle Chir towards Kalach ... was 
impossible because of a shortages of forces. The most we could hope to do now was 
to assemble sufficient strength at one SpOt."44 Thus, he decided to attempt only the 
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attack from Kotelnikovo, and ordered Paulus to begin shuffling ~Iis forces around inside 
the pocket in preparation for a break-out in that direction. He kept this part of the plan 
hidden from the Fuhrer until almost the last minute. Hitler, he knew, favoured an operation 
to break Sixth Army's encirclement and build a strong front on the Don, but still wanted 
that army to hold its positions on the Volga whilst being supplied via a "land corridor". 
Von Manstein ordered the immediate formation of a convoy of 800 trucks loaded with 
3,000 tons of fuel and other supplies, plus a fleet of tractors for mobilizing part of Sixth 
Army's artillery, all of which would follow his Panzers into the "fortress". He also began 
positioning his forces for the coming attack, taking care not to leave his flanks exposed 
or the Chir front weakened. Inside the pocket, meanwhile, Paulus acted on the field 
marshal's instructions by shifting two motorized divisions and a Panzer division to the 
southwest part of the pocket. 
Despite being the product of von Manstein's excellent strategical mind, Wintergewitter 
ran into trouble right from the moment of conception. On 2 December, shortly after 
Paulus moved the three divisions to the southwest, the Soviet Don and Stalingrad Fronts 
struck the pocket and tied those divisions down in bitter defensive fighting for almost a 
week. Their attacks, von Manstein recalled, ''were bloodily repulsed by the courageous 
troops of the army."45 Next day, Southwestern Front hit the Chir front, "striking ceaselessly 
at one Schwerpunkt after another," forcing von Manstein to commit the three fresh divisions 
intended for the Forty-Eighth Panzer Corps to defensive operations on the Chir.46 In 
effect, this removed the corps from any participation in Wintergewitter. Additionally, the 
two Panzer divisions promised to the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps (the 6th and 23rd) were 
slow in arriving, and the OKH instructed the field marshal to deploy his two Luftwaffe 'field 
divisions for defensive actions onlyY 
Von Manstein was a realist. He knew that his chances of success were fair at best. 
Hitler remained optimistic, on the other hand, responding to the field marshal's "pessimistic" 
report of 28 November48 with a radio message encouraging him not to be downcast 
because of the great number of Soviet divisions in the region. He should remember that 
Soviet formations were always smaller and weaker than they at first appeared to be, and 
that the Soviet command was probably having trouble maintaining supplies and effective 
command as a result of its unexpected successes.49 Von IVianstein was not persuaded 
and, on the 9th, sent the High Command a detailed appraisal in which he outlined the 
situation of both Axis and Soviet forces. 50 Axis forces were greatly outnumbered, he 
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explained at length, and air reconnaissance revealed that additional Soviet units were 
steadily pouring in from other sections of the front. The Soviet command clearly anticipated 
a relief operation and was determined to thwart it at all costs. Strong Soviet attracks were 
already being made on the Chir front. 
Outlining his intentions, von Manstein urged that he be allowed to launch his attack 
as soon as possible, even though he was still uncertain if the Forty-Eighth Panzer Corps 
could be released from the Chir immediately. A steady flow of reinforcements to Army 
Group Don was absolutely crucial, he stressed, if he was to offset Soviet reinforcements. 
It was also essential to increase their rate of arrival if they were not always going to lag 
behind the enemy. 
Von Manstein had previously maintained that Sixth Army's break-out was an essential 
prerequisite for the consolidation of the southern flank. However, although he still planned 
to liberate the army, he now seemed unsure whether this was the wisest course of action. 
In his lengthy appraisal to the High Command he even suggested that the trapped army 
would probably playa more valiJable role by continlJing to tie down the scores of Soviet 
divisions around Stalingrad.51 Freeing the army from the ruined city would release far 
more Soviet forces than Army Group Don could possibly handle. On the other hand, he 
added, the strength of enemy forces and the rate and scale of their reinforcement was 
already so great that the Soviet command might 
take the proper action and, while maintaing its envelopment of Stalingrad, 
attack with strong forces against Third and Fourth Rumanian Armies with 
Rostovas its target. If this happens, our most vital forces will be operationally 
immobilized in the fortress area or tied down keeping the corridor to it open, 
whereas the Russians will have freedom of action along the whole of the army 
group's front. To maintain this situation throughout the winter strikes me as 
not advisable. 
This glooomy appraisal had little effect. Although Hitler did express concern for the 
immediate stability of the Chir front, and began tinkering with the disposition of forces in 
that sector, he remained convinced that Soviet formations were weaker than von Manstein 
claimed, that the field marshal would liberate Sixth Army, and that he would probably also 
restore the line held before Uranus. The 9 December entry in the OKW war diary states: 
Weather permitting, Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein will launch the attack 
aimed at relieving Sixth Army on 11 or 12 December, and expects to continue 
the attack until the 17th. The Fuhrer is very confident, and wants to regain our 
former positions on the Don. He believes that the first phase of the Russian 
winter offensive can be regarded as finished, without having shown any decisive 
successes.52 
Air support for the attack would be limited, due to the fact that Fiebig's Fliegerkorps 
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V111-previously the most powerful close air support force in the east-now committed 
most of its bombers and half its fighters, and devoted all its efforts, to meeting Sixth 
Army's logistical needs. However, von Richthofen was determined to provide the army 
with the best support possible by his depleted air fleet, aware that the failure of von 
Manstein's relief operation would seal the fate of Sixth Army. 
During all previous operations, von Richthofen's efforts to form a close army-air force 
working relationship had resulted in markedly enhanced combat effectiveness. He now 
wanted inter-service co-operation during Wintergewitter to be as close as it had been 
during the attack on the Kerch Peninsula or on Sevastopol, when it had produced splendid 
results. Although he lacked the powerful forces at his disposal back in May and June, 
he believed that, with effective liaison and close co-operation between his team and von 
Manstein's-previously a winning combination-his fleet could still provide the army with 
acceptable air support. Unfortunately, one factor now threatened to ruin his efforts to 
build a close working relationship with Army Group Don: the incompetence of Oberst 
Hans-Detlef Herhudt von Rohden, his Chief of Staff. Von Rohden was intelligent and 
energetic, but a poor administrive officer, unable to marshal effectively and efficiently the 
efforts of his subordinates and focus them on the fleet's missions. He also lacked judgement 
of situational constraints, understanding of human behaviour, and, most importantly, inter-
personal skills. He simply could not "get on" with his superiors, peers or subordinates. 
Von Richthofen summoned von Rohden on 10 December and sharply rebuked him for 
his poor performance. The fleet staff was "simply not functioning", he said.53 The latter 
snapped back that it was not his fault. "He raged at me," the surprised von Richthofen 
wrote that night. "Claims he does too much himself and requests new people." The 
rebuke had no immediate effect. Two days later, von Rohden's inability to work closely 
with Genera/major Schulz, Army Group Don's Chief of Staff, resulted in a clash between 
the air fleet commander and von Manstein. Von Rohden was "uncongenial" and impossible 
to work with, von Manstein insisted, stressing that his chief and the rest of his staff 
concurred.54 The best short-term solution, he added, was for von Richthofen and ~Iimself 
to liaise directly, as they had at Sevastopol. The airman agreed, pointing out that he had 
never appointed von Rohden in the first place. It had been a decision from above. He 
remained hostile towards von Rohden, "letting fly at him again" that night and, on the 
13th, writing in his diary: 
Rohden is always useless, not taking care of the essential things. That's 
because he knows nothing at all about them. He's endowed with the ability 
to write insignificant but literarily-faultless orders. He never urges the units to 
do anything; he takes care neither of the [fleet] staff business nor of the rear 
area services or the Gau [the fleet's administrative section]; he does not keep 
in contact with the army commands, and, when he does, he only ends up 
quarreling with them. All in all, then, he's an ideal Chief! 
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He wanted von Rohden replaced as soon as possible, and rang Jeschonnek several 
times to request his transfer. According to received opinion, the unpopular officer remained 
in his post until late-January, when Generalfeldmarschall Milch arrived to take over the 
airlift. One of the first things he did was instruct von Richthofen to sack von Rohden.55 
This is not true. Milch never issued any such instruction. In fact, despite von Richthofen's 
requests for his removal, von Rohden remained Luftflotte IV's Chief of Staff until late 
February (three weeks after Milch had returned to Berlin), when he took over as Chief 
of Staff to Generaloberst Keller's Luftflotte I, operating in northern Russia. 56 In the 
meantime, von Richthofen kept him tightly reined in, whilst liaising with the various army 
commands himself. 
On 9 December, von Richthofen issued a directive entitled "Luftflotte /V's combat 
operations for the destruction of the enemy around Stalingrad".57 Not yet aware that von 
Manstein had been forced to abandon his secondary thrust towards Kalach because of 
insufficient forces, the air commander included that diversionary attack in his directive. 
The fleet would "first pull Fourth Panzer Army forward in a north-east direction from the 
Kotelnikovo region towards the Stalingrad fortress, and then forwards from the Chir 
bridgehead in the direction of Kalach." However, despite the directive's overly-optimistic 
title and its promise of the "fullest" support of the army, von Richthofen had so few units 
to throw against the Soviets that he was forced once again to abandon Schwerpunktbildung 
the practice of creating single points of maximum effort. Instead, he had to dissipate his 
forces by deploying them on three major, seperate but simultaneous missions: 1) the 
continued supply of Sixth Army at Stalingrad; 2) the close support of von Manstein's relief 
operation; and 3) the close support of the Axis forces already fighting desperately on the 
Chir. 
Fliegerkorps VIII must continue its air-lift to Stalingrad with no slackening of effort, he 
stressed in the directive. Sixth Army's mobility and combaHeadiness must be improved 
so that it could break out when von Manstein gave the order. However, "if the need 
arose," Fliegerkorps VIII would deploy its bomber groups (KG. 51, KG. 55, UKG. 100, 
/I.IK G. 27), against Soviet concentrations at various pOints around the pocket as well as 
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at the Don-Chir bridgehead. The 2nd Group of the 52nd Fighter Wing would escort the 
bombers during such missions. One might have thought that Fiebig opposed the use of 
these bombers in a combat role, especially the He 111 groups, preferring to use them 
as he had for the last week or so: as a valuable component of his transport fleet. 
However, he was already painfully aware that the airlift was failing miserably and that, as 
a result, Sixth Army's only chance of salvation lay with von Manstein's relief effort. As 
he wrote in his diary on 12 December, the first day of the operation: "Today only 80 tons 
of supplies reached the fortress .... But the tactical success of Fourth Panzer Army, 
together with the He [111]s, is worth much more than a few additional tons in the 
fortress." 58 
Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV, which now had only around one-third of its June or July 
strength, would carry out the main offensive mission: support of Fourth Panzer Army's 
relief drive from Kotelnikovo to the pocket. Pflugbeil's air corps was poorly equipped for 
this task, lacking sufficient fighters to keep the skies clear of Soviet 'fighters and tank-
destroying Shturmoviks as well as enough Stukas and ground-attack planes to offer the 
army effective battlefield support. Fliegerkorps IV commanded two Stuka wings, a ground-
attack wing and a destroyer wing. Although this looked an adequate force on paper, the 
operational rate was less than 50 per cent. In total, the operable Ju 87s, Bf 109s and Bf 
110s numbered less than 200. They were already substantially outnumbered by their 
VVS counterparts, which had possessed air superiority in the region since Uranus began 
and which would doubtless concentrate their formations against the relief force as soon 
as they detected it. 
In his operational directive, von Richthofen stressed the need to "shield" the Chir front, 
already creaking under the weight of constant enemy pressure. If it gave way, the entire 
southern flank would probably collapse. Both air corps, he stated, must carefully monitor 
enemy activities along the Chir and be ready, in the shortest time, to throw back any 
forces penetrating the front. Fiebig's fighter, Stuka and ground-attack units would focus 
most of their attention on the Chir front. They were in poor condition, though, with the 
operational rate of most units being around 35 to 40 percent. Therefore, to defend the 
weakest stretch of the Chir front, held by the remnants of the Rumanian Third Army, von 
Richthofen also committed the few Rumanian air units left in the area to protection of the 
Chir. They were understrength, poorly trained and equipped with aircraft inferior to the 
new VVS fighters now making their presence felt at Stalingrad, but at least they filled a 
308. 
few gaps in the coverage of the depleted German units, 
Despite their quantitative inferiority, von Richthofen's combat units had exacted a high 
toll on the enemy in recent weeks, so he could expect them to perform well during 
Wintergewitter. Whereas most Soviet pilots were fresh from training schools, almost all 
German combat fliers were experienced in aerial combat and in dealing with the very 
difficult weather conditions. As a result, not only had German Stukas and ground-attack 
planes proved deadly on the battlefield since the beginning of Uranus, but, although they 
were numerically much weaker than their Soviet counterparts, German fighters had claimed 
more enemy planes destroyed than they had themselves lost. On 8 December, for 
instance, Soviet armoured forced launched attacks on the northwest corner of the pocket, 
but were successfully driven back by combined air force and army actions. Escorted by 
fighters from the 3rd Fighter Wing, Stukas of the 2nd Dive-Bomber Wing repeatedly hit 
the Soviet infantry and armour, destroying a large percentage of the 60 tanks left wrecked 
on the battlefield. For the loss of a few planes, the fighter squadrons inflicted high 
casualties on their Soviet counterparts, claiming 32 fighters and Shturmoviks destroyed. 59 
The kill ratio was consistently in favour of the German air units, although not always as 
dramatically so as on 8 December. In general, throughout the last week of November 
and the first two of December, German units destroyed around three times as many 
aircraft as they lost. Von Richthofen could take little heart from this, however .. His units 
were so depleted that even losses usually considered acceptable were now substantially 
reducing their operational effectiveness. The VVS, on the other hand, was still strong 
enough to absorb its higher losses. Von Richthofen felt sick with foreboding over the 
coming relief operation, but insisted that his units do their utmost to bring it to a successful 
conclusion. 
The progress of the air supply operation further discouraged the air leader. Despite the 
best efforts of Fiebig, Pickert and their staffs, the airlift was going as badly as he had 
earlier predicted to the High Command. Between 1 and 9 December, when he issued 
his directive for the Luftwaffe's participation in Wintergewitter, his transport units had 
managed to carry a mere 1,055 tons of supplies into the pocket.60 That is, they transported 
an average of only 117 tons per day, or about one-third of the amount considered the 
bare minimum for Sixth Army's survival. Only once, on the 7th, did they reach their daily 
goal. On that occasion they carried in 362 tons, prompting von Richthofen to praise 
Fiebig's corps in his diary (the first time he had) for its "good airlift results",61 Yet twice 
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in that period, on the 3rd and the 9th, weather conditions prevented any aircraft at all 
landing within the pocket. 
Between the 10th and the 12th, when Wintergewitter finally commenced, weather 
conditions allowed a slight increase in air operations. With an average of only 180 tons 
reaching Sixth Army during those three days, however, the trapped forces were still 
consuming far more food, fuel and ammunition than they were receiving.62 In fact, by the 
3rd, food stocks had already dropped so low that Pickert, refusing to consume more than 
his men, was eating "two slices of bread per day, plus a little thin SOUp".63 The only meat 
available came from the army's rapidly-decreasing number of horses, and that was also 
rationed carefully. On the 8th, the food situation had become so critical that Paulus, 
wanting to stretch out his remaing foodstocks until von Manstein's forces broke the 
encirclement, reduced the rations for all troops in the pocket to one-third of normal. 
Sixth Army would not survive long, he knew, if the relief operation failed. 
"Winter Storm" Commences 
Before dawn on 12 December, Hoth's Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps-really just the 6th 
and 23rd Panzer Divisions-began its drive from Kotelnikovo towards "Fortress Stalingrad", 
110 kilometres away. Carrying extra fuel and ammunition, and followed by rifle regiments 
and anti-tank units, the corps' 230 white-painted tanks initially made good progress. They 
encountered light opposition, having apparently caught their opponents with their guard 
down. They quickly destroyed the few units attempting to blunt their advance, and advanced 
past the abandoned weapons of others that had fled in disarray. "The Russians are on 
the run, just like old times," Fiebig excitedly penned in his diary.64 
Indeed, the attack had surprised the Soviet command, and only the quick thinking of 
Vasilevskii, the Chief of the Red Army's General Staff, prevented their forces between 
Kotelnikovo and the pocket collapsing.65 As soon as he learned of the attack, Vasilevskii 
emphatically insisted to the unconvinced Stalin that he must transfer the crack Second 
Guards Army from the Don Front to the Stalingrad Front in order to block Hoth's advance. 
Stalin finally relented to his repeated appeals early next morning, and authorized the 
transfer. Until that army arrived a few days later, Hoth's divisions were able steadily to 
bulldoze their way forward. 
The 12th was also a good day for the Luftwaffe. The air units supporting Hoth's 
armoured divisions met weak and disorganized VVS opposition. For half a dozen losses, 
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they claimed 54 Soviet aircraft destroyed, 25 of them on the ground, the rest in aerial 
combat.56 They also bombed and strafed enemy troops and field fortifications in front of 
the advancing Panzers. Von Richthofen and von IVlanstein worked together throughout 
the day, carefully co-ordinating their operations as they had on previous occasions. 
Although still disgusted by the "hopeless dissipation" of his forces, the airman felt partly 
consoled by their initial successes. "I only hope it will be as easy to bomb the enemy 
tomorrow," he wrote, noting that his groups had hit the Soviets in five repeated attacks.67 
These pleasing results had a cost. Robbed of many He 111s and escort fighters, 
Fiebig's transport fleet only managed to carry 80 tons of supplies to Sixth Army that day.68 
However, those in the pocket were probably less concerned by this paltry amount that 
they usually would have been. Their hour of liberation was at hand, or so they believed. 
A mood of optimism spread through the pocket with the news that "Papa" Hoth was on 
his way, and divisions in the southwest corner stood ready to begin their drive towards 
Hoth's forces. Pickert wrote in his diary that evening: "The assembly of troops for our 
freedom is finished, and [the relief effort] has begun. May God grant the liberation of our 
splendid soldiers here."69 
During a conference at Hitler's East Prussian headquarters, held that first day of 
Wintergewitter, Zeitzler requested Hitler to release the 17th Panzer Division from the Chir 
so that von Manstein could give it to Hoth for the relief operation. The Soviets would not 
remain idle for long, he accurately predicted, and would promptly mount a strong defence. 
The Fuhrer refused his request, claiming that the division was needed where it was 
because of a threat developing at the junction of von Manstein's army group and Italian 
Eighth Army's right flank. Encouraged by the relief operation's early progress, Hitler 
remained optimistic about its chances of success. He was also still convinced that, whilst 
Sixth Army should thrust out to meet Hoth's Panzers at the right moment, it must not 
abandon its positions on the Volga. "I have reached one conclusion, Zeitzler," he declared, 
pointing to Stalingrad on the map. "Under no circumstances can we give that up. We 
would never win it back again. We know what that means., .. If we abandon it, we 
sacrifice the entire meaning of this campaign. To imagine that I will get there again next 
time is insanity."70 Hitler's statement reveals a substantial shift in thinking. During B/au's 
planning stage and early operations, Stalingrad had not even been a primary target. Now 
Hitler was calling it "the entire meaning of the campaign", making no mention of the 
Caucasus ollfields, the original strategic goal. 
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For the next two days, the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps made steady progress, reaching 
the Aksai river and capturing a bridge at Zalivskii on the 14th. Thus, they were already 
a third of the way to the Stalingrad pocket.71 Although stiffening quickly, Soviet resistance 
was still relatively weak. The Luftwaffe had provided good support on the 13th, mainly 
because von Richthofen personally directed all its combat operations. Also, to ensure 
effective army-air force co-operation, he not only visited the command posts and airfields 
of several key air units, but also the command posts of Army Group Don, Fourth Army 
and the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps. Soldiers and airmen alike marvelled at the sight of 
his light Storch bobbing and weaving above the battlefield or landing on unprepared and 
uneven fields beside command centres. 
However, "very dreadful weather" on the 14th curtailed air operations in the entire 
region, leaving Hoth's two armoured divisions to push forward most of the day without air 
support. Of course, adverse weather grounded not only Luftwaffe units, but also those 
of the VVS, thereby temporarily removing the threat of Shtumovik attacks. The weather 
also grounded Fiebig's transport fleet, except for a few He 111s flown through the "white 
outs" by the most skilled and courageous pilots. They carried no food or ammunition, but 
only materials urgently needed to increase Sixth Army's mobility: fuel and low-viscosity 
engine oil and lubricants. The quantity they managed to suppply was unlikely to make 
much difference, though. As von Richthofen wrote: "I\lo flying except for weak supply [to 
Stalingrad] of 80 tons of fuel." 72 
Soviet pressure along the Chir and against the Don-Chir bridgehead had intensified 
during the 13th, forCing von Richthofen (as he put it) ''to wheel the mass [of air units] to 
the Chir, because a catastrophe looms there."73 Determined to widen the gap between 
the pocket and the main German line, which they wanted to crack open in several places, 
the Soviet Fifth Tank Army and the newly-formed Fifth Shock Army had thrown themselves 
against the Chir front, which the Forty-Eighth Panzer Corps fought desperately to stabilize. 
Von Richthofen was pessimistic about its chances of holding the Chir, writing that "if we 
[the Luftwaffe] don't strongly help them tomorrow, there won't be anything left to be 
done." Von Manstein held grave fears as well, not only for the stability of the Chir front, 
but also for the safety of Hoth's two armoured divisions, a third of the way to Stalingrad. 
They were unable to achieve decisive successes, he told the High Command, and, 
because of their extended flanks, needed immediate reinforcements. He requested the 
17th Panzer Division and the 16th Motorized Infantry Divison. Hitler reluctantly gave him 
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the former, although it meant weakening the Don-Chir bridgehead, but not the latter, 
which held the stretch of front between Army Groups Don and A?4 
The following day (14 December), Soviet forces hit the Don-Chir bridgehead so strongly 
that German forces were forced to evacuate their positions east of the Don. It was an 
"incredible mess," said von Richthofen, whose units were powerless to intervene because 
of the bad weather. They were unable to offer any assistance next day as well, when 
"white outs" again hampered reconnaissance and combat operations and prevented all 
but a few dozen of Fiebig's transport aircraft from reaching the pocket. They carried in 
only 70 tons of food, fuel and ammunition, which was less than a quarter of the army's 
minimum daily requirement?5 Von Richthofen was most upset by his force's weakness, 
especially concerning the fate of the encircled troops. "We can do absolutely nothing 
because of the weather," he lamented that night. "The poor Sixth Army." His only real 
achievement in recent weeks, he thought, was the evacuation of wounded soldiers; 9,000 
so far, saved from almost certain death within the pocket. 
Early on the 16th, German fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse. Stalin's 
Operation Malyi Saturn (Small Saturn) commenced, opening with a short but heavy 
artillery barrage. Two Soviet armies-the Sixth, under Lieutenant-General Kharitonov, 
and the First Guards, under General Kuznetsov-then crashed through the Italian Eighth 
Army's line on the Don, northwest of Stalingrad. Lieutenant-General Lelyushenko's Third 
Guards Army joined them on the 17th, helping them rip open the front as they pushed 
southwards. 
LIke both von Manstein and von Weicl1s, von Richthofen had long feared that the 
Soviets would target the Italians. As early as 29 November, for instance, he had written 
in his diary: "It looks as though the Russians are also going to hit the Italians; a bad thing, 
because they will probably run faster than the Rumanians." He was wrong. When the 
Soviets finally did attack the Italians on the 16th, the latter resisted courageously and, 
despite suffering heavy losses, launched several minor counterattacks in a desperate 
attempt to save the front. Despite their best efforts, however, they were overpowered by 
much stronger forces and had to fall back, though they did so steadily. Nevertheless, 
German disdain for the Italian army reached right to the highest levels, its alleged "poor 
showing" in Russia only confirming the low opinion formed by a string of defeats in the 
Mediterranean over the last two years; defeats in which, of course, German forces suffered 
a full share and for which their Italian allies served as convenient excuses. Count Ciano, 
313. 
the Italian Foreign Minister, observed this antipathy whilst visiting Hitler's headquarters 
two days after Malyi Saturn began. When one of his entourage inquired of the OKW 
whether the Italian forces on the Don had suffered heavy casualties, he received the 
untrue reply: "None at all. They never stopped running." 76 
The OKL immediately ordered von Richthofen to send two bomber wings-K. G. 27 
and K. G. 51-north from Army Group Don's combat zone to help the Italians prevent their 
line disintegrating. He was bitterly disappointed, and promptly informed Jeschonnek by 
telephone that the transfer would remove one-third of the air units supporting Hoth's 
advance and protecting the hard-pressed Chir front. It would also substantially reduce the 
forces available to support Paulus' breakout. In short, he stated ("washing my hands of 
all responsibility"), it would mean "abandoning Sixth Army and [allowing] its murder".77 
The situation grew rapidly worse. Hoth's Panzers became bogged down in heavy 
fighting around Kumskiy, halfway between the Aksai and Mishkova rivers. With momentum 
lost and opposition now stiff, their chances of reaching Paulus, or even approaching close 
enough to encourage his army to break out of the pocket, were rapidly decreasing. On 
the 19th, the Panzer divisions managed to claw their way forward to the Mishkova river, 
50 kilometres from the pocket, but were stopped by strong armoured formations. Believing 
that he could neither reach Sixth Army nor open a permanent corridor to the pocket, von 
Manstein informed the High Command that only one course of action could now be 
considered: Sixth Army must break out, gradually pulling back its northern and eastern 
fronts as it pushed out towards Hoth's divisions in the southwest,78 This would at least 
save most troops and some matf~rie!. He was so convinced that this was the only 
solution that he told Paulus to make immediate preparations to break out, but not to start 
until ordered. 79 Sixth Army would have to reach the Mishkova river, he explained. Once 
contact was established, he would send his supply convoys through the corridor, loaded 
with food, fuel and ammunition. Sixth Army would then steadily contract its perimeter as 
it withdrew southwestward, taking whatever equipment it could. 
Hitler had other ideas. He was encouraged by Hoth's progress, and now (according 
to the OKW diarist) "relinquished the idea of abandoning Stalingrad."80 He ordered the 
transfer of the SS Wiking Division north from the Caucasus to strengthen Fourth Panzer 
Army. But he refused to sanction Donnerschlag, Sixth Army's breakout, claiming that 
Sixth Army had only enough fuel to go 30 kilometres, half-way to the Mishkova. Therefore, 
it must hold its positions until the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps could advance further and 
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establish contact, at which point-but only if circumstances demanded-an orderly 
withdrawal could be undertaken. In the meantime, he would see that the Luftwaffe 
substantially increased its fuel supplies to the pocket, in order to permit the army to travel 
50 kilometres. 
Fiebig was astounded. The High Command wanted him to supply Sixth Army with 
4,000 tons of fuel and 1,800 tons of rations, which was, he wrote in his diary "simply 
impossible to accomplish."81 Indeed, during the previous four days, his transport groups 
had been able to carry in a total of 581 tons of supplies; a daily average of only 145 
tons.82 At that rate, it would take no fewer than 40 days to supply the army with the 
amount required to restore its mobility, but only if the army survived that long and 
consumed nothing in the meantime. These prerequisites reveal the absurdity of the 
situation. 
Meanwhile, by 20 December the three Soviet armies had shattered the Italian defences. 
The Celere and Sforzesca Divisions on the Italian army's right flank collapsed under a 
heavy attack, taking with them the two Rumanian divisions on Army Group Don's left 
flank.83 The Soviets drove southwards, advancing along a 100-kilometre-wide front towards 
Fiebig's main bases between the Donets and Chir rivers. Hitler promptly ordered the 
transfer of additional divisions to the region, but they were few in number and would take 
time to arrive. Some had to travel from the far north. 
The Luftwaffe's Own Problems 
Fiebig was deeply concerned for the safety of Millerovo, his main supply base, and, 
on the 20th, ordered the transfer southwards of the 27th Bomber Wing, which had 
operated from its airfield.84 He was more fearful, however, for the Tatsinskaya and 
Morozovskaya airfields, the principal bases for the supply of Stalingrad. They were already 
being attacked repeatedly by Soviet bombers, but their capture or evacuation would be 
a severe blow to the airlift No other fields in the region were as large or well equipped. 
"Fiebig is very pessimistic," von Richthofen noted, "and also radiates it."85 The air fleet 
commander was himself just as downcast; two day earlier, he had written that he could 
"no longer see any positive solution" to the steadily-worsening situation. 86 
On the 21st, spearheads of the Soviet Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps advanced to within 
20 kilometres of Tatsinskaya and Soviet-flown Douglas Boston twin-engined bombers 
began pounding Morozovskaya. Fiebig-now "really nervous", according to von 
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Richthofen-ordered immediate preparations for evacuation. He had not yet received 
instructions from the fleet command, despite repeated requests, so he put his staff and 
units on emergency alert and told them to be ready to leave at any time.87 Believing that 
only a few individual tanks threatened Fiebig's base and command centre, von Richthofen 
instructed him to sit tight for now. He would seek clarification of the situation from the 
High Command, he said, and issue formal orders as soon as he could. A day later, 
however, he had neither received a reply from the High Command nor learned from Army 
Group Don what measures were being taken to ensure the protection of the airfields, 
which were clearly in danger of being overrun. Acting on his own initiative, therefore, he 
instructed Fiebig to organize an emergency defence force from flak troops and ground 
personnel, and to pr~tre both Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya for immediate evacuation 
if and when So~t"tOrces seriously threatened their defences. He favoured early evacuation, 
/ 
he explainetl, so that important equipment could be driven out or air-lifted to other airfields. 
He could not afford to Jose fuel tankers, engine-warming equipment and spare parts, 
which were all in short supply after the loss of airfields east of the Chir in the first days 
of Uranus. 
On the 23rd, von Richthofen finally received a reply from the High Command. It was 
not the answer he wanted. Fliegerkorps VIII must hold Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya, 
instructed Goring, in a rigid "stand fast" order.88 It must continue supplying 8.ixth Army 
from those bases at all costs. They could be evacuated only when Soviet tanks or troops 
began firing directly on the airfields-but not a minute before. With a heavy heart, von 
Richthofen transmitted the Reichsmarscha/l's instructions to Fiebig. The matter was now 
out of his hands, he said. He could not over-ride Goring's instructions and order a more 
timely evacuation. Fiebig accepted the news with resignation (and the same reluctant 
obedience displayed by Paulus at Stalingrad). He wrote in his diary that evening: "/ch 
sehe, wir rennen ins UnglOck, aber Befehl ist Befehl!'-"I see that we're rushing headlong 
into disaster, but orders are orders!"89 He did not have long to wait. Within three hours 
of writing this entry, Soviet forces launched their attack on Tatsinskaya. 
First came some good news, however. At 0200 on the 24th, von Richthofen rang to 
congratulate him: he had just learned from Oberst von Below, Hitler's Luftwaffe adjutant, 
that the Fuhrer had awarded Fiebig the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross for ~Iis outstanding 
leadership of Fliegerkorps VIII. Von Richthofen was delighted, noting in his diary that the 
award was "long overdue" and came at exactly the right moment. The situation was grim, 
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he wrote, so this great news could only "improve the atmosphere".90 Yet the air corps 
commander had little time to savour his new decoration. At 0330, Soviet artillery batteries 
opened fire on the airfield, joined shortly after by the tanks that easily broke through its 
flimsy defences. A tank shell struck the signals centre, destroying all means of 
communications.91 Artillery and tank gunfire wrecked several transport planes sitting on 
runways, but failed to prevent the others taking off. With visibility at only 500 metres and 
a ceiling of 30 metres, and shells slamming into the runways around them, pilots took off 
in the most "frenzied" conditions. Their planes were laden with as much equipment as 
ground personnel had time to load before climbing on board themselves. After overseeing 
the hasty evacuation, Fliegerkorps VII/'s senior commanders, including Fiebig and his 
Chief of Staff, left in one of the last intact Ju 52s on the base. They were lucky to make 
it out, especially after the plane developed trouble in one engine. The pilot nursed it to 
Rostov,flying through low cloud on instruments only. "At least it didn't ice up," Fiebig 
noted that night. "What an absolutely lucky break!"92 
Aircraft losses were acceptable under the circumstances. 108 of Fiebig's 130 operable 
Ju 52s and 16 of his 40 operable Ju 86s managed to take off, scatter and finally land 
at a variety of airfields in the region. 93 That is, he lost 46 (27 per cent) of the 170 air-
worthy aircraft stationed at Tatsinskaya when the Soviets overran it. He called this "almost 
unbelievable", Still, the loss of those 46 aircraft, the abandonment of valuable equipment, 
and the capture of hundreds of tons of supplies urgently needed by Sixth Army were 
major blows. By his own account, Fiebig was numb with depression, unable to participate 
in the Christmas Eve celebrations put on by von Richthofen's staff. "I was at the end of 
my strength," he wrote, "so I went to bed early, even missing the Christmas visit of the 
Genera/oberst [von Richthofen].94 
Fiebig flew over Tatsinskaya next morning in a Storch, observing a few wrecked 
aircraft and a burning fuel train.95 After returning to Rostov, he was slightly heartened 
by his Christmas present: von Richthofen's staff had re-assembled the scattered 
Tatsinskaya transport groups on airfields at Salsk, in the northern Caucasus. They would 
probably begin airlift operations from Salsk later that day, albeit on a much-reduced 
scale. Fiebig paid von Richthofen a "sleepy Christmas visit" in the afternoon.96 The latter 
tried to "raise his spirits," reassuring him that, although the airlift had suffered a blow, it 
was far from fatal. He felt that Fiebig blamed him for the loss of Tatsinskaya, so he 
showed him a copy of Goring's order, pointing out that the "damned thing" had paralyzed 
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his ability to act independently. Fiebig accepted his explanation, cursing the High Command 
for its actions. He noted in his diary: 
Von Richthofen can see only one possibility: that the Fuhrer has always been 
right in his decisions up until now, even though we could not quite understand 
it when, on previous occasions, he acted contrary to the advice he received. 
Perhaps one day we will be laughing over a wine about our present woes. 
May Heaven grant itl 97 
Despite purporting to have faith in the Fuhrer's genius-clearly an attempt to cheer 
up Fiebig-von Richthofen had come to believe that neither Hitler nor the High Command 
grasped the true situation in this critical region and that, as a result, their decisions were 
invariably going to make that situation worse. "My confidence in our leadership is rapidly 
shrinking to nothing!," he had scrawled in his diary two weeks earlier.sa Almost every day 
since then, his diary reveals, he had phoned Zeitzler, Jeschonnek and Gt)ring, trying to 
get them to 'fly out and assess the situation for themselves. All he received, he noted, 
were empty promises and unconvincing statements of empathy. Zeitzler was the only 
one who seemed aware of tl1e true state of affairs, but his "stammering" revealed that he 
lacked the strength or ability to do anything substantial.99 
The airman was not alone in losing faith in the High Command. All the senior army 
commanders in the region-including von Weichs, Hoth, Paulus and von Manstein-were 
equally fed up. Von Richthofen shared a meal with von Manstein on the 26th, after which 
he jotted these comments: 
We both complained together. Manstein suggested that the Reichsmarschall 
himself should assume command of both the [Don] army group and Luftf/otte 
IV, since he always claims that the situation here or at Stalingrad is not as 
bad as we report. Our motto: "Assign the confident commander to the post he 
is confident of fulfilling!" The Fuhrer now refuses to speak to Manstein by 
telephone, to summon him to his headquarters, or to come out here himself.10o 
The End of "Winter Storm" 
Hitler's anger at his outstanding field marshal stemmed not only from the latter's failure 
to break through to Sixth Army, but also from his repeated claims that the entire southern 
front could collapse if the High Command-meaning Hitler himself-insisted on trying to 
keep the encircled army in its present positons. On the 21 st, after the Fifty-Seventh 
Panzer Corps had attempted unsuccessfully for two days to push past the Mishkova river, 
von Manstein told both Paulus and Hitler that the corps would probably not be able to 
advance further and that Sixth Army must attempt to break out immediately. Paulus and 
his Chief of Staff replied that they would not move without Hitler's permission, and offered 
318. 
several reasons (which von Manstein and von Richthofen privately called "lame excuses") 
why they opposed a breakout anyway. Von Manstein therefore tried to convince Hitler to 
approve the breakout, knowing that Paulus would then have no choice but to attempt it. 
Zeitzler agreed that this was the best course of action, even though it would mean heavy 
casualties and the abandonment of much equipment. 
According to the published version of the OKW war diary, Hitler promptly discussed 
the overall situation with the General Staffs of both army and air force, but "as usual, 
again no bold decisions are taken. It is as though the Fuhrer is no longer capable of 
doing SO."101 As David Irving points out, however, this frequently-cited passage is a post-
war interpolation, designed to cast Hitler in a poor Iight.102 It does not appear in the 
original, unpublished manuscript by Helmuth Greiner, the OKW's diarist, and it is 
inconsistent with Hitler's recorded actions on the days both preceding and following the 
21 st. Rather than vaccilating, the Fuhrer stood firm, repudiating tile "defeatist" views of 
his generals with typical dogmatism. He strongly disagreed with von Manstein's and 
Zeitzler's assessments and rejected their suggestions. Still determined to hold Stalingrad, 
the only major prize of an extremely costly summer campaign, he insisted that Sixth 
Army might attempt to join up with Hoth's corps only if it continued holding its positions 
on the Volga. 
On the 22nd, von Manstein informed Hitler that he would have to transfer one or two 
divisions away from the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps to strengthen Army Group Don's 
crumbling left flank. DOing so, he added, would naturally mean abandoning Hoth's relief 
drive, for the time being anyway.103 Disappointed by the field marshal's "pessimistic 
outlook", the Fuhrer grudgingly authorized him the following day to transfer "elements" of 
the corps to his deteriorating flank in order to protect the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya 
airfields. However, he stressed, Hoth's remaining formations must not withdraw from the 
Mishkova river until reinforcements arrived and they could resume their relief operation. 
A battalion of new Tiger tanks were already on the way, and they would cross into Russia 
by rail later that day.104 
At noon on the 24th, shortly after Soviet armoured spearheads overran Tatsinskaya, 
von Manstein detached the 11 th Panzer Division from Fourth Panzer Army and directed 
it to hold the threatened IVlorozovskaya airfield and recapture Tatsinskaya, and block the 
advance towards Rostov of the Soviet Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps. If the enemy reached 
Rostov, von Manstein realized, they would not only have enCircled Army Group Don, but 
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also cut off the two German armies in the Caucasus. As it happened, the 11th Panzer 
Division eventually did stop the Soviet drive on Rostov, defeat the enemy forces and win 
back Tatsinskaya (on the 28th), but not before the Soviets had destroyed or removed 
most of its stocks, equipment and spare parts. 
Although now angered by von Manstein's "constant complaints," Hitler was still 
optimistic-outwardly, at least. He hoped to reinforce the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps 
with the SS Wiking Division and the 7th Panzer Division. With these extra formations, he 
argued, the corps could resume its drive to the pocket. Hitler apparently managed to 
persuade Keitel and Jodi, but then they had seen how his personal fortitude had saved 
the eastern armies during the previous winter. Surely it would do the same again. 
Jeschonnek and Zeitzler were unpersuaded. Acting as much on von Richthofen's initiative 
as on their own105, they pressed Hitler to withdraw the two armies in the Caucasus and 
use them to rebuild the southern front. Still relatively strong and well-equipped, those 
armies would certainly be capable of holding Zhukov's forces in check. Hitler refused 
outright. 
On Christmas day, von Manstein again infuriated the Filhrer, this time by dispatching 
a very gloomy situation assessment.106 Wintergewitter had not only ground to a halt, he 
said, but the Soviets had forced the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps' two remaining divisions 
to withdraw from the Mishkova to the Aksai, thus widening the gap between them and 
the pocket. Restarting the relief operation was impossible with the forces at his disposal. 
Within days, the Second Guards and Fifty-First Armies would cut the so-called "corridor" 
at the Aksai river, encirCling Fourth Panzer Army's forces to the east. The Rumanian 
Sixth and Seventh Army Corps offered little, he stated, and the two remaining divisions 
of the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps, bogged down half-way to Stalingrad, now possessed 
only 19 operational Panzers between them. Because Tatsinskaya had fallen and 
Morozovskaya was under attack, Sixth Army's supply situation was very poor. The army 
now needed at least 550 tons of supplies per day to maintain its combat-worthiness. 
Moreover, the only way to save the army from imminent destruction, he said, was to 
transfer to Hoth the two-division-strong Third Panzer Corps from von Kleist's First Panzer 
Army in the Caucasus, as well as an infantry division from Ruoff's Seventeenth Army, 
also in the Caucasus. He would then have to add at least another infantry division from 
the Seventeenth Army to Army Group Don, in order to bolster its left flank. This report 
came like a slap in the face to Hitler. Its message was clear: the relief operation had 
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failed and Sixth Army, along with the entire army group, now faced destruction unless 
appropriate counter-measures-not those planned by Hitler-were immediately undertaken. 
The report soured his already-strained relationship with von Manstein, resulting in the 
situation described by von Richthofen: with the Fuhrer refusing to take the field marshal's 
calls or allow him to report in person. 
Constant pressure from his generals and steady Soviet gains gradually wore down 
Hitler's resolve. On 28 December, he finally authorized the withdrawal of the armies in 
the Caucasus and the transfer of many of their divisions to Army Group Don. Zeitzler 
deserves the principal credit for this decision, and with it the salvation of those armies. 
He was an honourable man, who had been so moved by the plight of Paulus' trapped 
soldiers that he began limiting himself to their rations. He lost so much weight after 
several days that Hitler, annoyed by this "ill-considered" gesture, ordered him to desist 
and return to his normal meals. On the evening of the 27th, Zeitzler arrived unannounced 
at the Fuhrer's private quarters and requested a meeting. He implored his Commander-
in-Chief to authorize Army Group A's withdrawal from the Caucasus, pointing out that its 
two armies would greatly improve von Manstein's chances of rebuilding the southern 
flank. Yet if they remained where they were, he added, they would soon be cut off south 
of the Don by Soviet forces driving to Rostov. He ended with the words: "Unless you 
order a withdrawal from the Caucasus now, we shall soon have a second Stalingrad on 
our hands."107 Hitler was clearly struck by the power of these words and, after pondering 
them for a few seconds, replied: "Very well. Go ahead and issue the orders." Zeitzler 
wasted no time. After excusing himself, he used the telephone in Hitler's anteroom to 
order the withdrawal, adding the stipulation that his instructions be passed on to the 
armies immediately. This was a wise move. As soon as he returned to his own quarters, 
his staff officers informed him that the Fuhrer had rung and that he was to return his call 
immediately. When he rang Hitler, the latter said: "Don't do anything just yet about the 
withdrawal from the Caucasus. We'll discuss it again tomorrow." Knowing that this would 
begin a string of postponements, probably resulting in the loss of the armies, Zeitzler was 
relieved to be able to answer: "My Fuhrer, it is too late. I despatched the order from your 
headquarters. It has already reached the front-line troops and the withdrawal has begun." 
Hitler hesitated for a moment, then said, with annoyance in his voice: "Very well then, 
we'll leave it at that", 
Next day, Hitler issued Operations Order No.2, his formal instructions for the 
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withdrawal.108 The gradual retreat it outlined was not as complete as Zeitzler would have 
liked, but it was a promising start. First Panzer Army was to begin disengaging itself from 
the enemy and pulling back by stages to Salsk, whilst Seventeenth Army was, at least 
for now, to hold its line on the Black Sea. The 3rd and 13th Panzer Divisions were to shift 
to Fourth Panzer Army's northern flank, which they were to protect during the withdrawals. 
Together with the 16th Motorized Division, these divisions were to be subordinated 
immediately to Army Group Don and used to cover the army group's threatened right 
flank. 
On the 29th, von Richthofen was surprised to learn of the withdrawal order. He had 
given up hope that the High Command would take any radical steps to save the southern 
front. On the very day that Hitler Signed the order, the air commander had learned from 
Jeschonnek and von Manstein that Hitler and his closest cronies had been agonizing 
over the situation and had finally arrived at an important decision. He was highly sceptical 
that anything good would come of it. Twisting the German proverb, "the mountain 
laboured and brought forth a mouse", he sarcastically wrote in his diary: "From Manstein 
and Jeschonnek I learn that the highest mountains are again in labour. We await the little 
mouse."109 Next evening, pleasantly surprised that Hitler had actually ordered something 
sensible, he wrote: "This morning orders finally arrived. They grew out of the proposal I 
had been fighting for over the last few weeks. Pity about the loss of time. It might not 
have been so costly [in the meantime]. Hopefully it's still not too late, which is my fear." 110 
Despite his relief that the two Caucasus armies were being pulled back, von Richthofen 
remained convinced that the southern flank could not be held if the High Command 
insisted on keeping Sixth Army in its present positions on the Volga. He also knew that 
his air units were proving woefully incapable of meeting even that army's minimum 
logistical requirements, despite his best efforts and those of his subordinates. During the 
five days preceding the loss of Tatsinskaya on the 24th, his transport fleet had operated 
to its maximum capacity and performed better than it had since the air-lift began. Still, 
during those five days it had managed to carry a mere 1,077 tons of supplies to the 
pocket, a daily average of only 215 tons. This amount was as much as von Richthofen 
told von Manstein and the High Command that he could guarantee each day, but was 
only two-thirds of the amount originally fixed as the army's absolute minimum and less 
than half the amount the army now demanded. 111 On the 24th, the day Soviet forces 
overran Tatsinskaya, no supplies at all reached the pocket. The hasty evacuation of that 
322. 
base's Ju 52s to a variety of airfields in the region, and eventually to Salsk, prevented 
them carrying out any supply missions. Bad weather at Morozovskaya and "white outs" 
in the pocket prevented the other transport planes from carrying in supplies. 
The He 111 units at Morozovskaya were more fortunate than their counterparts at 
Tatsinskaya. When Soviet forces approached their base on the 24th, their commander, 
Oberst Ernst KOhl, instructed them to stand by for evacuation orders. A sensible and 
experienced bomber commander, the Oberst lived up to his name, which means "cool". 
As von Richthofen noted on the 26th: "KOhl strikes me as being calm and reliable, and 
he's doing very well." Indeed, when KOhl learned on the 24th that Tatsinskaya had been 
overrun, he took immediate action.112 He transferred his He 111s, as well as the Stukas 
also operating from Morozovskaya, to the relative safety of Novocherkassk, near Rostov. 
He courageously remained behind with a small staff, though, hoping that weather conditions 
would improve enough for him to direct his units against the Soviet forces now less than 
15 kilometres away and advancing steadily. Early next morning, Christmas day, his 
meteorologists informed him that good flying weather could be expected for much of the 
day. He immediately contacted his units at Novocherkassk, telling them to stand by for 
operational orders. As soon as the morning fog lifted, he ordered them to launch the 
strongest possible attacks on Soviet forces swarming around Morozovskaya. Tanks caught 
on the steppes without cover made good targets, even for the horizontal bombers, who 
swooped in at low altitude. KOhl's men attacked all that day and much of the next, 
reinforced by as many other air units as von Richthofen could spare from air-lift duties 
and combat missions in the Kotelnikovo region. Working in close co-operation with the 
11 th Panzer Division, whose Flivos and reconnaissance officers provided good information 
on enemy movements, and whose tanks and anti-tank gunners proved equally effective 
against their opponents, they succeeded in destroying the Soviet threat to Morozovskaya-
at least for the time being. Most of KOhl's He 111s returned to the base on the 26th. 
Although the He 111s at Morozovskaya experienced only a minor interruption to their 
supply missions, the Ju 52 groups operating from Salsk after the loss of Tatsinskaya 
suffered considerably. First, the distance from Salsk to the pocket was over 120 kilometres 
greater than it had been from Tatsinskaya, which not only gave VVS units more interception 
space and time, but also significantly reduced the number of supply flights that each 
plane could make per day. Because the Ju 52s needed additional fuel, they were forced 
to reduce the amount of supplies they carried. Second, despite the hard work of von 
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Richthofen's quartermaster, who endeavoured to improve performance as quickly as 
possible, Salsk remained overcrowded and lacking in the facilities and equipment necessary 
for continuous use by large transport fleets. As a result of these adverse factors, as well 
as a steady worsening of weather conditions, Fiebig's transport units were only able to 
carry 7 tons to the pocket on Christmas day, 78 tons on the 26th, 127 on the 27th, 35 
on the 28th, 124 on the 29th, 224 on the following day, and 310 tons, the only acceptable 
total, on the last day of the year.113 Thus, throughout the final week of 1942, Paulus' 
starving and frozen troops received an average of 129 tons a day, nowhere near enough 
to keep them alive for much longer, let alone combat-worthy as well. Keeping them alive 
was clearly the first priority, of course. During the first weeks of the airlift, when most 
air force and army commanders had placed their hopes on von Manstein' relief operation, 
more fuel and ammunition had entered the pocket than food and medical supplies. 
However, throughout the last week of the year, by which time only Hitler still appeared 
to believe that Sixth Army would be liberated, the ratios had reversed. Far more food and 
medical supplies entered the pocket than fuel and ammunition.114 
Transport planes never returned to their home bases empty. Wounded soldiers and 
their medics filled their fuselages. During the last week of 1942, transporters carried no 
fewer than 4,120 sick or wounded troops from the pocket, making a total of 18,410 
evacuated since the air-lift began.115 The wounded were never alone inside the lumbering 
transporters, though. They were joined by mail bags crammed full of letters written mainly 
by exhausted and frightened soldiers to their loved ones back home. Up until 31 December, 
transport planes carried 15 tons of mail out of the pocket.116 Whilst this represents a 
substantial volume of mail, it was slight compared to the amount of mail carried into the 
pocket. Up to the same date, the encircled troops received 73 tons of mail. That is, 
almost two tons of mail from the homeland reached the pocket each day, taking up a lot 
of supply space in the planes and placing enormous strain on Sixth Army's 257 postal 
workers attempting to sort and distribute it efficiently. At no point did the air units balk 
at carrying mail to and from the pocket, however. The thousands of letters posted each 
day to the troops at Stalingrad played a major role in keeping up their spirits in the face 
of adversity. 
German troop morale in the last few days of 1942 was very low, the result of renewed 
Soviet pressure and resulting gains. On 27 December, the Rumanian Seventh Army 
Corps, on the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps' rigl1t flank, collapsed under the weight of a 
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Soviet armoured attack and fell back in a disorganized retreat.117 Hoth decided the best 
thing he could do was pull the Panzer corps back from its positions on the Aksai river 
and, if he could, rebuild the line at Kotelnikovo. With this withdrawal, the completed third 
of the planned German "corridor" to the Stalingrad pocket disappeared for good. Von 
Richthofen threw every available fighter, Stuka and ground-attack plane at the Soviet 
forces pressing against Kotelnikovo. Despite conducting up to a dozen sorties each, the 
pilots were powerless to stop Soviet units entering Kotelnikovo and seizing a small 
German airfield west of the city.118 Soviet forces also pressed in on Morozovskaya again, 
forcing Oberst KOhl once more to place his He 111s on an emergency evacuation alert. 
In the meantime, he directed heavy air strikes against the forces threatening his airfield. 
Fiebig was most concerned for the safety of KOhl's air units, fearing that they might be 
overrun before they could scramble. "The situation for our units at "Moro" is not good," . 
he wrote in his diary on the 27th. "It could easily develop into a crisis like at Tatsinskaya 
on the 24th."119 Within days it would do just that. 
During the afternoon of the 28th, great pressure on the Fifty-Seventh Panzer Corps 
forced Hoth to pull it back past Kotelnikovo to the Sal river. This withdrawal opened up 
the left bank of the Don to Rostov, the city Stalin now wanted to recapture above all 
others. It also exposed the deep right flank of Armeeabteilung Hollidt (Army Detachment 
Hollidt), the makeshift operational command holding the section of front between the 
Rumanian Third Army in the north and Fourth Panzer Army in the south. The following 
day, Soviet forces finished clearing up Kotenikovo and pushed out of a small bridgehead 
near Potemkinskaya, on the Don south of Nizhne-Chirskaya.12o General der Infanterie 
Hollidt, commander of the formation bearing his name, then had to shift the 11 th Panzer 
Division to Tsimyanskiy, 120 kilometres downstream on the Don, to prevent the Soviets 
pushing through to Rostov. Responding to this move, Hitler ordered the 7th Panzer 
Division to remain at Rostov to prevent that city's recapture.121 
The only pleasing news in this dark period was that Hollidt's forces managed to 
recapture the Tatsinskaya airfield on the 28th.122 Von Richthofen hoped to use it again 
as an air-lift base and ordered Luftgau Rostov to repair and re-equip it as soon as 
possible so that the Ju 52 groups could return there from the inferior field at Salsk. It was 
a pointless exercise. Before Tatsinskaya could be restored to full use, Soviet forces 
advanced so strongly towards it and Morozovskaya that, on the 31th, Hollidt announced 
his intention to abandon them both and pull back to a line 20 kilometres east of Tatsinskaya, 
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if not to the Donets river.123 Fiebig was shocked; the loss of both airfields would cripple 
the airlift. He despondently wrote in his diary: "What will the year 1943 bring?"124 To 
Sixth Army it brought only destruction, as Fiebig would find out only a month later. 
45. Wanting to restore his tattered prestige and unable to stand up to Hitler, 
Reichsmarschall Hermann Goring, the Luftwaffe's Commander-in-Chief, promised the 
Fuhrer that his air force could keep Sixth Army alive and operational at Stalingrad. He 
made this assurance without having first consulted his airlift experts, studied all available 
information on the situation at Stalingrad or sought the opinions of von Richthofen and 
the Fliegerkorps commanders involved. Goring did not even bother to oversee the airlift 
himself. Instead, he disappeared to Paris on a shopping trip and then, on his return, 
only rarely attempted to involve himself in its progress. 
46, 47. Ju 52s (shown above and below being loaded for flight into the Stalingrad 
pocket) performed the lion's share of transportation work during the ill-fated airlift. 
Although they were robust and reliable and had excellent short take-off and landing 
capabilities, they proved very difficult to start during cold weather and their load capacity 
(2 tons) and range (750 kilometres) were not sufficient to satisfy the logistical demands 
placed upon them. They were also vulnerable to Soviet air attack. 266 Ju 52s-a 
third of the Luftwaffe's total complement-were destroyed, lost or written off during the 
airlift. 
48. Pre-heating engines-by blowing hot air onto them from tubes connected to 
special ovens-was not always possible, due to a scarcity of heating devices caused 
by the abandonment of equipment at several airtields that Fliegerkorps VIII hastily 
evacuated in order to prevent them being overrun by the Red Army. 
I 
I 
I 
49. Most Luftwaffe airtields involved in the Stalingrad airlift lacked mechanized snow 
plows like this. Instead, troops armed only with shovels spent long hours each day 
clearing snow and ice from runways and maintenance areas (few hangars existed, so 
most maintenance was carried out in the open). 
50. Despite the tremendous effort of cold and exhausted Luftwaffe ground personnel 
to keep runways free of snow and ice, the combination of poor visibility, caused by 
constant snow, fog or low cloud, and uneven runway surfaces, caused by frequent 
Soviet bombing raids, resulted in numerous crash-landings. 
51. Heinkel 111s suffered less from the effects of cold than Ju 52s and, because of 
their defensive machine-guns, proved less vulnerable to Soviet fighters. Although 
awkward to load and unload, they made fair transport planes, having a similar load 
capacity to a Ju 52 and a far greater range. 
52. Oberst Ernst KOhl, commander of all He 111 units involved in the Stalingrad airlift, 
lived up to his name, which means "cool". An experienced bomber commander with 
an impressive record of distinguished service, KOhl remained calm, courageous and 
decisive even under the most difficult circumstances. Von Richthofen trusted him 
completely, calling him "a splendid fellow to have around when the chips are down". 
This photograph shows KOhl inspecting enemy fighter damage to his He 111. 
53. Generalfefdmarschall Erhard Milch, Deputy-Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe 
and Air-Inspector General, was a dynamic leader and outstanding administrator. He 
displayed excellent managerial skills during the final two weeks of the Stalingrad airlift, 
but arrived too late to make a substantial difference to its progress and was no more 
able to overcome adverse weather conditions and considerable enemy air and ground 
superiority than von Richthofen and Fiebig had been. 
Chapter X 
Collapse 
January 1943 
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"Nothing would delight me more than that [Generalfeldmarschall] Milch should 
chance upon the Philosopher's Stone which our supreme authorities apparently 
believe is lying around somewhere. We certainly haven't been able to find it." 
-Generaloberst von Richthofen's diary, 15 January 1943 
On the first day of 1943, von Manstein received Hitler's "Supplement to Operations 
Order No. 2".1 The Fuhrer announced in this document-which reveals his unrealistic 
assessment of the situation-that he was going to send Army Group Don additional 
forces for the relief of Stalingrad. These would include the elite SS Adolf Hitler, SS Oas 
Reich and 7th SS divisions, as well as three regular infantry divisions, all coming from 
the west "with the greatest possible speed". They would be joined by the SS 
GroBdeutschland Division, coming from Army Group Centre with equal haste. They would 
all arrive and be ready for combat by mid~February. In the meantime, he said, Army 
Groups B and Don were to secure favourable positions for their jump-off. All the provisions 
of the main operations order (including the stipulation that Hollidt must not withdraw any 
further than the line from Morozovskaya to Tsimyanskiy) were to remain in effect. 
Holding territory was proving difficult, however. Oberst Stahel, the Luftwaffe flak officer 
whose makeshift force had managed to hold a critical section of the Chir front for over 
a month, was finally overrun on 2 December. Both von Richthofen and Fiebig held him 
in the highest regard. Two days earlier, for example, the former had noted in his diary 
that Stahel was a real hero, "a hell of a guy ... whose front, the only one to stand firm, 
is held together by his personality alone'? They were therefore grieved to learn that 
enemy forces had finally broken his defences and killed or captured him. Both held faint 
hopes that he was encircled somewhere and would fight his way back to the new German 
line, but, as von Richthofen noted on the 2nd, "that hope sin ks by the hour". 3 In fact, 
Stahel was alive. Along with various elements of his combat group, he had been surrounded 
and strongly attacked from front and rear by numerically-superior forces. He proved a 
real fighter. Regrouping his shattered units into a single cohesive formation, which finally 
hacked its way free on the 4th, he destroyed several enemy battalions in the process. 
Stahel became an immediate celebrity and the darling of the Luftwaffe, which could 
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present Hitler with a hero to rival any of the army's. The Fuhrer, who had long been 
impressed by Stahel's courageous defensive fighting on the Chir, was delighted to learn 
of his heroic breakout. He immediately awarded him the Oak Leaves to the Knight's 
Cross. This high award, Fiebig thought, "was very well deserved. Success was due to his 
personal efforts."4 
Sadly, the Luftwaffe found little else to rejoice over. On 1 January, Soviet forces were 
so close to Morozovskaya that Fiebig-this time ignoring Goring's "stand fast" order-
issued KOhl with clear evacuation instructions.5 If weather conditions next day permitted, 
he said, the bomber commander should transfer all his He 111 units to Novocherkassk, 
near Rostov, and his fighters, Stukas and ground-attack planes to Tatsinskaya. He need 
not wait until the enemy arrived at his airfield before commencing the evacuation. That 
had resulted in disaster last time. Fiebig's advice was sensible. Even before ground fog 
lifted next day, KOhl evacuated Morozovskaya, abandoning much equipment and supplies 
but suffering no aircraft losses. Fiebig was very relieved, although he still held grave 
fears for the safety of his close-combat aircraft. Tatsinskaya may have been recaptured, 
but its security was far from certain. As a result, he refused to move his Ju 52 groups 
back there, preferring instead to operate them from Salsk in the northern Caucasus, even 
though that airfield was inferior and much further from the Stalingrad pocket. His decision 
to evacuate his close-combat units to Tatsinskaya had been made on the spur of the 
moment. He regretted it immediately. "I can't get the fate of the Stukas, ground-attack, 
fighter and tactical reconnaissance planes out of my mind," he wrote. "What if they all 
have to be dynamited if enemy tanks suddenly appear through the fog in the early 
morning?".6 Not wanting to leave them at Tatsinskaya for long, he flew around the region 
in a Storch for three hours, searching unsuccessfully for a safe and suitable place to 
construct an improvised airfield for them. He would eventually find a satisfactory site, but 
not for several days. 
Now that Fiebig's He 111s operated from Novocherkassk, near Rostov, they suffered 
from the same problem as his Ju 52s operating from Salsk: the increased distance from 
the Stalingrad pocket substantially reduced their airlift capabilities. From Novocherkassk, 
the Heinkels had to fly 330 kilometres to reach Pitomnik, 130 kilometres further than they 
previously had to fly from Morozovskaya. As a result, fighters were unable to escort the 
transports all the way to the pocket, leaving them vulnerable to enemy fighter attack as 
they approached their destination. They were no longer able to carry out multiple supply 
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missions per day, instead only carrying out one. Also, because they now consumed 
more fuel, they were forced to reduce the amount of supplies they carried. 
Aware that Soviet forces were attempting to fight their way down the Don towards 
Rostov and that German armies in the Caucasus were already contracting their front and 
pulling back towards the same city, Fiebig knew that he might soon have to order his Ju 
52 groups out of Salsk. He needed to find a new airfield within range of Stalingrad. The 
region west of the Donets was the safest place to operate aircraft from, but no established 
airfields existed in that area. Thus, he scoured that region in his Storch, looking for 
suitable ground to create an airfield for Ju 52 operations if ever he had to evacuate Salsk. 
Oberst Fritz Morzik, an airlift expert recently transferred to his command by the OKL, 
accompanied him during these reconnaissance flights. They eventually settled on the 
cornfields of Zverevo, a town 65 kilometres due north of Novocherkassk.7 Although 
barely within the Ju 52s' operating range, this site was well bel-lind the Donets and, 
therefore, in no immediate danger of being overrun. Fiebig recommended Zverevo to von 
Richthofen, who promptly instructed Luftgau Rostov to create an improvised field ready 
for operations with two weeks. This was a daunting task for the Gau's technicians and 
construction teams. They would have to create a 600-metre by 30-metre runway on the 
flat fields at Zverevo, and construct rudimentary supply, maintenance, command and 
accomodation buildings. They would then have to supply the new base with loading and 
maintenance equipment, and lay telephone wires linking it to Fiebig's own command 
centre. Despite the severity of the weather, they diligently set about their tasks. Within 
days, locals were able to see an airfield appearing in their cornfields. 
In the meantime, Fiebig still had an airlift to run, and its record of late had been very 
poor. Weather remained the main adversary. On 6 January, he unhappily wrote in his 
diary: 
For days now the general weather situation has been unfavourable .... We 
have lousy visibility, icing up at ground level as well as in the air, snow 
flurries, and very changeable conditions between take-off and landing at our 
destinations. Around 30 per cent [of our planes] fail to get through and have 
to turn back, through no fault of their own. We fly in conditions which one 
would normally refuse to fly in, but everyone knows what's at stake! 
Between 28 December and 4 January, Fiebig lost as many as 62 Ju 52s: 15 of them 
missing, 24 totally destroyed and the remainder damaged so badly they had to be taken 
out of service for major repair. Weather conditions caused around 50 per cent of these 
losses; enemy flak and VVS action caused the rest.s 
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The Soviet command had erected a strong 1'Iak "curtain" around the perimeter of the 
Stalingrad pocket, with batteries concentrated most heavily along the sections through 
which German flight paths crossed.9 These I1ak batteries inflicted high losses on the 
transport groups, much to the chagrin of von Richthofen and Fiebig, who lacked sufficient 
Stukas and ground-attack planes to knock them out. Even if they had possessed more 
planes, they had little chance of destroying most batteries. Poor visibility caused by 
ground fog, low cloud and snowstorms provided the batteries-and most other Soviet 
installations and fortifications-with excellent cover from German air attack. On the other 
hand, Soviet flak gunners did not need clear visibility to be effective against the transport 
aircraft. The extended distances from home bases to the pocket forced transport planes 
to fly by the most direct routes, and the location of airfields within the pocket forced them 
to conform to only a few variations in approach flights. Thus, the Soviet gunners soon 
became aware of the common German tlight paths and altitudes. Even when weather 
conditions reduced their visibility, they were able to inflict losses. When they heard the 
distinctive drone of the Ju 52s, they began firing into the flight paths, frequently hitting 
planes that they were unable to see. 
Soviet fighter activity also increased during the last weeks of 1942 and the first of 
1943. The VVS command created a ring around the Stalingrad pocket, extending out 
over 50 kilometres from its perimeter. It then divided that ring into five sectors, and 
assigned each to specific air units. In this way, each unit was able to become thorolJghly 
acquainted with the unique features of its own zone. tO The Soviet command created two 
other coverage rings around Stalingrad, extending out successively further towards the 
main German-Soviet front. Again, it allocated speci'fic air units to each ring and, with a 
few exceptions, assigned them tasks only within their own sectors. On paper, this system 
looked comprehensive and effective. In practice, it failed to create anywhere near a full 
air blockade of the pocket, despite the markedly improved kill rate that followed its 
implementation. VVS fighters did force German transport planes to fly into the pocket in 
small groups instead of their previous "air columns", but they continued carrying valuable 
supplies into the pocket most days, with only the weather stopping them on others. 
VVS units in the outer operational "rings" repeatedly attacked Salsk, Novocherkassk 
and other Luftwaffe airfields. Despite postwar Soviet claims, those attacks never seriously 
threatened or substantially curtailed the operations of the air units themselves, although 
they caused steady nuisance damage to runways, buildings and aircraft. Strong flak 
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defences around key airfields-which both Fiebig and von Richthofen placed great 
importance on-prevented most marauding VVS formations from inflicting heavy damage. 
Surviving German war diaries reveal that most Soviet descriptions of attacks on German 
airfields in trlis period are generally exaggerated and sometimes entirely concocted. For 
example, although Pickert, Fiebig and von Richthofen mention every significant incident 
at their airfields, and make no effort to ignore Soviet successes, they do not mention that 
Salsk was attacked by Shturmoviks on 2 January 1943. Yet G. K. Prussakov, a Russian 
author, claimed that a small number of Shturmoviks, escorted by Yak-1 fighters, struck 
Salsk unexpectedly on 2 January and destroyed no fewer than 72 German aircraft.11 
Although repeated by several writers on the VVS, this story is patently untrue. Had 
Soviet squadrons destroyed any aircraft at Salsk that day, all three German commanders 
would have recorded that fact in their diaries. Disaster did strike German airfields, as 
already noted, but at the hands of Soviet ground troops, not VVS pilots. 
Pitomnik Falls 
On 16 January, the disaster that Luftwaffe leaders feared most occurred: Soviet forces 
overran Pitomnik, the principal airfield within the pocket. The loss of Tatsinskaya and 
Morozovskaya in the first days of January had been heavy but not fatal blows to the air-
lift operation. Fiebig was able to carry on from other airfields, despite suffering a perceptible 
decrease in performance. The loss of Pitomnik, however, was a death blow. Recovery 
was impossible under the circumstances. To explain how this catastrophic situation occured, 
it is necessary to go back several days. 
On 7 January, the Soviet command informed Paulus, in his capacity as Sixth Army's 
Commander-in-Chief, that it was sending three officers across the lines under a flag of 
truce. Paulus agreed to receive them. Next morning, the three emissaries entered the 
northern sector of the pocket, carrying an ultimatum signed by Colonel-General Voronov, 
representing the Stavka, and Lieutenant-General Rokossovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of 
the Don Front. The Red Army had sealed Sixth Army within an "unbreakable" ring, the 
ultimatum stated, and all attempts to relieve the army had proved hopeless.12 The Red 
Army's successful push to the west had also forced the Luftwaffe transport fleet, which 
provided only "starvation rations" of food, fuel and ammunition, to withdraw to airfields 
much farther from the pocket. The air transport fleet was suffering terribly at the hands 
of the Russian Air Force, the ultimatum added (exaggerating, and not mentioning that 
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bad weather was equally, if not more, destructive). Therefore, the help that transport 
aircraft could bring to the besieged forces "is rapidly becoming illusionary". The situation 
of the troops "is desperate. They are suffering from hunger, sickness and cold. The cruel 
Russian winter has scarcely begun. Hard frosts, cold winds and blizzards still lie ahead. 
Your soldiers are unprovided with winter clothing and are living in appalling sanitary 
conditions." 
Sixth Army's situation was hopeless, and any further resistance pointless, the ultimatum 
stated. Therefore, Paulus should surrender immediately. The conditions of surrender 
were generous, under the circumstances: The Soviet command would guarantee the 
safety of all officers and troops who surrendered, and would repatriate them to Germany 
when the war ended. Personnel could retain their uniforms, insignia, medals and valuables, 
and officers could keep their swords. All men woud receive normal rations and all wounded 
would receive medical attention. "Should you refuse our offer that you lay down your 
arms," the ultimatum warned, "we hereby give notice that the forces of the Red Army and 
the Red Air Force will be compelled to proceed with the destruction of the encircled 
German troops. The responsibility for this will lie with you." The document stipulated that 
Paulus had 12 hours to reply. 
Paulus transmitted the ultimatum to Hitler, once again asking for freedom of action. 13 
He clearly wanted to accept the Soviet terms. Hitler emphatically refused to let him 
surrender. He no longer held hopes that a relief operation could be mounted in time to 
stave off destruction, although he did not share this view with Paulus. He merely insisted 
that every day the army fought on significantly helped the entire front, because its continued 
resistance tied down a large number of enemy formations. Later that same day, therefore, 
Paulus felt obliged to reject the surrender offer. 
The Soviet command wasted no time in responding. On the morning of 10 January, 
Lieutenant-General Rokossovskiy launched Operation Koltso (Ring), the Stavka's 
frequently-postponed plan to split the pocket in an easterly direction and then destroy the 
two parts in succession. After a powerful 55-minute artillery barrage-during which some 
7,000 Soviet guns and mortars pounded their German counterparts, outnumbered 20 to 
one-Rokossovskiy's tanks and infantry attacked along a 70-kilometre section of the 
pocket's western perimeter.14 VVS units pounded the forces in their attack path, hoping 
to pin them down and break their morale. Nonetheless, initial German resistance was 
stiffer than the Soviet general had antiCipated. His men gained less than five kilometres 
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on that first day.is Paulus was shaken by the attack's intensity, however. That night, he 
reported to von Manstein that there was no longer any prospect of holding out until mid-
February, when Hitler's new relief force was due to launch its operation. Relief would 
have to come much sooner. In the meantime, fully-equipped replacement battalions must 
be flown in immediately, and the Luftwaffe must airlift the promised quantity of supplies.i6 
Paulus was able to save his western front from collapse only by steadily pulling back 
all forces west of the Rossoshka river and rebuilding the front on its eastern shore, where 
the original Soviet defences had recently been repaired to serve German troopsY 
Rokossovskiy threw four armies at the Rossoshka front, which they finally cracked on the 
15th. 
The Advent of Erhard Milch 
Hitler was gravely concerned, not only by the pocket's rapidly shrinking perimeter, but 
also by the Luftwaffe's evident inability to improve its airlift performance. Late on the 14th, 
he sent for Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch, Deputy-Supreme Commander of the 
Luftwaffe and Air-Inspector General. iS When Milch arrived at his headquarters in 
Rastenburg next day, the FDhrer briefed him on the situation at Stalingrad. The Luftwaffe 
had so far failed to meet Sixth Army's logistical needs, he explained. As a result, the army 
was now in a very poor state. Unless the airlift improved substantially, and it was Milch's 
task to ensure that it did, the army would soon collapse. Hitler then ordered him to fly 
to southern Russia as soon as possible to take charge of the entire airlift operation, 
armed with "special powers and authority to issue orders and instructions to every section 
of the armed forces [in the region]".i9 As they talked, an adjutant informed them that bad 
news had just arrived from the encircled army: Pitornnik, the main airfield within the 
pocket, had apparently been overrun by Soviet forces. Thus, even before Milch arrived 
at von Richthofen's headquarters in Taganrog on the 16th, he knew that he faced a very 
difficult challenge. 
The field marshal soon learned how Pitomnik had fallen. It was a depressing story. 
When the Don Front had launched Koltso on the 10th, Soviet long-range artillery opened 
fire on the airfield, joined by VVS bombers, which subjected it to a steady rain of bombs 
during repeated high-altitude attacks.20 Soviet ground forces advanced towards the 
airfield next day, prompting a nervous Pickert to write: "If the enemy achieves a deep 
penetration, we'll have to move the base for air supply. That will take a lot of effort and 
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consume fuel. And if we're then pushed back again, it will be all over, because no army 
can be supplied with its rations and ammunition by dropping supplies alone."21 Paulus, 
now suffering frequent anxiety attacks, ordered Pickert to fly to von Richthofen's and von 
Manstein's headquarters in Taganrog on the 12th, so that he could present the two 
commanders with an up-to-the-minute situation report. 22 Flying out of the pocket at dusk 
in a Heinkel 111, Pickert was struck by the "fantastic spectacle of flashes from enemy 
guns encircling the fortress."23 His situation report was detailed and explicit. Sixth Army 
was freezing, starving and exhausted, he explained. Pitomnik looked certain to fall, leaving 
it with no suitably-equipped airlift base. In short, "collapse is only days away. And nothing 
further can be done about it." 
Pickert reported to Fiebig next day, and again described Sixth Army's suffering: "Sixth 
Army is fighting its last battle. It may be six days or only two before the end comes. 
Ammunition and fuel reserves no longer exist. The movement of forces is no longer 
possible. The Russians ... attack from all sides. Our troops are at the end of their strength! 
From the 13th, everyone will defend himself with his own gun, where he stands, to the 
last cartridge."24 Pickert added that the air transport units had clearly done their utmost, 
and should not be blamed for their failure. They had flown in the worst possible conditions. 
The loss of 250 aircraft to date was a testament to their courage and tenacity.25 Fiebig 
was deeply moved, and noted that night in his diary: "Nobody's heart beats more strongly 
for the fate of Sixth Army, I believe, than those of the men responsible for the organisation 
and conduct of the airlift. We have done our best. I know of no fault of my own, if I have 
to judge myself, or anything I could have done differently or better."26 
Pickert wanted to return to the pocket immediately, arguing that he should be with his 
men when they fought their final battles. After many heated discussions with Fiebig and 
von Richthofen, the latter-who had awarded him the Knight's Cross on the 12th-finally 
relented on the 15th and authorized ~lim to return to the pocket. After writing what he 
believed to be his final letters to his wife, children and parents, and after receiving gifts 
of chocolate and cigarettes from senior Luftwaffe officers, Pickert climbed aboard another 
Heinkel and left for Stalingrad.27 At around 0100 on the 16th, his plane circled over 
Pitomnik, trying to identify the correct recognition signals and landing instructions from a 
confusing display of lights and sounds. They never came. The plane was soon so low 
on fuel that the pilot announced he could wait no longer. He turned around and headed 
back to Novocherkassk. Shortly after landing, Pickert learned what had happened. 
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Soviet forces had attacked the field late on the 15th, destroying all opposition by dawn. 
The small number of 'fighters and tactical reconnaissance planes stationed at Pitonrnik 
had evacuated the field at about the same time as Pickert was trying to land. Had his 
pilot ignored the muddled lighting and radio signals and attempted to land, Soviet gunners 
around the field would have destroyed his plane in the air before its wheels even touched 
the runway. He was lucky to be alive. Most of Pitomnik's fighters and reconnaissance 
planes had also escaped in time. They landed shortly afterwards at Gumrak, an inferior 
airfield within the pocket. The condition of the Gumrak runway was so poor, though, that 
over half the planes flipped over and crashed when attempting to land. 
Shortly before Pitomnik fell, von Richthofen had ordered Luftwaffe forces within the 
pocket to prepare Gumrak, an old Soviet airfield of small size and poor quality, for airlift 
operations as soon as possible. He had actually wanted to repair and expand Gumrak 
several weeks earlier, but Sixth Army had repeatedly refused permission. The army had 
its headquarters at Gumrak, as well as hospitals, supply installations and the command 
posts of two corps, so it did not want any construction activity to draw Soviet attention 
to the site. "Now," Fiebig jotted glumly on the 16th, "we're paying the price for that 
decision."28 Two days earlier, he had noted optimistically that Gurnrak should be ready 
by the 16th.29 However, as noted above, its runway was still so pitted on that date that 
landing there was extremely dangerous. Even finding the runway was difficult; Gumrak 
initially had no radio beacon.30 As a result, by the time Milch arrived, Ju 52 units were 
temporarily unable to land within the pocket. Instead, they had to drop supplies to the 
encircled troops, usually by parachute in purpose-built air-drop containers, but sometimes 
by less effective means: merely pushing crates out of their open doors. Without fuel, 
Sixth Army were unable to gather all the dropped cargo. Many containers, crates and 
oil drums lay embedded in the snow until found by Soviet troops after Paulus' army finally 
surrendered. 
KOhl's He 111s were undaunted by the poor state of Gumrak's runway, and ten even 
landed there on the 16th, the day Pitomn ik fell. 31 Those Hein kels carried in a miserable 
amount of supplies-13 tons, of which nine were provisions-and carried out only 62 
wounded soldiers. Their performance during the next few days was slightly better. They 
carried in almost 32 tons on the 19th, for instance, virtually all of it rations.32 Yet even 
including the 30 tons dropped into the pocket that day, Sixth Army received only one-fifth 
of the amount considered the minimum for its survival. 
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Only hours before Milch arrived at the front, the airlift suffered another major reverse. 
The German forces in the northern Caucasus had withdrawn so far that Salsk, the main 
Ju 52 base, had to be evacuated. Von Richthofen gave the order on the 15th, and the 
planes t'lew out early on the 16th, the day Milch arrived.33 They landed at the newly-
constructed "base" at Zverevo, which von Richthofen's technicians and labour battalions 
had transformed from a snow-covered cornfield into an airfield in less than two weeks. 
As a major airlift base, it was very poor. Its main runway consisted of hard-packed and 
rolled snow, its billeting was rudimentary (huts for a few, tents for most), and all maintenance 
had to be carried out in the open, despite the temperature seldom rising above zero. 
Thus, by the time Milch arrived at Taganrog, Sixth Army was already fighting its last 
battles and Luftf/otte /V's air-lift operation had been severely crippled by factors outside 
its control. He would have to perform miracles if he hoped to stave off the army's 
imminent destruction. Realizing this, von Richthofen had written in his diary during the 
previous evening: "]\Jothing would delight me more than that Milch should chance upon 
the Philosopher's Stone which our supreme authorities apparently believe is lying around 
somewhere. We certainly haven't been able to find it."34 Of course, Hitler and the 
Wehrmacht High Command were not really searching for that mythical stone which 
alchemists once believed could transmute base metals into gold. The air fleet commander 
was merely describing metaphorically his superiors' desperate search for any means of 
turning looming defeat at Stalingrad into victory. In fact, his metaphor nicely sums up the 
entire 1942 campaign, Hitler's quest for oil, which he believed would transform his military 
fortunes on the eastern 'front. 
Von Richthofen was bitterly hurt by Hitler's decision to place Milch in charge of the 
airlift, perceiving it to be proof of the Fuhrer's lack of confidence in his and Fiebig's 
abilities. He angrily demanded an explanation from Jeschonnek, who assured him that 
Hitler was very happy with their leadership but wanted to send an administrator-as 
opposed to a commander-to see if he could iron out some of the persisting difficulties. 
It was, Jeschonnek said, a last-ditch effort to save the encircled army. Von Richthofen 
was un persuaded, and told Fiebig so. The latter was also offended by the decision to 
send Milch, and privately wrote: "There is not much left to organize, for we can only drop 
supplies from the air from now on-a matter of pure chance." 35 "Von Richthofen and I 
are in agreement," he added, "that we have done everything humanly possible. No-one 
can be blamed for lack of effort. Everyone has fulfilled his duty to the highest level. We 
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can stand tall and with a clear conscience inany examination." Despite the fact that both 
Fiebig and von Richthofen had maintained from the start that the proposed airlift was 
impossible, they were clearly worried that they would be blamed for its failure. Von 
Richthofen shared with Fiebig his growing fear that "scapegoats will be looked for and 
have to be found." 
The airlift had certainly gone poorly during the first sixteen days of 1942, with only 
2,325 tons of supplies reaching the encircled army, an average of 145 tons per day.36 
During that period, however, Fiebig and von Richthofen had displayed strength, talent 
and resourcefulness as they struggled to master one crisis after another, not least among 
them being the loss of Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya, their main airlift bases; the inferior 
quality of Salsk and Novocherkassk, the improvised replacement fields; the eventual loss 
of Salsk and the transfer of their main transport groups to a hastily-constructed base bullt 
on a cornfield; and finally, the loss of Pitomnik, the only properly-equipped airfield within 
the pocket. Therefore, even though Fiebig and von Richthofen only managed to airlift 
145 tons of supplies to Sixth Army each day, less than half of what the army needed, 
they were convinced that this was the maximum possible under the circumstances. They 
felt sure that Milch could do no better, unless he brought the Philosopher's Stone with 
him. 
The Final Two Weeks 
The air fleet chief was disappointed, but not surprised, to learn that Milch had no real 
understanding of the situation. After what Milch called a "thorough situation conference" 
in Luftf/otte IV's special command train on the 16th37 , von Richthofen wrote that he "is 
completely misinformed about the technical and tactical situation. As a result, he is still 
rather optimistic."38 Von Richthofen was apparently able to convince Milch of two things: 
that Luttf/otte /V was in worse shape than the High Command assumed and that its 
failure to meet Sixth Army's logistical needs was due to forces outside its control, weather 
being its worst adversary. Oberstarzt Heinz Kalk, Milch's personal physician and the the 
keeper of his war diary, recorded that night: "There are considerably fewer aircraft available 
for the airlift operation than had been assumed at the FOhrer's headquarters. The 
principal difficulty regarding the operation of the units is the extreme cold, because of 
which a great many aircraft are not operational."39 
Milch was shocked to learn from Generalingenieur Weidinger, Luttf/otte IV's Chief 
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Engineer, that the operational rate of the transport groups had fallen to about 20 per 
cent.40 The fleet possessed 140 Ju 52s, Weidinger said, but only 42 were operational at 
that point in time. Of those, 27 were in transit to Zverevo, and could not resume airlift 
duties until after they arrived and received maintenance. Thus, only 15 (11 per cent) were 
currently able to carry supplies to Sixth Army. The fleet possessed 140 He 111s, of which 
only 41 were operational, and 29 FW 200 Condors, of which only one was operational. 
This aircraft type was too fragile for the conditions, Weidinger explained, and repeatedly 
suffered damage during landing, especially to its tail-skid. When Milch asked how long 
it would take to get the damaged or broken-down Junkers, Heinkels and Focke-Wulfs 
repaired and back in operation, the engineer estimated that around ten per cent could be 
repaired wIthin three days and another 50 per cent within 14 days. The rest would take 
longer than two weeks, the duration depending on whether they were repaired within the 
region or sent back to the Reich. 
The new airlift boss was determined to see conditions at the main supply bases for 
himself. At dawn on the 17th, he set off towards the Taganrog airstrip, hoping that the 
ground fog would clear quickly. As his car went over a railway crossing, a train suddenly 
appeared out of the fog. His driver had no time to swerve. The train struck the car at 
70 kilometres per hour, sending it careering across the embankment into a railway hut, 
which shattered with a great crash, killing two soldiers inside.41 Unconscious and bleeding 
profusely from a head wound, Milch was pulled from the wreckage and rushed to a field 
hospital. The doctors stitched up his head and, to repair several broken ribs, cast his 
back and ribs in plaster. Nonetheless, when he regained consciousness, he refused to 
obey the doctors' instructions and remain in hospital. Discharging himself, he returned to 
von Richthofen's command train, where, encased in plaster, he resumed command of the 
airlift. "Back to work in the train," he noted with typical brevity in his pocket diary that 
evening, "My head is clear."42 Milch's strength and sense of duty impressed von 
Richthofen, who recorded in his diary that day that, despite his "bad contusion, haemorrhage 
and flesh wound to the head," Milch had immediately returned to work. "He has both a 
temperature and a desire to administer," he added admiringly. 
Milch spoke to Fiebig by telephone shortly afterwards. The situation was depressing. 
The VVS had launched several bombing attacks on the main Ju 52 base at Zverevo.43 
Nine planes were burning on the runway, another 12 were damaged and, as a result, only 
12 were operational. Also, Fiebig told him, the ground organization at Gumrak had broken 
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down. Soviet forces were two kilometres from the field's perimeter, but no immediate 
danger to ground personnel existed. Yet when 'five Heinkels landed there earlier that day 
(out of the 16 that attempted to do so), no ground personnel or units of Sixth Army were 
present to unload their valuable cargo of food and fuel. The crews had to unload their 
planes themselves. They also had to defend themselves with their side-arms against 
soldiers pressing around their aircraft, hoping to climb aboard and escape the pocket. 
Milch promised him: "Tomorrow we will send reliable Luftwaffe officers (air landing troops) 
into Gumrak, who should ascertain the condition of Gumrak airfield. If landing possibilities 
remain, then transport gliders will be sent in."44 Those air supply specialists would also 
look for a decent air-drop zone, he added, as well as for suitable glider landing sites, 
preferably away from the threatened perimeter and closer to Stalingrad itself, because 
fifty gliders were now available for operations. 
The field marshal was not the 'first person to suggest employing transport gliders at 
Stalingrad. Von Richthofen and Fiebig had already investigated the possibility, especially 
after the OKL had initiated the formation of glider squadrons at Stalino and Makeyevka, 
110 kilometres northwest of Taganrog.45 But they had already abandoned the idea-as 
Fiebig told lVIilch on the 17th-after learning that gliders required conditions no longer 
existing at Stalingrad. First, gliders could not be used at all during the many days in which 
strong winds and other adverse weather conditions prevailed. Second, their large size, 
slow speed and lack of guns made them even better targets for VVS fighters and 
Shturmoviks than the lumbering Ju 52s. As it was, von Richthofen lacked sufficient 
'fighters to escort the Ju 52s during their Hight to the pocket, let alone to protect a 'fleet 
of unarmed gliders as well. Moreover, the steady withdrawal of the German line towards 
the west had placed the Stalingrad pocket outside the operating range of almost all of 
Luftflotte /V's fighters. Few long-range fighters-Bf 109s and Bf 11 Os equipped with drop 
tanks-existed, and they were already fully committed to Ju 52 escort duties. Third, 
because no way of towing gliders back out of the pocket was possible under the 
circumstances, they would have to be abandoned after their cargo was unloaded. Fourth, 
the existing facilities in the pocket were not large enough or sufficiently equipped to 
handle gliders as well as regular transport fleets, and the resources and manpower 
needed to improve the fields to the required level were lacking. Finally, Sixth Army's 
vehicle and fuel situation was so poor that, if gliders landed on open terrain within the 
pocket, instead of at the airfields, recovery of the supplies would be very difficult, if not 
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impossible. Even recovering air-drop containers had proved difficult, and many lay 
uncollected for want of transportation. 
Milch was determined to overcome these difficulties, telling Fiebig that "al/ aircraft, 
including gliders, must be utilized."46 It did not matter if gliders had to be abandoned 
within the pocket The aircrew could ride out aboard He 111s. All that mattered, he said, 
was that Sixth Army received their cargo. He immediately telephoned Jeschonnek, 
instructing him to form two long-range fighter squadrons for glider-escort and general 
combat duties.47 Jeschonnek initially insisted that he could spare no fighters, because 
they were all sorely needed in the Leningrad sector, where Soviet forces had launched 
a strong attack. Milch remained adamant. He needed long-range fighters, he insisted, 
and Jeschonnek must see to it immediately. Milch also rang Oberst Vorwald, head of the 
Luftwaffe's Technical Office in Berlin, demanding an acceleration in the production of air-
supply containers. He placed an initial order of 13,000 250-kilogram and 7,000 1,000-
kilogram containers.48 Von Richthofen was envious of Milch's "special powers", privately 
claiming-and quite rightly, too-that he would have aC~lieved better results in the previous 
seven weeks if he had been able to issue such orders. He had been forced to work 
through the usual bureaucratic channels, issuing "requests" to the OKL, which WOUld, if 
it saw fit, pass them on to the relevant agencies. 
As it happened, although the new airlift containers began arriving within days, the first 
long-range fighters-nine Bf 109Gs and five Bf 11 OC-1 s-did not reach the front until the 
27th.49 They finally commenced operations on the 28th, but were too few in number to 
make their presence felt. Also, technicians had mistakenly fitted larger internal fuel tanks 
and external drop tanks to inferior Bf 110 models (C-1s, instead of the superior and much 
faster Fs). They suffered engine problems and performed poorly, so, on the 31th, a 
frustrated Milch ordered them to be deployed solely on airfield defence duties.50 In the 
meantime, he wanted his few new 8f 109s and Bf 110s to be airborne over Stalingrad 
on the 30th, to celebrate the tenth anniversary ·of Hitler's election to power. "No objections 
will be tolerated," he insisted to Major Wilke, commander of the new long-range fighter 
squadrons, on the 29th.51 "The reputation of the Luftwaffe, and especially of the fighter 
arm, with the Army is at stake." Wilke's operation was hardly likely to inspire the army 
and restore the Luftwaffe's flaggi ng prestige; only six 8f 109s and five 8f 110s took to 
the sky on the 30th to mark the anniversary. 
Milch's plan to supply the encircled army by gliders also came to nothing. As conditions 
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in the pocket deteriorated throughout January, he gradually abandoned the idea.52 Fiebig 
and von Richthofen had been right, he conceded. Gliders were not suitable for conditions 
at Stalingrad after all. Therefore, when Goring requested him on the 25th to release the 
bulk of his gliders for use in an airlift operation planned for First Panzer and Seventeenth 
Armies in the northern Caucasus, Milch gladly complied.53 On the previous day, he had 
actually halted their shipment to the front, and, to free up rolling stock for more essential 
supplies, he had ordered supply personnel to unload them from all trains in the region. 54 
Thus, none of the hundreds of gliders that arrived at the front according to his instructions 
actually saw service at Stalingrad.55 
Genera/oberst Paulus-to return to the events of mid-January-infuriated Milch, Fiebig 
and von Richthofen by claiming to almost anyone who would listen that the Luftwaffe was 
primarily to blame for the rapid deterioration of his army. Late on 17 January, Milch spoke 
to OberstleutnantChristian of Hitler's headquarters staffY Paulus had complained directly 
to Hitler that the Luftwaffe was not carrying out the Fuhrer's orders, Christian said. 
Although Gumrak airfield had been serviceable for over 24 hours, few aircraft had landed 
there during the day and, despite the airfield being suitable for night operations, none at 
all had landed at night. They were merely throwing out their loads as they flew over, and 
making no attempt to land or pick up any of the 20,000 sick and wounded soldiers waiting 
for evacuation. The Luftwaffe was making excuses, Christian said, quoting Paulus, who 
had appealed for Hitler's personal intervention. To Milch's dismay, Christian added that 
the Fuhrer tended to agree with Paulus' claims. "Airmen who have landed at Gumrak 
report that conditions are exactly the opposite," the field marshal retorted, insisting that 
it lacked proper lighting and other eqUipment essential for night operations. Still, he would 
ensure that greater efforts were made to equip the field for night operations as soon as 
possible, and would send a senior officer into the pocket next day to supervise the work. 
Twenty minutes later, Milch had to stress these point to a self-righteous von Manstein, 
who had also received, and believed, Paulus' accusations. It is simply not true that 
Gumrak is already as well equipped as Pitomnik was, snapped Milch, refuting the army 
leader's claim. His pilots had circled the airfield looking for any signs of landing lights and 
markers, but found none. Sixth Army was to blame, he said, because it had previously 
thwarted all attempts to expand Gumrak and equip it for night operations. 
Von Richthofen and Fiebig were disgusted to learn that their airmen were being 
blamed for the situation at Gumrak. The latter angrily insisted to Milch, for instance, that 
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"we must defend ourselves from Sixth Army's slanderous reproaches."58 Milch tried to 
pacify him, explaining that the army's unfair accusations stemmed from the tremedous 
stress Paulus and his commanders were under. "Express to your personnel my full 
recognition of their accomplishments," he added. Fiebig was certainly pleased to pass 
on Milch's praise. He was proud of the dedication and courage displayed by his men. 
"Our crews are doing their best," he wrote in his diary shortly after talking to Milch, "Even 
flying at all without fighter escort is a heroic achievement. Yet inside the pocket they now 
take the position: 'these are our demands and we don't care how you meet them."'sg 
By the 18th, Milch had formed an accurate assessment of the general situation, which, 
two days later, he summed up in his pocket diary with one large, underlined word: 
"hopeless!"60 Yet he felt a deep sense of commitment to the trapped forces, and insisted 
that the Luftwaffe must do its utmost to stave off their destruction. "We are just as 
concerned as you are," he told von Manstein on the 18th, "We must assume that Stalingrad 
can be held, and do all we can to that end. Naturally there can be no question of our 
acting as though Stalingrad were already 10st."61 
Milch believed that the Fuhrer understood neither Sixth Army's rapid deterioration nor 
the major difficulties involved in maintaining the airlift. On the 18th, therefore, he ordered 
Genera/major Pickert to fly to Hitler's headquarters in Rastenburg, East Prussia, in order 
to present both Hitler and G()ring with an detailed situation report. Pickert was still 
depressed by his "involuntary abandonment" of his men within the pocket, and, whilst he 
considered this mission a "great honour", noted in his diary that he would have preferred 
to meet the High Command as the leader of a liberated division than as "the only one 
in a position to report to them, while my men are struggling and dying within the pocket."62 
He would follow Milch's instructions, he added, "but the orders weigh heavily on me." 
Pickert left for Rastenburg at dawn on the 20th. After flying virtually non-stop for two 
days in a variey of aircraft, including a Ju 52 damaged during the airlift, and then enduring 
a long train journey, he finally arrived at the Rastenburg train station at midnight on the 
22nd.63 However, while waiting for a staff car to collect him, a non-commissioned officer 
called him to a telephone in the station guard house. A member of the headquarters staff 
informed him that, because the situation in the east had changed since his departure, his 
report was no longer current. Pickert was flabbergasted. He had travelled continuously 
for over two days, only to be told that his report was no longer wanted. Next morning he 
phoned G()ring for an explanation, only to be told by Major Bernd von Brauchitsch, 
342. 
Goring's adjutant, that the Reichsmarschall placed no importance on his report. 64 Pickert 
was disgusted, telling Milch on the 29th, the day he finally arrived back at Luftflotte IV 
headquarters, that "his troops inside the pocket had certainly earned the right to have a 
report presented on their behalf to the Luftwaffe's Commander-in-Chief."65 Milch doubtless 
sympathized, but cooly stated that, "as a soldier, he was only supposed to do his duty 
and not to express criticism." Before dismissing Pickert, Milch demonstrated his own faith 
in the general's worth; he placed him in charge of all 'flak forces in the Taman Peninsula, 
quickly developing into the new crucial sector of the eastern front now that Paulus' army 
at Stalingrad clearly had only a day or two left to live. 
Pickert's failure to be received by the Fahrer does not mean that the latter tried to 
avoid hearing inconvenient or unpalatable reports on the airlift or conditions within the 
pocket. Rather, it reveals that Pickert, a previously-unknown flak officer commanding a 
single division, was of relatively little consequence to Hitler. The Fahrer did want an 
unvarnished picture, but from an army general of stature. He especially wanted to hear 
from General der Panzertruppen Hans Hube, the highly-decorated commander of the 
Fourteenth Panzer Corps. Just before the new year began, he had sent Hans Baur, his 
personal pilot, into the Stalingrad pocket with instructions to bring back Hube. Hitler had 
long held the one-armed general (maimed during the Great War) in high esteem, and had 
been impressed on 29 December by his sharp mind and frank manner.66 Now, with 
Paulus and Milch making conl'licting claims about the state of the airlift, he wanted to hear 
from Hube. On 18 January, therefore, he ordered Milch to have Hube and a small staff 
flown out of the pocket in one of the He 111s landing supplies at Gumrak. Milch was 
then to give Hube and his men positions on his airlift staff as special army-air force liaison 
officers.67 
After escaping the pocket in a He 111 flown through a total "white out" by a courageous 
young lieutenant, Hube promptly informed the Fahrer that the situation at Stalingrad had 
deteriorated considerably since the Soviet attack on the pocket began nine days earlier. 
"The Luftwaffe airlift has failed," he stated bluntly. "Somebody must be to blame for that." 
Pointing out that not one air force general remained in the pocket, he added harshly: 
"Why don't you kill off some of your Luftwaffe generals-it's always the army generals 
who go to the wall!"68 Hube knew, of course, that no army leaders had been executed 
for cowardice or incompetence. He was merely trying to make the point that Goring and 
his officers should be held accountable for their failures, as the army generals were. 
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Although now convinced that Goring and his chief advisers had deceived him about the 
Luftwaffe's air supply capabilities, Hitler could not admit to Hube that all was lost. He 
calmly replied: "I know the grim position you are in at Stalingrad. But things will get 
better." Perhaps referring to his appointment of Milch, he added, "I have got it all in hand." 
Hitler was unsettled by Hube's reproach, however, and passed his comments on to 
Goring. Realizing by now that the airlift he had promised was failing miserably, the 
Reichsmarschall was trying desperately to curry Hitler's favour by attending most war 
conferences and (as Milch jotted in his pocket diary a few days later) "dispatching endless 
telegrams" to the air commanders at the front.69 Hube's comments stung Goring, prompting 
him to rant to Milch: "Isn't it strange that anyone who serves at the front loses his clear 
view of the front!" The arrogance and stupidity of Goring's comment made von Richthofen, 
listening on another phone, look around "for a wall to run Up".70 
Hube's assessment of the airlift gave Milch no cause for cheer. Gumrak had been 
suitable for landing for three days now, he told the air marshal on the 19th, but very few 
aircraft were attempting to land.11 Most were simply dropping their supplies as they flew 
over. This was very unsatisfactory, he said, because "the air-drop canisters are scattered 
widely throughout the pocket and are very hard to locate in the deep snow. Around 25 
per cent can't be found." Collecting them is also arduous, he added, "because of fuel 
shortages and the difficulty of starting trucks in the cold, especially after they have been 
standing [idle] for a while." Hube added that Hitler was of the impression that, "in general, 
every effort is being made here, and that everything is being done that can be done." 
However, this was apparently not the case. Many of the tranport planes landing at 
Gumrak arrived only half full, and "unnecessary supplies are being flown in that the army 
simply cannot use." When lVIilch tried to defend his airmen, pointing out that cold weather 
wreaked havoc with aircraft engines, that visibility was consistently poor and that, in any 
event, Gumrak lacked even rudimentary Ijghting for night operations, Hube cut him off 
short. He had himself seen signal flares being fired as transport planes circled overhead. 
Therefore, pilots were apparently refusing to land for lack of commitment, not lack of 
lighting. This situation could not continue. Sixth Army's troops were "exhausted," he said. 
"Their daily bread ration is 200 grams for combat troops, 100 grams for rear area personnel. 
The ammunition situation is catastrophic. Our artillery no longer fires on enemy positions, 
but fires only to stave off enemy attacks. Russian aircraft can fly as low as they like." 
Responding to Hube's complaint that useless supplies were entering the pocket, Milch 
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ordered some of the airlift containers to be opened before departure.72 To his disgust, 
many contained only fish-meal. He sent them back and asked the army to have the 
victualling officer hanged. "If we had not had the contents of these sacks sampled on the 
airfields," he later said, "our aircraft would actually have flown fish-meal into Stalingrad!"13 
Early post-war accounts of the Stalin grad encirclement made much of this aspect of the 
supply mission, repeating claims that hundreds of thousands of condoms, tons of mosquito 
repellent and so on were carried into Stalingrad. There is a kernel of truth in these stories. 
Useless supplies were airlifted to Stalingrad on many occasions. However, as Pickert 
himself pointed out in the early 1970s, "the fact that transport aircraft and para-dropped 
goods now and then contained foolish and unnecessary items is undisputed, but this was 
an exception which should not be overestimated."14 Even so, Milch wanted it stopped, 
and issued very strict orders to that effect. 
Milch the Manager 
The field marshal chose not to dissolve either von Richthofen's or Fiebig's command 
and create a new command and administration body. Instead, he opted to work 
independently of both airmen's organizations, creating a small Sonderstab (Special Staff) 
com prising only himself and a small team of consultants and signals officers. It would 
liaise with, and issue directives to, Luftflotte IV and Fliegerkorps VIII, but would not 
interfere with command matters or erode the authority of their leaders. He worked well 
with von Richthofen and Fiebig, whom he consulted regularly each day, and often threw 
his weight behind their initiatives. For example, when von Richthofen created several new 
aircraft workshops behind the front, so that aircraft with medium damage would no longer 
need to be transported all the way back to the Reich for repair, Milch arranged for teams 
of technicians and mechanics to be brought from the Luftwaffe's testing and development 
centre in Rechlin. He also ordered the new workshops to be fitted out with specialized 
equipment and adequate supplies and spare parts. 
Milch's greatest problems were caused by the poor state of airfields, both inside and 
outside the pocket. He was able to improve conditions at Gumrak a little, although landing 
on its narrow runway, pitted with bomb-craters and exposed to Soviet artillery gunfire, 
remained difficult for even the most skilled and courageous pilots. On the 17th, the army's 
complaints that no night landings were being attempted had pressured him into ordering 
lighting equipment, smoke pots and radio recognition equipment to be sent into the 
345. 
pocket immediately, along with signals and air traffic experts.75 He had then assured 
Paulus, Manstein and the High Command that aircraft would definitely land at Gumrak 
during the night of the 18th. His confidence was justified. Six He 111s and a single FW 
200, which alone carried six tons of supplies, landed at Gumrak and unloaded valuable 
supplies before safely departing, with General Hube aboard the Condor.76 Despite the 
radio beacon, direction finder and makeshift landing path (comprising ten tank lights) 
installed according to Milch's instructions, landing proved even more dangerous at night 
than during the day. A quarter of the He 111s attempting to unload supplies at the airfield 
crashed or suffered substantial damage during landing or take-off. Yet a small but steady 
stream of aircraft now flew into Gumrak around the clock.77 
The prinCipal airfields outside the pocket-the He 111 base at Novocherkassk and the 
Ju 52 base at Zverevo-were in very poor shape when Milch arrived. The latter was 
easily the worst. Oberst Morzik, the Air Transport leader at Zverevo, reported that it was: 
a smooth field, with no hangars and no billeting facilities. The aircraft stand 
right next to the runway, because the airfield is otherwise completely covered 
in snow. Five barracks are being built, others are coming by rail. Seven 
bunkers now exist, but the construction of further bunkers is very difficult, 
because the earth is frozen solid to a depth of a metre everywhere.78 
The temperature inside the few existing barracks was currently 10 degrees below zero 
centrigrade (at 1025 hours), because all windows had been broken during air attacks. 
Snow drifted continuously across the runway, he added, and it had taken three and a 
half hours to dig out a single Ju 52 that day. Despite a number of frostbite cases, some 
of them severe, troop morale remained surprisingly good. The VVS was apparently 
determined to change that. Air attacks came "both day and night, during landing, loading 
and take-off". The field's only flak guns-one 7.5-cm Rumanian battery and a 3.7-cm 
battery-were no longer operable. 
Air operations were severely curtailed because of the cold, Morzik continued. Zverevo 
had 106 Ju 52s, but 48 were damaged and awaiting repair. The operational rate of the 
remaining planes was very low. Only eight had managed to take off for Stalingrad that 
day, and, because of radio and mechanical problems, five had turned back before reaching 
the pocket. The others never returned. They had either been shot down or destroyed at 
Gumrak by enemy shelling. 
Milch was shocked by conditions at Zverevo, and disappointed by what he perceived 
to be Morzik's defeatist attitude. He promptly phoned Fiebig and complained: "I have the 
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impression that things are not in order under Oberst Morzik."79 Suspecting that Morzik 
was not driving his subordinates hard enough, Milch stated that "tomorrow it will be 
mandatory for all aircraft [from Zverevol to land at Gumrak in Stalingrad during the course 
of the day." Fiebig felt that Milch's criticisms of Zverevo and its commanders were unfair. 
It must be remembered, he told the field marshal in a formal report a few hours later, that 
Zverevo had been hastily constructed from a cornfield within a two-week period. This was 
a superb achievement on the part of Luftflotte /V's technicians and labour battalions, who 
worked on an open steppe during blizzards and heavy frosts to create a new field for the 
Ju 52s after Salsk, itself an improvised air supply base, came under threat. Ju 525 had 
only been at Zverevo since the day before the field marshal arrived at the front. He and 
von Richthofen were well aware that conditions were bad, but they were already attempting 
to remedy the situation before the air marshal arrived. 
Regardless of these explanations, Milch wanted the operational rate of the transport 
units raised immediately. He asked Weindinger, the air fleet's chief engineer, what could 
be done to improve the state of the Ju 52 fleet at Zverevo. Weidinger answered that little 
could be done immediately because of deep snow drifts, howling winds and sub-zero 
temperatures.so When weather conditions improved, Milch should transfer the Ju 52s to 
Novocherkassk, which had stronger flak protection, better hangars and a proper ground 
organization. It would first be necessary to shift the He 111s from Novocherkassk to 
Stalino, he added. Milch replied that the situation on the ground ruled out these transfers. 
Enemy troops were too close to Novocherkassk. He 111s could escape more quickly 
than Ju 52s, so he wanted to leave the respective fleets where they were for now. 
Convinced that Morzik's apathy was partly responsible for the low operational rate of 
the Ju 52s at Zverevo, and annoyed by his apparent indifference, Milch summoned the 
air transport officer to his command train. When the field marshal asked him whether he 
needed anything urgently, Morzik replied that it was pointless importing additional technical 
staff as there was insufficient accomodation or equipment as things were.81 Milch was 
staggered. "These men had no chance whatsoever of warming themselves up," he told 
the air ministry staff a few days later. "The only thing accomplished for them was parking 
a stone-cold omnibus there. Just imagine what it means, working in 25 degrees of frost 
with a fifty-mile-per-hour blizzard howling round your ears day and night without respite".s2 
He was unconvinced by Morzik's explanation that he had issued written requests for 
necessary buildings and equipment, but nothing had arrived. "Do you think that lets you 
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off?", he challenged. Why had he not provided even simple huts for his men, taking 
materials from local villages? Morzik answered that he lacked vehicles for transportation. 
lVIilch snapped back that a number of army trucks sat idle near the field, to which Morzik 
protested that the Luftwaffe could not touch army equipment without authorization. "That 
would be larceny!" "The only larceny done around here," lVIilch thundered, "is that 
somebody has made off with your brains."83 
David Irving stated in his laudatory biography of Milch that, following his argument with 
Morzik, the field marshal "ordered sixteen prefabricated huts to be rushed immediately to 
Zverevo airfield." Irving was mistaken. Milch did nothing about the airfield's lack of 
accomodation for over a week, in the meantime leaving ground personnel to work in the 
open and sleep in tents.84 On the 26th, eight days after quarreling with Morzik, Milch 
finally got around to ordering the huts. He only acted then, it would appear, after receiving 
complaints that the incidence of frostbite among Zverevo's mechanics was steadily rising. 
i'Jext day, he had the gall to snap at Fiebig, who had been nagging him for days about 
the accomodation problem: "I notice a lack of initiative in providing quarters .... At present 
there is only one shed and one omnibus at Zverevo."85 
This was not the only occasion when Milch's much-touted administative abilities were 
conspicuously absent. He later had to admit that Morzik had indeed placed orders for 
urgently-required barracks and equipment and that, through no fault of his own, it had 
never arrived. "I found out that the trains did actually set out," he reported during a 
conference shortly afterwards. "But they were shunted off somewhere else, because 
more important stuff had to be transported." Conceding that he had been unable to 
influence the situation, he added: "So they lay around ... and who knows where they are 
today?" 86 Also, Milch did not mention to his audience that this "more important stuff" 
included the hundreds of useless gliders that he himself had ordered. Even after he had 
abandoned the idea of using gliders, a full train load arrived at the front every third day.87 
"The Junkers squadrons had not the foggiest idea how to improvise," Milch claimed 
two weeks after the airlift ended. 88 "I had to drum some sense into them. At first they had 
nothing. But all at once they had a wooden hut with a small stove in it so they could keep 
warm. Then gradually they began to look at the correct cold-start procedure for the 
engines. I threatened anybody who neglected it with execution." Milch firmly insisted that 
all air transport units must employ the cold-start procedures stipulated by the manufacturers 
of their aircraft. He noticed that most 111 units, many of which had served in Russia 
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before the airlift began, were used to bad weather and familiar with cold-start techniques. 
Many of the Ju 52 units, on the other hand, had only recently arrived in Russia, drawn 
mainly 'from the Reich, the western theatre and the Balkans. As a result, few knew how 
to start their aircraft engines in the sub-zero temperatures they now experienced each 
day. 
On the 20th, therefore, Milch ordered 50 extra Ju 52 maintenance experts to be 
brought from the Luftwaffe's testing and development base at Rechlin in order to supervise, 
amongst other tasks, the employment of the correct cold-start procedure by airfield ground 
personnel.89 When they finally reached the forward airfields, these experts found that 
very few Junkers crews were using the correct cold-start procedure. "The Ju 52 squadrons 
did not even know of it," Milch later claimed, "because they had arrived from Africa."90 
Only a few Ju 52 units had actually been drawn from the Mediterranean theatre, as Milch 
doubtless knew, but he was right about the widespread ignorance of proper cold-start 
techniques. His leading engineers and mechanics frequently complained to him that units 
were ignoring his instructions. He eventually resorted to a show of authority. Anyone not 
starting their aircraft according to the stipulated procedure, he threatened, would be 
court-martialled (as would any pilot who turned back during flight without attempting to 
land in, or drop supplies to, the Stalin grad pocket91 ). Naturally, he added, responsibilty 
ultimately lay with the airfield commanders. "I hope you are a strict and tough commander," 
he warned Morzik on the 26th.92 
Compliance with the stipulated procedures did result in improved operation rates, as 
an entry in the war diary of Milch's air-lift staff reveals: "This morning most of K. G. 55's 
[He 111] aircraft started by applying the correct cold-start procedure, without using the 
heating truck and despite a temperature of minus 15 degrees centigrade."93 However, 
even after issuing threats and instructions for more than a week, Milch learned on the 
27th that (for unknown reasons) many units were still not employing proper cold-start 
techniques. Even worse, many were failing to use special starting fuel, despite sufficient 
quantities now being stored at the airfields. As a result, the operational rate of the Ju 52s 
and He 111 s had not improved much since he arrived. It had risen from 20 per cent to 
around 30 per cent, which was still much too low. 
Failure to implement starting procedures was only one of several reasons for the 
airlift's continual inadequate performance. The principal reason was that Milch suffered 
the same crippling misfortune as von Richthofen and Fiebig had: the loss of the main 
349. 
airlift bases inside and outside the Stalingrad pocket. The first to go was Gumrak, the 
only operational airfield within the pocket, on 23 January. Milch had worked hard to 
improve conditions at Gumrak. He had ordered its runway cleared of debris and wrecked 
aircraft, he had installed a radio beacon, a direction finder and a crude but satisfactory 
landing path, and he had ordered improvements in the unloading and distribution of 
supplies. However, within days of watching these steps bear initial fruit-in the form of 
slight increases in the amount of supplies unloaded in the pocket (as opposed to merely 
dropped from the air)-Soviet forces overran Gumrak, undoing in minutes what Milch had 
taken several days to accomplish. 
Fiebig described the fall of Gumrak in his diary. On 22 January, he noted that Milch's 
efforts had improved conditions, although the field was still "not very good, especially for 
He 111s".94 Next evening, he wrote that renewed efforts by Major Freudenfeld, the senior 
Luftwaffe signals officer in the pocket (later awarded the Knight's Cross for ~Iis effective 
work95), had further improved the base. "Operations at the new Gumrak airfield were 
working well," Fiebig jotted on the 23rd, until Soviet pressure undid Freudenfeld's good 
work.96 By mid-morning, he explained, Soviet artillery and flak batteries were hitting the 
airfield repeatedly. Combined with bad weather, this gunfire made take-off and landing 
difficult and dangerous. By early-evening, gunfire had knocked out the radio beacon and 
direction finder, prompting Fiebig to seek clarification of the situation from Sixth Army. 
The army replied by radio at 2140 hours: "Situation at the airfield has been uncertain 
since 1700 hours. No contact [with Freudenfeld and the airfield staff] since that time. 
Don't land any more." Fiebig was bitterly disappointed, and could think of little else than 
the fate of the trapped army. He had finally received his Christmas package from his 
family, but, although "the love of one's wife and children gives one strength," he felt 
unable to enjoy his family's gifts. "The situation is just too grim," he wrote. 
He was not exaggerating. When Soviets forces attacked the pocket 'from the southwest 
on the 22nd, advancing on a five-kilometre wide front, Paulus had been unable to prevent 
their steady progress. His cold and exhausted troops lacked ammunition as well as 
sufficient fuel to transport reinforcements from other sections of the pocket, which was 
now only around one-third of the size it had been two weeks earlier. In the evening of 
the 22nd, Paulus had sent the High Command the following message: "Rations exhausted. 
Over 12,000 unattended wounded in the pocket. What orders should I give to troops who 
have no more ammunition and are subjected to mass attacks supported by heavy artillery 
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fire? The quickest decision is necessary, since disintegration is already starting in some 
places."97 Careful not to offend the Fuhrer, he lamely added that "confidence in the 
leadership still exists, however." Hitler was unimpressed by Paulus' attitude, claiming that 
he showed weakness in the face of adversity. A true commander would never bleat like 
this, he told his closest advisers. He forbade Paulus to surrender, telling him that "the 
troops will defend themselves to the last. If possible, the size of the fortress is to be 
reduced so that it can be held by the troops still capable of flghting."98 The courage and 
endurance of the encircled forces had tied down powerful Soviet armies, he added, 
making it possible to shore up the broken southern front and begin preparing a counter-
offensive. Thus, "Sixth Army has made an historic contribution to Germany's greatest 
struggle." 
The loss of Gumrak on the 23rd was a grievous blow to Paulus, who realized immediately 
that his army was now alone, cut off from all help except for the small amount of supplies 
now dropped into the pocket by Fiebig's transport planes. Seeing that the Soviet momentum 
was unstoppable, Paulus had actually anticipated the airfield's capture for several days 
before it finally occurred. Major von Zitzowitz, one of his staff officers, had reported this 
to Milch on the 21st, telling him that Gumrak's fall was imminent. As a result, von 
Zitzowitz said, Sixth Army had initiated a repair and construction programme at 
Stalingradskiy, an inferior airfield further from the pocket's rapidly-contracting perimeter.99 
In the afternoon of the 22nd, the army had reported Stalingradskiy operational. However, 
when several dozen He 111s had attempted to land there later that day, six crashed 
because of the "thick snow and deep bomb craters on the runway".100 This prompted 
Milch to warn Fliegerkorps VIlI that "we must reckon with heavy losses if we use 
Stalingradskiy for night operations".101 As a result, he prohibited all night landings, 
replacing them with air-drop missions only. He then instructed Ju 52 groups that they 
were not compelled to attempt landing there even during the day. It hardly mattered. 
During a heavy assault on Stalingrad's western outskirts on the 23th, Soviet forces 
overran Stalingradskiy only hours after they had captured Gumrak.102 
Thus, after Gumrak and Stalingradskiy fell within hours of each other on the 23rd, 
Paulus knew that the airlift Goring had so boldly promised the Fuhrer was, to all intents 
and purposes, over. His army would now receive nothing more than what a few He 111s 
and Ju 52s dropped each day. No more wounded soldiers would be evacuated. The 
remnants of Sixth Army-once the strongest German army in the Wehrmacht-were now 
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doomed. Soviet successes that day meant that those remnants no longer even functioned 
as a single entity. After sweeping over the German airfields, advancing Soviet forces had 
cut through the "fortress" virtually to the Volga, thereby dividing it into two small pockets. 
The remaining troops of the Eleventh Army Corps formed the northern pocket, an area 
of about 11 by 14 kilometres in the area of the Gorodishche tractor works. The surviving 
troops of the Fourteenth Panzer Corps and the Fourth, Eighth and Fifty-First Army Corps 
formed the southern pocket, occupying a slightly larger area in Stalingrad's ruined southern 
suburbs. The situation was very grim. On the 24th, Paulus sent a despondent message 
to the High Command: "Troops without ammunition and food .... Collapse inevitable. Army 
requests immediate permission to surrender in order to save the lives of remaining 
troops."103 Again, Hitler refused to grant permission for the army's surrender. 
Accusations and Acrimony 
Paulus blamed the Luftwaffe for Sixth Army's destruction, claiming that, despite the 
Reichsmarschall's promises, it had failed to keep his army alive and combat-worthy. 
Even before Gumrak and Stalingradskiy fell, he had given up trying to disguise his 
comtempt for the air force. It had performed miserably and bore responsibility for the 
suffering of his men, he told anyone within range, including Luftwaffe personnel within the 
pocket For example, Major Erich Thiel, commander of a He 111 bomber group serving 
in an improvised transport role, flew into the pocket on the 19th.104 Milcl1 11ad asked him 
to contact Paulus in the hope that the army leader would improve ground services at 
Gumrak. Thiel reported to Paulus shortly before noon. The army leader would accept no 
responsibility for the poor ground organization, even when Thiel pointed out that the 
aircraft turn-around time had dropped to around 5 hours and that the airfield, including 
part of the runway, was littered with wrecks.105 Paulus became "very upset" and snapped 
at him: ''You are talking to dead men here. We have remained here as the Fuhrer 
ordered. The Luftwaffe has left us in the lurch and has not kept its prornises.''106 
Thiel, whose men had repeatedly risked their lives (and many had lost them) carrying 
supplies to the encircled troops, could scarcely believe his ears. The Luftwaffe was being 
accused of gross incompetence by the very general who had ignored von Richthofen's, 
Fiebig's and Pickert's repeated warnings that the Luftwaffe could not sustain the army; 
the general who had wasted initial opportunities to break out; the general who had (as 
Pickert and other Luftwaffe leaders inside the pocket often commented amongst 
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themselves) shown no interest in improving the landing, unloading and distribution 
conditions and services at the airfields his men depended on. Neither he nor Schmidt, 
his Chief of Staff, had ever even visited an airfield to see first-hand the conditions under 
which Luftwaffe air and ground crew were forced to work. Yet Paulus was not finished. 
In his typical icy manner, he continued his attack: 
When [aircraft] don't land, it means the army's death. It is too late now, 
anyway .... Every machine that lands save the lives of 1,000 men .... Dropping 
[supplies] is no use to us. Many supply canisters ["bombs" in Paulus' original 
text] are not found, because we have no fuel with which to retrieve them .... 
Today is the fourth day in which my troops have had nothing to eat. We could 
not recover our heavy weapons [during recent withdrawals], because no fuel 
was available. They are now lost. The last horses have been eaten. Can you 
imagine it: soldiers diving on an old horse cadaver, breaking open its head 
and devouring its brain raw? ... What should I say, as supreme commander 
of an army, when a man comes to me, begging: 'Herr Genera/oberst, a crust 
of bread?' Why did the Luftwaffe say that it could carry out the supply mission? 
Who is the man responsible for mentioning the possibility? If someone had 
told me that it was not possible, I would not have reproached the Luftwaffe. 
I would have broken OUt. 107 
At this point Schmidt angrily butted in. "And now you dare to try to whitewash the 
Luftwaffe," he seethed at Thiel, "which has committed the worst treachery in German 
history. Somebody must have suggested it [the air-lift] to the Fuhrer? Must an entire 
army, this magnificent Sixth Army, go to the dogs like this?"108 Paulus spoke again: "The 
Fuhrer gave me his firm assurance, that he and the entire German people feel responsible 
for this army, and now we suffer the most dreadful catastrophe in German military history 
because the Luftwaffe has failed US."109 Thiel was stunned by their vehemence, and 
appalled by their discourtesy. Schmidt would not even shake his hand when he departed, 
he later told Fiebig.110 
Fiebig was furious. The honour of his men was at stake, he insisted to Milch on the 
20th. The field marshal reassured him that Hitler placed little weight on the claims of 
hysterical generals, especially those of Schmidt and Paulus, whose fall from favour was 
well-known to senior commanders. Even if the Fuhrer was unhappy about the airlift's lack 
of success, he certainly wasn't blaming the operational commanders or the troops. Milch's 
arguments apparently pacified Fiebig. When he learned two days later that even the 
corps commanders inside the pocket were blaming the Luftwaffe for the army's collapse, 
he responded calmly. He noted sympathetically in his diary that the generals were "fully 
under the psychosis of the situation in the pocket", and made no further complaints to 
Milch.111 For all his reassuring comments to Fiebig, however, Milch was in fact worried 
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that the High Command would believe the army's splenetic accusations. After first learning 
about Paulus' and Schmidt's outbursts at Thiel, for instance, he had phoned Oberstleutnant 
Christian, at the Fuhrer's headquarters, ostensibly to describe his recent decisions and 
actions, but really to promote his airmen's reputation. "Please tell the Fuhrer," he said to 
Christian, "that there is not a single man who is not giving his utmost to the supply 
operation. What our people are accomplishing here is more than has ever been done in 
this respect so far in this war."112 Hitler and Goring had heard Sixth Army's complaints, 
of course. The Fuhrer said little about them to Goring, but his increasing coolness towards 
his deputy reveals that he also felt let down. Goring, pompous and self-righteous as ever, 
refused to accept responsibility for Sixth Army's destruction. For instance, two weeks 
after Paulus finally stumbled into captivity with the remnants of his once-mighty army, the 
Reichsmarschall addressed a conference of air fleet commanders. "If the army had 
fought harder," he stated, "particularly in Stalingrad itself, we should still have the city 
today and it would not have fallen."113 Paulus was at fault, he insisted, not the Luftwaffe: 
Paulus was too weak. He failed to turn Stalin grad into a proper fortress .... 
The Paulus army just relied on the Luftwaffe and expected it to perform 
miracles .... And then General Schmidt, the Army's Chief of Staff, General 
Schmidt, had the gall to say: 'The Luftwaffe has committed the biggest treachery 
in history because it could not manage to supply the Paulus army.' Yet the 
army lost its airfields-how on earth was a mass airlift supposed to be possible 
after that?"114 
Pitomnik, Gumrak and Stalingradskiy did fall in quick succession between 16 and 23 
January, leaving transport units unable to land within the pocket and forcing them to drop 
their supplies from the air. But Milch, von Richthofen and Fiebig refused to abandon 
Sixth Army. "For as long as German soldiers remain alive and can be located," they all 
agreed, "they will be supplied".115 They had several thousand tons of rations and 
ammunition at their forward airfields, waiting to be dropped into the two German pockets 
at Stalingrad. With a heightened sense of urgency, they pressured their subordinates to 
improve their efficiency. They must increase the operational rate of the transport units 
even further, the air leaders ordered, and load and drop supplies faster and in greater 
quantities. They must do everything humanly possible to ease Sixth Army's suffering, and 
they must do it now. 
Major Freudenfeld, the senior Luftwaffe signals officer trapped within the two shrinking 
pockets, responded to his superior officers' urging with energy and skill. On his own 
initiative, he immediately set about constructing proper drop sites, with lights and radio 
beacons to show pilots where to unload their supply canisters. They would otherwise 
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scatter the canisters allover the pockets, which would result in some falling into Soviet 
territory and others falling into the city ruins, where they would be difficult to find and 
retrieve. Freudenfeld therefore ordered small labour teams to clear areas in each pocket, 
which he equipped with radio beacons and improvised lighting grids made from the up-
turned headlights of lorries. It was a dangerous, difficult and time-consuming task, but by 
the evening of the 25th, Freudenfeld had created a drop site in the southern pocket. 
Fiebig noted in his diary that, as a result, "supply containers were dropped at the right 
place."116 Constructing a drop site in the other pocket took longer, but the signals expert 
set about that task with what Fiebig called "admirable energy".117 In the meantime, many 
canisters were scattered and lost. "If only they could all be found," Fiebig glumly wrote 
on the 27th, "but that's impossible in the house ruins in 'Red Square', in the workers' 
settlement and in the tractor plant. Only a fraction will be found."118 Freudenfeld was 
equally determined to prevent these losses. Taking many personal risks, he constructed 
the northern drop site on the 28th, and established a direct radio link between the drop 
sites and Fliegerkorps VIII. Fiebig was delighted and immediately recommended him for 
the Knight's Cross; Milch whole-heartedly endorsed it. 
Shortly after dawn on the 28th, Milch received an unexpected visitor to his command 
post: Genera/major Schmundt, Hitler's chief adjutant The Fuhrer had sent his trusted 
assistant to assess the situation on his behalf and to see what could be done to alleviate 
Sixth Army's drawn-out death throes. "Avoid the formation of large pockets," Milch boldly 
told him, "because air supply can never be completely assured, especially during periods 
of bad weather."119 Believing that Hitler had received poor counsel, for which he was now 
paying a high price, he informed Schmundt: "I think it would be good for the Fuhrer to 
detach himself more from the individual problems of army command, and appoint a 
leading figure as Supreme Commander of the Eastern Front, like those already existing 
in the west and south, with authority over all three branches of the armed forces." Von 
Manstein would be perfect for this position. "I believe that Manstein is strong enough, 
both in military ability and in character", he explained. He added that the Fuhrer should 
also form an Armed Forces General Staff, "comprising one special person from each 
service branch with his staff." Von Richthofen was certainly the ideal person to represent 
the Luftwaffe, he stressed. Schmundt was taken back by Milch's suggestions, which cast 
Hitler's command abilities in an unflattering light, but agreed with his assessment of von 
Manstein and von Richthofen. He clearly did not want to convey Milch's thoughts to the 
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FOhrer, however, so he recommended that Milch report to Hitler himself when his 
assignment finished. The field marshal agreed, provided he could speak informally with 
Hitler, away from his cronies, and preferably in the presence of Albert Speer. 
Milch's desire to have Speer present is understandable. He was not only a capable 
and forthright man, but also a close personal friend of both Hitler and Milch. He would 
make a good arbiter. The field marshal had last spoken to the Armaments Minister on 
the 24th, when he telephoned him from von Richthofen's command train. Speer informed 
Milch that the FOhrer already recognized that he had improved the air-lift and regretted 
not sending for him earlier.120 In actual fact, despite Milch's barrage of orders, directives 
and threats, the tonnages airlifted to Sixth Army did not improve dramatically under his 
command; in fact, they declined. During the 13 days between his arrival at the front on 
the 16th and his conversation with Schmundt on the 28th, Fliegerkorps VIJ/'s transport 
units had carried or dropped into the pocket only 790 tons of supplies, a daily average 
of a mere 60.75 tons.121 This was only one-fifth of the amount considered necessary to 
meet Sixth Army's barest survival needs. It was also a substantial drop from the daily 
average of 157.75 tons carried in during the 13 days preceding Milch's arrival. 
Milch can hardly be blamed for this decrease. He had done everything possible under 
the circumstances. The decrease stems primarily from the loss of good airfields and the 
forced use of poor airfields. The Soviets had overrrun Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya 
two weeks before he arrived, obliging the Ju 52 and He 111 groups, which together 
composed over 90 per cent of Fiebig's transport fleet, to transfer to inferior and distant 
fields at Salsk and Novocherkassk. The greater distance from those fields to the pocket-
not to mention the inadequate maintenance, repair, and loading facilities at those fields-
had a major impact on the air-lift's effectiveness. Then, only hours before Milch arrived, 
Fiebig had to evacuate Salsk, sending all Ju 52 groups to the improvised, unfinished and 
woefully inadequate "airfield" at Zverevo. During each of these evacuations, the Luftwaffe 
had lost valuable vehicles, heating equipment, spare parts, fuel and stockpiles of supplies. 
Their loss seriously limited the air units' ability to perform their tasks effectively. Solving 
the problems caused by the loss of properly-equipped airfields and the forced use of 
rough, uneven landing strips was not easy, and, although he displayed drive, imagination 
and managerial talent, Milch failed to solve many of those problems before another 
disaster struck: Soviet forces overran Pitomnik, Gumrak and Stalingradskiy in quick 
succession, leaving the Luftwaffe unable to land anywhere within the pocket. That his 
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units managed to carry or drop an average of 60 tons of supplies per day reflects both 
the improvements Milch made and the obstacles that he could not overcome. Sixty tons 
per day throughout Milch's first two weeks at the front was a considerable aC~lievement 
under the circumstances. As noted, Paulus did not see it that way. Regardless of the 
reasons-which he called excuses-the Luftwaffe had failed to supply his army. It was 
now gasping its last breaths. 
An Army Expires; An Airlift Ends 
On 26 January, Soviet forces cut the narrow corridor linking the two German pockets, 
which they began efficiently crushing. Realizing that sustained resistance on even a small 
scale was pointless, Paulus asked the Luftwaffe to drop only food. Ammunition was no 
longer needed; there were too few guns.122 After another two days of constant Soviet 
attacks substantially reduced the size of the two pockets, Sixth Army stopped issuing 
rations to the 25,000 wounded now lying strewn throughout ruins and in cellars. By doing 
so, the army hoped to preserve the depleted strength of the fighting troopS.123 Not that 
it expected to hold out much longer; that evening, the army reported to the High Command 
that its resistance "must finally collapse no later than February 1 st." 124 Soviet attacks next 
day split the southern pocket, leaving Paulus, his staff and the remnants of several 
broken divisions in the south, whilst the Eighth and Fifty-First Army Corps fought on in 
the north. The Fourteenth Panzer Corps ceased to exist that day, two days after the 
Fourth Panzer Corps collapsed and was overrun.125 
On 30 January, Milch ordered that air-supply missions to the northern pocket must 
continue, but added that units should drop supplies to the disintegrating southern pocket, 
now really two pockets, "only if requested".126 The northern pocket would hold out longer, 
he explained, possibly even for a few more days. The southern pocket would proably 
disappear within hours. Knowing the airlift was virtually over, Fiebig visited his two main 
air transport leaders, Oberst KOhl at Novocherkassk and Oberst Morzik at Zverevo. They 
had done an excellent job under the circumstances, and he wanted to thank them and 
their squadrons leaders personally. "My heart was overflowing", he wrote in his diary that 
night.127 
Although the suffering of the doomed soldiers upset Fiebig, he felt particular grieved 
by the fate of the Luftwaffe personnel who shared Six Army's fate. He received a poignant 
radio report from Freudenfeld, sheltering from contant explosions in a cellar within the 
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collapsing southern pocket: "Soldiers run around aimlessly. Very few combatants are left. 
The staffs have lost their grip as leaders. Russian tanks are breaking through. This is the 
end." 128 Fiebig added sadly in his diary that his meteorologist and his signals teams had 
sent their final messages, asking him to relay their greetings to their loved ones at home. 
Few of the trapped Luftwaffe personnel who radioed their final messages to their 
commanders showed the panic they doubtless felt. Most-like their army counterparts-
sent calm and stoical messages. For example, Oberst Rosenfeld, commander of the 
104th Flak Regiment, signalled: 
In the basement ruins of Red Square, Stalingrad, surrounded by the thunder 
of enemy gunfire, we have read our Fuhrer's proclamation [issued that day, 
the tenth anniversary of his assumption of power]. It has given us courage 
and resolution for these last hours of the battle for the ruins of the Red citadel 
on the Volga. Above us flies the swastika banner. The orders of our Supreme 
Command are being obeyed to the end. We turn our thoughts loyally to the 
fatherland. Long live the Fuhrer!129 
Deeply moved, Fiebig wrote that "all the men have an unheard-of attitude. They want to 
prove themselves worthy of 30 January."130 Paulus-whose nervous exhaustion prompted 
Schmidt to take over direction of the final defensive operations-clearly wanted to protect 
the reputation of his army. Therefore, despite the fact that his faith in the High Command 
and the National Socialist world-view had steadily deteriorated over the last two months 
and now no longer existed, he Signalled to Hitler late on the 29th: 
On the anniversary of your assumption of power, the Sixth Army sends 
greetings to its Fuhrer. The Swastika still flutters over Stalingrad. May our 
struggle stand as an example to generations as yet unborn, never to capitulate, 
however desperate the odds. Then Germany will be victorious. Heil, mein 
Fuhrer .131 
On the 30th, Milch ordered his transport units to fly over the pocket that night, looking 
for any signs of life. If they identified Germans, they were to drop their supplies. 85 
aircraft flew to Stalingrad that night 30 others turned back because of bad weather or 
mechanical problems. Most of those that managed to reach Stalingrad dropped their 
supplies, some 72 tons, into the northern pocket, where the Eleventh Army Corps defended 
itself courageously.132 Few dropped supplies into the southern pocket, the aircrews 
knowing from the many fires burning throught areas supposedly held by German troops, 
from the lack of drop-site lighting and from the arbitrary firing of signals nares that the 
pocket scarcely existed.133 By dawn on the 31st, it no longer did. Freudenfeld and his 
signals team radioed Luftflotte IV that Soviet troops "were at the door", before formally 
"Signing Off".134 This act brought tears to the eyes of von Richthofen, Milch and Fiebig, 
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whose desperate efforts to stave off this ghastly moment had failed. Army signals 
officers made similar calls, each formally signing off in the same courageous manner. At 
0615 hours, the radio operator at Sixth Army's headquarters in the basement of a ruined 
department store on Red Square signalled to Army Group Don: "Russians at the door. 
We are preparing to destroy [the radio equipment]."135 An hour later, Sixth Army's final 
transmission came through: "We are destroying [the equipment]."136 Shortly before noon, 
Paulus surrendered. He neither signed a general surrender document nor ordered the 
Eleventh Army Corps, still fighting in the northern pocket, to lay down its arms. Instead, 
adhering to Hitler's order not to surrender his army, he merely surrendered himself and 
the remnants of his staff over to General Mikhail Shumilov, commander of the Soviet 
Sixty-Fourth Army, leaving individual sector commanders to arrange their own surrenders. 
Expecting to accept the surrender of a general, Shumilov was surprised when Paulus 
stood up and introduced himself: "Generalfeldmarschall Paulus." Less than a day earlier, 
Hitler had promoted him to field marshal. He knew, as Paulus did, that no German field 
marshal had ever surrendered, and hoped the new field marshal would earn himself a 
prominent place in the glorious annals of German soldiership by chOOSing death before 
dishonour. Paulus saw the options differently. He chose life. To Hitler's disgust, he and 
eleven German and five Rumanian generals entered Soviet captivity.137 Upon receiving 
the news, the Fuhrer immediately asked his adjutant to find out if it was too late to cancel 
Paulus' promotion. It was too late, the adjutant replied. His promotion had already been 
published in the newspaper. Hitler, ironically presaging his own suicide two years later, 
insisted to Zeitzler next day that "the man should have shot himself, like the old commanders 
who threw themselves on their swords when they saw that the cause was lost."138 Even 
the Roman commander Varus had given his slave the order, "Now kill me!", when defeated 
by German tribes almost two thousand years ago. "I will create no more field marshals 
in this war," he added angrily. 
Paulus' surrender on 31 January did not signal the end of air supply operations to 
Stalingrad. In the northern pocket, General der Infanterie Karl Strecker ordered the 
remnants of the Eleventh Army Corps to continue fighting. Fiebig ordered his transport 
groups to drop as much food and ammunition to Strecker's valiant troops as they COUld. 
That night, 85 aircraft dropped 74 tons of supplies into the northern pocket.139 Fiebig 
noted that Strecker's men had lit three lamps to guide the aircraft to the drop site. These 
were not the only recognition Signals, however. Strecker's men also laid out a large 
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swastika of red lights, a powerful symbol of defiance to the Soviet forces set to crack their 
defences within days at most.140 Although they set out that symbol on their own initiative, 
Hitler did demand that they continue fighting. "I expect the Eleventh Army Corps to resist 
to the very end," he radioed the general in the afternoon of 1 February, "in order to tie 
down as many enemy forces as possible, because that will be of great benefit to operations 
on the other [sections of the] front."141 
The 1 st of February was a very difficult day for Strecker and his men. They suffered 
heavy losses as they withstood constant attack by superior forces. When 116 of Fiebig's 
Ju 52s flew over the pocket that night, the aircrew saw many fires and the muzzle flashes 
of hundreds of Soviet guns.142 They knew that the Eleventh Army Corps would be 
destroyed within hours, and felt powerless to intervene. All they could offer were 98 tons 
of ammunition and food, little use to the cold and exhausted soldiers who would be dead 
or marching eastwards into captivity within hours and who had no chance of even collecting 
the rations before then.143 Shortly after dawn, Army Group Don received the last message 
Strecker sent: "XI Corps, with its six divisions, has done its duty to the last. Long live the 
Fuhrer! Long live Germany!-Strecker." 144 
Throughout 2 February, both the High Command and the air force and army operational 
commanders waited for further messages. None came. Even now unwilling to abandon 
German soldiers, Milch ordered aircraft to fly over Stalingrad and to drop supplies to any 
German troops clearly identified. When the aircraft returned from their missions, Fiebig 
reported to Milch that all was lost. "The outline of the pocket can no longer be recognized." 
he said. "No artillery fire was seen. An enemy vehicle column with headlights blazing is 
advancing from the northwest into what was formerly the northern pocket.. .. The front of 
that column is almost at our former drop-site."145 A fire raged in the northwest part of the 
tractor factory, Fiebig added in his diary, and there were no signs of continued fighting. 
Coupled with the lack of radio transmissions, these aircrew observations revealed that 
the Battle for Stalingrad was finally over.146 
With a heavy heart, Milch thanked Fiebig and ordered him to turn all his transport 
groups over to Luftflotte IV, which would now need every available aircraft for the major 
operation it had already turned its attention to: the evacuation of the remaining forces in 
the Caucasus. Hitler's dream of capturing that vast region's oil-fields had been shattered 
by his obsession with Stalingrad. Milch then took stock of the Luftwaffe's achievements 
and losses. During the 71 days and nights between 24 November 1942 and 2 February 
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1943, the Luftwaffe had carried or dropped to the encircled troops a total of 8,350.7 tons 
of rations, fuel and ammunition, or a daily average of 117.6 tons per day.147 During the 
same period, it had evacuated 30,000 wounded soldiers.148 The cost was very high, 
however. Due mainly to bad weather, but also to VVS and Soviet flak attacks, the 
Luftwaffe had suffered 166 aircraft destroyed, 108 missing and 214 written of1.149 
Recovering from the loss of these 488 aircraft would take a long time. "The total losses 
are the equivalent of five wings, or more than one full air corps", Oberst Rohde, the 
liaison officer to the Quartermaster-General, told a depressed Milch on 2 February.15o 
The Ju 52 groups had lost 266 aircraft, a third of the Luftwaffe's total complement, and 
the He 111 groups had lost 165 planes. Other losses included 42 JIJ 86s, 9 Fw 200s, 
5 He 177s and one Ju 290. Approximately 1,000 airmen had given their lives, including 
many of the Luftwaffe's most experienced bomber and transport pilots, navigators and 
training instructors. Milch could not help but wonder whether the sacrifice of these young 
men, and of the Luftwaffe troops who perished inside the pocket or stumbled into captivity 
along with 108,000 of their army comrades, had really been necessary. The airlift should 
never have been promised or attempted, he had maintained from the outset. It was 
always doomed to failure, and, as long as Hitler refused to permit its surrender or break-
out, Sixth Army was always doomed to destruction. 
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Conclusion 
The disastrous campaign was, from its very conception, the result oJ perceived economic 
necessity. To a far greater degree than any other German military undertaking of the 
Second World War, economic considerations significantly influenced its planning. The 
Fuhrer's directive of 5 April 1942 committed the Wehrmacht for the first time to a major 
offensive with economic objectives taking precedence over strictly military objectives. The 
resulting campaign not only failed to attain those objectives, but cost Hitler dearly in men, 
matf~riel and-not least-prestige, at home and abroad. 
The dire predictions of Hitler and his economic advisers during 1941 and 1942 about 
the certain collapse of the German war machine if no new sources of oil were obtained 
proved to be exaggerated. The German war effort did not grind to a halt when the 
campaign to capture the Caucasus oilfields failed. Although Germany's oil situation 
remained acute, and became desperate after the Allied air offensive against its synthetic 
fuel plants and the Rumanian oilfields commenced, the Reich continued fighting until May 
1945. 
In fact, despite the total failure of the 1942 campaign, events in 1943 actually led to 
a slight improvement in the oil situation. First, when Italy defected from the Axis in 
September it ceased to be a drain on Germany's near-exhausted reserves. Second, 
when German forces in Italy responded to this defection and rapidly disarmed their 
former allies they captured surprisingly large stocks of oil. Third, Germany's synthetic 
fuel industry, not yet targeted by Allied bombers, reached a production peak.1 Fourth, 
it turned out that all units had stored more than they revealed. Accordingly, the oil 
shortages that had bedeviled the Wehrmacht's efforts throughout the previous two years 
appeared far less critical. The Luftwaffe was even able to build up slightly its meagre 
reserves for the first time since the beginning of the Russian campaign. 2 
In May 1944, however, the USAAF's strategic bombing force began concentrating its 
efforts against both the German synthetic fuel plants and the Rumanian oilfields and 
refineries. The use of bases in southern Italy greatly facilitated raids on the latter. 
Despite high aircraft and crew losses, these efforts paid off handsomely for the Allies, 
who learned from "Ultra" decrypts that many plants suffered production decreases or 
were put out of action altogether. By late summer Germany's oil supplies were seriously 
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depleted. In May, by way of illustration, 316,000 tons of synthetic fuel were produced in 
Germany. The following month production fell to 107,000 tons, and in September it 
plummeted to a mere 17,000. As a result, the Luftwaffe received only 30,000 tons of 
petrol that month, instead of its normal 180,000 tons? Its training programmes suffered 
terribly, with many pilot training schools shutting down for lack of fuel. The mobility of 
the mechanized forces was also significantly curtailed. For the Ardennes campaign in 
December, Germany's last major offensive action of the war, the armoured formations 
had very slender fuel reserves (and these were only created by robbing fuel from forces 
not involved). Hitler was gambling on their ability to capture American or British stocks. 
With the failure of this endeavour, and powerful Allied armies pressing in from west, east 
and south, it became clear that the Reich could not survive much longer. 
Thus, Germany's ability to wage war did not dissolve with the failure of the Caucasus 
campaign, as the Fuhrer and his economists had previously believed. Having said that, 
it should also be noted that neither Hitler nor his military planners could forecast with 
certainty the future course of the war or, therefore, accurately calculate the future oil 
consumption of Germany's armed forces. Frequent evaluations in 1941 and 1942 by the 
War Economy and Armaments Office, based on careful and detailed analyses of past 
production, import and consurnption rates, clearly revealed that once known oil reserves 
were exhausted it would no longer be possible to find any elsewhere. The mechanized 
part of Germany's war machine would rapidly grind to a halt, and operations would have 
to be entirely based on horse power. These grim conclusions were repeatedly presented 
to Hitler and the High Command in the form of detailed reports. Their claims, we saw 
above, were seemingly corroborated by commanders in the field and even senior service 
chiefs like Raeder, who complained constantly that the mobility or operational capability 
of their forces had deteriorated because of decreases in their oil supplies. History has 
exposed the exaggeration of the warnings the Nazi leader received from his economists, 
but at that time they seemed both credible and compelling. 
A Difficult Year for Luftflotte IV 
It had been a long and costly campaign for Luttf/otte IV, containing easy and successful 
operations at first, leading its commanders to predict in their diaries (and sometimes to 
their men) that a successful conclusion appeared imminent, and then came difficult and 
disastrous operations, causing them to write despondently that failure was inevitable. 
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Under von Richthofen's direct command, air units performed superbly during the Crimean 
offensives of lVIay and June. Functioning mainly as an extension of the army's artillery, 
they provided von Manstein's troops with an unprecedented level of tactical air support. 
The excellent working relationship between Generals von Richthofen and von Manstein, 
outstanding commanders committed to close inter-service co-operation, ensured that the 
Luftwaffe's operations were carefully co-ordinated with the army's. As a result, airpower 
played a decisive role in the recapture of the Kerch Peninsula and the fall of Sevastopol, 
as von Manstein later acknowledged in his memoirs. 
However, the Luftwaffe managed to provide this level of support only because of a 
unique combination of circumstances. First, because most of the eastern front was 
relatively quiet during that period (except for the short-lived Soviet offensive at Kharkov 
in May) the OKL was able to give von Richthofen a strong air force at a high level of 
operational readiness. Second, that powerful force faced numerically-weak and poorly-
trained VVS opposition, allowing air and flak units to commence army support operations 
without having first to wage a time-consuming and costly battle for air superiority and then 
commit a large number of aircraft to escort and protection operations. Third, almost the 
entire force was deployed against only a few targets within a small area; in Sevastopol's 
case, there was only one, although it was very strong. Finally, it operated against those 
targets from established and well-equipped airstrips in the immediate vicinity, allowing a 
high number of sorties to be conducted each day. 
This favourable set of circumstances existed nowhere throughout the main summer 
campaign. During the Battle of Kharkov (May) and B/au's early stages (late-June to late-
July), von Richthofen was able to continue Schwerpunktbildung, the creation of single 
points o'f maximum effort. Through close liaison with army counterparts, he usually created 
joint Schwerpunkte, concentrations of strong air and army forces at the same critical 
points. After winning air superiority, Luftflotte /V provided an effective combination of 
direct battlefield support and systematic interdiction operations against Soviet rear areas. 
In late July, however, Hitler committed a major mistake that had dire consequences 
for both the army and for von Richthofen's air fleet. Encouraged by his troops' rapid 
seizure of vast areas and misreading the signi'ficance of their relatively small prisoner 
haul, he deviated from B/au's original conception of striking to the Volga, securing the 
northern flank and then plunging into the Caucasus. Instead, he divided the campaign 
into two simultaneous offensives: against Stalingrad and against the Caucasus. This 
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dissipated army and air force strength, opened a large and vulnerable gap between his 
two army groups, created major logistical difficulties for both groups and expanded Luftflotte 
/V's combat zone to an unmanageable size. 
Von Ricl1thofen possessed nowhere near enough aircraft to provide adequate support 
for both army groups and was no longer able, as a result, to create major Schwerpunkte. 
He spent the next three months-even after he pulled most units out of the Caucasus 
in mid-August, leaving two complete armies with little support-hastily swapping units 
back and forth between Stalingrad and the Caucasus as he attempted to create "local" 
Schwerpunkte as opportunities arose or crises developed. Those transfers over long 
distances steadily reduced operational rates. Moreover, air units encountered increasingly-
numerous VVS forces, which proved better trained and equipped than hitherto. To 
overcome them cost time, effort and high losses. They also often had to operate from 
inadequate airfields, sometimes far from their targets, which were widely scattered over 
a large area. Consequently, the level of support for most army formations dropped 
dramatically, with the exception of Sixth Army's divisions inside Stalingrad itself, which 
received strong support in accordance with Hitler's personal orders. Also, because the 
struggling Caucasian armies constantly requested direct battlefield support, the frequency 
and scale of indirect support missions-interdiction of Soviet rear areas-dropped 
considerably. 
By early September, the army's wide dispersion across the width of the Caucasus and 
Fliegerkorps IV's much-reduced complement left von Richthofen unable to create even 
minor Schwerpunkte in that large region without first having to "borrow" units from 
Fliegerkorps VIII. With Hitler constantly demanding an intensification of effort at Stalingrad, 
against which Fiebig's air corps committed almost all its aircraft, von Richthofen was 
seldom able to send units south. Even when he managed to divert units to the Caucasus, 
he had to dissipate their strength by committing half to each of the army's critical sectors: 
the forested hills around Tuapse, where Soviet defenders withstood Seventeenth Army's 
repeated attempts to break through to the Black Sea coast, and in the Terek bend, where 
First Panzer Army encountered fierce resistance as it tried to push through to Grozny. 
Fliegerkorps VIII performed well against its primary target, Stalingrad, pounding it into 
rubble during heavy raids, but its continued bombardment of the ruins in accordance with 
Hitler's insistence that every street be cleared of the enemy led to a great waste of 
resources. For two months, Fiebig's units rained hundreds of tons of bombs on the ruins 
365. 
each day, turning small heaps of large rubble into large heaps of small rubble but 
achieving nothing substantial. This was neither Fiebig's nor von Richthofen's fault. Hitler 
wanted Stalingrad taken, and insisted that all efforts be directed to that end. Even after 
he realized that the oilfields could not be gained in 1942 and ordered von Richthofen to 
destroy them 'from the air, he still insisted that the destruction and capture of Stalingrad 
remained his highest priority. Thus, the air fleet commander was unable to commit strong 
bomber forces to the destruction of the oilfields. In fact, he could only temporarily reduce 
the bombardment of Stalingrad and send bomber forces south when bad weather at 
Stalingrad curtailed operations there. Even then, he lacked sufficient bombers to conduct 
major raids against the most important installations. As a result, although he occasionally 
inflicted substantial damage on a few refineries and oilfields, particularly at Grozny, he 
never succeeded in crippling Soviet oil production. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now reasonable to argue that von Richthofen's air 
Heet could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken 
at least several months to recover, if it had unloaded as many bombs on Baku as on 
Stalingrad. Heavy damage to that oil metropolis, which alone accounted for 80 per cent 
of all Soviet production, was possible during August and September. Von Richthofen still 
possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the VVS's presence 
in the Caucasus was still relatively weak. By October, when Hitler finally ordered attacks 
on oilfields, von Richthofen's bomber fleet was much reduced and most forward airfields 
had been badly damaged by VVS forces which were now far stronger. The opportunity 
had been missed. 
Of course, such arguments are the luxury of historians with hindsight allowing them 
vantage points not possessed by the participants themselves. The reality is that Hitler 
wanted Stalingrad captured more than he wanted oilfields destroyed (or even captured, 
judging by his decision to send Fourth Panzer Army from the Caucasus to Stalingrad in 
July and his subsequent unwillingness to reinforces his Caucasian armies). He therefore 
insisted on the continued heavy bombing of Stalingrad, despite it having limited strategic 
or tactical value. Until he personally raised it to prominence by trumpeting its "great 
importance" on several occasions to the German public, the city's propaganda value was 
nil. 
Hitler's concentration of forces at Stalingrad left Army Group B's long flanks dangerously 
exposed, particularly the section held by Rumanians northwest of the city. Hitler was well 
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aware of this, but believed that Stalingrad's quick capture would release sufficient forces 
to reinforce them. Even after Stalingrad proved far more costly and time-consuming to 
take than he previously thought, he refused to break off the attack, preferring to demand 
renewed effort and dribble in the few reinforcements available. This was his second 
major mistake of the campaign. Before Sixth Army could 'finish off Stalingrad, the Soviets 
launched the very attack that he had feared. It was not the Fuhrer's last mistake, 
however. Even after the Soviets broke through the Axis flanks on either side of Stalingrad, 
trapping Sixth Army and other formations, he refused to allow Paulus to withdraw from 
the Volga. Wanting to avoid the humiliation of abandoning the city he had publicly vowed 
to hold, he made one of his most ill-considered decisions thus far in the war: after 
receiving rash promises from the Luftwaffe's Chief of Staff, he ordered Sixth Army, which 
he extravagantly re-named "Fortress Stalingrad", to form a "hedgehog" defence and wait 
for relief. It would be sustained by an airlift operation, he declared. 
Almost immediately, Luftflotte IV ceased to be a regular combat command. Instead it 
became something it was hopelessly equipped to function as: an air supply command. 
Well over half its aircraft, joined by hundreds of additional transport planes sent from 
other theatres (many of them unsuited to their new task), flew supply and escort missions 
in support of the encircled forces. However, this fleet did not include the 250-odd transport 
planes tied down in the Tunisian campaign, evidence of Hitler's limits as a strategist. 
Establishing rational priorities was one of his weaknesses, and it was seldom manifest 
more clearly than during this critical period. Tunisia was of negligible strategical value 
compared to the Don-Donets region. Yet he continued pouring scores of thousands of 
well-trained and well-equipped men into the former, squandering almost 25 air transport 
squadrons in the process, while Soviet forces rolled back the main German line and 
tightened their grip on Sixth Army. Those 250 planes would have greatly bene'fitted 
Fiebig's airlift, constantly plagued by shortages of operational aircraft. Almost all of them 
Ju 52s, they could have replaced many of the bombers struggling as makeshift transporters. 
Combat units not directly involved in the airlift, subordinated at times to makeshift 
tactical commands, proved incapable of retaining air superiority or preventing Soviet 
advances along the entire southern front. Luftflotte IV's leaders worked energetically to 
ensure that all missions, airlift and combat, provided the best possible results. Under the 
circumstances, however, good results were impossible. Despite the drive and determination 
of von Richthofen, his senior commanders, and lVIilch (whose administrative talents 
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produced improvements in the airlift), Luftflotte IV could not overcome poor suitability for 
its designated tasks, its loss of established airfields and forced used of inadequate landing 
strips, its loss of air superiority and its high attrition rate (caused primarily by bad weather 
but also by VVS attacks and strong flak). As a result, the air fleet failed to sustain Sixth 
Army or prevent the southern front being rolled back. 
Finally, Luftflotte /V's campaign against naval targets, both vessels and bases, needs 
to be discussed. Although they never involved the commitment of more than 20 per cent 
of the fleet's aircraft (and sometimes only five or ten per cent), anti-naval missions 
occurred continuously throughout most of the period under study. Even before von 
Richthofen's FJiegerkorps VIII transferred to the Crimea late in April 1942, specialist anti-
naval commands operated against Vice-Admiral Oktyabrskii's Black Sea Fleet. First 
Sonderstab Krim, then FliegerfOhrer SOd, its successor, conducted daily bewaffnete 
Seeaufklarung (armed reconnaissance) sorties along the Caucasus coast, paying careful 
attention to Soviet ports and naval bases, around Crimean coasts, and over the eastern 
reaches of the Black Sea. They attacked with guns, torpedoes or bombs any warships 
and merchant vessels discovered plying those waters, and, when weather, fuel and 
ammunition stocks permitted, they conducted raids on naval bases. 
Neither Sonderstab Krim nor FliegerfOhrer SOd was sufficiently strong enough to sink 
many vessels or heavily damage naval bases, but their efforts produced results far 
outweighing the small scale of their deployment. Their constant presence and intermittent 
vessel-damaging and sinking were sufficient to persuade the over-cautious Soviet admiral 
to keep his large warships in port except for occasions when weather or darkness provided 
them with reasonable cover. They also prompted him to curtail naval bombardment missions 
against German targets along Crimean coasts. More importantly, fearing the loss of 
capital ships to the Luftwaffe, he attempted no further major landings on the Crimea. 
Even after the powerful Fliegerkorps VIII arrived in the Crimea and von Richthofen took 
over all air operations in the region, no change of operational emphasis occurred. Von 
Richthofen committed virtually all his aircraft to the annihilation of Soviet resistance at 
Kerch and Sevastopol, leaving only FliegerfOhrer SOd (from which he transferred various 
units for operations against ground targets as part of his own air corps) to combat the 
Soviet fleet. This orientation, consistent with the concept of Schwerpunktbildung, is 
understandable: believing that success or failure in the Crimea depended on the result 
of the army's campaigns, and determined to bring them to quick and successful conclusions, 
368. 
he threw his air force's full weight behind the army's efforts. Only when success at the 
Schwerpunkte looked imminent did he divert units to assist FliegerfOhrer Sad in its anti-
shipping missions, which were, after all, peripheral to the decisive campaign. 
Nonetheless, FliegerfOhrer Sad performed well, due mainly to Oberst von Wild's capable 
leadership. He demanded great effort and aggression from all his units, carefully co-
ordinated their operations wlth the small Axis naval flotillas that arrived in the region, and 
himself practiced small-scale Schwerpunktbildung. Realizing that he lacked sufficient 
aircraft to interdict most shipping traffic in the eastern Black Sea and unwilling to dissipate 
his forces in the attempt, he concentrated his forces against what he perceived to be the 
single most critical point: the sealanes leading into Sevastopol. Their constant attacks 
on vessels attempting to slip into the fortress, often made in conjunction with sorties by 
German and Italian light warships, inflicted little material damage but proved effective 
nonetheless: they caused Oktyabrskii to reduce, and finally stop, supply missions by 
surface vessels. After mid-June, only submarines attempted the perilous journey, carrying 
far less cargo than slJrface ships had. Thus, FliegerfOhrer Sad contributed substantially 
to the success of the sea blockade that slowly but surely severed the fortress's life-line. 
When the fortress fell, von Wild immediately concentrated his units against Novorossiisk 
and other Caucasian naval bases. They were joined on those missions by numerous 
bombers and Stukas of Fliegerkorps VIII (temporarily under von Wild's command), which 
damaged ports and sank several warships. However, von Wild could only deploy those 
reinforcements against the Soviet fleet for a few days before having to send them north 
to the Kursk area where they again came under von Richthofen's direct control. Still, 
following their departure, FliegerfOhrer Sad successfully kept the Soviet fleet under constant 
surveillance and regular attack, ensuring that it undertook no major operations in the 
region. Its light but steady pressure not only kept all large warships penned up in Poti and 
Batumi, where strong 'flak defences offered them protection, but also limited the number 
of coastal shelling missions carried out by destroyers and light vessels. 
Although this was a notable achievement, considering FliegerfOhrer Sad's small 
complement, by the middle of August von Richthofen-who had never shown interest in 
the anti-shipping operations-no longer considered the Soviet fleet a major danger. 
FliegerfOhrer Sad's aircraft were needed elsewhere, he reasoned, particularly in support 
of First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies. He therefore disbanded von Wild's command, 
incorporating all units into Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV. Air attacks on ports and vessels 
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continued on a steadily-reduced scale until mid-November, when the Soviets launched 
their immense counter-offensive on either side of Stalingrad. After the air fleet chief 
transferred all combat planes from the Caucasus to that critical sector, anti-shipping 
operations ceased for good (except for limited reconnaissance missions). Consequently, 
Oktyabrskii's fleet became increasingly active. By February 1943, when the Stalingrad 
airlift ended in failure, it was clear that the Luftwaffe's anti-naval campaign had also failed: 
Soviet warships were again pounding Crimean, Ukrainian and, on occasions, Rumanian 
coastlines and attacking Axis supply convoys. 
The Aftermath 
Hitler's major summer campaign had ended in disaster, and Milch, von Manstein and 
von Richthofen feared that they would become targets of bitter accusations. They did not. 
At various times, Hitler thanked and commended all three for their efforts. Milch was first 
to be pleasantly surprised. He left for Hitler's heaquarters early on 3 February, accompanied 
by Hube. They arrived that same evening.4 To Milch's consternation, the Fuhrer sent for 
Hube and ordered the airman to wait. 
Hitler stili trusted the Panzer general implicitly, his favourable opinion strengthened by 
a letter that von Below, his Luftwaffe adjutant, had shown him a few days earlier. Written 
by Winrich Behr, one of the adjutant's relatives trapped at Stalingrad, the letter described 
conditions within the pocket as well as Sixth Army's commanders. 5 Next to Paulus' 
name, the officer had placed a question mark, while next to Schmidt's and von Seydlitz's 
names, he had scrawled: "Should be shot!" Next to Hube's name, however, he had 
written: "The Man!" Hitler was very impressed, telling Zeitzler that the letter confirmed 
he had acted wisely when ordering the Luftwaffe to fly Hube out of the pocket.6 In the 
evening of 3 February, the Fuhrer asked Hube whether Milch's management had improved 
the airlift, to which the general replied that Milch had done everything in his power, "and 
more". He described Milch's efforts at length, adding that if Milch had arrived at the front 
two weeks earlier, the Luftwaffe would probably have managed to sustain Sixth Army. 
''That,'' regretted Hitler, "is a judgement on me."7 
Hitler then warmly welcomed Milch to his quarters after discharging Hube, and thanked 
him profusely for his efforts, which, he said, would have made a big difference to the airlift 
had they come sooner. For that, he was himself responsible. According to Milch's 
unpublished memoirs, he did not raise the matter of Hitler's leadership of the armed 
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forces. He nonetheless shocked him by announcing that, had he been Paulus, he would 
have disobeyed orders and commanded his army to break out of the pocket.s The 
Fuhrer replied that he would then have been obliged to lay Milch's head at his feet. The 
latter retorted that his life in exchange for an entire army was a worthwhile sacrifice. 
Athough this comment displeased the Nazi leader, he apparently dismissed it as nothing 
more than evidence of the stress Milch was under. He bore no grudge towards Milch. 
Indeed, he commented to his closest advisers several times in the next few weeks that 
he now wished he had sent for Milch earlier. His opinion was reinforced by a formal 
"experience report" on the air-lift submitted by Hube on 15 March, in which the general 
wrote: 
If he had been sent out earlier, Feldmarschall Milch and his staff would have 
decisively influenced the [air] supply of Fortress Stalingrad. His measures 
needed an initial period of 10 to 14 days to take full effect. Had he been in 
charge from [the beginning 01'] Stalingrad's encirclement (23 .11.42), the effect 
would have been fully felt after the middle of December at the latest. And, if 
the [air] supply were maintained, the fortress could have been held for many 
months to follow.9 
Next, Hitler welcomed von Manstein to his headquarters on 6 February. The dictator 
turned on his considerable charm, probably aware from Schmundt that the field marshal 
intended to request him to step down from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 
appointing an experienced and trustworthy general instead. After thanking von Manstein 
for his outstanding efforts, Hitler promptly disarmed him by admitting unreservedly that he 
was solely responsible for the destruction of Sixth Army: 
I alone bear the reposibility for Stalingrad! I could perhaps put part of the 
blame on Goring by saying that he gave me an incorrect picture of the 
Luftwaffe's supply capabilities. But I personally appointed him as my successor, 
so I cannot blame him for Stalingrad.10 
Hitler's frank admission impressed the field marshal, who later wrote that it "struck a 
chivalrous note." Hitler, he added, certainly appeared to be "deeply moved by the 
tragedy, not only because it revealed the failure of his own leadership, but also because 
he was very affected in a personal sense by the fate of soldiers who, because of their 
faith in him, had fought right to the end with courage and devotion to duty."11 Hitler 
displayed the "utmost composure" during their four-hour meeting. After promising to 
consider his arguments carefully and with an open mind, he listened attentively to von 
Manstein's suggestions about the conduct of future operations in southern Russia. When 
he insisted that von Manstein continue holding the whole industrial area of the Donets 
basin, the latter argued that a withdrawal from at least the region east of the Mius river 
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was essential. If he tried to retain that region, he maintained, he would probably lose both 
Army Group Don and the whole of the basin. Hitler reluctantly agreed that he could 
withdraw to the Mius. Pleased that he had won a decision from Hitler and flattered by 
his relative intimacy and congeniality, the field marshal avoid tackling him on the issue 
of his leadership of the armed forces. Instead, he weakly suggested that Hitler should 
appoint a competent and trustworthy Chief of Staff, whom he could invest with authority 
over the three service branches. Hitler quickly brushed this off, pointing out that Goring, 
as the only Reichsmarschall in Germany, would never submit to anyone's authority but 
his. Also, his own experiences with army as well as armed forces supreme commanders 
had never been satisfactory. It was better that he remain in charge himself. 
Von Richthofen was disappointed when von Manstein recalled the meeting a few days 
later. "The FDhrer had been calm and composed," he wrote in his diary on 8 February, 
"and Manstein was visibly heartened. Of course, the question of another type of command 
or command organization was never brought up, although that was exactly what Manstein 
wanted."12 Von Richthofen then lectured the field marshal on the need to keep a tighter 
grip on his Panzer divisions, to execute short, sharp raids, destroying the enemy piece 
by piece, and to reduce the size of his rear area organization. It was pointless having 
divisions of 12,000 men, he said, if only 600 actually fought in the front line. He had been 
impressed by new Soviet command systems, involving tight command, small rear area 
organizations and a strong front. "We must finally go over to that type of thing ourselves," 
he insisted. Von Manstein agreed whole-heartedly, but maintained that his generals 
would invariably do the opposite. He couldn't do anything about it, he complained. Amused 
by this response, von Richthofen "told him calmly that in my youth I had once heard a 
rumour that in military affairs it was possible to issue orders." The field Marshal took the 
jibe light-heartedly, he added.13 
Finally, von Richthofen arrived at Hitler's headquarters on 11 February, after spending 
a day conferring with Goring and Jeschonnek about coming air operations in southern 
Russia. Well aware that von Richthofen blamed him for the Stalingrad disaster, which 
had cost Hitler an army and "torn the guts" out of both Luftflotte IV and the air transport 
fleet, the Reichsmarschall protested lamely that he had been given little choice; the 
FDhrer had clearly wanted to keep Sixth Army on the Volga, and expected the Luftwaffe 
to keep it fully operational. He could not have refused. Anyway, at that time he expected 
the encirclement to be temporary. It probably would have turned out alright, he claimed, 
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had the Italians not collapsed, allowing the Russians to roll back the German front and 
deprive the Luftwaffe of its forward airfields. Von Richthofen snapped back that the 
disaster began before the Italian line collapsed, and that the Reichsmarschall would know 
more about events and conditions at the front if he had actually risked going there in 
person. "If you can't trust your lucky star for your personal safety," he said, "then you 
have no right to believe that destiny has called you for greater things."14 A lengthy 
argument ensued, during which Goring insisted that he had tried to reason privately with 
Hitler on many occasions, but could not challenge him publicly, because that would 
"endanger" the Fuhrer's authority. Von Richthofen-who later admitted to "playing the 
strong mann-replied that he saw things differently.15 The Reichsmarschall did not 
challenge Hitler, but always agreed with him, because he was scared of the Fuhrer's 
wrath. Naturally, Goring "energetically denied this". 
Before von Richthofen spoke with Hitler on the 11th, Goring, clearly worried that the 
air fleet commander would blame him for the disaster, asked him whether he intended 
to be as frank with Hitler as he had been with him. Von Richthofen replied cooly that he 
had "no inhibitions whatever."16 As it happened, he refrained from attacking Goring. He 
did ask Hitler (whom he found to be "very serious, but decidely charitable") when and why 
he had promised to supply Sixth Army by air. Hitler admitted-as noted above-that he 
had made his initial promise without Goring's knowledge, but "with the qualification that 
it would be possible only if supply conditions did not deteriorate."17 Trying to distance 
himself from the airlift's poor record, the Fuhrer added: "Through bad weather and the 
forced abandonment of the forward airfields, that promise became invalid." He did not 
hold von Richthofen accountable, of course. On the contrary, he had followed the air fleet 
commander's operations and efforts with satisfaction and complete faith in his abilities. 
When he asked von Richthofen what he thought of von Manstein, the airman immediately 
sensed that someone had been trying to pOison the Fuhrer against the field marshal. He 
suspected Joldl and Keitel, who feared that Hitler would replace one or both of them with 
this gifted soldier. Von Richthofen replied that von Manstein was clearly "the best tactician 
and operational commander we have", but bluntly added that he, like other commanders, 
"must be given tactical freedom to act as their own local experience dictates."18 Taking 
a swipe at Hitler's leadership style, he boldly insisted that it was wrong to "lead them by 
the scruff of the neck as though they were children". The Fuhrer indignantly replied that, 
had he not kept his general under close guidance, "they would be fighting in Germany 
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by now". Von Richthofen refuted this, stating: "if you can't trust your most important 
figures, you must replace them." Perhaps referring again to the airlift, Hitler shortly 
afterwards complained that he was constantly let down by his closest advisers, who 
reported dishonestly and did little else. Clearly with the airlift in mind, von Richthofen 
replied that "this is of no interest either to us at the front or to future historians." As 
Commander-in-Chief, he pOinted out, the Fuhrer alone was responsible for the success 
or failure of operations. There was no point in cursing or blaming his advisers. Hitler 
frowned disapprovingly but remained quiet, inwardly admiring the air leader's frankness 
and unable to challenge the truth of his comments. 
Indeed, the Fuhrer liked men of Hube's and von Richthofen's ilk; committed National 
Socialists, aggressive commanders, inspiring leaders, forthright advisers, loyal followers. 
Although he had sworn never to create another field marshal, Hitler announced on 15 
February, four days after von Richthofen had bluntly told him that he bore ultimate 
resonsibility for Stalingrad, that he was promoting the airman to Generalfeldmarschall. 
Von Richthofen received official confirmation of his elevation next day, when von Below, 
Hitler's Luftwaffe adjutant, rang to congratulate him and pass on the Fuhrer's best wishes. 
He had mixed feelings about his promotion. An ambitious and arrogant man, he was 
deeply gratified by this elevation to the highest of ranks. He was also proud of the way 
Luftf/otte IV had performed since Operation B/au began seven months earlier. His generals 
had displayed not only fortitude and tenacity under the worst circumstances, but also 
vigour and resourcefulness. His troops-air, ground and flak-had perfomed their duties 
effectively and courageously, working to the utmost of their abilities in conditions that 
were seldom favourable but frequently hostile. He was proud to accept promotion on their 
behalf. 
On the other hand, his promotion could not compensate for what he believed to be the 
needless depletion of his air fleet. Before the Soviets launched their November counter-
offensive, the High Command had constantly forced Luttflotte IV to perform duties that 
greatly over-taxed its limited resources. Von Ricrlthofen had grudgingly accepted that as 
a normal feature of military life. But in November, the High Command had totally ignored 
his repeated protests and appeals, and those of his generals, and given Luftflotte IV 
responsibility for a massive airlift operation that it could not possibly carry out successfully, 
even with the additional resources made available. As a result, he had lost a thousand 
brave young men and hundreds of aircraft. The air fleet was now depleted, disorganized 
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and demoralized and, as a consequence, needed extensive rehabilitation. However, it 
was already engaged in major operations in the Donets basis and northwestern Caucasus. 
Its recovery looked uncertain, as did its ability to perform its new tasks effectively. 
Recovery 
When Blau began in June 1942, the eastern air fleets had possessed 2,644 aircraft, 
of which 1,610 (61 per cent) operated in the southern front under Luftflotte IV. The 
operational rate of that air fleet had been 71 per cent, good by the standards of the 
eastern front. By 31 January 1943, the day on which Paulus trudged into Soviet captivity, 
marking the end of Hitler's grandiose plans for southern Russia, the state of the eastern 
air fleets had deteriorated markedly. They now possessed only 1,657 aircraft (excluding 
transport planes), of which von Richthofen's Luftflotte IV commanded a mere 624 (37 per 
cent).19 That is, after seven months of constant combat, the fleet's complement had 
dropped to 39 per cent of its former strength. Because of bad weather and the frequent 
evacuation of airfields, its operational rate had also dropped dramatically. On the day 
Paulus surrendered, the air fleet had only 240 air-worthy planes, its operational rate 
having fallen from 71 to 38 per cent.20 
Because so many transport groups had been sent to Luftflotte IV for the airlift, the fleet 
now possessed a vast transport armada of 477 planes, excluding regular corps transport 
squadrons.21 The vast majority of its transports were Ju 52s, but it also had three He 
111 groups and a Ju 88 group. However, for reasons described at length in the previous 
chapter, their operational rate was even worse than that of the '1:leet's combat groups. 
Only 146 transports, or 30 per cent, were air-worthy on 31 January 1943. The bomber 
grolJps deployed on transport duties during the airlift had suffered badly, due mainly to 
adverse weather and the poor runways in the pocket, which caused many to crash during 
landing. 52 of the Fifty-Fifth Bomber Wing's He 111s had survived the airlift, for example, 
but only 12 (23 per cent) were now operational. Similarly, 66 of the Twenty-Seventh 
Bomber Wing's He 111s had survived, but only 18 (27 per cent) were fit for operations. 
The human cost was no less important than the material. Few of von Richthofen's 
supply, service and maintenance personnel, airmen or flak troops had been able to enjoy 
even brief periods of rest and recuperation behind the front, let alone take home leave, 
during the last seven months. Some had been in continuous combat even longer, having 
fought in the Kerch and Sevastopol campaigns before going straight into operations for 
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Blau. Thus, not only were aircraft operational rates low, but the troops were exhausted 
and suffering stress. Morale had dropped, reaching a low point in the last days of January 
and the first of February, when the airlift's failure resulted in Sixth Army's destruction. 
Aware that von Manstein would need effective air support if he were to stop Soviet 
advances and rebuild the southern front, and that Fiebig would need extra aircraft if he 
were to carry out a new supply mission planned for the northwestern Caucasus, von 
Richthofen was determined to raise his fleet's strength as soon as possible. Unfortunately, 
because of steady Soviet gains, he could give his air fleet no time to catch its breath. 
Even before Stalingrad fell, he began reorganizing Luftflotte IV for its new tasks. On 20 
January, he ordered Oberst KOhl to transfer all He 111s not used for transport duties from 
the vulnerable, makeshift Novocherkassk airfield, east of Rostov, to much better fields at 
Stalino, 180 kilometres to the northwest. 22 He also ordered Oberstleutnant von Beust, 
the He 111 combat commander at Voroshilovgrad, to withdraw his groups to 
Konstantinovka, 80 kilometres due west. Fiebig organized the transfers. Not only were 
Stalino's and Konstantinovka's airfields far safer from enemy air and ground attack, but 
they were established airfields, constructed on a permanent basis more than a year 
earlier. They had excellent runways, hangars, and maintenance and repair facilities. 
They were also connected by both rail and road to the main German supply centres in 
the Ukraine, unlike Novocherkassk and the other improvised airfields closer to the front. 
Now that the Don front had been pushed back and the two German armies in the 
Caucasus were withdrawing towards the northwest, these airfields were again within 
combat range. Therefore, the He 111 groups could support operations in the Don-Donets 
sector as well as in the northwestern Caucasus, whilst enjoying far better service and 
maintenance facilities than they had recently experienced. 
As the airlift drew to a close during the last week of January, von Richthofen requested 
the return to regular combat missions of some of the He 111 groups then performing 
transport missions. On the 23rd, Hitler approved the return of 30 He 111s to combat 
operations, stipulating that they were only to be "borrowed" from the airlift temporarily.23 
As it happened, those bombers never returned to transport duties. They were deployed 
against Soviet forces attacking Fourth Panzer Army's right flank and then against Soviet 
troops attempting to prevent Seventeenth Army's withdrawal towards the Taman Peninsula. 
Von Richthofen did not "borrow" only those 30, however. Realizing by 24 January that 
Sixth Army's destruction within days was certain, he began quietly removing a few He 
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111 squadrons from transport duties each day, re-deploying them in a combat role. He 
sent them back to the established airfields around Stalino and Konstantinovka, where 
their operational rates soon began to pick up. 
Generaffeldmarschall von Kleist's Army Group A was withdrawing from the Caucasus 
in accordance with Hitler's reluctant permission. Von Mackensen's First Panzer Army was 
pulling back towards Rostov, its divisions retreating faster than the pursuing Soviet forces 
(lacking sufficient fuel and adequate logistical systems) could follow. Ruoff's Seventeenth 
Army had withdrawn its forward units from the Caucasus mountain passess. It was now 
steadily disengaging the bulk of its forces from the enemy and, along with two divisions 
of First Panzer Army, withdrawing towards the Taman Peninsula. To the consternation of 
Admiral Schwarzes Meer, which lacked sufficient naval forces to protect its coasts24, 
Hitler wanted Seventeenth Army to form a bridgehead on that peninsula. He believed that 
occupation of the peninsula was an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of security 
in the Crimea and along the northern coastline of the Sea of Azov. He also believed that 
the bridgehead-which the Germans called Gotenkopf (Goth's Head)25-would create a 
jumping-off point for future operations in the Caucasus, and that it would signal to Turkey 
that Germany still had a foot-hold in Asia. On 23 January, the Fuhrer ordered that the 
bridgehead should be "kept as small as possible".26 The significance of this is obvious: 
he planned to evacuate most of Seventeenth Army to the Crimea and the. southern 
Ukraine, leaving only enough forces to form and hold a secure bridgehead on the Taman 
Peninsula. The Luftwaffe, aided to a small degree by Admiral Schwarzes Meer, would 
have to supply and evacuate scores of thousands of soldiers. As von Richthofen and 
von Kleist agreed when they discussed the Fuhrer's plans that same day, this was going 
to be a remarkably difficult task under the circumstances. 27 
On 25 January, von Richthofen gave Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII, whose supply operation 
at Stalingrad was drawing to a close, the tasks of supplying the Gotenkopf and "evacuating 
the strongest elements of Seventeenth Army" to the Crimea, to the Taganrog area or to 
Rostov, using Ju 52s as they became available, Ju 90s, FW 200s and the gliders Milch 
had ordered for Stalingrad but never used.28 The organization for this new air transportation 
operation should be set up immediately, he told Fiebig, so that they could begin within 
days (presumably as soon as Sixth Army fell). He anticipated the daily transportation of 
2,000 of Ruoff's men from the northwestern Caucasus to airfields in the Crimea and along 
the northern coast of the Sea of Azov. 
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Fiebig was sceptical of his air corp's ability to transport so many men, noting in his 
diary that "the changeable weather" would dictate whether his boss was being too 
optimistic. 29 Still, he attacked the task with typical energy, working long hours to formulate 
an effective command structure, flying to von Kleist's headquarters to discuss the coming 
operation and methods of ensuring close inter-service co-operation, and regularly 
communicating by phone with von Richthofen on important matters. On the 27th, he met 
the air Heet commander in Mariupol, only to learn that Ju 52s could not be removed from 
the Stalingrad airlift for the time being. Fiebig agreed whole-heartedly that the Ju 52s 
"must do their duty there first."30 They would be free for the new operation soon enough. 
By the 29th, Fiebig and Oberstleutnant von Heinemann, his capable Chief of Staff, had 
set up a command structure for the airlift, now called Lufttransporteinsatz Krim (Air Transport 
Mission Crimea), and drawn up "special supply arrangements" for the operation. 31 Its 
tasks were clear-cut: 
After 29 January, Fliegerkorps VIII takes over, along with the air supply of 
Fortress Stalingrad, and in close agreement with Army Group A and 
Seventeenth Army: 
a) Transportation of troops and wounded from the region east of the Kerch 
Straits to the Crimea; 
b) Shipment of supplies (especially vehicle fuel) from the Crimea, as well as 
from airfields north of the Sea of Azov, to the region east of the Kerch Straits.32 
The following day (30 January), Fiebig issued to his air corps an "Order for the Assembly 
and Deployment [of Forces] for the Evacuation of the Operational Zone of Army Group 
A and the Supply of the Western Caucasus".33 His He 111s, FW 200s, Ju 90s and Ar 
232s would operate from the excellent Crimean airfields at Saki and Sarabus, and his Ju 
52s from the equally-good fields at Taganrog and Mariupol. All glider units would operate 
from Bagerovo, on the Kerch Peninsula. The supply and evacuation bases in the northwest 
Caucasus would be Krasnodar, Timashevskaya and Slavyanskaya. On von Richthofen's 
instructions, these sub-standard airfields were already being hastily expanded and improved 
by signals teams and labour battalions from Luftgau Rostov. They were joined by labour 
battalions from General der Flieger DeBloch's Luftwaffengruppe Kaukasus (Air Force 
Group Caucasus), the prinCipal air command in the Caucasus for the last two months.34 
Lastly, both Fliegerkorps VIII and Army Group A would have their headquarters in the 
Crimean town of Simferopol, where they would carefully oversee the operation "with the 
closest co-operation". 35 
Thus, Fiebig was ready to begin. All he had to wait for-but was certainly not looking 
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forward to-was Sixth Army' surrender or destruction, which would release the bulk of the 
transport groups he had ear-marked in his directive for the new operation. Late on the 
31st, he received the news he had been dreading: Paulus had surrendered and Sixth 
Army was no more. He had no time to mourn, however. Milch immediately ordered the 
cessation of Ju 52 missions to Stalingrad, and turned all Ju 52s and FW 200s over to 
von Richthofen.36 The latter promptly notified Fiebig that he had ordered their transfer to 
established and well-equipped bases in the Crimea and at Taganrog and Mariupol, and 
that his operation should start next morning. Fiebig flew to his new headquarters in 
Simferopol, grieving for Sixth Army but ready to commence his "difficult new task: the 
evacuation of Seventeenth Army."37 
While Fiebig was preparing for ~Iis new air transport operation, von Richthofen continued 
reorganizing the rest of his fleet. He began rebuilding Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV, then 
committed in support of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and the remnants of Fourth Rumanian 
Army, which were pulling back across the Manych river towards the lower Don. Despite 
being greatly weakened in October and November 1942 to provide the maximum 
concentration of forces for Stalingrad, Pflugbeil's air corps had performed relatively well 
during December and the first weeks of January 1943. It was time for a major refit, 
however, especially as von Richthofen wanted to use Fliegerkorps IV more effectively 
now that Fliegerkorps VIII, once the Luftwaffe's best close support force, was again to be 
used for an air transport operation. "The future task of Fliegerkorps IV," he told that air 
corps' staff on 25 January, "will be to work in the region southeast of Rostov with all its 
forces. To that end, I will strengthen the corps with a destroyer wing and allow most of 
the 51st Bomber Wing to return to the corps."38 He also initiated a replacement and 
rehabilitation programme for Pflugbeil's units. Although it involved only a gradual removal 
of a few squadrons per week for rest and rem, it steadily improved Fliegerkorps IV's 
strength, operational rate and, not least, morale. 
On 27 January, von Richthofen renamed DeBloch's Luftwaffengruppe Kaukasus as 
Luftwaffengruppe Kuban (Air Force Group Kuban), in order to reflect more accurately its 
operational area, which was steadily contracting as German forces pulled out of the 
Caucasus or withdrew to the Taman Peninsula (in the Kuban region). Von Richthofen 
actually planned to take DeBloch's command out of the Caucasus altogether. It would 
provide flak, reconnaissance and fighter assistance during Seventeenth Army's withdrawal 
to the Kuban, but then, once the army had established a solid bridgehead on the Taman 
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Peninsula, its staff would move to the southern Ukraine, where it would rebuild Luftf/otte 
IV's disorganized flak forces. 39 Its few fighter and reconnaissance planes would be 
subordinated to Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VI/I. A newly-constituted 9th Flak Division would 
take over flak defence of the Kuban bridgehead.40 Genera/major Pickert was already 
rebuilding this division from fresh battalions and the remnants of his previous division of 
the same name, the bulk of which had perished at Stalingrad. He would add to his new 
flak division the elements of Luftwaffengruppe Kuban remaining on the Taman Peninsula. 
Realizing that Pickert's new division would lack heavy batteries and searchlights, von 
Richthofen requested the OKL to send the extra guns, equipment and personnel that 
Pickert would need. 
Fliegerdivision Donez was the only other command subordinate to Luftf/otte IV. Since 
von Richthofen had formed this makeshift close-support command on 2 January, placing 
it under Generalleutnant Mahnke, it had functioned virtually independently. With little 
interference (or advice) from von Richthofen or his air fleet staff, Mahnke's fighters, dive-
bombers and ground attack planes had been active against Soviet forces attacking 
Armeeabteilung Hollidt(Army Detachment Hollidt) in the Don-Donets region. Von Richthofen 
had never been happy with Fliegerdivision Donez's performance, however, although he 
blamed its perceived poor showing on its commanders' lack of experience, not lack of 
effort or courage. On 20 January, for example, he had privately noted that the air division 
"plunges into everything possible. The staff have hardly any experience. They handle 
many things too heavily, other things too lightly, and still have a lot to learn."41 In the 
beginning of February, therefore, he transferred Fliegerdivision Donez from its poor airfields 
at Shakhti to better fields at Gorlovka, near Stalino, 170 kilometres to the northwestY He 
then subordinated it to Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV, in the hope that the air corps' experienced 
commander would improve its effectiveness. 43 This move would also help strengthen 
and tighten up the chain of command, which had, he felt, become disorderly during the 
near-chaotic last few months. He also initiated a rest and refit programme for Mahnke's 
units, which (as elsewhere) gradually improved their strength, operational rates and morale. 
Thus, by the time German resistance at Stalingrad ceased on 2 February, von Richthofen 
had already begun rebuilding his depleted air fleet. He had started pulling bomber units 
out of the Stalingrad airlift and preparing them for new combat missions; he had transferred 
other units from poor and threatened airfields at the front to established fields further to 
the west, where their operational rate began climbing as a result of better shelter and 
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supply and maintenance facilities; he had initiated the transfer of transport units from the 
improvised and crowded airfields that had poorly served them during the Stalingrad airlift 
to established and less congested fields in the Crimea and southern Ukraine; he had 
started returning to Pflugbeil's air corps some of the units he borrowed during previous 
months for operations at Stalingrad; he had placed Fliegerdivision Donez, which he 
believed had been poorly~handled, at better fields and under Plugbeil's capable command; 
and he had initiated a replacement and rehabilitation programme. These steps, coupled 
with a major rehabilitation effort during February, steadily~better weather conditions, and 
the many improvements made by Milch, would soon result a rapid rise in operational 
rates and, correspondingly, in markedly-improved combat effectiveness. 
Back in Action 
By the beginning of February, First Panzer Army had successfully escaped from the 
Caucasus through the Rostov bottleneck and been transferred to von Manstein's Army 
Group Don. The latter's forces had clung for so long to exposed positions around Rostov, 
desperate to prevent the bottleneck being pinched off before von Mackensen's army 
could escape, that their own chance of safe withdrawal was jeopardized. Unlike so many 
'last stands' elsewhere, von Manstein's efforts achieved a useful purpose. By the narrowest 
of margins, the evacuation of First Panzer Army from the Caucasus denied the Soviets 
a huge prisoner haul. Seventeenth Army had also escaped encirclement. While von 
Manstein was desperately trying to prevent the entire Don-Donets front collapsing under 
the weight of numerically-superior Soviet forces, Seventeenth Army commenced a 
systematic withdrawal of all units towards the Kuban. By the beginning of February, most 
of the army had reached the Kuban, where a strong bridgehead had been established. 
Thus, Soviet forces had rolled the German line back to slightly west of its position 
when B/au first began. Making steady gains in the central Donets region during the first 
days of February, they looked set to roll the line back even further, right to the Dnieper 
river. This prompted Hitler to disband von Weichs' Army Group B on 12 February, 
transferring the bulk of its forces to von Manstein's Army Group Don.44 He renamed the 
field marshal's command Army Group South, in order to reflect more accurately its 
expanded operational area, which now stretched from north of Kharkov, which was now 
threatened, to the Crimea and Taman Peninsula. The following day, the Fuhrer emphatically 
ordered that "Kharkov is to be held at all COSt."45 In order to attain the best possible air 
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support for von Manstein's forces along their newly-extended front, the High Command 
subordinated to von Richthofen's air fleet another complete air command: Gunther Korten's 
Luftwaffenkommando Don, which had supported the army northeast of Kharkov since its 
formation as an independent air command late in July 1942.46 Luftwaffenkommando Don 
would revert to the status of an air corps and, with its headquarters at Poltava, take over 
operations in Luftflotte IV's northern combat zone. It possessed adequate forces for this 
task, although it was slightly heavy on bombers and light on dive-bombers.47 Pflugbell's 
Fliegerkorps IV, with its headquarters about to move to Dnepropetrovsk48 , would operate 
in the central sector, whilst its subordinate command, Fliegerdivision Donez, would operate 
in the southern. 
On 16 February, Hitler was shocked to learn that German troops had been compelled 
to withdraw from Kharkov and that Soviet forces were advancing in strength towards 
Pavlograd and Dnepropetrovsk. He was furious with von Manstein for allowing the 
"abandonment" of Kharkov and failing to hold back the Soviet tide, which had now 
pushed his armies back well behind the line it held before Blau commenced. On Zeitzler's 
advice, he decided to fly to the field marshal's headquarters at Zaporozhye next day in 
order to insist in person that he retake Kharkov as soon as possible and rebuild that 
section of the front.49 Von Manstein held his ground, insisting that the Soviets were over-
extended, many formations being over 320 kilometres from their supply bases. His own 
troops, on the other hand, were close to railheads and logistics centres. Generalleutnant 
Hauser's Second SS Panzer Corps was intact, he explained, and Hoth's Fourth Panzer 
Army had undergone partial rehabilitation since its failure to relieve Paulus' army. l\Jow 
was not the time to carry out a localized attack to liberate Kharkov; instead, it was time 
to launch a larger counter-offensive aimed at rebuilding the entire southern front. It would 
be necessary to throw back Soviet forces threatening the Dnieper crossings, even if it 
meant pulling Hauser's SS corps out of the Kharkov region for the time being. Only then, 
once they had crushed Soviet forces attempting to cut into Armeeabteilung Hol/idt's and 
First Panzer Army's rear areas, and pushed the enemy back to the Donets, should they 
attack Kharkov. After two days of fierce debate, during which time the Fuhrer was able 
to hear the faint sound of Soviet artillery fire less than forty kilometres away, he finally 
relented and authorized von Manstein to carry out his bold counterstroke. 
Despite the danger of being overrun by steadily-approaching Soviet forces, von 
Richthofen ordered the transfer of his headquarters from Mariupol to Zaporozhye on 16 
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February.50 He flew next day by Storch to that town on the Dnieper, arriving only an hour 
after the Fuhrer. His staff arrived by train two days later. Von Richthofen's motive for 
transferring his command to threatened Zaporozhye is clear: if he and von iV1anstein were 
to blunt the Soviet advance, regain strategically-important territory and rebuild a strong 
southern front, they must work closely on all coming operations. That is precisely what 
happened. Repeating liaison practices that had proved effective in the past, the two 
commanders immediately set about creating joint Schwerpunkte and co-ordinating their 
operations. 
In the meantime, however, von Richthofen was concerned for Zaporozhye's safety. 
The constant sound of gunfire revealed that Soviet forces were perilously close. Therefore, 
the air leader was delighted to learn that a Luftwaffe officer had already thrown a strong 
protective cordon around the town. On his own initiative, Generalleutnant DeBloch, who 
had been rebuilding the I. F/ak-Korps in the region since his departure from the Caucasus, 
arranged for almost 200 flak guns to be positioned in front of the town.51 Von Richthofen 
praised him for his efforts, assuring him that he would personally accept responsibility for 
the loss of any weapons, but only if the gunners fought to the last round. Next day, the 
Fuhrer personally appointed one of his new favourites to command "Bridgehead 
Zaporozhye". To von Richthofen's satisfaction, it was another Luftwaffe officer: the 
newly-promoted Genera/major Stahel, whose recent heroic defence of the Chir and 
breakout from a Soviet encirclement had endeared him to Hitler.52 
Von Manstein's troops launched their counter-offensive on 20 February. Due to the 
field marshal's outstanding tactics and leadership, the operation went superbly. In a 
series of swift armoured manoeuvres, von Manstein's two Panzer armies attacked the 
surprised and over-extended Soviet formations, several of which had been immobilized 
by fuel shortages. The assault units of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army, primarily Hauser's SS 
divisions, inflicted heavy damage on the Soviet Sixth and First Guards Armies advancing 
from the Izyum region. They quickly destoyed the spearheads threatening Dnepropetrovsk, 
retook Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod three days later, then formed a solid front 
along the northern Donets. The entire Kharkov region was back in German hands. In the 
southeast, meanwhile, von Mackensen's First Panzer Army was able to cut off and 
destroy much of the Soviet armoured force commanded by Lieutenant-General M. M. 
Popov, who proved no match for von iV1anstein in these battles of fast manoeuvre. Popov 
was barely able to save his forces on the lower Donets before the advent of muddy 
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weather brought German offensive operations to a halt. 
Hitler was very pleased. Von Manstein's army group now securely held the entire 
Donets front from Belgorod down to the line of the Mius river. These Donets and Mius 
fronts together formed the line that German forces had held before Blau began nine 
months earlier. Not only had von Manstein recaptured considerable territory, including 
Kharkov (of economic and propaganda value), but he had dealt heavy and humiliating 
blows to enemy forces whose rapid successes in December 1942 and January 1943 had 
resulted in a dissipation of their strength and an over-extension of their supply lines. Von 
Manstein had also regained the strategic initiative, prompting the Fuhrer, no longer smarting 
from the losses he had himself suffered in recent months, to begin talking optimistically 
of a new summer campaign in the east. 
Von Manstein made no mention in his memoirs of Luftflotte IV's contribution to his 
counter-offensive. Most historians of these battles have been equally ignorant. For example, 
a recent thorough account of the field marshal's campaigns in this period fails to mention 
von Richthofen or the Luftwaffe even once.53 Yet Richthofen's air fleet played a decisive 
role in the outcome of von Manstein's counter-offensive. The air commander deployed 
elements of all his commands during the operation, except for Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII, 
which was busy with its own air supply missions in the Crimea and Kuban regions. Von 
Richthofen initially deployed Fliegerdivision Donez in support of Armeeabteilung Hollidt, 
battling along the Mius river against Soviet forces attempting to unhinge the entire Southern 
front by driving across the Mius, along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov, and up 
towards Dnepropetrovsk.54 Under P'I'lugbeil's guidance, Mahnke's air division provided 
the army with good support, striking not only Soviet troops, vehicles and installations on 
the battlefield, but also supply columns, logistics centres and march routes behind the 
front. Pflugbeil's Fliegerkorps IV performed the lion's share of close air support duties, 
effectively supporting First and Fourth Panzer Armies as they engaged Soviet forces 
extended towards Pavlograd, then supporting their drive north towards Kharkov. Korten's 
Luftwaffenkommando Don-now renamed Fliegerkorps I-operated in the Kharkov region, 
supporting the makeshift operational command headed by General der Panzertruppen 
Kempf. When the final assault on Kharkov commenced in the first week of March, both 
Fliegerkorps I and IV supported the army, co-ordinating their operations through close 
and constant liaison with each other as well as with local army commanders. 
Luftflotte IV's various air commands performed very well during these operations, von 
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Richthofen's preparatory efforts having paid off handsomely. The measures he had taken 
in January to enlarge his fleet's complement and improve its operational rate resulted in 
substantial improvements to both. When von Manstein's counter-offensive began, Luftflotte 
IV possessed 928 aircraft, over 300 more than it had at the end of January.55 493 (54 
per cent) were now operational, a rise of 16 per cent in three weeks. These figures do 
not even include Korten's units, which gave Luftflotte IV an additional 198 air-worthy 
planes (from a complement of 314) to deploy against the Red Army.56 The air fleet's 
much improved strength naturally resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of sorties 
made. During January, the fleet had only managed around 350 sorties per day, but 
throughout von Manstein's counter-offensive, it achieved an average of 1,000 per day. It 
was like old times. Von Richthofen wrote excitedly on 22 February: "We made over 1,500 
sorties. The Russians were stopped everywhere and suffered heavy losses."57 
The air leader deployed his units according to his usual practices. He personally 
directed major air attacks after consulting carefully with relevant army generals and his 
own air corps commanders, between whose headquarters he flew each day in his Storch. 
In order to avoid dissipating his strength, he concentrated units in mass at certain 
Schwerpunkte, often deploying units from two or more air commands against single 
targets. Shortly after the war, Wing Commander Cyril March, editor and principal author 
of the British Air Ministry's study of Luftwaffe operations, accurately summed up von 
Richthofen's effective leadership during this period: 
The major success of the German counter-attack, the recapture of Kharkov 
on March 15th, was achieved essentially by a concentration of attack by 
ground and air forces .... There is no disputing the skill with which von 
Richthofen handled the forces under his command .... The main factor behind 
von Richthofen's success .. , was extreme flexibility, coordination and concen-
tration-the latter secured by the formation of temporary ad hoc battle groups 
to support the spearheads of attack by military formations, such as the SS 
Division Reich which led the assault on Kharkov. "Massive concentration", 
"drastic concentration", "concentration of all forces to the highest degree", 
were phrases which resounded through Luftflotte IV's battle orders. 58 
March added that von Richthofen's air fleet played "an important-perhaps a decisive 
part" in von Manstein's successful counter-offensive. 
Meanwhile, Fiebig's air supply operation was also going very well. His transports flew 
short distances to the Taman Peninsula from established fields with good supply and 
maintenance facilities. The weather was generally favourable and they had adequate 
fighter protection. As a result, they managed to carry far larger quantities of supplies to 
Seventeenth Army than they had ever managed to carry to Paulus's doomed forces at 
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Stalingrad. By 28 February, Fiebig's transports had evacuated 50,000 men from the 
northwestern Caucasus to the Crimea and the Ukraine59, and were unloading within the 
Kuban bridgehead a daily average of 500 tons of fuel, ammunition and rations (enough 
to have kept Sixth Army operational) and evacuating around 2,000 men. Some days they 
airlifted as many as 700 tons of supplies and evacuated an impressive 5,000 men. so 
Thus, by the middle of March 1943, Luftflotte IV had made an astonis~ling recovery 
from its badly-depleted and exhausted state only six weeks earlier, when its attempt to 
supply the Stalingrad pocket finally proved hopeless. Von Richthofen deserves much 
credit for this fine performance. Paying tribute to his recent reconstruction efforts, Wing 
Commander March concluded that the energy with which Luftflotte /V's operations in 
February and March 1943 were directed and executed "showed that, even after the 
disasters of the previous two months, the Luftwaffe was still a factor to be reckoned 
with."61 From then until its final oblivion, Soviet airmen-indeed, airmen in all the Allied 
nations-treated the Luftwaffe with wary respect. Nevertheless, the peak of its power 
was past. It came no closer to providing Hitler with his Philosopher's Stone. 
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The FDhrer and Supreme Commander 
of the Armed Forces 
FDhrer Headquarters, 
5 April 1942 
OKW/WFSt No. 55/616142 g.K. Chefs. 
Geheime Kommandosache 
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[Secret Command Matter/Commander Matter 
Officers Only] 
DIRECTIVE NO. 41 
14 Copies 
3rd Copy 
The winter battle in Russia is approaching its end. Through the unequalled courage 
and self-sacrificing devotion of our soldiers on the Eastern Front, a defensive success of 
the greatest scale has been achieved for German arms. 
The enemy has suffered the severest losses in men and materiel. In an effort to 
exploit apparent initial successes, he has expended during the winter the bulk of his 
reserves earmarked for later operations. 
As soon as the weather and the state of the terrain provide the necessary prerequisites, 
we must seize the initiative again, and, through the superiority of the German command 
and troops, force our will upon the enemy. 
The aim is finally to wipe out the remaining Soviet military potential, and, as far as 
possible, deprive them off their most important military-economic sources of strength. 
To this end, all available forces of the German Armed Forces and our Allies will be 
deployed. At the same time, it is essential that the occupied areas in western and 
northern Europe, especially the coasts, remain secure under all circumstances. 
I. GENERAL PLAN 
Holding to the original essential features of the eastern campaign, we must, whilst 
holding fast in the central army zone, bring about the fall of Leningrad and establish land 
communication [that is, link up] with the Finns in the north, and, on the southern wing of 
of the army front, force a breakthrough into the Caucasus. 
In view of the conditions prevailing at the end of the winter battle, the available forces 
and resources, and the transport situation, these objectives will have to be achieved only 
one at a time. 
Initially, therefore, all available forces are to be assembled for the main operation in 
the southern sector, with the objective of destroying the enemy forward of the Don, in 
order to secure the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasus 
[mountain range] itself. 
The final cutting off of Leningrad and the occupation of Ingermanland will have to be 
postponed until conditions in that area permit, or the availability of other, sufficient forces 
make them possible. 
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II. THE COf\IDUCT OF OPERATIONS 
A) The first task of the Army and the Air Force, following the conclusion of the muddy 
period, is to establish the prerequisites for the carrying out of the main operation. 
This will require the mopping up and consolidation of the entire eastern front and the 
army rear areas, with the objective of ensuring the maximum possible forces for the main 
operation, while the other fronts must be able to meet any attack with minimum effort. 
However, where offensive operations with limited objectives are to be carried out, in 
accordance with my order, it is necessary to ensure that all available forces of the Army 
and the Air Force are deployed in overwhelming strength in order to ensure rapid and 
decisive success. Only in this manner will we be able, even before the beginning of the 
major spring offensive, to instil in our troops confidence in the certainty of victory, even 
as we hammer into the enemy his own hopeless inferiority. 
B) Within this framework, the next tasks will be to clear [zu saubern; lit. to clean up] 
the Kerch Peninsula in the Crimea and to bring about the fall of Sevastopol. In preparation 
for these operations, the Air Force, and later the Navy, will have the task of energetically 
hindering enemy supply traffic in the Black Sea and the Kerch Straits. 
In the southern area, the enemy forces which have broken through on both sides of 
the Izyum along the course of the Donets are to be cut off and destroyed. 
Necessary adjustments in the central and northern sectors of the eastern front can be 
looked at and decided upon following the conclusion of both the current combat operations 
and the muddy period. The necessary forces, however, will have to be obtained by 
thinning out the front as soon as the situation allows. 
C) THE MAIN OPERATION ON THE EASTERN FRONT 
As already stated, the objective is to seize the Caucasus front by deCisively smashing 
and destroying Russian forces located in the Voronezh area to the south, west or north 
of the Don. Because of the manner in which available units can be brought up, t~lis 
operation will have to be carried out in a series of consecutive, but interconnected and 
supplementary, attacks. Accordingly, these attacks must be synchronized from north to 
south so that a high degree of concentration of ground, and especially air, forces can be 
assured at the decisive points. 
Considering that, as often demonstrated, the Russians are not very vulnerable to 
operational encirclement movements, it is of decisive importance that individual 
breakthroughs are turned into close pincer movements, as in the double battle of Vyazma-
Bryansk. 
We must avoid closing the pincers too late, thus giving the enemy the possibility of 
escaping destruction. 
It must not happen that, by advancing too swiftly and too far, the Panzer and motorized 
units lose contact with the infantry following them, nor are the Panzer and motorized units 
to be placed in such a position that they lose the opportunity of supporting, by direct 
attacks on the rear of the encircled Russian armies, the Army's infantry forces as they 
fight their way forward. 
With the exception of the overall operational objective, in each separate case the 
destruction of the enemy is to be ensured by the manner of the attack and the command 
direction of our units. 
The initial stage of the total operation is to commence with an enveloping attack or 
breakthrough from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh. Of the two Panzer 
and motorized formations forming the pincers, the northern one will be stronger than the 
southern. The objective of this breakt~lrough is the capture of Voronezh itself. While it is 
the mission of part of the infantry to establish a strong defensive front between Orel, the 
starting point of the attack, and Voronezh, Panzer and motorized formations are to 
continue the attack south from Voronezh along the Don with their left wing to support a 
second breakthrough towards the east, which is to be made from the general area of 
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Kharkov. Here too the primary objective is not to crush the Russian front as such, but, 
in conjunction with the motorized formations advancing down the Don, to destroy the 
Russian forces. 
The third attack of this operation is to be carried out so that the forces advancing down 
the Don can link up in the Stalingrad area with forces advancing from the Taganrog-
Artemovska area between the lower course of the Don and Voroshilovgrad across the 
Donets to the east. These forces are to link up finally with the Panzer army advancing 
on Stalingrad. 
Should opportunities arise during during the course of these operations, particularly 
through the capture of undamaged bridges, to establish bridgeheads east or south of the 
Don, such opportunities are to be seized. In any case, the attempt must be made to reach 
Stalingrad itself or at least to subject this city to the bombardment of our heavy weapons 
to such an extent that it is eliminated as an armament and transportation centre in the 
future. 
It would be especially desirable to succeed in capturing either undamaged bridges, be 
it in Rostov itself, or otherwise securing bridgeheads south of the Don for the resumption 
of operations planned later. 
In order to prevent important parts of the Russian forces north of the Don from 
escaping across the river towards the south, it is essential that the right wing of the group 
advancing from the Taganrog area to the east be reinforced by Panzers and fast troops, 
which, if necessary, should be made up of improvised formations. 
As the attack progresses, consideration must be given, not only to the strong protection 
of the northeast flank of the attack operation, but also to the immediate strengthening of 
the defensive positions along the Don. In doing so, particular emphasis is to be laid on 
very strong anti-tank defenses. From the beginning these positions are to be prepared 
with a view to them being possibly used in winter, and are to be equipped for such in 
every possible way. 
Allied units will primarily be used to occupy the Don front as it lengthens in the course 
of this operation, whilst German troops will be deployed as a strong supporting force 
between Orel and the Don, and in the Stalingrad sector. At the same time, individual 
German divisions are to remain behind the Don front as a reserve. 
The troops of our Allies will mainly be deployed so that the Hungarians are farthest 
north, then the Italians, and the Rumanians furthest to the south-east. 
D) In consideration of the seasonal conditions, the rapid progress of the movements 
across the Don to the south toward the operational objective must be ensured. 
III. AIR FORCE 
It is the task of the Air Force, aside from directly supporting the Army, to cover the 
deployment of forces in the area of Army Group South by intensifying air defenses. This 
applies especially to the railway bridges across the Dnieper. 
If a concentration of the enemy's forces is perceived, his principal roads and the 
railways leading to the battle area are to be brought under constant attack well into the 
rear area. To this end, the first priority will be to direct destructive attacks against the 
railway bridges across the Don. 
At the commencement of the operation, the enemy Air Force and its ground organization 
in the zone of battle are to be attacked and destroyed with the concentration of all 
available forces. 
The possibility of a rapid transfer of Air Force units to the central and northern battle 
zones [that is, fronts] must be ensured, and the ground organization necessary for this 
must be maintained as far as possible. 
IV. NAVY 
In the Black Sea it is the main task of the l\lavy, insofar as our combat and escort 
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forces and and our tonnage permit, to assist in supplying the Army and Air Force by sea. 
In light of the fact that the combat power of the Russian Black Sea Fleet remains 
unbroken, it is especially important to transfer light naval forces there and have them 
ready for operations at the earliest possible time. 
The Baltic Sea will be secured by cutting off the Russian naval forces in the inner 
waters of the Gulf of Finland. 
V. My basic order to preserve secrecy is once again to be issued to all officers 
involved in these preparations. In connection with this Directive, the procedure to be 
followed with our Allies will be outlined in special instructions. 
VI. The branches of the Armed Forces are to communicate their intended preparations, 
and their timetables, to me through the High Command of the Armed Forces. 
Signed: Adolf Hitler 
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Instead of one, there are now to be two Anti-Aircraft units stationed before Sevastopol 
to protect the Dora equipment. The second unit must be brought up as quickly as 
possible from the Rumanian or Bulgarian area. For the protection of the Dora equipment, 
both light and heavy searchlights must be installed. 
Over and above that, the transportion of the Dora equipment (especially the three 
trains with the most important equipment) is to be protected by light Anti-Aircraft guns on 
the trains themselves and by the deployment of fighter aircraft. Luftflotte IV must guarantee 
the transportation of these three crucial trains so that they will, through Army Group 
South, under all circumstances arrive on time. Luftflotte IV must once again test whether 
or not the possibility exists, shortly before the arrival of those trains, to destroy on the 
ground the enemy aircraft situated at the airfields of Sevastopol by an attack with strong 
forces. 
The Anti-Aircraft Protection of Simferopol is to be checked/reviewed. 
Over and above that, Luftflotte IV must report immediately about the current availability 
of Anti-Aircraft units before Sevastopol and the front-line of the Kerch Peninsula, and 
whether these Anti-Aircraft units are being strengthened before the beginning of the 
attack on the Kerch Peninsula and, after that, at the beginning of the preparations for the 
attack on Sevastopol. 
Luftflotte IV must note that that enemy attacks from Sevastopol (against the 18th 
Rumanian Division) must at all times be rebutted with strong close air support. 
For the preparations of the attack against the Kerch Peninsula, which will commence 
in the beginning of May, Luftflotte IV is to be informed of the following: 
During the period until the attack itself begins, the supply of the Kerch Peninsula must 
be interrupted in the strongest manner. Because of the short travel time of the ships 
between Novorossiisk and Kerch, it will often be impossible to attack them at sea. The 
point of main effort [Schwerpunkt] of the fight against supplies will therefore be the 
harbours of Kerch and Kamysh-Burun as well as Novorossiisk and Tuapse. 
Despite this energetic fight against supplies to the Kerch Peninsula, the operational 
readiness of the units of Luftflotte IV must be further increased. The Ob.d.L [Hermann 
Goring, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe] will supply all aircraft necessary for the 
units to attain that goal. To solve the worry of personnel operational readiness, especially 
in the He-111 units, Luftflotte IV is to draw personnel from the fourth [training] group of 
each wing. To achieve this, Luftflotte IV can issue orders to Kampfgeschwader 55. 
When selecting personnel from the fourth groups, it is important to note that, if the 
weather situation over the combat zone permits, even those pilots who can not yet fly by 
instruments alone will be used. They will be placed under the command of older flight 
commanders, especially squadron leaders. 
On the Crimean Peninsula, airfields must immediately be created and supplied, so that 
the approach flights-not only of the fighters and Stukas, but also of a greater part of the 
bomber units-can be kept as short as possible and, with that, the number of sorties can 
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be increased. If the supply of these airfields can not be achieved in time for the beginning 
of the attack by the means available by land, particularly the railways, then air transport 
must be used. To that end, Luftflotte IV must demand the assistance of the Gen. Qu. 
[Quartermaster General]. Also, Luftflotte IV is directed to ensure, especially through light 
Anti-Aircraft guns, the protection of the airfields. 
The Fuhrer places great emphasis on the employment of SD2 fragmentation bombs. 
These are best used against living targets [iebende Ziele]. A satisfactory result can only 
be achieved when the bombs are used against crowds. The fitting out of the bomber units 
of Luftflotte IV with SD2 bombs is to be accelerated by all available means. Regardless 
of whether the production goal is reached or not, it must be ensured that the AB23 bomb 
canisters [for the SD2 bombs] (of which around 6,000 units are supposed to be available 
by the end of April) will be delivered immediately to Luftf/otte IV. 
Above and beyond that, the 'fitting out of the Ju 88 groups of Luftflotte IV with the SD2 
bombs must be carried out, and, additionally, for the He 111 units a large enough number 
of BSK36 bomb racks for SD2 bombs must be made available. The supply of SD2 
bombs must be regulated so that, under no circumstances, will a shortage of bombs 
occur. It is estimated that the duration of the campaign against the Kerch Peninsula will 
be 14 days. 
The enemy battery positions are to be hit with the heaviest bombs. Alongside that, 
Luftflotte IV must ascertain whether it is possible, by using the heaviest bombs, to create 
a safe path for our tanks across the massive enemy anti-tank ditches. 
The leaders of our forces supporting the capture of the Kerch Peninsula will be under 
special command. In any case, the total forces, including those attacking shipping, will 
be held together by only one hand. 
Ob.d.L has to send all available forces to strengthen Luftflotte IV for the attack against 
the Kerch Peninsula. Despite the overall strengthening of Luftflotte IV, the heaviest 
[schiirfste, lit. "sharpest"] concentration of the Luftwaffe for the capture of Kerch must 
take place. The remaining front of Army Group South must during this time go without 
Luftwaffe support. The only exception are, as mentioned above, the troops defending 
themselves from enemy attacks from Sevastopol. 
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